situation bar in Maryland

2019We ultimately concluded in Merritt that "the result would be the same whether the denial of the motion for a new *321 trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard or under an error standard." Id. at 31-32 , 785 A.2d at 765 . **347 Maryland appellate courts have applied the Merritt standard in various contexts since 2001.

2019We ultimately concluded in Merritt that "the result would be the same whether the denial of the motion for a new *321 trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard or under an error standard." Id. at 31-32 , 785 A.2d at 765 . **347 Maryland appellate courts have applied the Merritt standard in various contexts since 2001.

1993As Judge Levine *572 explained, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies “demands that a party fully pursue administrative procedures before obtaining limited judicial review and contemplates a situation in which the claim asserted is enforceable initially by administrative action exclusively.” Maryland Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Washington Nat’l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 602 , 386 A.2d 1216 (1978) (emphasis in original).

1993As Judge Levine *572 explained, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies “demands that a party fully pursue administrative procedures before obtaining limited judicial review and contemplates a situation in which the claim asserted is enforceable initially by administrative action exclusively.” Maryland Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Washington Nat’l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 602 , 386 A.2d 1216 (1978) (emphasis in original).

1976The situation at bar was not such that the attitude of the State could be described as ‘capricious,’ ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unreasonable’ — the sort of motivational attitude we deplored in Caesar v. State, 10 Md.

1973The situation at bar was not such that the attitude of the State could be described as “capricious,” “arbitrary” or “unreasonable” — the sort of motivational attitude we deplored in Caesar v. State, 10 Md.

1972In that bustling marketplace of narcotics users, it was further an inviting target for theft by any tempted or opportunistic “junkie.” The exigency in the situation at bar was at least as strong as that in Carroll, supra; in Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 (1931) ; and in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949), and was much stronger than that in Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251 (1938), and in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970), none of which cases has been disavowed by Coolidge.

1972He also seeks to distinguish the situation at bar from such cases as Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251 , and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 , wherein the automobile searches preceded the arrests, notwithstanding arguable probable cause for the arrests even absent the fruits of the automobile searches. *105 He will find no solace in the decisions of either the Supreme Court or of this Court.

1972In that bustling marketplace of narcotics users, it was further an inviting target for theft by any tempted or opportunistic “junkie.” The exigency in the situation at bar was at least as strong as that in Carroll, supra; in Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 (1931) ; and in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949), and was much stronger than that in Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251 (1938), and in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970), none of which cases has been disavowed by Coolidge.

1972He also seeks to distinguish the situation at bar from such cases as Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251 , and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 , wherein the automobile searches preceded the arrests, notwithstanding arguable probable cause for the arrests even absent the fruits of the automobile searches. *105 He will find no solace in the decisions of either the Supreme Court or of this Court.

2011We reiterate what the Court of Appeals stated in Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68 , 939 A.2d 689 (2008): "It would be advisable for a trial judge in a similar situation to rule specifically on each ground presented in a motion to suppress.” Id. at 104 n. 15, 939 A.2d 689 .

2011We reiterate what the Court of Appeals stated in Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68 , 939 A.2d 689 (2008): "It would be advisable for a trial judge in a similar situation to rule specifically on each ground presented in a motion to suppress.” Id. at 104 n. 15, 939 A.2d 689 .

2011Therefore, there is no need to address, as the Court of Special Appeals did, 189 Md.App. at 431-38 , 984 A.2d at 432-36 , the applicability to this situation of the analysis of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

2011Therefore, there is no need to address, as the Court of Special Appeals did, 189 Md.App. at 431-38 , 984 A.2d at 432-36 , the applicability to this situation of the analysis of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

2011Therefore, there is no need to address, as the Court of Special Appeals did, 189 Md.App. at 431-38 , 984 A.2d at 432-36 , the applicability to this situation of the analysis of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

2011Therefore, there is no need to address, as the Court of Special Appeals did, 189 Md.App. at 431-38 , 984 A.2d at 432-36 , the applicability to this situation of the analysis of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

2010Greenbriar set forth the appropriate procedure to forestall a foreclosure sale where the debtor admitted liability but disput *269 ed the amount claimed by the creditor. 387 Md. at 746-47 , 878 A.2d 528 .

2010Greenbriar set forth the appropriate procedure to forestall a foreclosure sale where the debtor admitted liability but disput *269 ed the amount claimed by the creditor. 387 Md. at 746-47 , 878 A.2d 528 .

2008The phrase, “under color of title,” describes a situation in which a claim to land is based on an instrument that appears to give title — an instrument that, while actually defective in some manner, is “ ‘prima facie good in appearance [so] as to be consistent with the idea of good faith on the party entering under it.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

2006Thus, the letter was an effective, timely notice of renewal because it “clearly manifests an intent to accept that offer.” Id. *714 Here, the circuit court interpreted Beckenheimer’s as articulating a test that is applicable to this case: “The [Becken-heimer’s ] Court stated that in considering whether Becken-heimer’s attempt at renewal was satisfactory, the test is to hypothetically reverse the situation so that the test would be, could Acme hold Beckenheimer to the leas[e] if Beckenheimer’s claimed that the renewal was invalid?” The circuit court applied the Beckenheimer’s “test” to the comm

2003The cases discussed in Roeser and later in Stansbury , however, are distinguishable in that Ad + Soil, Bounds and the Court of Special Appeals case, Cromwell v. Ward, 102 Md.App. 691 , 651 A.2d 424 (1995), presented situations where the landowner's only assertion was that the landowner’s self-created noncompliance with the regulations itself made the variance necessary; they did not claim that any unique characteristics of the land created the hardship, or that any regulations were responsible for the hardship.

2003The cases discussed in Roeser and later in Stansbury , however, are distinguishable in that Ad + Soil, Bounds and the Court of Special Appeals case, Cromwell v. Ward, 102 Md.App. 691 , 651 A.2d 424 (1995), presented situations where the landowner's only assertion was that the landowner’s self-created noncompliance with the regulations itself made the variance necessary; they did not claim that any unique characteristics of the land created the hardship, or that any regulations were responsible for the hardship.

2001After pointing out that “| w]hat the fact of a timely complaint forestalls or counteracts is frequently a defense based upon consent,” 83 Md.App. at 290 , 574 A.2d 326 , we went on to point *416 out that the salutary forestalling effect is not limited to cases where consent is asserted as a defense but also serves to forestall challenges to the very occurrence of the sexual event itself. 4 Wigmore, supra, § 1135, at 298, not only concurs as to the provenance of the rule but points out that the relevance of either a timely complaint and the absence of a complaint is not limited to the situation

2001After pointing out that “| w]hat the fact of a timely complaint forestalls or counteracts is frequently a defense based upon consent,” 83 Md.App. at 290 , 574 A.2d 326 , we went on to point *416 out that the salutary forestalling effect is not limited to cases where consent is asserted as a defense but also serves to forestall challenges to the very occurrence of the sexual event itself. 4 Wigmore, supra, § 1135, at 298, not only concurs as to the provenance of the rule but points out that the relevance of either a timely complaint and the absence of a complaint is not limited to the situation

1985The situation at bar and in State v. Gibson, supra, is unlike that dealt with by Dill v. State, 24 Md.App. 695 , 332 A.2d 690 (1975).

1985The situation at bar and in State v. Gibson, supra, is unlike that dealt with by Dill v. State, 24 Md.App. 695 , 332 A.2d 690 (1975).

1985See McLay v. Maryland Assemblies, Inc., [ 269 Md. 465 , 306 A.2d 524 (1973) ]; Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 61 , 225 A.2d 294, 299-300 (1966); Board of County Commissioners v. Kines, 239 Md. 119, 125 , 210 A.2d 367, 370-71 (1965). 59 Md.App. at 537 , 476 A.2d 1170 (quoting State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 210 , 328 A.2d 737 (1974).

1985See McLay v. Maryland Assemblies, Inc., [ 269 Md. 465 , 306 A.2d 524 (1973) ]; Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 61 , 225 A.2d 294, 299-300 (1966); Board of County Commissioners v. Kines, 239 Md. 119, 125 , 210 A.2d 367, 370-71 (1965). 59 Md.App. at 537 , 476 A.2d 1170 (quoting State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 210 , 328 A.2d 737 (1974).

1985See McLay v. Maryland Assemblies, Inc., [ 269 Md. 465 , 306 A.2d 524 (1973) ]; Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 61 , 225 A.2d 294, 299-300 (1966); Board of County Commissioners v. Kines, 239 Md. 119, 125 , 210 A.2d 367, 370-71 (1965). 59 Md.App. at 537 , 476 A.2d 1170 (quoting State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 210 , 328 A.2d 737 (1974).

1985See McLay v. Maryland Assemblies, Inc., [ 269 Md. 465 , 306 A.2d 524 (1973) ]; Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 61 , 225 A.2d 294, 299-300 (1966); Board of County Commissioners v. Kines, 239 Md. 119, 125 , 210 A.2d 367, 370-71 (1965). 59 Md.App. at 537 , 476 A.2d 1170 (quoting State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 210 , 328 A.2d 737 (1974).

1985The State analogizes the situation at bar to that of a grant or denial of a motion in limine, relying on Funkhouser v. State, 51 Md.App. 16 , 440 A.2d 1114 , cert. denied, 293 Md. 331 (1982).

1985The State analogizes the situation at bar to that of a grant or denial of a motion in limine, relying on Funkhouser v. State, 51 Md.App. 16 , 440 A.2d 1114 , cert. denied, 293 Md. 331 (1982).