automobile exception in Virginia

2024See Dyson, 527 U.S. at 465 (holding that a “finding [of probable cause] alone satisfies the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement”). - 10 - Further, it is clear that the automobile exception contains no exigency requirement, and given the lessened privacy interests involved, rises and falls solely on the presence or absence of probable cause.

2019But see Maryland v. Dyson , 527 U.S. 465 , 466-67, 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (per curiam) (holding that no separate exigency requirement exists for the application of the automobile exception); Pennsylvania v. Labron , 518 U.S. 938 , 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam) ("If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment ... permits police to search the vehicle without more.").

2025Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970)).4 Under the automobile exception, the law recognizes “no difference between . . . seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and . . . carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.

2024The majority asserts that Dyson “reaffirmed” the conclusion that “the ‘automobile exception’ has no separate exigency requirement.” Actually, the most recent United States Supreme Court case on this issue is a Virginia case, Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586 (2018), which makes the opposite conclusion.8 The Court discussed the two justifications behind the automobile exception—“[t]he ‘ready mobility’ of vehicles,” and “the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.” Id. at 591 (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390, 392 (1985)).

2024In articulating the contours of the exception, many of these cases relied (at least in part) on the “ready mobility” of the vehicle—or, in other words, the “exigency” of the situation4 that would preclude obtaining a warrant—as a justification for the search. 4 The Court in Carroll stated that the automobile exception rested, at least in part, on the fact that “it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” 267 U.S. at 153 . -7- The Supreme Court of Virginia stated, in 1984, “[u]nder

2022The Commonwealth relies on one such exception, “the automobile exception,” established in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

2024The Court recognized that the facts of that case arose “at the intersection of two components of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and the protection extended to the curtilage of a home.” Id. at 591 .

2024See id. at 595 (“Nothing in our case law, however, suggests that the automobile exception gives an officer the right to enter a home or its curtilage to access a vehicle without a warrant.”).

2019Many legal commentators, including those disagreeing with Scher , have interpreted that case just as it was written - as an application of the Carroll automobile exception. 8 The United States Supreme Court has also stated that the automobile exception recognized in " Carroll was followed and applied" in later cases, including Scher , Chambers v. Maroney , 399 U.S. 42 , 49, 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), and that Scher was an "application of Carroll ," United States v. Ross , 456 U.S. 798 , 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

2019Many legal commentators, including those disagreeing with Scher , have interpreted that case just as it was written - as an application of the Carroll automobile exception. 8 The United States Supreme Court has also stated that the automobile exception recognized in " Carroll was followed and applied" in later cases, including Scher , Chambers v. Maroney , 399 U.S. 42 , 49, 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), and that Scher was an "application of Carroll ," United States v. Ross , 456 U.S. 798 , 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

2025Cf. Duncan v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 175, 179 (2009) (assuming without deciding that a warrantless search was not justified as one incident to arrest and upholding it under the automobile exception).

2016“As the United States Supreme Court has explained, if an officer . . . has probable cause to believe that [a] vehicle contains evidence of a crime, then a warrantless search of that vehicle is permissible under the automobile exception.” Duncan v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 175, 179-80 , 684 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2009) (citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999)).

2025Under the Fourth Amendment’s longstanding automobile exception, law enforcement officers, “[b]efore making an arrest and without obtaining a search warrant, . . . may search a vehicle when they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.” Id. at ___; see Curley v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 616, 621 (2018).

2024In evaluating “whether a police officer had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle, as occurred here, we examine the events leading up to the [search], and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” Curley, 295 Va. at 622 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). -6- Here, the Commonwealth argues that the automobile exception applies to the facts of this case.

2024In articulating the contours of the exception, many of these cases relied (at least in part) on the “ready mobility” of the vehicle—or, in other words, the “exigency” of the situation4 that would preclude obtaining a warrant—as a justification for the search. 4 The Court in Carroll stated that the automobile exception rested, at least in part, on the fact that “it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” 267 U.S. at 153 . -7- The Supreme Court of Virginia stated, in 1984, “[u]nder

2016See McCary v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 228 , 321 S.E.2d 637, 642 (1984) (the automobile exception applies “even if there is no risk of removal of the vehicle or its contents”).

2025Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970)).4 Under the automobile exception, the law recognizes “no difference between . . . seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and . . . carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.

2019Many legal commentators, including those disagreeing with Scher , have interpreted that case just as it was written - as an application of the Carroll automobile exception. 8 The United States Supreme Court has also stated that the automobile exception recognized in " Carroll was followed and applied" in later cases, including Scher , Chambers v. Maroney , 399 U.S. 42 , 49, 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), and that Scher was an "application of Carroll ," United States v. Ross , 456 U.S. 798 , 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

2025Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); -3- Duncan v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 175, 179-80 (2009). “[A] police officer may, before making an arrest and without obtaining a search warrant, search a vehicle involved in a traffic stop so long as the officer has probable cause to do so.” Curley, 295 Va. at 621 . “[P]robable cause exists when ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” Jones, 277 Va. at 178 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006)).

2024Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). “[A] police officer may, before making an arrest and without obtaining a search warrant, search a vehicle . . . so long as the officer has probable cause to do so.” Curley v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 616, 621 (2018) (citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804-809 (1982); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 ). -4- Probable cause exists when “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 178 (2009) (quoting United Sta

2015As long as there is probable cause, the automobile exception “‘authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.’” Armstead v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 569 , 576 n.4, 695 S.E.2d 561 , 564 n.4 (2010) (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 347 ); see 3 Wayne R.

2015The automobile exception to the warrant rule therefore authorized Officer Wade to search “‘any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.’” Armstead, 56 Va. App. at 576 n.4, 695 S.E.2d at 564 n.4 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 347 ).

2019But see Maryland v. Dyson , 527 U.S. 465 , 466-67, 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (per curiam) (holding that no separate exigency requirement exists for the application of the automobile exception); Pennsylvania v. Labron , 518 U.S. 938 , 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam) ("If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment ... permits police to search the vehicle without more.").

2019But see Maryland v. Dyson , 527 U.S. 465 , 466-67, 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (per curiam) (holding that no separate exigency requirement exists for the application of the automobile exception); Pennsylvania v. Labron , 518 U.S. 938 , 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam) ("If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment ... permits police to search the vehicle without more.").

2022The curtilage of the house “enjoys [constitutional] protection as part of the home itself.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013).

2016This area around the home is intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, and 22 Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s opinion that Officer Rhodes’ warrantless search was permitted by the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. is where privacy expectations are most heightened.” Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 , 1414- 15 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2025Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); -3- Duncan v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 175, 179-80 (2009). “[A] police officer may, before making an arrest and without obtaining a search warrant, search a vehicle involved in a traffic stop so long as the officer has probable cause to do so.” Curley, 295 Va. at 621 . “[P]robable cause exists when ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” Jones, 277 Va. at 178 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006)).

2024Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). “[A] police officer may, before making an arrest and without obtaining a search warrant, search a vehicle . . . so long as the officer has probable cause to do so.” Curley v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 616, 621 (2018) (citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804-809 (1982); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 ). -4- Probable cause exists when “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 178 (2009) (quoting United Sta

2025A vehicle “may be searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband[ without additional proof] of exigent circumstances.” United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985). “[T]he justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven away[] or . . . its contents . . . tampered with . . . .” Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam); see United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586

2025A vehicle “may be searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband[ without additional proof] of exigent circumstances.” United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985). “[T]he justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven away[] or . . . its contents . . . tampered with . . . .” Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam); see United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586

2025A vehicle “may be searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband[ without additional proof] of exigent circumstances.” United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985). “[T]he justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven away[] or . . . its contents . . . tampered with . . . .” Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam); see United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586

2025A vehicle “may be searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband[ without additional proof] of exigent circumstances.” United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985). “[T]he justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven away[] or . . . its contents . . . tampered with . . . .” Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam); see United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586

2025A vehicle “may be searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband[ without additional proof] of exigent circumstances.” United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985). “[T]he justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven away[] or . . . its contents . . . tampered with . . . .” Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam); see United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586

2025A vehicle “may be searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband[ without additional proof] of exigent circumstances.” United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985). “[T]he justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven away[] or . . . its contents . . . tampered with . . . .” Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam); see United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586

2024For these reasons, we reject [appellant]’s attempt to create an exception to the automobile exception.” (quoting California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 577 (1991))).

2023See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (explaining the automobile exception allows for the search of “containers within [the car] where [officers] have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained”).

2019See, e.g. , Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 460, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that the automobile exception did not apply to a parked vehicle on a private driveway because there were no exigent circumstances and because the car was not suspected to contain contraband or dangerous items).

2019See, e.g. , Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 460, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that the automobile exception did not apply to a parked vehicle on a private driveway because there were no exigent circumstances and because the car was not suspected to contain contraband or dangerous items).

2010During this period of lawful detention, the police dog alerted to the presence of the odors of narcotics — thus providing the officer with probable cause to search Boyd’s vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 4 See, e.g., Alvarez v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 768, 773-76 , 485 S.E.2d 646, 648-50 (1997).

2010During this period of lawful detention, the police dog alerted to the presence of the odors of narcotics — thus providing the officer with probable cause to search Boyd’s vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 4 See, e.g., Alvarez v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 768, 773-76 , 485 S.E.2d 646, 648-50 (1997).

2010United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-821 , 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2170-71 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.” Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1721 ; see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301 , 119 S.Ct. 1297, 1301 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999).

2010United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-821 , 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2170-71 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.” Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1721 ; see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301 , 119 S.Ct. 1297, 1301 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999).

2016As long as there is probable cause, this automobile exception “‘authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found’ . . . [and the] authority to search need not be incident to arrest or in any way related to a recent occupant.” Armstead v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 569 , 576 n.4, 695 S.E.2d 561 , 564 n.4 (2010) (quoting Gant, 556 5 “[A] procedural Miranda violation differs in significant respects from violations of the Fourth Amendment.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306 .

2016As long as there is probable cause, this automobile exception “‘authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found’ . . . [and the] authority to search need not be incident to arrest or in any way related to a recent occupant.” Armstead v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 569 , 576 n.4, 695 S.E.2d 561 , 564 n.4 (2010) (quoting Gant, 556 5 “[A] procedural Miranda violation differs in significant respects from violations of the Fourth Amendment.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306 .

2016Id. (citing United States v. Navas , 597 F.3d 492 , 498-500 (2d Cir. 2010) (under the automobile exception, police were permitted to search a trailer even though it was unattached from the tractor trailer cab)).

2016Id. (citing United States v. Navas, 597 F.3d 492, 498-500 (2d Cir. 2010) (under the automobile exception, police were permitted to search a trailer even though it was unattached from the tractor trailer cab)).

2019However, that ruling was based on Schaum v. Commonwealth , 215 Va. 498 , 501, 211 S.E.2d 73 (1975), which justified such searches on the automobile exception and the inventory exception.

2019However, that ruling was based on Schaum v. Commonwealth , 215 Va. 498 , 501, 211 S.E.2d 73 (1975), which justified such searches on the automobile exception and the inventory exception.

1982Just three months ago, in Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816 , 284 S.E.2d 833 (1981), we articulated again the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.

1982Just three months ago, in Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816 , 284 S.E.2d 833 (1981), we articulated again the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.