A prevailing party lacks standing to appeal a decree that denies the requested relief (standing).
Common carriers sought to enjoin the enforcement of a state trucking statute, and a three-judge district court denied the permanent injunction while dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for fees. The Public Service Commission, which prevailed below, appealed solely to review the dismissal of its counterclaim. The Supreme Court held that its direct appellate jurisdiction under the relevant statute is strictly limited to reviewing final decrees granting or denying permanent injunctions. Because the commission was the successful party below, it lacked standing to appeal the decree denying the injunction. Consequently, the Court determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal regarding the counterclaim and dismissed the appeal.
At page 206 Limiting appellate jurisdiction from decree denying injunction7 citing cases[T]he successful party below has no standing to appeal from the decree denying the injunction.
- Nat Rescr Def Cncl v. Pena, Federico F., 147 F.3d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1998).published ([T]he successful party below has no standing to appeal from the decree denying the injunction.)
- Nat. Resources Def. Council v. Pena, 147 F.3d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1998).published ([T]he successful party below has no standing to appeal from the decree denying the injunction.)
- Bromfield-Thompson v. McNally, 334 A.3d 138 (D.C. 2025).publishedComm’n v. Brashear Freight Lines, 306 U.S. 204, 206 (1939)).
- Rsch. in Motion Ltd. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, No. 2012-1648 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 21, 2012).unpublishedServo Commn. v. Brashear Freight Lines, Case: 12-1648 Document: 19 Page: 3 Filed: 11/21/2012 3 RESEARCH IN MOTION v. ITC Inc., 306 U.S. 204, 206 (1939); United States v. Am.
- Brown v. Brown, 988 So. 2d 1053 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).published(stating that the successful party below lacked the right to appeal from a decree denying an injunction)
- James K.J. Cheng v. Gaf Corp., 713 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1983).published “the successful party below has no standing to appeal from the [district court's] decree”
- In the Matter of Carbide Cutoff, Inc. Appeal of Special Couns. to the Tr., 703 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1983).publishedE.g., Public Service Commission v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., 306 U.S. 204, 206 (1939); 9 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 203.06 (1982).
Other citing cases
- Concerned Citizens of Cohocton Valley, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Env't Conservation, Michael Zagata, as Comm'r of the New York State Dep't of Env't Conservation Jeffrey J. Sama, Deputy Permit Adm'r of the New York State Dep't of Env't Conservation, J. Makowski Assocs., Inc., Avoca Nat. Gas Storage v. Concerned Citizens of Cohocton Valley, Inc., 127 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 1997).published
- Concerned Citizens of Cohocton Valley, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Env't Conservation, 127 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 1997).published
- Native Vill. of Tyonek v. Donald Puckett, & Erna Puckett Fred Slawson, & Virginia Slawson, Native Vill. of Tyonek v. Donald Puckett Erna Puckett Alexandra Kaloa Esther Kaloa Fred Slawson Virginia Slawson Alec Constantine Olga Constantine, Native Vill. of Tyonek v. Donald Puckett, & Erna Puckett Fred Slawson, & Virginia Slawson, & Alexandra Kaloa Esther Kaloa Alec Constantine Olga Constantine, 890 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1989).published
- Native Vill. of Tyonek v. Puckett, 890 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1989).published
- Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974).published
- Am. Ins. v. Lucas, 314 U.S. 575 (1941).published
v.
Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., Et Al.
Appellees, Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., and others, common carriers of property for hire by motor vehicles operated in interstate commerce over the highways of Missouri and other States, brought this suit to restrain the enforcement of the statute of Missouri known as the Missouri Bus and Truck Act, effective September 15, 1931.
As an interlocutory injunction was sought, a temporary restraining order was issued and a court of three judges was convened pursuant to § 266 of the Judicial Code. 28 U. S. C. 380. It was later agreed “that the temporary restraining order should remain in effect until final decision on the merits of the relief asked in the plaintiffs’ bill of complaint and that hearing on plaintiffs’ application for a temporary and permanent injunction should be consolidated.”
Defendants, Public Service Commission of Missouri and several state officers, in their answer included a counterclaim of the Public Service Commission seeking an accounting-from plaintiffs for fees due to the State under the above mentioned Act for the use of the public highways during the time that the temporary restraining order was in effect. Upon stipulation, the restraining order was modified so as to provide for deposit of license fees with a trustee pending the termination of the litigation.
On hearing, the District Court entered its final decree as follows:
“1. That the plaintiffs are not entitled to a permanent injunction against the defendants;
“2. That the relief prayed for in plaintiffs’ bill of complaint should be and is hereby in all respects denied, and[*206] plaintiffs’ bill of complaint is hereby dismissed on its merits;
“3. That the temporary restraining order heretofore granted to plaintiffs by this court against the defendants, be and the same hereby is dissolved;
“4. That the issue raised by the defendants’ counterclaim, not having been urged nor presented by the parties, and the court being in doubt as to the right of the d'e-fendants to maintain such counterclaim, it is ordered that the same be and it hereby is dismissed without prejudice to the right of the defendants, or either of them, to maintain an independent action or suit thereon, if they, or either of them, shall be so advised;
“5. That defendants recover their costs and disbursements herein, to be taxed as provided by law and inserted herein in the sum of.Dollars.”
On motion for rehearing, paragraph 4 of the decree was modified by striking out the following words relating to the defendants’ counterclaim, to wit, “not having been urged nor presented by the parties,” and rehearing was denied.
The Public Service Commission brings this appeal seeking to review paragraph 4 of the decree, as amended, dismissing the counterclaim.
The appellate jurisdiction of this Court on direct appeal from a final decree by a District Court composed of three judges under § 266 of the Judicial Code is strictly limited as follows:
“a direct appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken from a final decree granting or denying a permanent injunction in such suit.”
The Public Service Commission as the successful party below has no standing to appeal from the decree denying the injunction. New York Telephone Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U. S. 645; Lindheimer v. Illinois Telephone Co., 292 U. S.[*207] 151, 176. And as no appeal has been taken to review the decree denying the injunction, this Court is without jurisdiction.
Section 266 as originally enacted! applied only to cases in which an interlocutory injunction was granted or denied and the purpose was to make interference by such an injunction with the enforcement of state legislation a matter for the adequate hearing and full deliberation which the presence of three judges was likely to secure. Cumberland Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 260 U. S. 212, 216; Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 282 U. S. 10, 14. The amendment that the requirement of a court of three judges should also apply to the final hearing on the application for a permanent injunction was to end the anomalous situation in which a single judge might reconsider and decide questions already passed upon by three judges on the application for an interlocutory injunction. Smith v. Wilson, 273 U. S. 388, 390, 391; Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., supra. And, as direct appeal to this Court was permitted from an order granting or denying an interlocutory injunction, the amendment provided also for such a direct appeal from a final decree granting or denying a permanent injunction.
It necessarily follows that, unless there is a proper appeal from a decree granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction, the provision in § 266 for a direct appeal to this Court has no application. The appeal is
Dismissed.