Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954). · Go Syfert
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Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1978 · …housekeeping provision of the department. ✓
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1980 · …simply a housekeeping provision of the department ✓
293 citation events (18 in the last 25 years) across 37 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In Re Butterfly Kisses Child Care Center, Inc. and Cindy Boyce (vt, 2025-08-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1957 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1957 1991 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 31 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Butterfly Kisses Child Care Center, Inc. and Cindy Boyce
Vt. · 2025 · confidence medium
Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173 (1954). ¶ 51.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walker v. Reno
N.D.N.Y. · 1995 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Numerous courts have unanimously concluded that the Petite policy “is merely an internal guideline for exercise of prosecutorial discretion, not subject to judicial review.” Id. at 71 ; see also United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 536-37 (D.C.Cir.1979) (“The Petite policy is not law, but rather an executive policy that permits of exceptions in the Attorney General’s discretion.”); United States v. Booth, 673 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir.1982) (“[Petite policy] is one of federal prosecutorial policy, ... and does not create a corresponding right in the accused”), cert. denied, 456 U.S.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. DeVaughn
D. Maryland · 1976 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344-45 , 94 S.Ct. 613, 618 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561, 569 (1974); cf. Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173-74 , 75 S.Ct. 182, 184-85 , 99 L.Ed. 210, 216 (1954).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Watts v. United States
SCOTUS · 1975 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Sullivan v. United States, 348 U. S. 170, 172-174 (1954); United States v. Hutul, 416 F. 2d 607, 626-627 (CA7 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1012 (1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Haley v. United States (2×)
W.D. Mo. · 1975 · confidence medium
For this he is answerable to the Department, but his action before the grand jury was not subject to attack by one indicted by the grand jury on such evidence.” Sullivan, supra, 348 U.S. at 173, 174 , 75 S.Ct. at 184, 185 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jenkins (2×)
SCOTUS · 1975 · confidence medium
If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact appear therein." [11] See, e. g., Sullivan v. United States, 348 U. S. 170, 174 (1954). [12] Brief for United States 10 n. 5, 24 n. 16.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chase v. Shasta Lake Union School District
Cal. Ct. App. · 1968 · confidence medium
(Cf. Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173 [ 99 L.Ed. 210, 216 , 75 S.Ct. 182 ].) In view of the closeness of the evidence, appellate interpretation or modification of the defective and essentially contradictory finding on assumption of the risk is inappropriate.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The United States of America, the Honorable Nicholas Deb. Katzenbach, Acting Attorney General of the United States, and the Honorable Robert E. Hauberg, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Mississippi v. Honorable W. Harold Cox, United States District Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, the Honorable Robert E. Hauberg, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Mississippi, and the Honorable Nicholas Deb. Katzenbach, Acting Attorney General of the United States v. Honorable W. Harold Cox, United States District Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
5th Cir. · 1965 · confidence medium
Hale v. Henkel, 1906, 201 U.S. 43, 62 , 26 S.Ct. 370 , 50 L.Ed. 652 . 12 See also Blair v. United States, 1919, 250 U.S. 273, 280 , 39 S.Ct. 468 , 63 L.Ed. 979 and Sullivan v. United States, 1954, 348 U.S. 170, 173 , 75 S.Ct. 182 , 99 L.Ed. 210 ; Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment"; Foul Blow or Fair Play, 55 Col.L.Rev. 1103 (1955).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Cox (2×)
5th Cir. · 1965 · confidence medium
Hale v. Henkel, 1906, 201 U.S. 43, 62 , 26 S.Ct. 370 , 50 L.Ed. 652 . [12] See also Blair v. United States, 1919, 250 U.S. 273, 280 , *189 39 S.Ct. 468 , 63 L.Ed. 979 and Sullivan v. United States, 1954, 348 U.S. 170, 173 , 75 S.Ct. 182 , 99 L.Ed. 210 ; Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment"; Foul Blow or Fair Play, 55 Col.L.Rev. 1103 (1955).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Wilson
3rd Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 471 (1979); Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954). 24 of $25,000 for first time offenders and seven years and a $50,000 fine for repeat offenders. § 7508(a)(2)(iii).
discussed Cited "see" Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Actions Against Public Employers to Enforce Settlement or Conciliation Agreements
OLC · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Attorney General as Chief Litigator, 6 Op. O.L.C. at 48–51. 2 Further centralizing the conduct of litigation on behalf of the United States, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 6166, “the [p]urpose of section 5 of [which], among other things, was to transfer responsibility for the prosecution of criminal proceedings and suits by or against the United States in civil matters to the Department of Justice.” Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173 (1954).
examined Cited "see" Schinck v. Stephens (In Re Stephens) (3×)
Bankr. D. Me. · 1998 · signal: accord · confidence high
Co., Inc., 300 F.2d 207, 210 (10th Cir.1962) (observing that if the statute does not define a term the court “must assume that the term was used in its ordinary and conventional sense.”); accord Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 171-72 , 75 S.Ct. 182, 183-84 , 99 L.Ed. 210 (1954).
examined Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Simmons (6×)
Pa. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 , 75 S.Ct. 182 , 99 L.Ed. 210 (1954); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 , 99 S.Ct. 1465 , 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979); United States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 , 99 S.Ct. 2889 , 61 L.Ed.2d 315 (1979).
examined Cited "see" Robert H. Laflower v. United States of America (3×)
1st Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173-74 , 75 S.Ct. 182, 184-85 , 99 L.Ed. 210 (1954) (noncompliance with internal directive irrelevant); cf. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 , 99 S.Ct. 1465 , 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979) (noncompliance with agency regulations does not mean exclusion of evidence in criminal case).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Brett C. Kimberlin (6×)
7th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173 , 75 S.Ct. 182, 184-85 , 99 L.Ed. 210 (1954); Delay v. United States, 602 F.2d 173, 178 (8th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 , 100 S.Ct. 660 , 62 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980); United States v. Thompson, 579 F.2d 1184, 1187 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 , 99 S.Ct. 257 , 58 L.Ed.2d 243 (1978); United States v. Nelligan, 573 F.2d 251, 255 (5th Cir.1978).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Trupiano (3×)
E.D. Mo. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 174 , 75 S.Ct. 182, 185 , 99 L.Ed. 210 (1954); United States v. Ramos, 613 F.Supp. 115, 119 (S.D.N.Y.1985).
examined Cited "see" International Union v. Brock (3×)
D.C. Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173-74 , 75 S.Ct. 182, 184-85 , 99 L.Ed. 210 (1954) (defendant cannot challenge District Attorney’s action in prosecuting even if it violated agency's "housekeeping provisions”); United States v. Fitch Oil Co., 676 F.2d 673, 677-78 (T.E.Ct.App.1982) (internal rules not binding on agency); United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 818 (5th Cir.) (agency not bound by press release indicating how it will exercise discretion), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 , 100 S.Ct. 93 , 62 L.Ed.2d 60 (1979); see generally K.
examined Cited "see" International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. William Brock, Secretary of Labor International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. William Brock, Secretary of Labor (3×)
D.C. Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173-74 , 75 S.Ct. 182, 184-85 , 99 L.Ed. 210 (1954) (defendant cannot challenge District Attorney's action in prosecuting even if it violated agency's "housekeeping provisions"); United States v. Fitch Oil Co., 676 F.2d 673, 677-78 (T.E.Ct.App.1982) (internal rules not binding on agency); United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 818 (5th Cir.) (agency not bound by press release indicating how it will exercise discretion), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 , 100 S.Ct. 93 , 62 L.Ed.2d 60 (1979); see generally K.
discussed Cited "see" Antonio Pino Palafox v. Calvin Edwards
6th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
Mich. 1983); See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954); United States v. Thompson, 579 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978); United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 818 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979). 6 The appellant also presents a variation of the first argument.
discussed Cited "see" Tyska v. BOARD OF EDUCATION TWP. SCH. DIST. (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
Stat. 1981, ch. 122, par. 10 — 20.5; see Jefferson.) It is our opinion that the criteria in the case at bar, similar to the executive order and departmental letter in Sullivan v. United, States (1954), 348 U.S. 170 , 99 L.
examined Cited "see" Ann Hansen v. Patricia Roberts Harris, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (6×)
2d Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 172-74 , 75 S.Ct. 182, 184 , 99 L.Ed. 210 (1954) (Executive Order and Circular Letters from Department of Justice requiring approval of Department before presentation of evidence to grand jury "simply a housekeeping provision of the Department" whose violation had no legal effect); American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Services, 397 U.S. 532 , 90 S.Ct. 1288 , 25 L.Ed.2d 547 (1970) (I.C.C. rule specifying contents of application for temporary operating authority under § 210a of the Interstate Commerce Act does not preclude grant of authority to …
examined Cited "see" United States v. Eleas Dabdoub-Diaz (3×)
5th Cir. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 , 75 S.Ct. 182 , 99 L.Ed. 210 (1954).
examined Cited "see" United States v. John H. Thomas and Jon-T Farms, Inc., a Corporation, United States of America v. John H. Thomas, Also Known as J. H. Thomas (3×)
5th Cir. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173 , 75 S.Ct. 182, 184 , 99 L.Ed. 210 (1954); United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 818 (5th Cir. 1979).
examined Cited "see" United States v. I. Marco L. Laurenti, E. Giorgio L. Laurenti, Lindar Manufacturing Corp., Rockhill Cutlery Ltd., Rockwell Co. (6×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
2d Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 171-72 , 75 S.Ct. 182 , 99 L.Ed. 210 (1954) (so construing similar language in a tax statute).
discussed Cited "see" Lott v. United States (2×)
SCOTUS · 1961 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rule II (2) of Criminal Appeals Rules, 292 U. S. 661 .” 4 (Emphasis added.) “Existing law” did not allow motions in arrest unless made within three days of “verdict or finding of guilt.” The majority notes petitioners’ argument that Sullivan v. United States, 348 U. S. 170 (1954), supports today’s decision “even if sub silentio.” With due deference, I say it does not.
examined Cited "see" United States v. Pack (3×)
D. Del. · 1957 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sullivan v. United States, 1954, 348 U.S. 170 , 75 S.Ct. 182 , 99 L.Ed. 210 . .
examined Cited "see, e.g." In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 2013R00691-009 (3×)
W.D.N.C. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282-83 , 39 S.Ct. 468 , 63 L.Ed. 979 (1919); see also Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 184 , 75 S.Ct. 182 , 99 L.Ed. 210 (1954).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner (2×)
Tax Ct. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954); United States v. Thompson, 579 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Fritz, 580 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1978) (Attorney General’s guidelines on exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Federico Fano v. Paul B. O'neill, Individually and as District Director of the Immigration & Naturalization Service for the Houston Division (3×)
5th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 184 , 75 S.Ct. 182, 184 , 99 L.Ed. 210 (1954) (refusing to enforce against the United States a "housekeeping provision" that required United States attorneys to obtain authorization before presenting evidence of tax violations to a grand jury); 2 K.
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Ramos (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
See United States v. Figueroa, 337 F.Supp. 645, 652 (S.D.N.Y.1972) (approving sua sponte decision to find facts specially); see also Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 , 75 S.Ct. 182 , 99 L.Ed. 210 (1954).
examined Cited "see, e.g." In Re Presentment of Special Grand Jury (3×)
D. Maryland · 1970 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Blair v. United States, 1919, 250 U.S. 273, 280 , 39 S.Ct. 468 , 63 L.Ed. 979 and Sullivan v. United States, 1954, 348 U.S. 170, 173 , 75 S.Ct. 182 , 99 L.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Sullivan
v.
United States
64.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 6, 1954.
348 U.S. 170
1954 U.S. LEXIS 2755
Llewellyn A. Luce argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Walter H. Maloney., Charles F. Barber argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Holland, Ellis N. Slack, David L. Luce, Joseph M. Howard and Harold S. Larsen.
Minton.
Cited by 101 opinions  |  Published
Mr. Justice Minton

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Upon pleas of nolo contendere, the petitioner was found guilty of violating the income tax laws by making and filing false and fraudulent returns. The District Court[*171] sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment and fined him $13,000. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 212 F. 2d 125, and we granted certiorari, 347 U. S. 1010.

On February 28, 1952, a duly constituted grand jury for the District of Kansas indicted the petitioner on four counts for false and fraudulent statements in his individual tax returns and on two counts in another indictment for false and fraudulent returns of the Central Theatre Co., a corporation of which he was president. To these indictments the petitioner entered pleas of not guilty. He later withdrew these pleas, and to two counts of the indictment on his individual returns and to one count on the corporation returns, he entered pleas of nolo contendere. The other counts were dismissed.

Before the pleas of nolo contendere were entered, petitioner had filed motions to dismiss the indictments because the evidence upon which they were based was presented to the grand jury by the District Attorney without direction to do so by the Attorney General’s office. These motions were overruled after argument and time for briefing. This presents the first question, namely, were the indictments faulty because, without sanction by the Attorney General’s office, the District Attorney offered evidence to the grand jury upon which the indictments were returned? It is first contended by petitioner that, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 3740, [1] the indictments could not be returned without authorization by that office. We agree with the Court of Appeals that this section applies only to civil suits and not to criminal proceedings. In the absence of words in their context requiring a different conclusion, the phrase “suits for recovery” ordinarily means civil suits and not criminal[*172] prosecutions. Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103, 105-109; Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. 531, 542-543. One “recovers” in a civil action but prosecutes and punishes in a criminal proceeding.

The further contention is made that § 5 of Executive Order No. 6166, [2] and Circular Letter No. 2431 of the Department of Justice, [3] required approval from the Attorney General’s office before any evidence could be presented to the grand jury and that such direction was not given. It is admitted that no authorization was received from the Attorney General’s office to present the evidence to the grand jury in the instant case; nor does the record reveal clearly that an emergency existed. Apparently none was reported to the Department of Justice as required by Circular Letter No. 2431.

[*173] Prior to Executive Order No. 6166, prosecutions for the violation of internal revenue laws were often referred directly to United States District Attorneys for presentation to grand juries. The purpose of § 5 of Executive Order No. 6166, among other things, was to transfer responsibility for the prosecution of criminal proceedings and suits by or against the United States in civil matters to the Department of Justice.

It was not the purpose of the Executive Order to direct how the responsibility should be exercised but to fix it in the Department of Justice. How that responsibility was to be discharged was a matter for the Department. To make the system uniform, Circular Letter No. 2431 was sent to all District Attorneys. It was never promulgated as a regulation of the Department and published in the Federal Register. It was simply a housekeeping provision of the Department and was not intended to curtail or limit the well-recognized power of the grand jury to consider and investigate any alleged crime within its jurisdiction. See United States v. Thompson, 251 U. S. 407, 413-415; Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 282; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 61-66; Frisbie v. United States, 157 U. S. 160, 163.

Therefore, it is not contended that, aside from the Executive Order and the departmental letter, a grand jury may not consider evidence of crime known to the grand jurors or revealed by their investigation. It is only urged that the Executive Order and the departmental letter limited the action of the grand jury in respect to cases concerning violations of internal revenue laws. We hold that the Order and the letter had no such restrictive effect, and that the grand jury in this case was free to consider the evidence put before it by Government counsel without authorization from the Attorney General’s office in Washington. The evidence was presented by the District Attorney, who was a representative of the Depart[*174] ment of Justice, notwithstanding that he failed to comply with the departmental directive. For this he is answerable to the Department, but his action before the grand jury was not subject to attack by one indicted by the grand jury on such evidence. The motions to dismiss were properly overruled.

Three days after judgment had been pronounced finding the petitioner guilty under his pleas of nolo contendere and sentences passed, the petitioner filed a motion asking for leave to withdraw his pleas. Later he filed an amended motion to withdraw the pleas and a petition for probation. In his motion to withdraw the pleas, he gave the following reasons, (1) because of manifest injustice, (2) because he had entered his pleas under the mistaken belief, induced by the acts and statements of Government counsel, that he would be placed on probation, and (3) because of misconduct of the District Attorney. The District Court, after hearing argument, denied the motion and the petition for probation and filed its findings of fact, although there apparently was no request for them. [4] Under Rule 32 (d) [5] a defendant may, after sentence, withdraw a plea of nolo contendere to correct manifest injustice. It is this provision that petitioner relies upon. He claims he was somehow misled by Government counsel to believe that if he entered the pleas of nolo contendere he would receive probation. By the court’s findings, which, in light of the evidence, raise not a doubt, it is settled that the court in no way[*175] misled the petitioner and that Government counsel made no promises of leniency or probation. [6]

Petitioner argues that the United States Attorney misled him because his statement to the court during the hearing for probation was stronger than petitioner and his counsel expected. No exception was taken to anything the District Attorney said, nor was any complaint made about such statement until after sentence was pronounced. We have read this statement and the affidavits of both counsel. The statement was factual, dispassionate and fair. The petitioner has failed to show any “manifest injustice” as required by Rule 32 (d). During all of the proceedings from arraignment to denial of petition for probation, petitioner was represented by able and experienced counsel. In our opinion they were not and could not have been misled by the action and statements of Government counsel. The judgment is

Affirmed.

1

“No suit for the recovery of taxes, or of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, shall be commenced unless the Commissioner authorizes or sanctions the proceedings and the Attorney General directs that the suit be commenced.”

2

“The functions of prosecuting in the courts of the United States claims and demands by, and offenses against, the Government of the United States and of defending claims and demands against the Government, and of supervising the work of United States attorneys, marshals, and clerks in connection therewith, now exercised by any agency or officer, are transferred to the Department of Justice.

“As to any case referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense in the courts, the function of decision whether and in what manner to prosecute, or to defend, or to compromise, or to appeal, or to abandon prosecution or defense, now exercised by any agency or officer, is transferred to the Department of Justice.

“For the exercise of such of his functions as are not transferred to the Department of Justice by the foregoing two paragraphs, the Solicitor of the Treasury is transferred from the Department of Justice to the Treasury Department.

“Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the function of any agency or officer with respect to cases at any stage prior to reference to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense.” Promulgated June 10, 1933, 5 U. S. C. §§ 124-132.

3

“In accordance therewith, all United States Attorneys are directed to present evidence to a grand jury concerning violations of revenue laws of the United States only when authorized to do so by this office, unless an emergency calls for immediate action, in which event a full report should promptly be submitted.” August 10, 1933.

4

See Rule 23 (c), Fed. Rules Crim. Proc.

5

“Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.” Rule 32 (d), Fed. Rules Crim. Proc.

6

“At the June 23 hearing, the court specifically inquired of defendant’s counsel as to whether any remark or statement made by the court to defendant’s counsel had influenced them in advising the defendant to enter the pleas above mentioned. The court was assured by defendant’s counsel and now finds that no statement of the court made to defendant’s counsel or in the presence of defendant influenced the defendant’s entrance of his pleas of nolo contendere.

“The court further finds that no promise of probation or lenience was made, either to the defendant personally or to his counsel by the United States Attorney or his assistant who handled the prosecution for the Government.” Findings 9 and 10, R. 91-92.