Wilson claim in California

2025Wilson’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no arguable issue and requesting that this court independently review the record.

2016Wilson's brief on appeal, filed by appointed appellate counsel, presents no argument for reversal, but invites this court to review the record for error in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).

2021Here, as in People v. Forrest, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at page 679 , Wilson’s plea to the substantive offense and to the prior convictions occurred in a single proceeding and was not separate in time.

2019Here, as in People v. Forrest, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at page 679 , Wilson’s plea to the substantive offense and to the prior convictions occurred in a single proceeding and was not separate in time.

2023Wilson concerned what categories of speech are protected under subdivision (e)(4). ( Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th 871 .) The Wilson court reasoned that “a defendant who claims its speech was protected as ‘conduct in furtherance of the exercise of [free speech rights] in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest’ (id., subd. (e)(4)) must show not only that its speech referred to an issue 18 of public interest, but also that its speech contributed to public discussion or resolution of the issue.” (Wilson, at p. 900.) By its terms, the Wilson test applies only to speech, not nonco

2023Wilson concerned what categories of speech are protected under subdivision (e)(4). ( Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th 871 .) The Wilson court reasoned that “a defendant who claims its speech was protected as ‘conduct in furtherance of the exercise of [free speech rights] in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest’ (id., subd. (e)(4)) must show not only that its speech referred to an issue 18 of public interest, but also that its speech contributed to public discussion or resolution of the issue.” (Wilson, at p. 900.) By its terms, the Wilson test applies only to speech, not nonco

2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) Wilson’s theory of prejudice is that the prosecutor’s disclosure that Tanner told Wilson that Stevens had a gun impaired Wilson’s credibility and gave the jury reason to reject Wilson’s testimony that he was taken by surprise when Stevens got out of the car with a gun in his hand.

2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) Wilson’s theory of prejudice is that the prosecutor’s disclosure that Tanner told Wilson that Stevens had a gun impaired Wilson’s credibility and gave the jury reason to reject Wilson’s testimony that he was taken by surprise when Stevens got out of the car with a gun in his hand.

2020The court denied Wilson’s motion for new trial and sentenced Wilson to an indeterminate prison term of 45 years to life. 11 DISCUSSION I Motion to Suppress: Private Search Doctrine A. Standard of Review “ ‘In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (Robey v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218,

2020The court denied Wilson’s motion for new trial and sentenced Wilson to an indeterminate prison term of 45 years to life. 11 DISCUSSION I Motion to Suppress: Private Search Doctrine A. Standard of Review “ ‘In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (Robey v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218,

2020(Brown, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 341 .) Thus, Wilson’s claim to the contrary has no merit.

2020(Brown, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 341 .) Thus, Wilson’s claim to the contrary has no merit.

2025(Sullivan v. United States, supra, 348 U.S. at p. 174 .) In any event, we will neither speculate about the inner workings of the district attorney’s office, nor will we usurp the prosecutor’s discretion to recommend (or not) resentencing.

2025(See Garcia, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 148 .) Second, Wilson’s claim that there was no evidence of inaccuracy or bad faith regarding the March 7 letter is incorrect.

2024“A criminal defendant has the right to testify at trial, ‘a right that is the mirror image of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and accordingly is of equal dignity.’ [Citations.] ‘The defendant may exercise the right to testify over the objection of, and contrary to the advice of, defense counsel. [Citations.] “When the decision is whether to testify . . . at the guilt phase of a capital trial [citation] it is only in case of an express conflict arising between the defendant and counsel that the defendant’s desires must prevail. . . . [T]here is no duty to admonish and secure

2024In such circumstances, the “failure to request clarification or amplification of the instruction at issue does not result in a forfeiture of his challenge.” (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011 ; see also People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561 , 579– 580 [failure to object does not result in forfeiture of a claim that an instruction violated due process or other substantial rights]; Pen.

2024(People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 500 .) Because we conclude that the evidence was, in fact, admissible under state law, we need not consider this contention. 53 PEOPLE v. WILSON Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 665–666.) Here, although the court erred in its application of the rules of evidence, its mistake — judging the admissibility of impeachment evidence according to the statutory standard applicable to testifying witnesses, as opposed to nontestifying hearsay declarants — is not the sort of mistake that significantly undermined fundamental elements of Wilson’s defense.

2023(People v. Cowan (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1159 .) Although the prosecutor’s use of the word “presume” was imprecise, Wilson’s claim that jurors would have understood it to mean they were required to find him guilty if persuaded he also committed the uncharged offenses is not accurate either.

2022Wilson’s challenge to mother’s statements under Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 , is more complicated.

2022Wilson’s challenge to mother’s statements under Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 , is more complicated.

2022Crawford held that “the admission of ‘testimonial’ out-of-court statements violates a criminal defendant’s confrontation rights unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination [citation], or waived that right by his own wrongdoing.” (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569 , 602–603 (Leon).) In contrast, “the admission of ‘nontestimonial’ statements ‘is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.’ ” (Gallardo, supra, 181 Cal.App.5th at p. 66, citing Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 68 and quoting M

2022There was extensive evidence that A.Y. had been generally healthy and active up to 11 Our conclusions also resolve Wilson’s claim that introducing mother’s statements through Dr. Gilgoff’s testimony violated Wilson’s constitutional rights under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 .

2022Crawford held that “the admission of ‘testimonial’ out-of-court statements violates a criminal defendant’s confrontation rights unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination [citation], or waived that right by his own wrongdoing.” (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569 , 602–603 (Leon).) In contrast, “the admission of ‘nontestimonial’ statements ‘is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.’ ” (Gallardo, supra, 181 Cal.App.5th at p. 66, citing Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 68 and quoting M

2021In Wilson, supra, D072948, we explained that, when applying the anti-SLAPP statute, “a court generally is required to engage in a two-step process”: “ ‘First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16’ ”; and second, “ ‘[i]f the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.’ ” (Quoting Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 .) In our de novo review in Wilson, supra, D072948, we concluded in part that, contrary to Wilson’s p

2021(Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1506 .) Here, because our ruling that Dagostino met his prong one burden was necessary to the disposition of Wilson, supra, D072948, the trial court properly applied it in Wilson’s later proceedings for fees and costs, and we apply it in this appeal. 11 In short, since Dagostino in fact prevailed in establishing that Wilson’s claim against him arose from activity that is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, Wilson did not meet her burden in this appeal of establishing that the trial court abused its dis

2020(See Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719 , 729–730 [noting the state has expressed, by statute and in the California Constitution (§ 527.6; Cal. Const., art.