v.
Petersburg Department of Social Services
Present: Judges Elder, Beales and Senior Judge Willis
RICHMOND DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 2261-05-2 PER CURIAM JUNE 13, 2006 PETERSBURG DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES1
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG
Pamela S. Baskervill, Judge
(Sarah M. Denham, Assistant City Attorney, on brief), for appellant.
(Joan M. O’Donnell; James R. Traylor, Guardian ad litem for the infant child, on brief), for appellee.
By order entered August 18, 2005, the Circuit Court for the City of Petersburg (“trial court”) determined that it was without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal by the Richmond Department of Social Services (“RDSS”) from certain orders entered by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for the City of Petersburg (“JDR court”). On this appeal, RDSS contends the trial court’s determination was error. We disagree, and summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.
The Petersburg Department of Social Services (“PDSS”) removed L.J., a child, from his home. PDSS learned that L.J.’s caretaker had signed a “safety plan” with RDSS, requiring the caretaker to take certain steps for L.J.’s benefit. The JDR court held two hearings. At the first, an Emergency Removal Hearing, it awarded temporary custody of L.J. to PDSS. At the second, a
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
preliminary removal hearing. The clear interplay between these two statutes reveals a statutory intent that the preliminary removal order issue prior to the dispositional hearing and that disputes concerning the preliminary removal order be resolved at the dispositional hearing. By plain language and by clear textual implication, a preliminary removal order is not a dispositional order, is not a final order, and thus is not subject to appeal. A contrary interpretation would render meaningless the statutory scheme, and the resulting circuit court jurisdiction could frustrate the deadlines imposed upon the JDR court.
RDSS also contends that the trial court’s orders serve as the functional equivalent of dispositional orders. In support of this argument, RDSS argues that “Virginia Code § 16.1-278.2 dictates that a court may transfer legal custody of a child to a local board of social services upon disposition to protect the welfare of the child[,]” and “because the JDR court issued a finding of abuse and neglect and because that court properly disposed of the case by transferring custody to RDSS, it clearly issued a final dispositional order notwithstanding the timing of the hearing or the title of the order.”
We reject this argument. While Code § 16.1-278.2 allows a JDR court to transfer custody permanently upon disposition, Code § 16.1-252, as well as Code § 16.1-251, allow for temporary transfers of custody. Likewise, Code §§ 16.1-251 and 16.1-252 have their own procedural requirements, which are distinct from the mechanisms provided in Code § 16.1-278.2. RDSS cannot graft a Code § 16.1-278.2 requirement onto the other two statutes.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain RDSS’s appeal. We summarily affirm that finding. Rule 5A:27.
Affirmed.