v.
Cook Children's Health Plan, Texas Children's Health Plan, Superior Health Plan, Inc., and Wellpoint Insurance Company
ACCEPTED 15-24-00114-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 9/29/2025 4:09 PM No. 15-24-00114-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK In the Fifteenth Court of Appeals FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS
Austin, Texas 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk Cecile Erwin Young, in her Official Capacity as the Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission; Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc.; and Aetna Better Health of Texas, Inc., Appellants, v. Cook Children’s Health Plan, Texas Children’s Health Plan, Superior Health Plan, Inc., and Wellpoint Insurance Company, Appellees.
On Appeal from the 353rd Judicial District of Travis County, No. D-1-GN-24-003839
Brief of Appellant Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc.
Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP Jason R. LaFond State Bar No. 24103136 [email protected] Cheryl Joseph LaFond 303 Colorado Street, Suite 2400 Austin, Texas 78701 (512) 495-6300 Counsel for Appellant Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc.
Oral Argument Requested
Identity of Parties and Counsel
Appellants
Parties Counsel Cecile Erwin Young Office of the Attorney General William F. Cole [email protected] Cory A. Scanlon [email protected] Jennifer Cook [email protected] Thomas Bevilacqua [email protected] P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Tel.: (512) 936-1700 Fax: (512) 474-2697
Molina Healthcare of Scott, Douglass, & McConnico, LLP Texas, Inc. Jason R. LaFond [email protected] Cheryl Joseph LaFond [email protected] 303 Colorado Street, Suite 2400 Austin, Texas 78701 Tel.: (512) 495-6300 Fax: (512) 495-6399 Aetna Better Health of Ewell, Brown, Blanke & Knight LLP Texas, Inc. Joseph R. Knight [email protected] 111 Congress Avenue, 28th Floor Austin, Texas 78701
Tel.: (512) 770-4010 Fax: (877) 851-6384 Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP Marc J. Kessler (pro hac vice) [email protected] 41 South High Street, Ste 1800 Columbus, OH 43215-6106 Tel.: (614) 220-0237 Fax: (614) 221-2007
Appellees
Parties Counsel Cook Children’s Health Alexander Dubose & Jefferson LLP Plan Amy Warr [email protected] Anna M. Baker [email protected] 100 Congress Avenue, Suite 1450 Austin, Texas 78701-2709 Tel.: (512) 482-9300 Fax: (512) 482-9303 Burgess Law PC Karen Burgess [email protected] Katie Dolan-Galaviz [email protected] 404 West 13th Street Austin, Texas 78701 Tel.: (512) 482-8808 Fax: (512) 900-6325 Perkins Coie LLP Matthew P. Gordon [email protected] 1201 Third Avenue, Ste 4900 ii
Seattle, Washington Tel.: (206) 359-8000 Fax: (206) 359-9000 Texas Children’s Health Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP Plan Susan Feigin Harris [email protected] Warren S. Huang [email protected] 1550 Lamar, Suite 2000 Houston, Texas 77010 Tel.: (713) 651-5151 Fax: (713) 651-5246 Paul D. Trahan [email protected] 98 San Jacinto Boulevard, Ste 1100 Austin, Texas 78701 Tel.: (512) 474-5201 Fax: (512) 536-4598 Thomas A. Coulter [email protected] 799 9th Street, NW, Ste 1100 Washington, D.C. 20001 Tel.: (202) 662-0200 Fax: (202) 662-4643 Superior Health Plan, Inc. Holland & Knight LLP
Richard B. Phillips, Jr. [email protected] One Arts Plaza 1722 Routh Street, Ste 1500 Dallas, Texas 75201 Tel.: (214) 964-9500 Fax: (214) 964-9501
iii Karen D. Walker [email protected] Tiffany Roddenberry tiff[email protected] 315 South Calhoun Street, Ste 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tel.: (850) 425-5612 Fax: (850) 224-8832 Wellpoint Insurance Foley & Lardner LLP Company Robert F. Johnson III [email protected] 600 Congress Avenue, Ste 3000 Austin, Texas. 78701 Tel.: (512) 542-7000 Fax: (512) 542-7100 Michelle Y. Ku [email protected] Stacy R. Obenhaus [email protected] 2021 McKinney, Ste 1600 Dallas, Texas 75201 Tel.: (214) 999-3000 Fax: (214) 999-4667 Benjamin J. Grossman [email protected] 106 East College Avenue, Ste 900 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tel.: (850) 222-6100 Fax: (850) 561-6475 iv Table of Contents Page Identity of Parties and Counsel ................................................................................. i Table of Authorities .............................................................................................. viii Statutory Changes .................................................................................................. xv Statement of the Case ........................................................................................... xvi Statement Regarding Oral Argument ................................................................... xvii Issues Presented .................................................................................................. xviii Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 Statement of Facts.................................................................................................... 2 A. STAR, CHIP, and STAR Kids ..................................................................... 2 B. The STAR CHIP procurement process ....................................................... 3 1. The STAR CHIP RFP ........................................................................... 4 2. The notice of intent to award ................................................................. 6 3. The Losing Plans’ protests .................................................................... 7 a. Protests generally ............................................................................. 7 b. Wellpoint’s solicitation protest ........................................................ 8 c. The Losing Plans’ award protests .................................................... 8 C. Procedural history. ....................................................................................... 9 D. The intervening legislative session ............................................................. 12 Standard of Review ................................................................................................ 12 Summary of the Argument .................................................................................... 14 Argument ............................................................................................................... 16 I. The Losing Plans’ Claims Fail to Overcome Sovereign Immunity, and Should Be Dismissed with Prejudice. ........................................................ 16 A. The Losing Plans lack sufficient interest to maintain their ultra vires claims. ............................................................................................... 16 v 1. Government procurement standards do not create private rights. ................................................................................................... 18 2. Even if procurement standards could create private rights, the Losing Plans waived them. .................................................. 19 B. Commissioner Young’s authority does not depend on how she or other HHSC officials apply procurement standards. ............................. 27 1. Commissioner Young’s authority. ....................................................... 29 2. Commands are distinct from consequences. ........................................ 30 3. The procurement standards the Losing Plans rely on are not conditions on Commissioner Young’s authority. ................................. 33 C. Commissioner Young’s unconstrained discretion precludes the Losing Plans’ ultra vires claims. ................................................................. 36 1. Commissioner Young’s ultimate and unrestrained objective in the procurement process is to interpret collateral law. ..................... 37 2. Commissioner Young has unconstrained discretion to procure for best value. ......................................................................... 41 3. No specific, substantive, or objective standards govern Commissioner Young’s exercise of judgment. ..................................... 45 II. Alternatively, the Losing Plans’ Claims Should Be Dismissed Without Prejudice for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.......................................................................................................... 53 III. Equitable Factors Do Not Support the Temporary Injunction......................... 55 A. The status quo is Commissioner Young’s authority to procure STAR CHIP contracts. .............................................................................. 56 B. The Losing Plans have no probable right to relief. ..................................... 56 C. The Losing Plans’ claimed irreparable harm arises from the expiration of their contracts, not HHSC’s reprocurement. ....................... 56 D. The balance of the equities weighs against the Losing Plans...................... 58 Conclusion and Prayer ........................................................................................... 59 Certificate of Compliance ...................................................................................... 61 vi Appendix Tab 1 Order denying Commissioner Young’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and Granting Plaintiffs’ Application for Temporary Injunction PX38: STAR CHIP Request for Proposals Tex. Gov’t Code § 522.0051 Tex. Gov’t Code § 523.051 Tex. Gov’t Code § 525.0101 Tex. Gov’t Code § 532.0051 Tex. Gov’t Code § 540.0051 Tex. Gov’t Code § 540.0203 Tex. Gov’t Code § 540.0204 Tex. Gov’t Code § 540.0206 Tex. Gov’t Code § 543A.0052 Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.076 Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.144 Tex. Health & Safety Code § 62.051 Tex. Health & Safety Code § 62.053 Tex. Health & Safety Code § 62.055 Tex. Health & Safety Code § 62.155 Act of May 29, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 1170, § 1, art. IX, sec. [17].09 1 Tex. Admin. Code 91.101 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.209 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.307 1 Tex. Admin Code § 111.3 (1997) vii Table of Authorities Page(s) Cases AC Ints., L.P. v. TCEQ, 543 S.W.3d 703 (Tex. 2018) ................................................................................ 35 Acker v. Tex. Water Comm’n, 790 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1990) ................................................................................ 37 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320 (2015) ............................................................................................ 35 Ascendant Servs., LLC v. United States, 160 Fed. Cl. 275 (2022) .......................................................................................51 Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................19, 20, 24 Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas v. Duenez, 201 S.W.3d 674 (Tex. 2006) ................................................................................ 53 Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002) ................................................................................. 54 Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. 2016) ................................................................................ 56 City of Dall. v. Dall. Consol. Elec. St. Ry., 148 S.W. 292 (Tex. 1912) .................................................................................... 16 City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) .......................................................................... 15, 35 City of Hous. v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. 2013) ................................................................................ 53 City of Hous. v. Gomez, 716 S.W.3d 161 (Tex. 2025)................................................................................. 12 Cobb v. Harrington, 190 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. 1945) .................................................................................15 Dall. Cnty. v. Sweitzer, 881 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied) ...................................... 56 viii Davis v. State, 12 S.W. 957 (Tex. 1889) ...................................................................................... 30 Delta Data Sys. Corp. v. Webster, 744 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ............................................................................. 36 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ............................................................................................ 16 Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1997)..................................................................................15 Fort Worth Cavalry Club v. Sheppard, 83 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1935) ...................................................................................31 Foxwood Homeowners Ass’n v. Ricles, 673 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984), writ ref’d n.r.e.) .......... 54 French v. Edwards, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 506 (1872) .............................................................................. 30 Friends of Canyon Lake, Inc. v. Guadalupe–Blanco River Auth., 96 S.W.3d 519 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) ....................................... 30 Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. 2017) ..................................................................... 27, 36, 39 Hayes Int’l Corp. v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1975) ............................................................................... 39 Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. 2001).................................................................................. 35 Honors Acad., Inc. v. TEA, 555 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. 2018) .................................................................................. 28 Hous. Belt & Terminal Ry. v. City of Hous., 487 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. 2016) ..................................................................... 36, 44, 45 In re Morris, 663 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. 2023) .......................................................................... 30, 45 In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) ................................................................................ 18 In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. 2023) ................................................................................ 12 ix In re State, 692 S.W.3d 466 (Tex. 2021) ................................................................................ 55 In re Stetson Renewables Holdings, LLC, 658 S.W.3d 292 (Tex. 2022) .............................................................. 28, 29, 32, 35 Indus. Specialists, LLC v. Blanchard Ref. Co., 652 S.W.3d 11 (Tex. 2022) ............................................................................ 44, 45 Janek v. Gonzalez, 2013 WL 1748795 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) ........................................ 53 Jessen Assocs., Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1975) ..................................................................................31 K-Con, Inc. v. Sec’y of Army, 908 F.3d 719 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ....................................................................... 24, 25 Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Farrow, 580 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1978) ............................................................................. 36 Labatt Food Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .............................................................................51 Landry’s Seafood Inn & Oyster Bar-Kemah, Inc. v. Wiggins, 919 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet.) ...................... 58 Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Shannon, 100 S.W. 138 (Tex. 1907) .................................................................................... 16 Morath v. Kingsville ISD, 710 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. App.—15th Court 2025, no pet.)...........................27, 30, 40 Morath v. Pecos-Barstow-Toyah ISD, 2025 WL 1833467 (Tex. App.—15th Court 2025, no pet.) ................................. 27 Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421 (Tex. 2011)................................................................................. 33 Packard Elevator v. I.C.C., 782 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1986)................................................................................ 56 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940) ..............................................................................................17 Phillips v. McNeill, 635 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2021) .................................................................................15 x Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. 1993) ................................................................................ 57 S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. 2022) ............................................................................... 32 Sanchez v. Saghian, 2009 WL 3248266 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) .................. 56 Schroeder v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Ass’n, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. 2022) .......................................................................... 35, 39 State ex rel. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. VitaPro Foods, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. 1999) ............................................................................... 31, 32 State v. $435,000, 842 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1992) ............................................................................... 33 State v. Hollins, 620 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. 2020) ............................................................................... 56 State v. Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. 2024) ................................................................................ 12 State v. Reagan Cnty. Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.) ........................... 32 State v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 526 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1975) ................................................................................ 55 TEA v. Devereux Tex. League City, 2023 WL 3325932 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, no pet.) ....................................... 45 TEA v. Hous. ISD, 660 S.W.3d 108 (Tex. 2023)................................................................................ 27 Terrell v. Kasch, 10 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. App.—Austin 1928, writ ref’d) ......................................... 16 Tex. Highway Comm’n v. El Paso Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 234 S.W.2d 857 (1950) ................................................................................... 17, 39 Tex. Logos, L.P. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 241 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) ............................................ 32 Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. RW Trophy Ranch, Ltd., 712 S.W.3d 943 (Tex. App.—15th Court 2025, mandamus denied) ................... 39 xi Tex. State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 343 S.W.2d 242 (1961) ................................................................................... 56, 57 Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr. v. Niehay, 671 S.W.3d 929 (Tex. 2023) ................................................................................ 38 Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. 2006)................................................................................ 53 TMRJ Holdings, Inc. v. Inhance Techs., LLC, 540 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) ......................... 27 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993) .............................................................................................. 30 Warrior Focused Sols., LLC v. United States, 175 Fed. Cl. 416 (2025) ....................................................................................... 19 Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ............................................................................. 56 Constitutional Provisions Tex. Const. art. I, § 13 ............................................................................................. 11 Statutes Act of May 29, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 1170, § 1, art. IX, sec. [17].09(b)(4) ... 20, 41 Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.016(2)–(3) ................................................................................................. 35 § 523.0051 .......................................................................................................... 28 § 524.0001(b) ..................................................................................................... 40 § 525.0101........................................................................................................... 28 § 532.0051 .......................................................................................................... 29 § 540.0051 ..................................................................................................... 10, 21 § 540.0051(a)(1)(B), (a)(6) ................................................................................. 48 § 540.0203.......................................................................................................... 47 § 540.0203(a) ............................................................................................ 6, 11, 33 § 540.0204 ......................................................................................................... 45 §§ 540.0204, 543A.0052 .................................................................................... 21 § 540.0204(1) ............................................................................................... 10, 22 § 540.0204(3) .......................................................................................... 10, 23, 46 § 540.0206 .................................................................................................. passim § 543A.0052 ....................................................................................................... 46 xii § 543A.0052(d) .................................................................................................. 10 § 2155.076 .................................................................................................... 18, 29 § 2155.076(a) ................................................................................................. 34, 37 § 2155.083(j) ...................................................................................................... 33 § 2155.131 ............................................................................................................51 § 2155.144.................................................................................................... passim § 2155.144(b), (b-1)(2) ........................................................................................ 37 § 2155.144(c)–(d)................................................................................................ 40 § 2155.144(d), (d)(11) ......................................................................................... 42 § 2155.144(d)(5) ................................................................................................. 44 § 2155.144(f ) ...................................................................................................... 42 § 2155.444(a) ...................................................................................................... 46 Tex. Health & Safety Code § 62.051 .......................................................................................................... 2, 47 § 62.051(e) ..................................................................................................... 11, 47 § 62.052(1) ......................................................................................................... 28 § 62.053(3) ..................................................................................................... 8, 49 § 62.155 ........................................................................................................ 29, 49 § 62.155(c)(1)...................................................................................................... 49 Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 32.021(a)............................................................................. 2 Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 252.061 ............................................................................................................ 33 §§ 252.061(2), 262.003 ...................................................................................... 39 Agency Materials 12 Tex. Reg. 2986 (Sept. [4], 1987) ........................................................................... 19 12 Tex. Reg. 4523 (Dec. [4], 1987) ............................................................................ 18 Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment and Program Characteristics: 2021 (2023) .............................................................. 3 HHSC, Request for Public Comment on Best Value Criteria for STAR & CHIP Managed Care Procurement (Apr. 28, 2022) .......................................................... 4 In re Armorworks Enters., LLC, B-400394, 2008 WL 4415709 (Comp. Gen. 2008)............................................. 24 In re DynCorp Int’l LLC, B-415349, 2018 WL 397133 (Comp. Gen. 2018)) ............................................... 19 xiii In re Veterans2work, Inc., B-416935, 2019 WL 497577 (Comp. Gen. 2019)................................................. 20 STAR CHIP Managed Care Services, Electronic State Business Daily, https://tinyurl.com/zyc7j889 (Addendum No. 2 HHSC Responses to Questions) ............................................................................................................ 6 Star Kids, Tex. Health & Hum. Servs., https://tinyurl.com/7a22ann5 .................... 3 Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0685 (2008) ..............................................................17 Other Authorities Marshall J. Doke, Jr., State and Local Government Bidding Preferences, 42 Procurement Law 7 (Summer 2007) ............................................................. 46 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57:5 (8th ed.)..................... 34 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (unabr. 2002 ed.) ............................................................................................................ 48 xiv Statutory Changes During this appeal (on April 1, 2025), several provisions of the Government Code relevant to the appeal moved locations. Molina cites the current statutes and parenthetically notes their prior location. For ease of reference, here is a key to the changes: Out-of-Date Government Current Location in the Code Provisions Cited in the Government Code District Court § 533.002 § 540.0051 § 533.003(a) § 540.0204 § 533.0035 § 540.0203 § 533.004 § 540.0206 § 536.052 § 543A.0052 xv Statement of the Case Nature of the Appellees, disappointed bidders in an HHSC procurement, sued Case: the agency’s apex official, Appellant Commissioner Young, under an ultra vires theory, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to halt the awarding, execution, and performance of Medicaid and CHIP managed care contracts under the STAR CHIP and STAR Kids requests for proposals (RFPs). CR.3308–41, 3510–57, 4231– 82, 4716–65 (live petitions). Trial Court: 353rd Judicial District Court, Travis County, Cause No. D-1-GN- 24-003839, Hon. Laurie Eiserloh Course of Appellees applied for a temporary injunction, CR.3339–40, 3549, Proceedings: 4276, 4762–63, and Commissioner Young filed a plea to the jurisdiction, CR.2949–3113. The district court considered both at a multi-day evidentiary hearing. [5].RR–8.RR. Trial Court The district court denied Commissioner Young’s plea to the Disposition: jurisdiction and entered a temporary injunction enjoining Commissioner Young “and all other persons or entities in active concert or participation with” Commissioner Young “from awarding, signing, entering into, executing, implementing, or otherwise taking action to effectuate or perform any contracts resulting from or in connection with the STAR & CHIP RFP or to further the procurement or contracting process for the STAR & CHIP RFP.” CR.5875–5884. The district court granted similar injunctive relief as to the STAR Kids RFP. CR.5883. xvi Statement Regarding Oral Argument Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc. respectfully requests oral argument. This ap- peal presents important questions about the proper role of each branch of govern- ment in ongoing state procurements. At stake are not only the immediate procure- ments but also the broader rules that govern how disappointed bidders may (or may not) enlist courts to halt state contracting. The Court’s resolution will have signifi- cant implications for how procurement disputes are handled in Texas and for the scope of judicial involvement in ongoing agency proceedings. Oral argument will give the Court the opportunity to probe the doctrinal boundaries of ultra vires claims, test the interplay between procurement statutes and sovereign immunity, and ensure clarity in an area of law with far-reaching consequences. xvii Issues Presented contracts with MCOs to provide, arrange for, and coordinate Covered Services for enrolled CHIP Members.” 12.RR.DX54.011. “As of August 2021, contracted MCOs participating in CHIP served an estimated 213,213 Members statewide.” 12.RR.DX54.007. HHSC has discretion to “coordinate [CHIP] with the Medicaid program.” 12.RR.DX.54.006 (quoting Tex. Health & Safety Code § 62.053(3)).
[*2]Another Medicaid program, STAR Kids, is the subject of a separate ongoing procurement that uses the same best value structure as STAR CHIP. MCOs have submitted STAR Kids proposals, but oral presentations have yet to occur, and HHSC has not issued a notice of selected vendors. STAR Kids beneficiaries are up to 20 years old and have disabilities. Star Kids, HHSC, https://tinyurl.com/7a22ann5 (last visited Sept. 15, 2025). As of 2021, MCOs participating in STAR Kids served an es- timated 168,194 members statewide. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Med- icaid Managed Care Enrollment and Program Characteristics: 2021 at 151–152 (2023), https://tinyurl.com/3sckypp7.
B. The STAR CHIP procurement process
The current STAR CHIP procurement began in 2019, when HHSC hired Mercer Health Benefits to assess HHSC’s managed care evaluation tools and proce- dures. [9].RR.PX92.002. Mercer’s report focused primarily on the development and assessment of best value criteria. Id. The report discussed forming a workgroup to determine: (1) the criteria’s content, weighting of best value criteria for the questions comprising the competition, and submission requirements, 9.RR.PX19.011–012; (2) the process for finalizing and approving the criteria, 9.RR.PX19.015–018; and (3) the process for evaluating proposals against the criteria, 9.RR.PX19.021–028.
[*3]Building on Mercer’s recommendations, HHSC’s Medicaid Managed Care Procurement Collaboration Committee began to develop the evaluation process for the STAR CHIP procurement. [9].RR.PX92.002. HHSC then solicited public input on HHSC’s proposed best value criteria. CR.4833 n.9. 1 And HHSC staff met with MCOs, including the Losing Plans, in “pre-solicitation meetings, so to speak, where the managed care organizations could come in and look at [HHSC’s] best value cri- teria and give us feedback on that criteria.” 6.RR.198:5–199:3; 6.RR.195:22–196:3.
1. The STAR CHIP RFP
The result of that process was the STAR CHIP Request for Proposals (RFP), released December 2022, after approval from the multiagency Contract Advisory Team and the federal government. See CR.942, 1997; see also Molina Resp. to Mots. for Temp. Relief at 7–8, 19–20. HHSC planned to have new STAR CHIP contracts in place by February 2025. See 9.RR.PX38.010.
The STAR CHIP RFP advised that HHSC’s conception of best value would guide its evaluation of proposals: “HHSC shall make an award to the Respondent that, in HHSC’s sole determination, provides the best value to the State of Texas as set out in this Solicitation.” 9.RR.PX38.021 (emphasis added). The RFP clearly set out what best value meant to HHSC, and informed vendors that scores on their
1 See HHSC, Request for Public Comment on Best Value Criteria for STAR & CHIP Managed Care Procurement (Apr. 28, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/2zshb6j5 (archived Feb. 27, 2023); see also 6.RR.196:4–6.
[*4]answers to the RFP’s Technical Questions would be tied to HHSC’s best value cri- terion. See 9.RR.PX38.025–026, .033–040; see also 9.RR.PX290 (RFP sample scoring rubric); 12.RR.DX54 (RFP scope of work); CR.1905 (RFP exhibit stating how many points were available for each Technical Question).
The RFP also detailed how HHSC would select MCOs for awards. HHSC would evaluate proposals on a 2000-point scale—1800 points available for responses to 18 Technical Questions, and 200 points available for Oral Presentations. HHSC intended to make 45 awards across the State’s 13 service areas (three to five MCOs per area). 9.RR.PX38.029–030. HHSC would not award an MCO more than seven service areas. [9].RR.PX38.029–030. The only exception to this rubric was for MCOs linked to hospital districts under Government Code § 540.0206, “Mandatory Con- tracts.” And the RFP stated that HHSC would award no more than one mandatory contract in any service area. [9].RR.PX38.030.
HHSC followed up the release of the RFP with multiple opportunities for pro- spective MCOs to ask questions about the procurement. HHSC held a pre-proposal conference for prospective MCOs. See 9.PX.38.010. And the RFP offered MCOs an opportunity to submit questions about the solicitation, while cautioning that failing to alert HHSC to “any ambiguity, conflict, discrepancy, exclusionary specification, or other error” in the RFP by the deadline for questions would “waive[] any claim of error.” 9.PX.38.011–013. HHSC answered 110 vendor questions, several of which pertained to the best value criteria, and HHSC incorporated the questions and an- swers into the RFP at Addendum 2. See STAR CHIP Managed Care Services, Elec- tronic State Business Daily, https://tinyurl.com/zyc7j889 (Addendum No. 2 HHSC Responses to Questions). “No issue was raised as to the location or inclusion of [any] statutory preferences in the” RFP’s “BVCs [best value criteria] or Technical Ques- tions in the Vendor Q&A or pre-solicitation meetings.” 9.RR.PX157.002 n.3; see also 9.RR.PX158.005 n.9.
[*5]Following submissions, HHSC evaluated the MCOs and certified that each is reasonably able to fulfill the contract terms, including all federal and state law require- ments, as required by Government Code § 540.0203(a). See, e.g., 9.RR.PX.84; (cer- tification); 9.RR.PX.192.
[*6]it ranked eighth, eleventh, and twelfth. See id. Neither Cook Children’s (eighth place with 1,826 points)—competing for only its single current service area—nor Texas Children’s (fourteenth place with 1,636 points)—competing for only its two current service areas—were selected to serve in any service area. See id.
[*7]review is limited to the Deputy Commissioner for Procurement’s determination and is the final decision on protest issues, id. § 391.307(d)(3), that review, too, concerns whether a “specific statute or regulation has been violated.”
HHSC generally does not award contracts when protests are pending. Id. § 391.309. b. Wellpoint’s solicitation protest
Only one of the Losing Plans—Wellpoint—submitted a timely solicitation protest in the STAR CHIP procurement. Wellpoint raised a single objection: that it would be improper to award CHIP contracts to the MCOs awarded mandatory con- tracts under Government Code § 540.0206. Wellpoint argued that because the man- datory contracts statute only applies to Medicaid, and CHIP is not a Medicaid pro- gram, attaching CHIP awards to STAR awards in the case of mandatory contracts was inconsistent with certain statutes. See 9.RR.PX44; but see, e.g., Tex. Health & Safety Code § 62.053(3) (allowing HHSC to “coordinate” Medicaid and CHIP).
The Deputy Commissioner for Procurement denied Wellpoint’s protest, and Commissioner Young denied Wellpoint’s appeal. CR.1956, 1996. Wellpoint did not respond with an ultra vires claim. Instead, Wellpoint voluntarily submitted to evalu- ation and award under the RFP as written.
There were no administrative protests of the terms of the STAR Kids RFP. c. The Losing Plans’ award protests
In the wake of the Notice of Intent to Award, eight MCOs filed protests, in- cluding the four plaintiffs here. See 6.RR.131:2–15. The Deputy Commissioner for Procurement denied each of the protests in eight separate “determination letters.” 5.RR.147:6–9; 9.RR.PX155; 9.RR.PX157–59. All eight protesting MCOs appealed to Commissioner Young. [6].RR.131:11–15. Those appeals remain pending.
[*8]C. Procedural history
Rather than await the result of their respective administrative appeals, the Los- ing Plans sued. Because the Legislature has not provided for judicial review of state procurement decisions, the Losing Plans sued Commissioner Young, attempting to plead ultra vires claims. Their claims merely parrot their administrative filings, rela- beling protest grounds as ultra vires acts. Compare, e.g., CR.3531–49 (Superior live petition), and CR.4719–20 (Texas Children’s live petition), with CR.1567–94 (Supe- rior’s protest), and CR.5800–01 (Texas Children’s protest).
The Losing Plans seek to permanently stop Commissioner Young from decid- ing their appeals, completing the procurement, or executing and performing the re- sulting contracts. See CR.3308–41, 3510–57, 4231–82, 4716–65. But the Losing Plans’ petitions do not claim, and they never tried to prove, that any of the errors they allege prejudiced them or caused the result of the STAR CHIP procurement to be any dif- ferent than it would have been had the alleged errors not occurred.
The Losing Plans also applied for temporary injunctive relief enjoining the STAR CHIP and STAR Kids procurements. See id.; CR.3339–40. Commissioner Young opposed the applications for a temporary injunction and filed a plea to the jurisdiction. CR.2949–3113. The district court held a multiday evidentiary hearing on the Losing Plans’ application and Commissioner Young’s plea to the jurisdiction in which high-ranking HHSC officials were forced to justify the agency’s procure- ment decisions. See 5.RR–8.RR. At the hearing’s conclusion, the Losing Plans pressed seven purportedly ultra vires acts (CR.5841): The district court denied Commissioner Young’s plea to the jurisdiction and entered a sweeping temporary injunction. [5].RR–8.RR; CR.5875–5884. The district court concluded that various “statutory and regulatory violations” occurred during the STAR CHIP procurement and leading up to HHSC’s notices of intent to award contracts from that procurement. CR.5878. In addition to accepting alleged violations pressed by the Losing Plans, the district court also found two other statu- tory and regulatory violations:
[*9][*10]1. The procurement purportedly violated Government Code § 540.0203(a)
(née § 533.0035(a)) and Health & Safety Code § 62.051(e) because HHSC sup-
posedly failed “to evaluate and certify that MCOs are reasonably able to fulfill the terms of the STAR contract . . . and to review MCOs to confirm their ability to
fulfill the requirements of the CHIP contract,” CR.5877; and 2. HHSC’s protest determinations purportedly violated 1 Texas Administrative
Code § 391.307(d)(1) by “refusing to consider as untimely any information sub- mitted in supplemental protests and/or after the protest filing deadline . . . when good cause for delay is shown,” CR.5878.
The district court found that any single one of these purported “statutory or regulatory violations” is alone sufficient to make the “intended contract awards . . . invalid and unlawful.” Id. 3 As a result, the district court concluded, any “further execution and implementation of such intended contract awards will be ul- tra vires acts.” Id.
The district court’s temporary injunction enjoins Commissioner Young “and all other persons or entities in active concert or participation with” Commissioner Young “from awarding, signing, entering into, executing, implementing, or other- wise taking action to effectuate or perform any contracts resulting from or in connec- tion with the STAR & CHIP RFP or to further the procurement or contracting pro- cess for the STAR & CHIP RFP.” CR.5875–5884. The district court granted similar injunctive relief as to the STAR Kids RFP. CR.5883.
[*11]Molina intervened and appealed the temporary injunction. CR.5946–52, 5964–67.
D. The intervening legislative session
The Court abated this appeal during the most recent legislative session. Dur- ing that session, a handful legislators introduced ten bills that would have impacted the noticed awards, such as by suspending the awards or creating a new statutory scheme in line with the Losing Plans’ desires (House Bills 2388, 3538, 5183, 5184, 5185, and 5284; and Senate Bills 2331; 2547, 2548, and 2988), but none progressed even to a hearing. A rider to the General Appropriations Act targeting the procure- ment also failed.
Standard of Review
Orders on temporary injunctions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, State v. Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215, 226 (Tex. 2024), but courts of appeals “review legal determi- nations de novo,” id., and a trial court always “abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d 289, 302 (Tex. 2023).
[*12]Summary of the Argument
The district court’s temporary injunction rests on the Losing Plans’ ultra vires claims. CR.5878–79. But the Losing Plans’ allegations and evidence do not satisfy the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity. The Losing Plans’ claims fail to over- come sovereign immunity for multiple independent reasons and thus should have been dismissed with prejudice. See Part I.
At the outset, the Losing Plans lack the interest necessary to satisfy the ultra vires exception. See Part I.A. Viable ultra vires claims require more than disappoint- ment; they require an invasion of rights. But the procurement standards the Losing Plans invoke are directives to government, not private rights enforceable in court. See Part I.A.[1]. And even if they were private rights, the Losing Plans waived those rights by sitting silent until after losing. See Part I.A.[2].
Still more, the Losing Plans’ ultra vires theory is fatally incomplete. See Part I.B. Sovereign immunity yields when a plaintiff shows that an official threatens to act without authority. The Legislature has expressly vested in Commissioner Young au- thority to procure managed care contracts, and to execute and perform those con- tracts. See Part I.B.[1]. Even so, the Losing Plans say Commissioner Young lacks that authority here because the STAR CHIP procurement offended various procurement standards. But that flawed logic fails to appreciate the difference between commands and consequences. See Part I.B.[2]. None of the standards the Losing Plans invoke withdraws Commissioner Young’s express authority, so none can support the Losing Plans’ claims. See Part I.B.[3].
[*13]Beyond those antecedent defects, the Losing Plans’ claims run aground on Commissioner Young’s unconstrained discretion to interpret and apply the stand- ards governing the challenged procurements. See Part I.C. The Legislature estab- lished a procurement system that delegates to state agencies authority and discretion to interpret collateral laws related to the agency’s procurement processes—often- overlapping purposes, considerations, preferences, etc. Those interpretations are not subject to second-guessing in an ultra vires suit. See Part I.C.[1]. If that were not enough, the Legislature specifically delegated authority to Commissioner Young to: (a) procure things like managed care contracts according to “best value,” and (b) the unconstrained discretion to determine what constitutes “best value” in a particular procurement. See Part I.C.[2]. And none of the standards the Losing Plans rely on includes the type of specific, substantive, or objective standards necessary to subject Commissioner Young’s exercise of discretion to review in an ultra vires suit. See Part I.C.[3].
The deficiencies in the Losing Plans’ ultra vires claims are not the only juris- dictional defect the district court overlooked. Procurement disputes are within HHSC’s exclusive jurisdiction at least until a disappointed bidder exhausts the pro- test and appeal process. The Losing Plans have not exhausted that process, so the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate their claims. See Part II.
Finally, even if the district court had jurisdiction, its temporary injunction is an abuse of discretion because it alters the status quo, the Losing Plans do not have a probable right to relief, the Losing Plans failed to show irreparable harm, and the bal- ance of the equities weighs against the Losing Plans. See Part III.
[*14]Argument
I. The Losing Plans’ Claims Fail to Overcome Sovereign Immunity, and Should Be Dismissed with Prejudice.
The ultra vires doctrine provides that “an action to determine or protect a private party’s rights against a state official who has acted ultra vires—that is, without legal or statutory authority—is not a suit against the State that sovereign immunity bars.” Phillips v. McNeill, 635 S.W.3d 620, 628 (Tex. 2021). The Losing Plans’ claims do not overcome sovereign immunity because the Losing Plans’ rights are not at stake, and because the Losing Plans cannot show that Commissioner Young lacks authority to complete the underlying procurements and to execute and perform the resulting contracts.
A. The Losing Plans lack sufficient interest to maintain their ultra vires claims.
Ultra vires claims are an accepted exception to sovereign immunity only be- cause they are necessary to “protect a private party’s rights against a state official” acting without authority or failing to perform a ministerial act. Phillips, 635 S.W.3d at 628. Protecting a “private party’s rights” is thus at the heart of “the rationale be- hind” the ultra vires exception. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 370 (Tex. 2009) (quoting Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. 1997) (emphasis added)); accord Cobb v. Harrington, 190 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex. 1945) (“[A]n action against the officials by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the determination and protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.”).
[*15]That feature of modern ultra vires law has a strong pedigree. An invasion of private rights has always been a fundamental prerequisite of equitable actions against state officials. Paralleling Ex parte Young, it has been “well settled” for at least a cen- tury in Texas “that [an] injunction is a proper remedy to prevent a public officer from exceeding his authority under the law when such conduct seriously invades the private rights of an individual without a corresponding benefit to the public.” Terrell v. Kasch,
10 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. App.—Austin 1928, writ ref’d) (emphasis added). 4 As a result, “without such invasion of rights there can be no lawful exercise of judicial authority” against government officials. City of Dall. v. Dall. Consol. Elec. St. Ry., 148 S.W. 292, 295 (Tex. 1912). 5
The Losing Plans have the understandable desire to acquire valuable govern- ment contracts. But that desire is insufficient for an ultra vires claim. The Losing Plans lack sufficient interest because the procurement standards they rely on do not create rights. And even pretending the procurement standards the Losing Plans raise could bestow rights, the Losing Plans waived those rights for the STAR CHIP pro- curement by failing to raise any objection until HHSC had completed its evaluation of proposals and noticed its intent to award. For either reason, the Losing Plans may not invoke the equitable power of the courts to interfere with the underlying procure- ments.
[*16]1. Government procurement standards do not create private rights.
The Supreme Court has made clear that legislative directives instructing agen- cies how to go about procuring goods and services are “not intended to be a bestowal of litigable rights upon those desirous of selling to the Government.” Tex. Highway Comm’n v. El Paso Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 234 S.W.2d 857, 860 (1950); see also Molina Resp. to Mots. for Temporary Relief 16–20 ( July 24, 2025); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0685 (2008) (“Other than requiring each state agency to develop and adopt rules to resolve vendor protests, we find no provision in the Purchasing Act by which a bidder or any other person can compel a state agency to reconsider the ap- plication of bidding preferences.”).
Texas Highway Commission relied on Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940), which explained that when the Legislature “lay[s] down guide posts by which its agents are to proceed in . . . procurement,” it does so “for the purpose of keeping its own house.” Id. at 127. A procurement standard thus “create[s] duties to the Gov- ernment alone.” Id. It “is a self-imposed restraint for violation of which the Govern- ment—but not private litigants—can complain.” Id.
With no rights at stake, the Losing Plans may not invoke the ultra vires excep- tion to sovereign immunity.
[*17]2. Even if procurement standards could create private rights, the Losing Plans waived them.
Even if procurement standards could create rights, rights may be waived, in- cluding by failing to comply with required procedures. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 130 (Tex. 2004). The Losing Plans waived any rights they may have had in most of the procurement standards they now raise, because they sat on those hypothetical rights when they should have been invoking them.
The Waiver Rule
Protests raising issues apparent on the face of a “solicitation”—here, the STAR CHIP RFP—“must be filed no later than the date that responses . . . are due.”
1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.305(a)(1). Failure to timely protest results in waiver. Id. § 391.307(d)(1) 6; see also 9.PX.38.011 (additional waiver rule in RFP § 2.2).
The Legislature endorsed the waiver rule in 1997, when it amended the Pur- chasing Act to direct agencies to “develop and adopt protest procedures . . . con- sistent with the comptroller’s [previously the State Purchasing and General Services Commission’s] rules.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.076 (emphasis added). At that time, the Comptroller’s predecessor agencies had a similar waiver rule. See 1 Tex. Admin Code § 111.3(a), (i) (1997) 7; 12 Tex. Reg. 4523, 4523 (Dec. [4], 1987) (adopting original
1 Tex. Admin Code § 111.3(a), (i), without change as proposed in 12 Tex. Reg. 2986, 2986–87 (Sept. [4], 1987)). The Legislature essentially directed other agencies to adopt the waiver rule, which HHSC did.
[*18]Texas’s waiver rule mirrors the federal practice. Protests submitted to federal agencies that are “based on alleged improprieties in a solicitation shall be filed before bid opening or the closing date for receipt of proposals.” 48 C.F.R. § 33.103(e); accord
4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(1) (analogous rule of the Government Accountability Office). Thus, “a protester may not wait until after an award has been made to protest alleged flaws in a procurement’s ground rules that are apparent prior to submitting its pro- posal.” In re DynCorp Int’l LLC, B-415349, 2018 WL 397133, *7 (Comp. Gen. 2018)). “The government must conduct acquisitions in accordance with applicable law. However, a bidder with knowledge of a solicitation defect may not choose to stay silent when submitting its proposal.” Warrior Focused Sols., LLC v. United States, 175 Fed. Cl. 416, 426 (2025).
Alleged defects in a solicitation that are not protested before proposals are due are forever waived. See, e.g., 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.307(d)(1); Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[A] party who has the opportunity to object to the terms of a government solicitation containing a patent error and fails to do so prior to the close of the bidding process waives its ability to raise the same objection subsequently in a bid protest action in the Court of Federal Claims.”). Commissioner Young may consider an untimely protest in specific cir- cumstances. See 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.307(d)(1). But that is Commissioner Young’s right; not the protesting party’s. Contra CR.5878.
[*19]The goals of the waiver rule are manifest and manifold. It discourages sand- bagging, promotes fairness, and preserves resources:
In the absence of a waiver rule, a contractor with knowledge of a solicitation defect could choose to stay si- lent when submitting its first proposal. If its first proposal loses to another bidder, the contractor could then come forward with the defect to restart the bidding process, per- haps with increased knowledge of its competitors. A waiver rule thus prevents contractors from taking ad- vantage of the government and other bidders, and avoids costly after-the-fact litigation. Blue & Gold Fleet, 492 F.3d at 1314; cf. CR.4186 (Wellpoint hoping HHSC will “have to cancel the procurement and restart it”). The rule also helpfully ensures that “chal- lenges to the fundamental ground rules by which a competition is conducted [are] resolved as early as practicable during the solicitation process” and “without unduly disrupting or delaying the procurement process.” In re Veterans2work, Inc., B-416935, 2019 WL 497577, at *3 (Comp. Gen. 2019). Indeed, the Legislature directed HHSC (and other procuring agencies) to “[e]nsure that contract award decisions are deter- mined based on best value criteria established in solicitation documents.” Act of May 29, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 1170, § 1, art. IX, sec. [17].09(b)(4), 2023 Tex. Gen. Laws 3573, 4510 (emphasis added).
The Losing Plans have made the alleged obviousness of the procurement de- fects a central feature of their case. They have walked themselves into waiver.
Preferences, Considerations, Continuity of Care, and Past Performance
The Losing Plans insist, for example, that HHSC erred by failing to give pref- erences during its evaluation of proposals as supposedly required by Government Code §§ 540.0204, 543A.0052 (née §§ 533.003, 536.052). See, e.g., CR.5841–45. They also claim HHSC failed to consider or document past performance as suppos- edly required by Government Code § 2155.144. See, e.g., CR.5845–47. They also claim that HHSC failed to promote continuity of care, as supposedly required by Government Code § 540.0051 (née § 533.002). See, e.g., CR.5848–49. These errors are plain, they say, because the RFP did not ask for the information HHSC needed to comply with those statutes.
[*20]From their opening at the evidentiary hearing:
[HHSC] did not ask the health plans – they did not ask us for the information. They didn’t even put in the questions the information that you would need to find out about past performance or quality initiatives or continuity of care. [8]
And again:
The various statutes require HHSC to give a preference. There are some of the statutes that require them to consider specific factors. And it’s simply impossible for the defendant and HHSC to have considered or to give preference if they did not ask in the RFP for the respondents to provide that information so that they had information on all of the respondents. . . . But if the question is not asked, and if the data is not assembled for all of the respondents, then it’s impossible to actually give consideration or preference. [9]
This theme continued in their questioning of HHSC’s Deputy Commissioner for Procurement. For example:
8 5.RR.30:5–9 (emphases added); see also, e.g., Children’s Plans Mot. for Temp. Relief at 37 ( July 10, 2025) (“[T]he procurement did not ask bidders for data or evidence about successful imple- mentation of existing or prior quality initiatives,” and “did not ask bidders to submit information on their past performances.”). 9 5.RR.49:7–22 (emphases added).
[*21]Q. Well, it didn’t mention the word “preference”; correct? A. Yes. I mean, the word “preference” is not in the RFP. 10
And here:
Q. Now, in the RFP, HHSC did not specifically ask about past vendor performance, did it? A. No. Q. And the published evaluation criteria in the RFP don’t use the words “past performance,” do they? A. No. 11
The Losing Plans also object that the RFP did not provide a preference for MCOs whose provider networks include “each health care provider in the region who has traditionally provided care to Medicaid and charity care patients.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 540.0204(1) (née § 533.003(a)(1)). The structure of the RFP—which required each MCO to submit a single statewide proposal no matter the number of service areas for which they were competing—prevented such region-by-region as- sessments:
Q. Now, Section 533.003(a)(1) uses the word “region”; right? . . . A. I think region’s there, yes. Q. Okay. But the responses to the RFP weren’t broken down by region, were they? A. No. It was a statewide procurement. 12
10 5.RR.86:2–5 (emphasis added). 11 5.RR.105:18–23 (emphases added). 12 5.RR.97:15–23 (emphases added); see also, e.g., Children’s Plans Mot. at 38 (“[T]he STAR & CHIP procurement did not ask bidders to provide information about charity care providers in their Mandatory Contracts
[*22]The Losing Plans also complain HHSC violated Government Code § 2155.144 and the Health & Safety Code by automatically awarding CHIP service areas to MCOs entitled to mandatory Medicaid contracts in those areas under Government Code § 540.0206 (née § 533.004). See CR.5849–50. But they acknowledge that HHSC’s approach was clear from the RFP, which “does not provide a separate pro- cess for awarding CHIP contracts to respondents that also meet section 533.004’s requirements for mandatory Medicaid contracts.” Superior Mot. for Temp. Relief at 5–6 ( July 10, 2025). That is why Wellpoint protested on this ground before submis- sions were due, noting that “courts and administrative bodies throughout the coun- try routinely hold that legal infirmities evident on the face of a procurements specifi- cations must be raised at the outset of the procurement.” CR.1961. The rest of the Losing Plans did not, and therefore waived their identical complaints.
Different Populations
Another alleged flaw in the procurement was HHSC’s supposed failure to “consider the need to use different managed care plans to meet the needs of different populations.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 540.0204(3) (née § 533.003(a)(3)); CR.5850–81. But the Losing Plans concede that this supposed flaw is plain from the very nature of the RFP, which “is conducted in a statewide manner,” CR.5850, and because the
existing networks.”); Superior Mot. for Temp. Relief at 13 ( July 10, 2025) (“[T]he proposals were not divided by region because the RFP was a statewide procurement, and there was no scoring based on region.”); id. at 14 (“[N]othing in the RFP asked respondents to provide information about their existing provider networks from which the preference in section 533.003(a)(1) could be determined.”); CR.3520 (Superior live petition) (similar).
[*23]RFP does not ask questions to elicit information about serving different populations. See 6.RR.89:14–90:25.
The Losing Plans’ Excuses Fall Flat
As this evidence shows, the RFP “clearly placed offerors on notice of its in- tended” evaluation criteria. In re Armorworks Enters., LLC, B-400394, 2008 WL 4415709, *4 (Comp. Gen. 2008) (finding protest untimely). The Losing Plans should have known of every complaint they have about the criteria HHSC used (or did not use) to evaluate RFP responses before they responded and voluntarily submitted to HHSC’s advertised method of evaluation. See, e.g., Blue & Gold Fleet, 492 F.3d at 1313 (“The terms of the solicitation prospectus did not include any requirement that the bidders consider the Service Contract Act . . . . Therefore, Blue & Gold’s asser- tion that the proposals should have been evaluated according to the Act is a challenge to the solicitation.”). So their current complaints are untimely and waived.
Below, the Losing Plans tried to avoid the consequences of their sandbagging, hiding behind the RFP’s statement that HHSC intended to conform to state law: “Proposals shall be evaluated in accordance with State law, including, but not limited to, applicable provisions of Chapters 533, 536, and 2155 of the Texas Government Code.” 9.RR.PX38.021 (RFP § 3.1.1); see, e.g., CR.4064 (Children’s Plans); see also CR.3931 (Superior). The Losing Plans’ excuse does not withstand scrutiny.
A solicitation “defect is patent if it could have been discovered by reasonable and customary care.” K-Con, Inc. v. Sec’y of Army, 908 F.3d 719, 722 (Fed. Cir. 2018). A reasonable respondent’s concern is how the government interprets the law it com- mits to follow. Crucially, as just shown by the Losing Plans’ own words, the RFP itself “would place a reasonable contractor on notice” that HHSC’s interpretation of the law differed from the Losing Plans’ interpretation. Id.
[*24]Even more, the difference in interpretations is clear just from the RFP sections the Losing Plans rely on as excuses. The Children’s Plans rely on RFP § 3.1.1, which makes plain that HHSC views its best value criteria as set out in the RFP as comply- ing with applicable law—in direct conflict with the Losing Plans’ interpretation of the law:
3.1.1 Conformance with State Law Proposals shall be evaluated in accordance with state law, including, but not limited to, applicable provisions of Chapters, 533, 536, and 2155 of the Texas Government Code. . . . HHSC shall make an award to the respondent that, in HHSC’s sole determination, provides the best value to the state of Texas as set out in this solicitation. 13
And Superior relies on RFP § 3.1.4, which just as plainly reveals HHSC’s view that applying the RFP’s express best value criteria and the RFP’s express scoring guides satisfies its legal obligations—in direct conflict with the Losing Plans’ inter- pretation of the law:
3.1.4 Best Value Evaluation Criteria Best Value Evaluation Criteria for this Solicitation is the basis upon which the written responses to the Technical Questions . . . will be scored, in addition to the considerations provided by the Technical Question Scoring Guide . . . . Responses to the Oral Presentation scenarios will also be scored against Best Value Evaluation Criteria and the Oral Presentation Scoring Guide . . . . Best Value Evaluation Criteria, Technical Questions, and Oral Presentation Scenarios were developed to ensure HHSC requests the information necessary
13 9.RR.PX38.021 (emphasis added).
[*25]to ensure that the Respondent selected for Contract award can achieve the outcomes mandated in Texas Government Code Sections 533.002, 533.003(a)(1), 536.052, and 2155.144. 14
Wellpoint, meanwhile, points to only the single issue it timely raised in a solic- itation protest. CR.4187. For every other issue, however, Wellpoint is in the same position as the rest of the Losing Plans. 15
The Losing Plans cannot escape their collective choice to stay silent until they saw the results of the procurement. They have waived any rights the cited standards may have given them.
B. Commissioner Young’s authority does not depend on how she or other HHSC officials apply procurement standards.
Even if the Losing Plans’ rights were at stake, their ultra vires theory still fails because, of the many procurement standards they raise, just one arguably constrains Commissioner Young’s authority to procure, execute, or perform contracts. And HHSC officials plainly complied with that standard. The rest are irrelevant. Com- missioner Young maintains authority to move forward with the STAR CHIP and STAR Kids procurements.
The Losing Plans seek to stop Commissioner Young from completing the STAR CHIP and STAR Kids procurements, and from executing and performing re- sulting contracts. See CR.5876–78. The Losing Plans’ burden is thus to show that
14 9.RR.PX38.024–25 (emphasis added). 15 Wellpoint also mistakenly says its solicitation protest was denied as premature. CR.4187. In fact, Commissioner Young denied it on the merits. See 9.RR.PX160.002 (describing Commissioner Young’s decision).
[*26]such future conduct “would exceed the bounds of the Commissioner’s legal author- ity or conflict with the law itself.” Morath v. Pecos-Barstow-Toyah ISD, 2025 WL 1833467, at *2 (Tex. App.—15th Court 2025, no pet.); see also TEA v. Hous. ISD, 660 S.W.3d 108, 118 (Tex. 2023) (“The question . . . is whether the evidence shows that the Commissioner will act ultra vires under current law.”); Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 243 (Tex. 2017) (“[O]nly when these improvident actions are unauthor- ized does an official shed the cloak of the sovereign and act ultra vires.”).
Commissioner Young, however, has express authority to procure, execute, and perform contracts with MCOs to carry out the STAR and CHIP programs. And run- ning afoul of a legislative instruction or a regulation does not mean the offending of- ficial loses authority to continue to act as the Legislature expressly authorized. See, e.g., Morath v. Kingsville ISD, 710 S.W.3d 918, 925 (Tex. App.—15th Court 2025, no pet.) (violating a statute did not mean official lost authority to issue order). To suc- ceed, then, it is not enough for the Losing Plans to show that Commissioner Young failed to follow some procurement standard (they have not, see infra, Part I.C). The Losing Plans must establish that any such failure would withdraw Commissioner Young’s express authority to perform the acts the Losing Plans seek to enjoin. See, e.g., TMRJ Holdings, Inc. v. Inhance Techs., LLC, 540 S.W.3d 202, 212 (Tex. App— Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (Bland, J.) (“An injunction . . . must not . . . enjoin a defendant from acting within its lawful rights.”).
The Losing Plans have not met and cannot meet their burden because they do not and cannot show that Commissioner Young’s authority to complete the underly- ing procurements or to execute and perform the resulting contracts is tied to complying with the various procurement standards they rely on. This reality does not mean HHSC and Commissioner Young are free to violate the cited procurement standards; it means only that the Losing Plans’ ultra vires claims are not the way to ensure compliance with those standards. See In re Stetson Renewables Holdings, LLC, 658 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. 2022).
[*27]1. Commissioner Young’s authority.
“ʻUltra vires claims depend on the scope of the state official’s authority,’ not the quality of the official’s decisions.” Honors Acad., Inc. v. TEA, 555 S.W.3d 54, 68 (Tex. 2018) (citation omitted). Commissioner Young’s authority over HHSC mat- ters is expansive, as she alone governs the agency:
Gov’t Code § 523.0051. Executive Commissioner (a) The commission is governed by an executive commissioner. (b) The governor appoints the executive commissioner with the advice and consent of the senate . . . . As a result, HHSC’s authority and discretion is also her authority and discretion. 16
Commissioner Young has the unconditional authority to enter contracts for the performance of HHSC activities:
Gov’t Code § 525.0101. General Contract Authority The commission may enter into contracts as necessary to perform any of the commission’s powers or duties. [17]
16 References below to Commissioner Young’s authority and discretion thus include authority and discretion granted to HHSC. [17] See also, e.g., Tex. Health & Safety Code § 62.052(1) (“The commission may . . . implement con- tracts with health plan providers under” CHIP).
[*28]Commissioner Young has the specific authority to procure contracts with MCOs to help deliver Medicaid benefits to beneficiaries (all emphases added):
Gov’t Code § 532.0051. Commission Administration of Medicaid (a) The commission is the state agency designated to administer federal Medicaid funds. (b) The commission shall: (1) in each agency that operates a portion of Medicaid, plan and direct Medicaid, including the management of the Medicaid managed care system and the development, procurement, management, and monitoring of contracts necessary to implement that system; . . . . And contract with MCOs to help deliver CHIP benefits:
Health & Safety Code § 62.155. Health Plan Providers (a) The commission shall select the health plan providers under the program through a competitive procurement process. . . .
Commissioner Young also has the authority to hear and decide administrative protests to HHSC procurement decisions:
Gov’t Code § 2155.076. Protest Procedures (a) The comptroller and each state agency by rule shall develop and adopt protest procedures for resolving vendor protests relating to purchasing issues. An agency’s rules must be consistent with the comptroller’s rules. . . . .
2. Commands are distinct from consequences.
“All law should be followed.” Stetson, 658 S.W.3d at 297. But the conse- quences for not following the laws, like the laws themselves, “are the proper domain of the legislature.” Id. Here, even assuming HHSC did not follow the procurement standards the Losing Plans raise, a question remains: What consequence, if any, did the Legislature intend as a result? The Losing Plans and the district court assumed that the consequence for not following a procurement standard is loss of authority over the procurement. They mistakenly ignored the difference between commands and consequences.
[*29]This distinction between commands and consequences is well established. Courts have “long recognized” that a public official’s failure to follow a statutory direction does not alone reduce the official’s sphere of authority. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1993) (applying French v. Edwards, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 506, 511 (1872)). This Court recognized the distinction between com- mands and consequences recently in Morath v. Kingsville ISD, holding that an offi- cial’s missing a mandatory deadline did not strip his authority to continue to act be- cause the Legislature did not impose that consequence for violating the statute. See 710 S.W.3d at 925.
So, even if it “may be granted” that a procurement standard is “a command to” HHSC and Commissioner Young, “it does not follow that it is mandatory in the sense that it makes . . . compliance . . . essential to the legality of the” procurement. Davis v. State, 12 S.W. 957, 962 (Tex. 1889); see also, e.g., In re Morris, 663 S.W.3d 589, 595 & n.30 (Tex. 2023); Friends of Canyon Lake, Inc. v. Guadalupe–Blanco River Auth.,
96 S.W.3d 519, 528 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) (applicant’s “fail[ure] to provide statutorily required information to the TNRCC” as part of permit applica- tion process did not vitiate agency’s authority to issue permit).
The importance of that distinction is magnified in the case of procurements. The Losing Plans and the district court posit that any foul-up during a procurement destroys the official-in-charge’s authority to continue that procurement and to exe- cute and perform the resulting contract(s). The Losing Plans “allege that Defendant administered the RFP in a manner that violates Texas law and that consequently, any award, execution, or implementation of the intended STAR & CHIP managed care contract . . . will constitute ultra vires acts.” CR.5876. And the temporary injunction order the Losing Plans drafted for the district court sets out a laundry list of griev- ances and then declares:
[*30]These statutory and regulatory violations, each singly and together collectively, have resulted in intended contract awards that will be invalid and unlawful, and the further ex- ecution and implementation of such intended contract awards will be ultra vires acts. CR.5878 (emphases added). To them, without a perfect procurement, there’s no au- thority to contract.
But if an error in a procurement vitiates authority to continue that procure- ment and to execute and perform the resulting contract, then procured contracts face untenable uncertainty. Actions exceeding an official’s authority “have no effect.” Jessen Assocs., Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593, 598 (Tex. 1975). Thus, contracts en- tered without authority are “null and void.” Fort Worth Cavalry Club v. Sheppard, 83 S.W.2d 660, 665 (Tex. 1935); accord, e.g., State ex rel. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. VitaPro Foods, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. 1999) (“[O]nly persons authorized by the Consti- tution or a statute can make a contract binding on the State.” (emphasis added)). If the Losing Plans’ ultra vires theory is correct, either party to a procured contract could, years into a contract, use a procurement error to escape its obligations. See, e.g., VitaPro Foods, 8 S.W.3d at 326 (State’s counterparty could not enforce unauthor- ized contract); State v. Reagan Cnty. Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 135–37 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.) (State could not enforce agreement executed by Attorney General without authority).
[*31]3. The procurement standards the Losing Plans rely on are not conditions on Commissioner Young’s authority.
An “accurate [statutory] construction frequently eliminates consequences that otherwise might seem troubling.” S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428, 450 (Tex. 2022). So it is here. “[T]he Purchasing Act . . . does not reflect legislative intent to render void an otherwise-authorized contract executed in violation of its requirements.” Tex. Logos, L.P. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 241 S.W.3d 105, 121 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.). Violating a procurement standard does not vitiate existing express authority to complete a procurement or to execute or perform a resulting contract.
As elsewhere, “the legislature has ample authority to examine [any] failure to comply” with procurement standards, and to engage “legislative responses.” In re Stetson, 658 S.W.3d at 297; see supra, p. 12 (discussing legislative activity). 18 The Leg- islature likewise has the power to condition HHSC’s (and other government enti- ties’) authority to contract, and the validity of its contracts, on HHSC’s compliance with procurement standards. For example, “[a] contract or procurement award made by a state agency that violates the applicable minimum time for [public] posting . . . is
In addition to the Legislature, HHSC and its officials also answer on procurement issues to the 18 Governor, the Attorney General, the Comptroller, the State Auditor, and the cross-agency Contract Advisory Team. See Molina Resp. to Mots. for Temp. Relief at 19–20.
[*32]void.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.083(j) (emphasis added). And, for municipal procure- ments, “[i]f the contract is made without compliance with [procurement standards], it is void and the performance of the contract, including the payment of any money under the contract, may be enjoined.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 252.061.
But just one of the standards raised here could possibly impose a condition on Commissioner Young’s authority: That statute provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any other law,” HHSC “may not award a contract under” the Medicaid managed care program to an MCO that HHSC has not “evaluate[d] and certif[ied] . . . is rea- sonably able to fulfill the contract terms, including all federal and state law require- ments.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 540.0203(a) (emphasis added) (formerly § 533.0035(a)). There is no question, however, that HHSC evaluated and certified the MCOs in the STAR CHIP procurement. See, e.g., 9.RR.PX.84.007–008 (certification); 9.RR.PX.192 (certification questionnaire). The Losing Plans complain only about how thoroughly HHSC conducted its evaluation, see, e.g., CR.5852–53—but that is a subject § 540.0203(a) does not cover. See infra, Part I.C.[3]. So the one possible condi- tion to an effective award that the Losing Plans cite is satisfied.
“Because the Legislature chose not to” impose any similar condition or con- sequence for failing to follow the rest of the procurement standards the Losing Plans rely on, “but did do so” elsewhere in the Government Code and other codes, we should “conclude that the Legislature did not intend” any similar condition or con- sequence here. Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421, 427 (Tex. 2011); see also, e.g., State v. $435,000, 842 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1992) (“If the Legislature had in- tended dismissal to be the consequence of a failure to hear a forfeiture case within the prescribed period, it could easily have said so.”); 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57:5 (8th ed.) (“[C]ontrasting language in similar statutes may indicate a legislature intended a different standard of compliance in one than in the other, and make clear that one is mandatory and the other directory.”).
[*33]Government Code § 2155.076(a) provides still more support, as it shows the Legislature expected that procurements would continue even if some statutory or regulatory standard had not been followed. It directs agencies to adopt protest rules “consistent” with those of the Comptroller and its predecessors. In 1997, when the Legislature enacted § 2155.076, the rules of the Comptroller’s predecessor—en- dorsed by the Legislature—left remedial action in the case of a statutory or regula- tory violation during a procurement to the discretion of the agency:
If the director determines that a violation of the rules or statutes has occurred in a case where a contract has not been awarded, he shall so inform the protesting party . . . by letter which sets forth the reasons for the de- termination and the appropriate remedial action.
1 Tex. Admin. Code § 111.3(e)(2) (1997) (emphasis added)). That rule would be su- perfluous if running afoul of a procurement standard vitiated an agency’s authority to continue with the procurement—for example, by deciding the proper remedy for some violation. See 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.307(c)(2) (HHSC’s nearly identical rule). The Legislature knew and approved that an agency’s authority to procure was not tied to compliance with every procurement standard.
The Losing Plans observe that “[e]ach of these statutes imposes a mandatory duty on the Commissioner by using the command ʻshall.’” Children’s Plans Mot.
[*34]for Temp. Relief 33. But “shall” does not alone create a condition precedent or any consequence. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.016(2)–(3). So even accepting that the standards create a mandatory duty, there is still “no corresponding provision dictat- ing” any consequence “for noncompliance” with the duty. Helena Chem. Co. v. Wil- kins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 495 (Tex. 2001). This “lack of guidance is what guides us” be- cause “creat[ing] a statutory consequence for noncompliance . . . is the Legislature’s job, not” the courts’. AC Ints., L.P. v. TCEQ, 543 S.W.3d 703, 713 (Tex. 2018).
Judicial imposition of “mandatory private enforcement” for breaching a stat- ute is “a limitation unheard-of with regard to state legislatures.” Armstrong v. Excep- tional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326 (2015) (refusing to allow Ex parte Young claim). Instead, “it is primarily for the legislature to determine how far it is worth pressing to achieve compliance with its own statutory directives.” In re Stetson, 658 S.W.3d at 297. The Legislature has not gone as far as the Losing Plans need.
C. Commissioner Young’s unconstrained discretion precludes the Losing Plans’ ultra vires claims.
Putting aside the Losing Plans’ lack of rights and the procurement standards’ lack of consequences, the Losing Plans’ lawsuit still fails because the discretion Com- missioner Young has over procurements forecloses ultra vires claims. An ultra vires “suit must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372. It follows that when an officer’s discretion is unconstrained, no ultra vires claim is viable. See Schroeder v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Ass’n, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 329, 333–36 (Tex. 2022); Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 241–43; Hous. Belt & Terminal Ry. v. City of Hous., 487 S.W.3d 154, 161 (Tex. 2016).
[*35]Courts often “are ʻill-equipped to settle the delicate questions involved in pro- curement decisions.’” Delta Data Sys. Corp. v. Webster, 744 F.2d 197, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.) (quoting Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Farrow, 580 F.2d 1260, 1271 (5th Cir. 1978)). The Legislature thus established a procurement process that leaves Com- missioner Young with unconstrained discretion to interpret and apply procurement standards while evaluating proposals and making awards. Commissioner Young an- swers to other Executive Branch officials and the Legislature for HHSC’s exercise of discretion—not to desirous vendors in litigation.
This ultra-vires-killing discretion has three independent sources: (1) The Leg- islature’s decision to channel bidders’ statute- and regulation-based complaints into the administrative protest procedure; (2) the Legislature’s decision to accord “best value” primacy above all other procurement standards; and (3) the Legislature’s de- cision to omit specific, substantive, or objective standards to govern Commissioner Young’s exercise of judgment in applying procurement standards.
1. Commissioner Young’s ultimate and unrestrained objective in the procurement process is to interpret collateral law.
The Legislature has tasked Commissioner Young with procuring HHSC con- tracts and finally resolving complaints that HHSC procurements violated statutes or regulations. The procurement structure established by the Legislature has left the interpretations of statutes and regulations that guide the setting of evaluation criteria and assessments of proposals to the unrestrained discretion of HHSC as the procuring agency. That discretion precludes the Losing Plans’ ultra vires claims based on their complaints that HHSC’s choice of evaluation criteria was inconsistent with various procurement standards or that the procurement was unfair for this or that reason.
[*36]In 1997, the Legislature significantly revised the State Purchasing and General Services Act, Gov’t Code tit. 10, subtit. D, including by enacting sections 2155.076 and 2155.144. Section 2155.144 expressly delegates to HHSC unconditional authority to procure goods and services, including from MCOs. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.144(b), (b-1)(2). Section 2155.076 directs all state agencies to “develop and adopt protest procedures for resolving vendor protests relating to purchasing issues” and required that such rules “be consistent with the comptroller’s [previously the State Purchasing and General Services Commission’s] rules.” Id. § 2155.076(a). At the same time, the Legislature did not provide for judicial review of protest resolu- tions. As a result, HHSC has the authority to evaluate the bids and proposals of pro- spective vendors, and finally resolve vendor complaints about its evaluation.
While the Legislature did not define “vendor protests relating to purchasing issues” in section 2155.076(a), context makes clear that the Legislature had in mind claims—like the Losing Plans’—that a purchasing agency had misapplied some stat- ute or regulation. That context is the State Purchasing and General Services Com- mission’s protest rules at the time the Legislature enacted § 2155.076. See Acker v. Tex. Water Comm’n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990) (“A statute is presumed to have been enacted by the legislature with complete knowledge of the existing law and with reference to it.”); see also Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr. v. Niehay, 671 S.W.3d 929, 936 (Tex. 2023) (“[W]e can presume that the Legislature was aware of this regula- tory interpretation and was accepting of that meaning . . . when it adopted the ADA definition of ʻdisability.’”). Under those rules, protests consisted exclusively of “stat- utory or regulatory provision(s) that the action complained of is alleged to have vio- lated.” 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 111.3(c)(1)–(2) (1997). As directed, HHSC adopted an essentially identical rule. See 1 Tex. Admin Code § 391.305(c).
[*37]And while the Legislature did not define “resolving,” the same context makes clear that the Legislature intended that the agency would “determine[]” whether or not “a violation of the rules or statutes has occurred,” and if so, “the appropriate remedial action.” 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 111.3(e)–(h) (1997); see id. § 391.305(c) (HHSC’s essentially identical rule). When the Legislature directed agencies to adopt rules “consistent with” the State Purchasing and General Services Commission’s rules, it knew it was delegating to state agencies the same authority the State Pur- chasing and General Services Commission exercised under the existing rule: The au- thority to interpret collateral laws related to the agency’s procurement processes. And the Legislature did not provide for judicial review of final protest determina- tions. The upshot is that the Legislature intended agencies like HHSC to have the last word in resolving vendor complaints about alleged violations of statutory and regulatory requirements in the procurement process.
The Legislature’s structure of the procurement process—granting HHSC un- conditional authority to procure and channeling legal disputes into HHSC proceed- ings in which HHSC is tasked with determining the existence and effect of alleged statutory and regulatory violations by HHSC—created the type of duty whose exercise is “not subject to judicial review.” Schroeder, 646 S.W.3d at 334. Like the defendants in Schroeder and Hall, when Commissioner Young is procuring contracts, “the ultimate and unrestrained objective of [her] duty is to interpret collateral law” in the form of overlapping and sometimes conflicting procurement preferences, con- siderations, purposes, goals, and other standards. Id. at 333 (quoting Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 242).
[*38]Thus, “a misinterpretation is not overstepping such authority; it is a compli- ant action even if ultimately erroneous.” Id. (quoting Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 242). The Losing Plans may “disagree[] with” HHSC’s “determination,” but the scheme es- tablished by the Legislature “does not ʻallow third parties to second-guess [HHSC] in this way.’” Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. RW Trophy Ranch, Ltd., 712 S.W.3d 943, 959 (Tex. App.—15th Court 2025, mandamus denied) (quoting Schroeder, 646 S.W.3d at 335).
Like the platting process in Schroeder, the state procurement “process is in- tended to be an expeditious one that favors” contracting. Id. at 336; see, e.g., Hayes Int’l Corp. v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 247, 258 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting the “strong public interest in avoiding disruptions in procurement”); see also Tex. Highway Comm’n, 234 S.W.2d at 860 (noting “the traditional principle of” keeping executive branch pro- curement “free from vexatious and dilatory restraints at the suits of prospective or potential sellers.” (quotation marks omitted)). So, like in Schroeder, the Legislature has intentionally “not created a mechanism for . . . judicial review,” unlike in similar areas, 646 S.W.3d at 336—here, municipal and county procurements. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 252.061(2), 262.003. Yet, to this point, the STAR CHIP procurement has been saddled with delays worse than those Chief Justice Brister found so frus- trating in Kingsville ISD. See 710 S.W.3d at 931 (Brister, C.J., concurring).
[*39]Commissioner Young’s unrestrained discretion to determine the meaning of the statutes and regulations the Losing Plans rely on is fatal to their ultra vires claims.
2. Commissioner Young has unconstrained discretion to procure for best value.
The procurement standards the Losing Plans rely on are independently insuf- ficient because none overcome the Legislature’s prime directive to Commissioner Young: Procure for “best value.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.144(c)–(d); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 524.0001(b) (“The commission shall implement the powers and du- ties given to the commission under Section[] . . . 2155.144.”).
The Legislature granted Commissioner Young the authority to procure goods and services according to best value, plus the discretion to determine what is relevant to best value (all emphases added):
Gov’t Code § 2155.144. Procurements by Health and Human Services Agencies ... (b) An agency to which this section applies is delegated the authority to procure its goods and services, except as provided by this section. (c) An agency to which this section applies shall acquire goods or services by any procurement method approved by the Health and Human Services Commission that provides the best value to the agency. The agency shall document that it considered all relevant factors under Subsection (d) in making the acquisition. (d) Subject to Subsection (e) [repealed], the agency may consider all relevant factors in determining the best value, including: ...
[*40](11) any other factor relevant to determining the best value for the agency in the context of a particular acquisition. . . . Plus the specific authority (and instruction) to award contracts based on whatever best value criteria are set out in its published request for proposals. Each biennial General Appropriations Act provides:
General Appropriations Act Art. IX, Sec. [17].09. Contract Management and Oversight. ... (b) Agencies and institutions should manage contracts consistent with state statute, . . . including: . . . (4) ensure that contract award decisions are determined based on best value criteria established in solicitation documents to ensure fair and open competition; . . . . 19
The Legislature also accorded priority to “best value” over other procure- ment standards, with just two exceptions:
Gov’t Code § 2155.144. Procurements by Health and Human Services Agencies ... (n) To the extent of any conflict, this section prevails over any other state law relating to the procurement of goods and services except a law relating to contracting with historically underutilized businesses or relating to the procurement of goods and services from persons with disabilities. . . . 20
19 Act of May 29, 2023, supra, § 1, art. IX, sec. [17].09(b)(4). 20 See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.441 (preexisting preference for products of persons with intel- lectual or physical disabilities). By expressly exempting two procurement standards from this con- flict provision, the Legislature made clear its conclusion that the myriad procurement standards that dot the Texas codes and direct HHSC to apply this preference or that consideration conflict with the freedom § 2155.144 gives the agency to procure for best value. Otherwise, the exemptions would be superfluous. For the same reason, HHSC need not reconcile that conflict by folding all the various procurement standards into its best value determination.
[*41]Implementing § 2155.144, HHSC’s procurement rules have long made that priority clear without objection from the Legislature: The rules’ express “pur- pose . . . is to . . . obtain best value when purchasing goods and services.” 1 Tex. Ad- min. Code § 391.101(3). And they plainly advise that, when procuring good and ser- vices through an RFP, “[a] contract is awarded to the respondent whose proposal offers the best value.” Id. § 391.209(5).
The best value standard controls and is inherently discretionary. The Legisla- ture did not attempt to control ex ante the considerations that go into determining best value. Rather, it freed HHSC to consider “all relevant factors in determining the best value,” including “any . . . factor relevant to determining the best value for the agency in the context of a particular acquisition.” Id. § 2155.144(d), (d)(11).
This freedom includes the selection and implementation of preferences, con- siderations, purposes, standards, criteria and other factors spread throughout the State’s statutes and regulations—including Government Code Chapters 540 and 543A, Health & Safety Code Chapter 62, and HHSC’s rules—all under § 2155.144’s ultimate objective of “best value.” And this freedom makes plain the Legislature’s recognition that HHSC officials like Commissioner Young—not courts—are best positioned to determine what’s best for HHSC and the State in these circumstances. Confirming the intended exclusion of judicial scrutiny of best value, the Legislature provided its own method of ex post review: Audit. See id. § 2155.144(f ) (“The state auditor may audit the agency’s acquisitions of goods and services before or after a warrant is issued to pay for an acquisition.”).
[*42]The STAR CHIP procurement shows why the Legislature’s chosen structure makes sense. HHSC’s bid protest process is a far better forum for adjudicating the solicitation and awards of MCO contracts than the courts. The STAR CHIP con- tracts ultimately may total $150 billion, 21 and, as shown, the best value criteria for this procurement has been in development since at least 2019. The “preferences” and “considerations” about which the Losing Plans complain are just a few of the hundreds of potential factors, explicit and implied in statute, HHSC weighed in de- veloping the RFP, with inputs from many stakeholders, including the MCOs. And, as demonstrated by the long roster of counsel, all MCOs were advised by experienced public health care and procurement counsel from Texas and around the country. Most of this lawsuit will have been spent trying to educate judges on managed care complexities that dozens of professionals on all sides have devoted their professional careers to learning. But for this judicial detour, Commissioner Young long ago would have fairly and conclusively decided this matter within HHSC’s protest process.
The Losing Plans do not contend, and the district court did not find, that Com- missioner Young sought anything but best value. Commissioner Young honored the Legislature’s direction by determining the best value for STAR CHIP would be ob- tained by an assessment of the competitors’ responses to 18 Technical Questions and four oral presentation scenarios. See 9.RR.PX38.025–26, 33–40; see also 9.RR.PX290 (sample scoring rubric included with RFP); 12.RR.DX54 (RFP scope of work). Upon
21 In the years before the 2022 release of the RFP, the approximate spend on STAR CHIP was $9.7 billion annually, and, with options, these new contracts will last up to 12 years. [9].RR.PX.38.006.
[*43]publishing the RFP, those criteria guided HHSC’s evaluation, just as the Legislature intended. In sum, HHSC carefully crafted the RFP “to ensure HHSC requests the information necessary to ensure [the selected MCOs] can achieve the outcomes man- dated” by the governing statutes. [9].RR.PX38.024. 22
Commissioner Young’s unconstrained discretion in determining best value, together with her unquestioned pursuit of her conception of best value, dooms the Losing Plans’ claims.
3. No specific, substantive, or objective standards govern Commissioner Young’s exercise of judgment.
Even if some procurement standard could constrain Commissioner Young’s discretion, the standards the Losing Plans rely on cannot. Below, the Losing Plans leaned hard into Houston Belt & Terminal Railway v. City of Houston. But Houston Belt shows why their claims fail.
In the first place, Commissioner Young’s statutory authority to procure and contract is unconditional. See supra, Part I.B.[1]. So, unlike the defendant’s authority in Houston Belt, Commissioner Young’s statutory authority is not “explicitly lim- ited.” 487 S.W.3d at 166. The unconditional and unreserved nature of this authority “distinguishes [it] from other grants of authority that have supported ultra vires
22 Yet the district court concluded, as the Losing Plans argued, that the STAR CHIP procurement nonetheless violated § 2155.144 by “fail[ing] to consider MCOs past performances.” CR.5877. Not so. Section 2155.144 allows but does not require Commissioner Young to consider past performance. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.144(d)(5) (“[T]the agency may consider all relevant factors in deter- mining the best value, including . . . past vendor performance.” (emphasis added)). The “nature of the word ʻmay’” is “fundamentally discretionary.” Indus. Specialists, LLC v. Blanchard Ref. Co., 652 S.W.3d 11, 17 (Tex. 2022).
[*44]claims where, for example, the grants require the decisionmaker to act only ʻaccord- ing to’ or ʻin accordance with’ another law.” TEA v. Devereux Tex. League City, 2023 WL 3325932, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, no pet.) ( Jones, J.) (rejecting ultra vires claim, distinguishing Houston Belt).
Even more, Houston Belt clarified that the “type of discretion that immunity protects” is “discretion where no specific, substantive, or objective standards govern the exercise of judgment.” Hous. Belt, 487 S.W.3d at 161. That description fits the standards relied on by the Losing Plans. Directives to “give preference,” “consider,” “to the extent possible,” “evaluate,” and “review” are inherently and intentionally vague, not specific, substantive, or objective. And “[e]ven if we . . . believe that guid- ing principles are ʻparticularly important’ in these circumstances, we cannot rewrite a statute that imposes no such principles.” Indus. Specialists, LLC v. Blanchard Ref. Co., 652 S.W.3d 11, 16 (Tex. 2022); see also In re Morris, 663 S.W.3d at 608 (Young, J., dissenting) (discussing issue not reached by majority, explaining that a statutory “re- quirement” is not “judicially cognizable” unless courts “have access to judicially administrable standards”).
Take the preferences and considerations, for example (all emphases added):
Gov’t Code § 540.0204. Contract Considerations Relating to Managed Care Organizations In awarding contracts to managed care organizations, the commission shall: (1) give preference to an organization that has significant participation in the organization’s provider network from each health care provider in the region who has traditionally provided care to Medicaid and charity care patients; . . .
[*45](3) consider the need to use different managed care plans to meet the needs of different populations; . . . 23
Gov’t Code § 543A.0052. Financial Incentives and Contract Award Preferences ... (d) In awarding contracts to managed care organizations under the child health plan program and Medicaid, the commission shall, in addition to considerations under Section 540.0204 of this code and Section 62.155, Health and Safety Code, give preference to an organization that offers a managed care plan that: (1) successfully implements quality initiatives under Subsection (a) as the commission determines based on data or other evidence the organization provides; or (2) meets quality-of-care and cost-efficiency benchmarks under Subsection (b). Many preference statues throughout the country direct how a statutory preference is to be applied. See Marshall J. Doke, Jr., State and Local Government Bidding Prefer- ences, 42 Procurement Law 7, 7–8 (Summer 2007); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.444(a)(1) (where cost and quality are equal, requiring purchase from a service- disabled Texas resident and then to other Texas residents before awarding to out-of- state vendors). But not these preference statutes. Supplying a “preference” does not, for example, direct HHSC to ask questions about preferences in an RFP, or to reflect preferences in scoring proposals at all. Contra CR.5841–45. The same goes for “con- sider.” Contra CR.5845–47, 5850–51. 24
23 See also Tex. Gov’t Code § 543A.0052(d) (referring to § 504.0204’s “considerations”). 24 As an HHSC official explained, HHSC has “consider[ed] the need to use different managed care plans to meet the needs of different populations,” Tex. Gov’t Code § 540.0204(3), and so set up “[E]valuate” and “review” are similarly amorphous:
[*46]Gov’t Code § 540.0203. Certification by Commission (a) Before the commission may award a contract under this chapter to a managed care organization, the commission shall evaluate and certify that the organization is reasonably able to fulfill the contract terms, including all federal and state law requirements. . . .
Health & Safety Code § 62.051. Duties of Executive Commissioner and Commission in General ... (e) The commission shall conduct a review of each entity that enters into a contract under Section 62.055 or 62.155 to ensure that the entity is available, prepared, and able to fulfill the entity’s obligations under the contract in compliance with the contract, this chapter, and rules adopted under this chapter. ... The terms suggest some sort of appraisal, but they tell one nothing about the depth required. 25 The statutes say nothing about what sorts of information is sufficient or insufficient. Contra CR.5852–53.
The record easily disproves the substance of the Losing Plans’ assertion in any event. HHSC certified MCOs only after independently assessing MCOs’ responses to certification questions and supporting documentation. See, e.g., CR.174 (explain- ing that HHSC completed “a comprehensive certification process”); CR.2041-44
entirely separate STAR programs (STAR, STAR Kids, STAR PLUS, and STAR Health) with en- tirely separate procurements. See 6.RR.102:1–104:5. 25 Also, Health & Safety Code § 62.051(e)’s “review” is of an MCO that “enters into a contract,” and thus does not need to occur during the procurement.
[*47](HHSC’s determination that Molina met the certification criteria based on a review of 57 pages of supporting documentation submitted in response to questions).
The other statutes the Losing Plans rely on are of no more assistance to their position. The Losing Plans (at CR.5848–49) rely on Government Code § 540.0051(a)(1)(B) and (a)(6), which provide:
Government Code § 540.0051. Purpose and Implementation The commission shall implement the Medicaid managed care program by contracting with managed care organizations in a manner that, to the extent possible: (1) improves the health of Texans by: . . . (B) promoting continuity of care; and ... (6) reduces administrative and other nonfinancial barriers for recipients in obtaining health care services. “To the extent possible” deprives the statute of any specific, substantive, or objec- tive standard. HHSC decides what is possible without further direction.
Regardless, the statute has nothing to do with procurement. The foremost “manner” of “contracting” to achieve some goal is to put it in the contract. See Con- tract (v., sense 1.a), Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 494 (unabr. 2002 ed.) (“to establish or undertake by contract”). HHSC has done that. See, e.g., 12.RR.DX54.272 (requiring a turnover plan that “assure[s] . . . [t]he least disruption in the delivery of Covered Services to Members during the transition to a subsequent contractor.”).
The Losing Plans also insist that pairing CHIP service areas with mandatory Medicaid MCO contracts, see Tex. Gov’t Code § 540.0206, runs afoul of requirements for “best value” and “competitive” procurements. CR.5849–50 (cit- ing Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.144; Tex. Health & Safety Code § 62.155). But neither of those terms is defined in the cited statutes. So it would be within Commissioner Young’s discretion to conclude that an MCO being entitled to a mandatory Medicaid contract in a particular service area made that MCO more competitive or of better value for CHIP in that service area by, for example, making it easier for HHSC to “coordinate [CHIP] with the Medicaid program.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 62.053(3). On top of that, Health & Safety Code § 62.155(c)(1) expressly allows Commissioner Young to “give preference to a person who provides similar coverage under the Medicaid program.”
[*48]Thus, Commissioner Young did not award “mandatory CHIP contracts” to any MCO. Contra CR.5888. Commissioner Young linked Medicaid and CHIP as she has the discretion to do. And Commissioner Young had compelling reasons to link STAR and CHIP here. Federal law requires states to offer CHIP members a choice of plans, so each service area must have at least two plans. See 9.RR.PX92.009. But CHIP alone is a tiny piece of HHSC’s managed care portfolio: In 2021, the 3.9 mil- lion STAR members outnumbered the 200,000 CHIP members about 20-to-1. See 12.RR.DX54.006–.007. As a result, “an MCO offering only CHIP services in a [ser- vice area] may not be sustainable or may result in uneconomical services.” 9RR.PX92.008 (action memorandum to Commissioner Young); cf. CR.1298 (Cook Children’s observing that large managed care programs “provide[] economies of scale”).
[*49]So, as Commissioner Young testified, HHSC has long “had a very difficult time getting people to bid on CHIP, so they’ve always been awarded together.” 6.RR.154:16–18. Given the small number of potential members for which multiple CHIP-only plans would be vying, it made sense for HHSC to ensure that each service area could support at least two plans by awarding the smaller CHIP program to the plans chosen to serve the much larger STAR membership in the service area.
The regulations the Losing Plans rely on are no better. During the STAR CHIP procurement, proposals were inadvertently released to an affiliate of one respondent, Aetna. See 9.RR.PX77–78; 9.RR.PX80–81. The release occurred after the evaluations of the 1,800-point Technical Question responses, but before the 200-point oral presentations. See 9.RR.PX77. The Losing Plans say this accidental disclosure vio- lated the “purpose” of HHSC’s procurement rules to “provide for consistent and uniform management of procurement and contracting processes.” 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.101(2) (cited at CR.5851).
Declaring a “purpose,” however, is facially insufficient to limit discretion, and says nothing about disclosure in any case. The same goes for HHSC’s statement that it “utilizes an evaluation method which provides for . . . the fair consideration of pro- posals.” Id. § 391.209(3)(A) (cited at CR.5851). That statement is nothing more than informational. The Losing Plans’ reliance on the Comptroller’s regulation about dis- closures is even farther afield. See CR.5851 (citing 34 Tex. Admin. Code § 20.208(d)(3)). That regulation does not offer any standards for HHSC because it does not apply to HHSC. The rules of which it is a part apply only to agencies that, unlike HHSC, have been delegated purchasing authority by the Comptroller via regulation. See 34 Tex. Admin. Code § 20.81(b) (“Chapter 20 of this title applies to any state agency delegated the authority to purchase goods and services pursuant to the Act and these rules.” (emphasis added)); cf. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.131 (“The comptroller may delegate purchasing functions to a state agency.”).
[*50]In any case, the more important regulation is HHSC’s rule that a protestor must show that it suffered an “adverse impact.” 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.305(c); see also, e.g., Labatt Food Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (requiring bid protestor to show competitive prejudice); Ascendant Servs., LLC v. United States, 160 Fed. Cl. 275, 288 (2022) (noting that a “finding of prejudicial error requires that the correction of the error must yield a different result”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Losing Plans never attempted to show prejudice from the release of pro- posals, instead resorting to general assertions of unfairness and procurement integ- rity. See, e.g., CR.5851–52. That is because the inadvertent disclosure of proposals before oral presentations could not have prejudiced the Losing Plans. HHSC scored all 18 plans highly on oral presentations, assigning to each MCO between 170 and 200 points of the 200 oral presentation points available. [9].RR.PX195. HHSC evalu- ated Aetna’s oral presentation at 190 points. Id. Of the Losing Plans, Wellpoint scored the highest with 1,874 points, finishing 48 points behind Aetna. See id. Aetna would have finished below Wellpoint only if it received an implausible 140 oral presentation points—50 points lower than Aetna actually scored and 30 points below any of the other 17 MCOs. The inadvertent disclosure was harmless.
[*51]The district court’s reliance on HHSC’s protest rules is likewise misplaced. The district court said Commissioner Young acted ultra vires by not considering un- timely “supplemental protests.” CR.5878. But no statute or regulation even provides for supplemental protests. And no statute or regulation “require[s] consideration of a protest or appeal submitted after the filing deadline when good cause for delay is shown.” Id. (citing 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.307(d)(1)). Section 391.307(d)(1) pro- vides that an untimely protest “shall not be considered unless good cause for delay is shown” (emphases added). The text beginning with “unless” is an authorization, not a command. Anyway, determining “good cause” is inherently discretionary.
The Losing Plans’ ultra vires claims fail because they merely ask the courts to substitute their discretion for HHSC’s and Commissioner Young’s. Sovereign im- munity forbids that result.
II. Alternatively, the Losing Plans’ Claims Should Be Dismissed Without Prejudice for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.
Every disappointed bidder in a state procurement knows the rules. Complaints must be raised in a timely protest, may be appealed within the agency, and are re- solved administratively. That route is not optional; it is the Legislature’s chosen mechanism for balancing fairness and efficiency in procurement. The Losing Plans here knew that process, participated in it, and even have administrative appeals still pending. Yet rather than await the result, they rushed to court and persuaded the district court to seize jurisdiction the Legislature had reserved exclusively for HHSC.
The comprehensive legislative scheme for procuring MCO contracts and re- solving protests at the very least shows that HHSC has exclusive jurisdiction to make an initial determination on the issues presented in this litigation. See Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 340–42 (Tex. 2006); see also, e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas v. Duenez, 201 S.W.3d 674, 676 (Tex. 2006) (“A party cannot circumvent an agency’s exclusive jurisdiction by filing a declaratory-judgment action if the subject matter of the action is one over which the Legislature intended the administrative agency to exercise exclusive jurisdiction.” (cleaned up)); Janek v. Gonzalez, 2013 WL 1748795, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (exclusive jurisdiction barred ultra vires claims against HHSC Commissioner). Molina Resp. to Mots. for Temp. Relief 27– 31.
[*52]Courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over a case that is within an agency’s exclusive jurisdiction at least until the aggrieved party has exhausted avail- able administrative remedies. City of Hous. v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam). The Losing Plans have not exhausted administrative remedies.
The Losing Plans exercised their option to appeal the denials of their protests to Commissioner Young; see CR.3315 n.1, 3529, 4249–50, 4264, 4717 n.2; 1 Tex. Ad- min. Code § 391.307(d). But rather than let Commissioner Young decide the appeals, the Losing Plans contemporaneously sued Commissioner Young. And then they ob- tained an injunction forbidding Commissioner Young from “taking action . . . to fur- ther the procurement . . . processes for the STAR & CHIP RFP.” CR.5883. The Los- ing Plans’ administrative appeals thus remain outstanding and unresolved, but not prejudged, as Commissioner Young explained: A. . . . [A]ssuming the Court will allow me to move forward, I would then finish the appeals process, the review of the appeals, and make a decision, one or the other, on each of the individual appeals. And then once that process is finished, then I would move forward. . . . Depending on how those appeals come out. ... Q. And in deciding the appeal -- the appeals, you, yourself, still need to determine whether the State complied with the law -- A Yes. Q -- in relation to this procurement? A Yes, sir. 26
[*53]So even if sovereign immunity did not bar the Losing Plans’ claims, the district court still lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate them.
III. Equitable Factors Do Not Support the Temporary Injunction.
“A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and does not issue as a matter of right.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). Its “pur- pose is to preserve the status quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits.” Id. The party seeking a temporary injunction must show “a probable right to the relief sought” and an “irreparable injury” in the absence of an injunction. Id. And because “[i]njunctive relief is an equitable remedy,” courts consider “the balance of the equities,” including whether “the complaining party . . . ha[s] acted promptly to enforce its right.” Foxwood Homeowners Ass’n v. Ricles, 673 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984), writ ref’d n.r.e.). None of these factors favor the Losing Plans.
26 6.RR.132:7–23.
[*54]A. The status quo is Commissioner Young’s authority to procure STAR CHIP contracts.
“The status quo is the last actual, peaceable, noncontested status which pre- ceded the pending controversy.” State v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 526 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex. 1975). When a claim challenges the authority of a government official to act, the sta- tus quo turns on whether the official “asserted his authority” before a challenge arose. In re State, 692 S.W.3d 466, 467 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam). Here, Commissioner Young has always maintained her authority to procure STAR CHIP contracts. The status quo is Commissioner Young exercising her authority, and the district court’s injunction upsets that status quo.
B. The Losing Plans have no probable right to relief.
As shown, sovereign immunity and HHSC’s exclusive jurisdiction foreclose the Losing Plans’ claims. As a result, the Losing Plans cannot show a probable right to relief.
C. The Losing Plans’ claimed irreparable harm arises from the expiration of their contracts, not HHSC’s reprocurement.
The district court found that the Losing Plans would suffer irreparable harm unless the court enjoined “the award, execution, and implementation of the intended STAR & CHIP contracts.” CR.5879. The district court clearly erred—all the harm identified results from the expiration of the Losing Plans’ contracts, not from any of the acts the Losing Plans claim are ultra vires.
Allegedly “unlawful acts of public officials may be restrained when they would cause irreparable injury.” Tex. State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 343 S.W.2d 242, 245 (1961) (emphasis added). 27 Thus, only irreparable harm that “would result” from allegedly ultra vires acts can support an injunction. See CR.5879; Carp, 343 S.W.2d at 245; State v. Hollins, 620 S.W.3d 400, 410 (Tex. 2020); see also, e.g., Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“T]he movant must show that the alleged harm will directly result from the action which the movant seeks to en- join.”); Packard Elevator v. I.C.C., 782 F.2d 112, 115 (8th Cir. 1986) (same).
[*55]The irreparable harms identified by the district court all stem from the Losing Plans’ loss of incumbency. Thus, the district court describes harm from “[t]he loss of STAR CHIP contracts,” not the award of a desired contract to others. CR.5879 (emphasis added). For Cook, this loss threatened its participation “in the STAR Kids program” because its “larger STAR & CHIP contracts” allow for “economies of scale” that the smaller STAR Kids contracts do not. Id. Cook’s customers will be forced to change plans. Id. Cook is suffering “hiring difficulties and the delay of needed internal projects.” Id. Cook “can no longer negotiate a new pharmacy bene- fits contract alongside other Texas-only Medicaid plans.” Cook’s “375 employees are at risk of losing their jobs.” “New STAR & CHIP entrants in the Tarrant Service area will likely poach Cook Children’s experienced employees.” The “irreparable harm” for the other Losing Plans tracks Cook’s. See CR.5879–81.
27 Accord Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146, 152 (Tex. 2016); Sanchez v. Saghian, 2009 WL 3248266, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.); Dall. Cnty. v. Sweitzer, 881 S.W.2d 757, 769 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied).
[*56]These harms are all tied to loss of incumbency. 28 The Losing Plans’ loss of incumbency, however, results directly from their existing contracts expiring, 29 not from HHSC procuring new contracts with others. The only way the STAR CHIP procure- ment could have saved the Losing Plans from the harm they allege is if its result was to award the Losing Plans new contracts in their current service areas. But the Losing Plans did not try to show (and cannot show) that, but for the alleged ultra vires acts, they would have received those new contracts. See, e.g., CR.3928 (“Superior does not, as Defendant contends, ʻallege that the sole and mandatory outcome of the pro- curement is that [Superior] be awarded all the contracts [it] desire[s].’”).
None of the alleged “unlawful acts of public officials” here have “cause[d] irreparable injury,” so there is no basis for an injunction. Carp, 343 S.W.2d at 245.
D. The balance of the equities weighs against the Losing Plans.
“Equity aids the diligent and not those who slumber on their rights.” River- center Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993) (quotation marks omitted). Most of the objections the Losing Plans now raise were apparent on the face of the STAR CHIP RFP, and so the Losing Plans needed to raise those objections before the proposal deadline, when HHSC began the arduous task of evaluating proposals. Instead, the Losing Plans waited to see the results before complaining. That is not
28 And many are self-inflicted. For Superior and Wellpoint, the district court also found harm from contracts Superior and Wellpoint entered into with others to assist Superior and Wellpoint in per- forming their incumbent contracts but that have terms beyond Superior’s and Wellpoint’s expiring contracts. CR.5880–81. No one, least of all Commissioner Young, forced Superior and Wellpoint to take those risks. 29 See 6.RR.145:14–15 (“We have reached the end date for . . . the current contracts that we have.”).
[*57]diligence. See, e.g., Landry’s Seafood Inn & Oyster Bar-Kemah, Inc. v. Wiggins, 919 S.W.2d 924, 927-28 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (rejecting tem- porary injunction where plaintiff waited eight months, until just before defendant’s operations began, to sue). The same result holds for Wellpoint’s timely solicitation protest about mandatory contracts: Rather than bring an ultra vires claim immedi- ately, Wellpoint sat on its hands after its protest and appeal were denied and as the procurement proceeded. That is not diligence. See id.
The post-solicitation objections the Losing Plans raise does not shift the bal- ance of the equities in their favor because they fail to show any prejudice. They com- plain that HHSC violated general procurement standards of “fair and equal” treat- ment by disclosing competitors’ proposals to Aetna-affiliated entities in between re- sponses to technical questions and oral presentations. But, as explained supra, Part I.C.[3]., the Losing Plans failed to show that any advantage Aetna could have possibly gained through this disclosure was enough to make a difference in the final tally of scores and thus the noticed awards.
Conclusion and Prayer
The Court should reverse and render judgment dismissing the Losing Plans’ claims with prejudice.
[*58]Respectfully submitted, Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP
Jason R. LaFond State Bar No. 24103136 [email protected] Cheryl Joseph LaFond State Bar No. 24104015 [email protected] 303 Colorado Street, Suite 2400 Austin, Texas 78701 (512) 495-6300 Cheryl Joseph LaFond Counsel for Appellant Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc. 59 Certificate of Compliance Microsoft Word 2019 reports that this brief contains 14,189 words, excluding the portions of the brief exempt from the word count under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1). Jason R. LaFond No. 15-24-00114-CV
[*60]In the Fifteenth Court of Appeals Austin, Texas Cecile Erwin Young, in her Official Capacity as the Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission; Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc.; and Aetna Better Health of Texas, Inc.,
Appellants, v. Cook Children’s Health Plan, Texas Children’s Health Plan, Superior Health Plan, Inc., and Wellpoint Insurance Company,
Appellees.
Appendix Tab
1 Order denying Commissioner Young’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and Granting Plaintiffs’ Application for Temporary Injunction PX38: STAR CHIP Request for Proposals Tex. Gov’t Code § 522.0051 Tex. Gov’t Code § 523.051 Tex. Gov’t Code § 525.0101 Tex. Gov’t Code § 532.0051 Tex. Gov’t Code § 540.0051 Tex. Gov’t Code § 540.0203
Tex. Gov’t Code § 540.0204 Tex. Gov’t Code § 540.0206 Tex. Gov’t Code § 543A.0052 Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.076 Tex. Gov’t Code § 2155.144 Tex. Health & Safety Code § 62.051 Tex. Health & Safety Code § 62.053 Tex. Health & Safety Code § 62.055 Tex. Health & Safety Code § 62.155 Act of May 29, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 1170, § 1, art. IX, sec. [17].09 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.101 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.209 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 391.307 1 Tex. Admin Code § 111.3 (1997) TAB 1
Filed in The District Court of Travis County, Texas ,. j OCT O 4 2024 /V'f2- CAUSE NO. D-1-C -24-003839 At L/ 'fl f) M. Vet•, - :...,. Distrk t Clerk COOK CHILDREN'S HEAL TH PLAN; § IN THE DISTRICT COURT TEXAS CHILDREN'S HEALTH PLAN; § SUPERIOR HEALTHPLAN, INC.; and § WELLPOINT INSURANCE COMPANY, § § Plaintiffs, § § v. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS § CECILE ERWIN YOUNG, in her official § capacity as Executive Com missioner of the § Texas Health and Human Services § Commission, § § Defendant. § 353rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT
TEMPORARY INJU NCTION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDA T'S PLEA T O THE JURISDICTION
Before the Court are the Applications for Temporary Injunction (the '"Applications") filed by Plaintiffs Cook Children's Health Plan ("Cook Children's"), Texas Children's Health Plan ("TCHP"), Superior HealthPlan, Inc. ("Superior"), and Wellpoint Insurance Company ("Wellpoint," and collectively, "Plaintiffs"); and the Plea to the Jurisdiction (the "Plea") filed by Defendant Cecile Erwin Young ("Defendant"), in her official capacity as Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (''HHSC"). After considering Plaintiffs' Applications and Defendant's response; Defendant's Plea and Plaintiffs' responses; the pleadings and attached evidence in these consolidated cases (Nos. D- I-GN-24-003839, D- I-GN-24-003874, D-1-GN-004059, and D-1-G -24-004327); the parties' prehearing briefing; the evidence admitted in the record and adduced at the hearing held on September 30, October I , October 2, and October
plicable authorities; the arguments of counsel, and alI other matters properly before the ourt DENIES Defendant's Plea and GRA TS Plaintiffs' Applications.
Page I of 10
Page 5875 The ourt makes the following findings: 1. The Court has ubject-matter jurisdiction over the claims in these consolidated ca es because Plaintiffs have alleged and offered e idence demonstrating that Defendant will act ultra vires in awarding, executing, and implementing the contracts arising out of Request for Proposals o. HHS00 I 1152 (the '·RFP" or " T R & CHIP RFP'') because he has acted ultra vires in admini tering the RFP. Plaintiffs properly seek only pro pective relief-specifically, injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant from awarding, executing, or otherwise implementing the intended RFP contracts and thus preventing further unlawful acts in connection with Defendant's procurement or contracting proces es, as well as accompanying declaratory relief. Accordingly sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiffs' claims or deprive the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction. [2]. The Court ha per onal jurisdiction o er the parties in these consolidated cases. [3]. Venue is proper in this Court. [4]. Through the RFP Defendant sought to procure managed care services for the tate of Texas ccess Reform (" T R ') Medicaid program and the Children s Health Insurance Program(' CHIP,' and together with STAR, "STAR & CHIP").
[*413]-- 1 TAC § 111.3 GENERAL SERVICES COMMISSION
(b) In the event of a titncly protest or appeal forth the reasons for the determination, which under this section, the state shall not proceed fur may include ordering the contract void. ther with the solicitation or with the award of the (0 The director's determination on a protest may contract unless the executive director, after consul be appealed by an interested party to the executive tation with the using agency and the appropriate director of the commission. An appeal of the di dhision director, makes a written determination rector's determination must be in writing and must that the award of contract without delay is neces be received in the executive director's office no sary to protect substantial interests of the state. later than 10 working days after the date of the (c) A formal protest must be sworn and contain: director's determination. The appeal shall be limit (1) a specific identification of the statutory or ed to review of the director's determination. Copies regulatory provision(s) that the action com of the appeal must be mailed or delivered by the plained of is alleged to have violated; appealing party to the using agency and other interested parties and must contain an affidavit (2) a specific description of each act alleged to that such copies have been provided. have violated the statutory or regulatory provi sion(s) identified in paragraph (1) of this subsec (g) The general counsel shall review the protest, tion; director's determination, and the appeal and pre (3) a precise statement of the relevant facts; pare a written opinion with recommendation to the executive director. The executive director may, in ( 4) an identification of the issue or issues to be his discretion, refer the matter to the commission resolved; ers for their consideration at a regularly scheduled (5) argument and authorities in support of the open meeting or issue a written decision on the protest; and protest. (6) a statement that copies of the protest have (h) When· a protest has been appealed to the been mailed or delivered to the using agency and executive director under subsection (0 of this sec other identifiable interested parties. tion and has been referred to the commissioners by (d) The director shall have the authority, prior to the executive director under subsection (g) of this appeal to the executive director of the commission, section, the following requirements shall apply. to settle and resolve the dispute concerning the (1) Copies of the appeal, responses of interest solicitation or award of a contract. The director ed parties, if any, and general counsel recom may solicit written responses to the protest from mendation shall be mailed to the commissioners, other interested parties. and copies of the general counsel's recommenda (e) If the protest is not resolved by mutual agree tion shall be mailed to the using agency, the ment, the director will issue a written determina appealing party, and other interested parties. tion on the protest. (2) All interested parties who wish to make an (1) If the director determines that no violation oral presentation at the open meeting are re of rules or statutes has occurred, he shall so quested to notify the commission general counsel inform the protesting party, the using agency, at least 48 hours in advance of the open meeting. and other interested parties by letter which sets (3) The commissioners may consider oral pre forth the reasons for the determination. sentations and written documents presented by staff and interested parties. The chairman shall (2) If the director determines that a violation of set the order and amount of time allowed for the rules or statutes has occurred in a case where a contract h as not been awarded, he shall presentations. so inform the protesting party, the using agency, (4) The commissioners' determination of the and other interested parties by letter which sets appeal shall be by duly adopted resolution re- forth the reas ons for the determination and the fleeted in the minutes of the open meeting, and appropriate remedial action. shall be final. (3) If the director determines that a violation of (i) Unless good cause for delay is shown or the the rules or statutes h as occurred in a case commission determines that a protest or appeal where a contract h as been awarded, he shall so raises issues significant to procurement practices inform the protesting party, the using agency, or procedures, a protest or appeal that is not filed and other interested parties by letter which sets timely will not be considered.
[*414]- EXECUTIVE ADMINISTRATION DIVISION 1 TAC § 111.12 (j) A decision issued either by the commissioners Cross References: This Section cited in 1 TAC §113.20, (relating to Group Purchasing Programs). in open meeting, or in writing by the executive director, shall be the final administrative action of HISTORICALLY UNDERUTILIZED BUSINESS the commission. CERTIFICATION PROGRAM Source: The provisions of this §111.3 adopted to be effective September 16, 1982, 7 TexReg 3205; amended to be effective Authority: The provisions of these §§111.11-11 I .23 issued under September 7, 1983, 8 TexReg 3266; amended to be effective Chapter 684, §6S(c), Acts of the 73rd Legislature (1993). December 16, I 987, 12 TexReg 4523; amended to be effective October 19, 1992, 17 TexReg 6894. Cross References: This Section cited in 1 TAC § I 13.19, (relating § 111.11. Policy and Purpose to Catalogue Purchase Procedure for Automated Information Sys tems). It is the policy of the commission to encourage the use of historically underutilized businesses by § 111.4. Ethical Standards state agencies and to assist agencies to achieve (a) This section states the ethical standards of these goals through race, ethnic, and gender neu conduct required of commission employees, ven tral means. The goal of this program is to promote dors, potential vendors, and employees of other full and equal business opportunity for all bu i agencies when acting under authority delegated nesses in state contracting. Source: The provisions of this §1 I 1.1 I adopted to be effective from the commission. October 4, 1995, 20 TexRcg 7473. (b) An employee may not: Cross References: This Section cited in 1 TAC §I 11.15, (relating to Agency Planning Responsibilities). ( 1) participate in work on a commission con tract knowing that the employee, or member of their immediate family has an actual or potential § 111.12. Definitions . financial interest in the contract, including pro The following words and terms, when used in spective employment; this subchapter, shall have the following meanings, (2) solicit or accept anything of value from an unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. actual or potential vendor; Applicant-A corporation, sole-proprietorship, (3) be employed by, or agree to work for, a partnership, joint venture, or supplier that applies vendor or potential vendor; to the commission as an historically underutilized ( 4) knowingly disclose confidential information business. for personal gain. Application-A written request for certification (c) A former employee who had a pay classifica as an historically underutilized business in the re tion of Group 17, Step 1 or higher may not repre quired format submitted to the commission. sent or receive compensation concerning any mat Commodities-Materials, supplies, or equip ter in which the former employee participated ment. during his or her employment with the state. Comptroller-Comptroller of Public Accounts. (d) A vendor or potential vendor may not: offer, give, or agree to give an employee anything of Contractor-A supplier of commodities or ser value. vices to a state agency under a purchase order (e) When an actual or potential violation of sub contract or other contract. sections (b)-(d) is discovered, the person involved • Directory-The Texas Certified Historically Un shall promptly file a written statement concerning derutilized Business Directory. the matter with an appropriate supervisor. The Disparity Study-The State of Texas Disparity person may also request written instructions and Study, performed by the National Econo1nic Re disposition of the matter. search Associates, Inc. (NERA). (f) If an actual violation of subsections (b)-(d) Historically Underutilized Business-A business occurs or is not disclosed and remedied, the em outlined in subparagraphs (C)-(H) in which the ployee involved may be either reprimanded, sus owner(s): pended, or dismissed. The vendor or potential ven dor may be barred from receiving future contracts (A) have a proportionate interest and demon and an existing contract may be canceled. strate active participation in the control, oper Source: The provisions of this § 111.4 adopted to be cffocth-c ation, and n1anagcmcnt of the entities' affairs; April.20, I 993, 18 TcxReg 2297. and Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Jason LaFond on behalf of Jason LaFond Bar No. 24103136 [email protected] Envelope ID: 106218880 Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument Filing Description: Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc. Brief Requesting Oral Argument Status as of 9/29/2025 4:29 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Michaelle Peters [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Julie Wright [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Amanda DoddsPrice [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Maria Williamson [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Mandy Patterson [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Michelle Joyner [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT William FCole [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Abril Rivera [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Nancy Villarreal [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Cory Scanlon [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT David Johns [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Jessie Johnson [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Stacey Jett [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT
[*415]Associated Case Party: Cook Children's Health Plan Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Karen Burgess 796276 [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Anna Baker 791362 [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Amy Warr 795708 [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Juliana Bennington [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Jonathan Hawley [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Jason LaFond on behalf of Jason LaFond Bar No. 24103136 [email protected] Envelope ID: 106218880 Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument Filing Description: Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc. Brief Requesting Oral Argument Status as of 9/29/2025 4:29 PM CST Associated Case Party: Cook Children's Health Plan Jonathan Hawley [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Trisha Marino [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Katie Dolan-Galaviz [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Perkins Docketing Team [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Matthew Gordon [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Associated Case Party: Texas Children's Health Plan Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Mark Emery 24050564 [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Warren Huang 796788 [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Paul Trahan 24003075 [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Susan Harris 6876980 [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Thomas Coulter 4885500 [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Kayla Ahmed [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Associated Case Party: Wellpoint Insurance Company Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Robert Johnson 10786400 [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Michelle Ku 24071452 [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Kristin Hernandez [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Stacey Obenhaus [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Benjamin Grossman [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Jason LaFond on behalf of Jason LaFond Bar No. 24103136 [email protected] Envelope ID: 106218880 Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument Filing Description: Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc. Brief Requesting Oral Argument Status as of 9/29/2025 4:29 PM CST Associated Case Party: Superior Healthplan Inc. Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Richard Phillips 24032833 [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT J McCaig 24070083 [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Karen Walker [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Tiffany Roddenberry [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Associated Case Party: Texas Health and Human Services Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Victoria Gomez [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Jennifer Cook [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Associated Case Party: Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc. Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Cheryl LaFond 24104015 [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Jason R.LaFond [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Associated Case Party: Aetna Better Health of Texas, Inc. Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Joseph Knight 11601275 [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Associated Case Party: Cecile Erwin Young, Texas Health and Human Services Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Jason LaFond on behalf of Jason LaFond Bar No. 24103136 [email protected] Envelope ID: 106218880 Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument Filing Description: Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc. Brief Requesting Oral Argument Status as of 9/29/2025 4:29 PM CST Associated Case Party: Cecile Erwin Young, Texas Health and Human Services Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Cory Scanlon 24104599 [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT Jeffrey Stephens [email protected] 9/29/2025 4:09:30 PM SENT