Harden v. C.O. Neal
v.
C.O. Neal, et al.
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WEILHEIMER, J. Orcdorsec vo , 2025
Plaintiff Major O. Harden, who is currently incarcerated at SCI Smithfield, brings this pro se action alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Harden seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Harden in forma pauperis status and will permit him to proceed on his conditions-of-confinement claim against Corrections Officer Heard involving an alleged denial of drinking water. The balance of Harden’s Complaint will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e}\(2)(B)(i).. Harden will be given an opportunity to proceed on the claim that passes statutory screening, or to file an amended complaint, L FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS!
Harden alleges that his rights were violated while he was housed at the Pennsylvania Industrial Corrections Center (“PICC”).[*] (Compl. at 1.) Named as Defendants are: Corrections Officers Neal, Heard, and Poole, identified as guards on the K-Unit; Corrections Officer Greene,
' The factual allegations are taken from Harden’s Complaint. The Court adopts the sequential pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system.
he returned to PICC, he was “not given anything for his pain, except for basic analgesics” and was not given the soft-food diet. (See id. at 4.) He also contends that, “[djespite his repeated, near constant entreaties to the guards and the medical staff’ at PICC, he was denied medical care. (See id.) These generalized allegations do not sufficiently identify an individual or individuals alleged to have intentionally denied or delayed access to medical care, who intentionally interfered with prescribed treatment, or how the alleged deprivation occurred. Accordingly, any deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims will be dismissed without prejudice to amendment in the event Harden can provide additional relevant details in support thereof.
Cc. First Amendment Retaliation Claim Harden claims that C.O, Heard retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights. (Compl. at 3.) To state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse action. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (Gd Cir. 2001); see also Coit vy. Garman, 812 F. App’x 83, 86 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). A prisoner’s filing of a grievance or expressing an intent to file a grievance constitutes constitutionally protected conduct. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2016); Mitchell vy. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003), “To establish the requisite causal connection a plaintiff usually must prove either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link.”
1]
Ruttle v. Brady, No. 22-3000, 2023 WL 5554648, at *2 (3d Cir, Aug. 29, 2023) (quoting Lauren W. rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 Gd Cir, 2007).
Harden contends that C.O. Heard retaliated against him after Harden requested to be moved to another cell “apparently one time too many” by threatening to prolong his stay in the “mhumane housing situation and threatening to make him drink totlet water.” (Compl. at 3, 5.) Harden asserts that such alleged threats were designed (o chill his First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Ud. at 5.) These allegations are conclusory and do not support a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim, While Harden named a Grievance Officer as a Defendant, he does not even allege that he engaged in protected activity. To pass statutory screening, a plaintiff must support his claims with plausible factual allegations and conclusory allegations will not suffice. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 USS, 544, 556 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” /d. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.) Accordingly, the First Amendment retaliation claim will be dismissed.
D. Claims Against Grievance Officer Greene
Harden names C.O. Greene as a Defendant and identifies her as a “Grievance Officer,” (Compl. at 1, 2.) The only allegation he presents against C.O, Greene is that she violated his constitutional rights by failing “to act on his reports of denial of medical care, retaliation, and other maltreatment, permitting the harms to continue.” (Ud. at 5.) Harden does not allege that he filed any grievances. To the extent Harden seeks to assert a stand-alone claim against C,O, Greene based on the grievance process, it will be dismissed because “prisoners do not have a constitutional right to prison grievance procedures.” Gerholt v. Wetzel, 858 F. App’x 32, 34 3d Cir, 2021) (per curiam) (citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) and Flick y, Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)). Accordingly, allegations predicated on failures of the grievance process or inyproper handling of or response to grievances do not give rise to a constitutional claim. See Woods v. First Corr. Med. Inc., 446 F, App’x 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“We agree with the District Court that because a prisoner has no freestanding constitutional right to an effective grievance process, Woods cannot maintain a constitutional claim against Lucas based upon his perception that she ignored and/or failed to properly investigate his grievances.” (internal citation omitted)); Burnside v. Moser, 138 F. App’x 414, 416 Gd Cir, 2005) (per curiant) (explaining that “[i]nmates do not have a constitutionally protected right to the prison grievance process” and that “a state grievance procedure does not confer any substantive constitutional right upon prison inmates” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
Furthermore, a prison official’s involvement in the grievance process is not sufficient to allege liability under § 1983 for the events that gave rise to the grievance. See Curtis v. Wetzel, 763 F. App’x 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“The District Court properly determined that Defendants Wenerowicz, Lewis, and Shaylor —- who participated only in the denial of Curtis’ grievances — lacked the requisite personal involvement [in the conduct at issue].”); see also Folk v. Prime Care Med., 741 F. App’x 47, 51 (Gd Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (‘Although some of these defendants were apparently involved in responding to some of Folk’s prison grievances, there are no allegations Imking them to the underlying incidents and thus no basis for liability based on those later grievance reviews.”). All claims based on the handling of grievances will be dismissed with prejudice.
E. Official Capacity Claims
Marden indicates in the Complaint that he seeks to present claims against each Defendant, all of whom appear to be employees of the City of Philadelphia, in his or her individual and official capacities. (See Compl. at 1.) Claims against municipal officials named in their official capacity are indistinguishable from claims against the municipality that employs them. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits... ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting Monell vy. Dep't of Soc, Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S, 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). “[Aqn official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Id.
A municipality such as the City of Philadelphia is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of its employees. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (Local governments can be liable as “persons” under § 1983, however, this liability extends only to “their own illegal acts.”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). Rather, to plead a § 1983 claim against a municipality, such as the City of Philadelphia, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality or contractor’s policy or custom caused the violation of his constitutional rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, “To satisfy the pleading standard, [the plaintiff] must... specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” MeTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (Gd Cir. 2009), “Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.’” Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir, 2019) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). “Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.’” Jd. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (Gd Cir. 1990)). Fora custom to be the proximate cause of an injury, the defendant must have “had knowledge of similar unlawful conduct in the past, failed to take precautions against future violations, and that its failure, at least in part, led to his injury,” Jd. (internal quotations and alterations omitted), In other words, “[c]ustom requires proof of knowledge and acquiescence by [a municipal] decisionmaker.” McTernan, 564 F.3d at 658: see also Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1191 (3d Cir. 1995) (to establish municipal liability, the plaintiff “must show that a policymaker for the Township authorized policies that led to the violations or permitted practices that were so permanent and well settled as to establish acquiescence”).* To the extent Harden seeks damages from any Defendant in their official capacity, he has failed to allege facts that support Monell liability. Harden has not pled a municipal policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violations, or municipal failures amounting to deliberate indifference, Nor does he describe a pattern of constitutional violations or an obvious need for training or supervision that supports a plausible inference of a due process violation. id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
Accordingly, the official capacity claims, as well as any claim against the City of Philadelphia, to the extent Harden intended to name the City as a Defendant, are not plausible.
FE. Supervisory Liability Claims Harden seeks to assert liability against the Commissioner of the Philadelphia Prison System and the Warden of PICC by alleging that they knowingly operated a decrepit prison and inhumane conditions were foreseeable and predictable, (Compl. at 5.) To the extent Harden seeks to bring claims against these Defendants for holding supervisory positions, he has not alieged plausible claims. Generalized allegations that a supervisory defendant is “in charge of” or “responsible for” an office or facility are insufficient to allege personal involvement in that violation. See Saisi vy. Murray, 822 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir, 2020) (per curiant) (Saisi asserted that some defendants were ‘in charge of agencies that allowed this to happen,’ and that liability stemmed merely from defendants’ ‘belief that their conduct would be ‘tolerated.’ However, a director cannot be held liable ‘simply because of his position as the head of the lagency].’”) (quoting Evancho y. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir, 2005)).
“Suits against high-level government officials must satisfy the general requirements for supervisory liability.” Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 243 (3d Cir. 2017). There are “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med. Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 Gd Cir, 2014), reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015). First, a supervisor may be liable if he or she “‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Jd (quoting 4.M. ex rel. JME. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det, Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original)), “Second, a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.” Jd “Although a court can infer that a defendant had contemporaneous knowledge of wrongful conduct from the circumstances surrounding a case, the knowledge must be actual, not constructive.” Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222 (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1194 3d Cir. 1995); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1201 n.6). “Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence ... must be made with appropriate particularity,” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
Harden has failed to allege that Commissioner of the Philadelphia Prison System or the Warden of PICC established and maintained a policy, practice, or custom with deliberate indifference that caused constitutional harm, and he has failed to allege these Defendants’ personal involvement in any alieged underlying constitutional violation. Accordingly, the individual capacity claims against these Defendants are not plausible, IV, CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Harden leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As set forth more fully above, any claim based on the handling of grievances will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)Gi). The Court is prepared to serve Harden’s condition-of-confinement claim concerning the denial of drinking water against C.O. Heard. However, all other claims will be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C, § 1915(e)(2)(B ii) for failure to state a claim. Considering Harden’s pro se status, he will be granted the option of filing an amended complaint to attempt to cure the defects identified by the Court.’ In the alternative, Harden may advise the Court that he seeks to proceed only on
If Harden chooses to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint must be a complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint or other papers filed in this case to state a claim, Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 contemplates amended pleadings, the conditions-of-confinement claim against C.O, Heard, and the Court will direct service of the original Complaint against C.O. Heard only, An appropriate Order regarding amendment follows.
BY THE COURT; i
————— GAIL A. WETLHEIMER, J.
“an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity.” Garrett vy. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019). “Thus, the most recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading.” fd. While the Court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, “liberal construction of a pro se amended complaint does not mean accumulating allegations from superseded pleadings.” Argentina y, Gillette, 778 F. App’x 173, 175 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019). This means that the submission of an amended complaint “effectively constitutes an abandonment of any prior complaints filed by a plaintiff.” Smith v. Price, No. 11- 1581, 2012 WL 1068159, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar, 5, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No, 11-1581, 2012 WL 1072282 (M.D, Pa. Mar. 29, 2012).