Gericke v. Weare P D, 2012 DNH 184 (D.N.H. 2012)
No citing cases on record.
v.
Weare P D , et al.
Gericke v . Weare P D , et a l . 11-CV-231-SM 10/15/12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Carla Gericke, Plaintiff v. Case N o . 11-cv-231-SM Opinion N o . 2012 DNH 184 Gregory C . Begin; James J. Carney;
Joseph Kelley; Brandon Montplaisir;
Weare Police Department; and The Town of Weare, New Hampshire, Defendants
O R D E R
In this civil action, Carla Gericke asserts claims under both the United States Constitution and New Hampshire’s common law against the Town of Weare, the Weare Police Department, the department’s Chief (Gregory Begin), and three of its officers: Lieutenant James Carney, Sergeant Joseph Kelley, and Sergeant Brandon Montplaisir. Defendants have moved for summary judgment, asserting that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of Gericke’s claims. Gericke objects and has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.[1] 50 (1986) (citations omitted). The key, then, to defeating a properly supported motion for summary judgment is the non- movant’s ability to support his or her claims concerning disputed material facts with evidence that conflicts with that proffered by the moving party. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). It naturally follows that while a reviewing court must take into account all properly documented facts, it may ignore a party’s bald assertions, unsupported conclusions, and mere speculation. See Serapion v . Martinez, 119 F.3d 9 8 2 , 987 (1st Cir. 1997). See also Scott v . Harris, 550 U.S. [3] 7 2 , 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe i t , a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).
jury. New charges were never filed and no indictment was returned.
officers, and Gericke’s presence at least arguably added to that potentially dangerous situation.
Meanwhile, Gericke had exited her car and was standing behind a small fence that separated her from Sergeant Kelley. She yelled to him that she was recording his actions and pointed what Kelley suspected was a camera at him. And, although Gericke denies i t , Kelley says she shouted words encouraging Hanslin not to cooperate. See, e.g., Affidavit of Sergeant Joseph Kelley (document n o . 20-2) at para. 8 (“Ms. Gericke verbally was encouraging M r . Hanslin not to comply with my motor vehicle stop and shouted ‘remember our cause.’”). Gericke later explained that she believed Kelley’s decision to stop Hanslin for speeding was “bizarre” and said she saw her own role as that of a witness to the unfolding events, who should document what was transpiring. Gericke Deposition (document n o . 26-4) at 6 1 , 6 5 . Curiously, however, Gericke also testified that she knew her video camera was not working at the time. Nevertheless, she kept it pointed at Kelley. Id. at 6 8 . Sergeant Kelley responded by telling Gericke to return to her car. She complied, but rolled the window down and “kept the camera trained on him.” Id. at 6 4 .
cooperative; Gericke was shouting at him and protesting the stop; and it was late at night, and he was alone. Accordingly, he called for assistance. Three members of the Weare Police Department responded: Lieutenant James Carney, Sergeant Robert Peterson (not a defendant in this action), and Officer Brandon Montplaisir. Around the same time, a third civilian car arrived at the scene. The driver, William Rodriguez, exited the vehicle. The officers were, then, presented with a late night situation that involved three vehicles, six unknown people, one (known) firearm, and a number of people outside of their vehicles.
In response to Officer Montplaisir’s request that she produce her driver’s license and vehicle registration, Gericke said, “I’m confused. Is that a lawful order? I’m not driving the car, I’m parked in a parking lot. I don’t understand why I would have to give you my driver’s license - my driver’s license and registration.” Id. at 74-75. Montplaisir explained that, under state law, she was required to produce that information and, for a second time, he asked her to do s o . Again, however, Gericke balked, saying “Are you sure this is a lawful order? I’m not driving the car, I’m sitting in a parking lot, I don’t see why I would have to give you my license and registration.” Id. at 7 5 . See also Id. at 76 (“So twice I said to him are you - you know, is that a lawful order, why do I have to provide i t , I’m not driving the vehicle, I’m parked in a parking lot.”). Officer Montplaisir explained to Gericke that if she did not produce her license and registration, he was going to place her under arrest and, if necessary, officers would use force to remove her from the car. Montplaisir Deposition (document n o . 20-25) at 44-45.
it u p . At that point, Montplaisir decided that he had given Gericke sufficient opportunity to comply with his (repeated) requests for identification, concluded that she was not going to comply with that directive, and told her that she was under arrest for disobeying a police officer. He instructed Gericke to get out of her car. According to Montplaisir, Gericke refused to exit the vehicle and he again instructed her to do s o . See Affidavit of Brandon Montplaisir (document n o . 20-11) at para.
10. Eventually, Montplaisir says, Gericke’s passenger persuaded her to comply and Gericke exited the vehicle. Officer Montplaisir then placed her under arrest for disobeying a police officer, handcuffed her, and escorted her to a police cruiser without incident. Gericke was transported to the police station, where she was charged with disobeying a police officer, in violation of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (“RSA”) 265:4. She was also charged with obstructing a government official, in violation of RSA 642:1, and unlawful interception of oral communications, in violation of RSA 570-A:2, I (also known as New Hampshire’s law against wiretapping and eavesdropping).
Gericke, after she was processed at the police station, she asked unidentified police officers to provide her with a receipt for the camera. She claims they refused and she was escorted out of the station.
During the search of the camcorder, digital video files were located, but could not be opened or viewed. Accordingly, the camera was sent to the New Hampshire State Laboratory. The lab encountered the same difficulties and i t , too, was unable to recover the apparently corrupted video files. But, it appears that rather than return the camera to the Weare Police Department, the state lab simply retained it - conduct Gericke characterizes as the defendants having “left the camera with the lab.” Plaintiff’s memorandum at 6.
In March of 2011, Gericke filed a motion in state court seeking return of her video camera. That motion was granted and, not long thereafter, Gericke’s camera was returned to her by the state.
Discussion
I. Gericke’s First Amendment Claims.
A. Background
Gericke advances two federal constitutional claims in which she asserts that she was the victim of retaliatory prosecution for having engaged in protected First Amendment activities. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In count one, she claims defendants lacked probable cause to charge her with violating New Hampshire’s wiretapping and eavesdropping statute, RSA 570-A:2, but nevertheless pursued that charge in retaliation for her having attempted to videotape Sergeant Kelley performing his official public duties. See generally Hartman v . Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (“Official reprisal for protected speech offends the Constitution because it threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right and the law is settled that as a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions, including criminal prosecutions, for speaking out.”) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). And, she says that because it was clearly established that police officers cannot arrest citizens for merely videotaping them while they perform official duties in a public place, the defendants are not entitled to the protections afforded by qualified immunity.
In count two, she advances a similar claim, asserting that defendants charged her with violating the wiretapping statute in retaliation for having “petitioned the Defendants for a redress of grievances.” Amended Complaint at para. [2] 8 .
According to Officer Montplaisir, he arrested Gericke for having disobeyed a lawful order of a police officer - that i s , for refusing to produce her driver’s license and vehicle registration when instructed to do s o . Police Report of Officer Montplaisir (document n o . 20-12) at 1 ; Montplaisir Deposition at 4 5 ; Montplaisir Affidavit at para. [1] 0 . He informed Gericke of the same when he took her into custody. Subsequently, when she was processed at the police station, Gericke was charged with three crimes: the initial crime of disobeying a lawful order of a police officer, as well as obstructing a government official during the course of his duties, and violating New Hampshire’s law prohibiting wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. Gericke focuses on the wiretapping charge, saying defendants’ decision to charge her for having videotaped the officers undeniably violated her First Amendment rights.
First, Gericke’s arrest for disobeying a police officer was plainly supported by probable cause and did not violate any of her constitutional rights. See generally Holder v . Town of Sandown, 585 F.3d 5 0 0 , 504 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing probable cause to arrest); RSA 594:10, I(a) (discussing the circumstance under which an officer may make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor violation). See also Atwater v . City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. [3] 1 8 , 354 (2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”). Officer Montplaisir was entitled, under New Hampshire law, to ask Gericke to produce her driver’s license and/or vehicle registration. See RSA 265:4, I(e). See also RSA 263:2 (“[e]very person driving a motor vehicle shall have his driver’s license upon his person or in the vehicle in some easily accessible place and shall display the same on demand of and manually surrender the same into the hands of the demanding officer for the inspection thereof.”). 3
The record evidence is undisputed. Officer Montplaisir twice asked Gericke to produce her license and registration. On both occasions, she refused to comply and, instead, questioned the lawfulness of his request. See Gericke Deposition at 31 (“The first two times he asked [for my license] I did not [produce i t ] , because I did not believe it was a legal order because I was not operating the vehicle.”). Only when threatened with arrest and forcible removal from her vehicle, did Gericke give at least the appearance of attempted compliance. See Gericke Deposition at 7 6 . (“So I actually started looking for my license. And it was at the time where I had reached over into the cubbyhole and I took out the - the engine book and stuff, and I found the State Farm card.”). Officer Montplaisir gave Gericke sufficient opportunity to comply with his request, and, when she failed to do s o , and offered no plausible excuse for her failure, he had probable cause to arrest her under state law for disobeying a lawful order of a police officer.
The critical question presented here is not whether Gericke was properly placed under arrest - she was - but whether defendants’ subsequent decision to charge her with violating the wiretapping statute (allegedly in retaliation for having ostensibly videotaped the officers) violated her First Amendment freedoms.
B. Retaliatory Prosecution - Videotaping
In count one of her amended complaint, Gericke asserts that she “was engaged in lawful First Amendment activities when she attempted to video - and audio - record Defendant Kelley performing his public duties in public, and the Defendants arrested her and charged her with ‘wiretapping’ in retaliation for exercising those rights.” Amended Complaint at para. [2] 4 . The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has recognized that it is clearly established in this circuit that police officers cannot, consistently with the Constitution, prosecute citizens for violating wiretapping laws when they peacefully record a police officer performing his or her official duties in a public area. Glik v . Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 7 8 , 84 (1st Cir. 2011).
Moreover, in this case, the police lacked probable cause to believe Gericke violated the state law prohibiting wiretapping. Gericke was charged with willfully intercepting, or attempting to intercept, an oral communication, in violation of RSA 570-A:2, I . See, e.g., Weare Police Department Case Submission Form (document no. 2 1 - 8 ) . Importantly, however, that statute provides that, for a crime to occur, the victim of an intercepted oral communication must have had a reasonable expectation “that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation.” RSA 570-A:1, I I . See also Fischer v . Hooper 143 N.H. 585, 590 (1999) (providing that the victim of intercepted oral communication must have a “reasonable expectation . . . that her communications will not be intercepted.”). Here, the officers had no reasonable expectation that their public communications during the traffic stop were not subject to interception: they were performing official duties, they were in a public place, and Gericke was openly videotaping (or purporting to videotape) their actions. See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82-83.
Even s o , defendants say, the facts underlying this case are at least sufficiently distinct from those presented in Glik that they are at least entitled to qualified immunity. That is to say, even if they did violate Gericke’s constitutional rights, they remain immune from suit and liability. A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from personal liability if his or her challenged “‘conduct [did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Aversa v . United States,
99 F.3d 1200, 1214 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Harlow v . Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8 0 0 , 818 (1982)). The challenged conduct is measured by a standard of objective reasonableness, that i s , one must ask: “Could an objectively reasonable official, situated similarly to the defendant, have believed that his conduct did not violate the plaintiff[’s] constitutional rights, in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the defendant at the time of the allegedly wrongful conduct?” Wood v . Clemons, 89 F.3d 9 2 2 , 927 (1st Cir. 1996). And, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has observed,
To determine a defendant’s eligibility for qualified immunity, courts must define the right asserted by the plaintiff at an appropriate level of generality and ask whether, so characterized, that right was clearly established when the harm-inducing conduct allegedly took place. This does not mean that a right is clearly established only if there is precedent of considerable factual similarity. It does mean, however, that the law must have defined the right in a quite specific manner, and that the announcement of the rule establishing the right must have been unambiguous and widespread, such that the unlawfulness of particular conduct will be apparent ex ante to reasonable public officials.
Brady v . Dill, 187 F.3d 1 0 4 , 115-16 (1st Cir. 1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis supplied).
As suggested in Dill, a defendant does not lose the protection of qualified immunity if he acts mistakenly, as long as his mistake was objectively reasonable, since qualified immunity is intended to protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v . Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
To resolve defendants’ claimed entitlement to qualified immunity, it is necessary to focus on two aspects of the Glik opinion. First, the court of appeals noted that the “peaceful recording of an arrest in a public space that does not interfere with the police officers’ performance of their duties is not reasonably subject to limitation.” Glik, 655 F.3d at 84 (emphasis supplied). A reasonable (if not self-evident) implication of that statement of the law is that the non-peaceful recording of police officers, in a way that does interfere with the performance of their duties, is not constitutionally protected conduct (or, at the very least, it has not been “clearly established” that it i s ) . Second, the Glik court distinguished a recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in which that court held that “there was insufficient case law establishing a right to videotape police officers during a traffic stop to put a reasonably competent officer on ‘fair notice’ that seizing a camera or arresting an individual for videotaping police during the stop would violate the First Amendment.” Kelly v . Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis supplied).
In light of the foregoing, and given that Glik does not clearly establish a First Amendment right to disruptively and non-peacefully engage in recording the public activity of police officers, a reasonable police officer in this circuit could plausibly conclude that Gericke did not have a constitutionally protected right to videotape the officers during the course of a traffic stop if she was behaving in a way that was not peaceful or was disruptive.[4] The events giving rise to Gericke’s claims arose out of a late night traffic stop and the circumstances faced by the officers in this case were substantially different than those faced by the officers in Glik. Simon Glik used his cell phone to record three Boston police officers arresting a young man on the Boston Common. Nothing in the opinion suggests that there was anything unusual or dangerous about the circumstances, or that Glik was disruptive in any way. Here, however, the officers did face a potentially dangerous situation: a late night traffic stop involving multiple vehicles, six citizens (some of whom were quite vocal, even confrontational, in expressing their opposition to the officers), and at least one firearm. As the court of appeals recognized in Glick, “a traffic stop is worlds apart from an arrest on the Boston Common in the circumstances alleged.” Glik, 655 F.3d at 8 5 . See also Michigan v . Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983) (“[W]e [have] recognized that investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers.”); Pennsylvania v . Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (recognizing the “inordinate danger” confronting police officers conducting traffic stops).
the government for redress of grievances. Specifically, she claims she:
was engaged in lawful First Amendment Activities, in that she petitioned the Defendants for a redress of grievances when she asked that they provide her a receipt for her seized camera. The Defendants arrested her and charged her with “wiretapping” in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights.
Id. at para. 28 (emphasis supplied). While there may be some debate as to its precise contours, the right to “redress grievances” is likely not violated when an arrestee unsuccessfully requests a receipt for evidence seized in a criminal case.
sought a receipt for her camera; on this record, the charge preceded her request.
Thus, a plaintiff who brings a section 1983 action against a municipality bears the burden of showing that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged. Such a plaintiff must identify a municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused the plaintiff’s injury.
Haley v . City of Boston, 657 F.3d 3 9 , 51 (1st Cir. 2011) (citations and internal punctuation omitted) (emphasis in original).
his personal belief that, as long as a citizen is not interfering with an officer’s ability to perform his or her official duties, that citizen has a right to videotape the officer. But, he said he also believes an officer has probable cause to arrest the citizen if he or she is being disruptive or otherwise “interfering with the officer and his duties.” Deposition of Gregory C . Begin (document n o . 21-12) at 3 6 . Gericke points to no other evidence suggesting that the police department had a custom or policy of the sort she alleges.
performing their public duties. Chief Begin i s , then, entitled to judgment as a matter of law on count four of plaintiff’s amended complaint.
described by Gericke existed, they would have encouraged officers to return seized (non-contraband) evidence after a criminal case concludes, and provide receipts for seized evidence upon request. A lengthy discussion of the point is unnecessary. The Town of Weare and the Weare Police Department are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on counts five and six of plaintiff’s amended complaint.
Under New Hampshire law, malice “is said to exist when the primary purpose in instituting the criminal proceeding was not to bring an offender to justice, but was, on the contrary, ill will, personal hostility, or to obtain a personal advantage.” MacRae v . Brant, 108 N.H. [1] 7 7 , 181 (1967) (citations omitted). But, while malice may be inferred from the lack of probable cause, Welch v . Bergeron, 115 N.H. 179, 183-84 (1975), that inference alone is insufficient to entitle Gericke to judgment as a matter of law. Defendants vigorously dispute her claim that they acted with any malice toward her; rather, they say they were simply enforcing the law as they understood i t . Whether one or more of the defendants acted with malice toward Gericke i s , then, an issue for the jury. Consequently, neither party is entitled to summary judgment on Gericke’s claim for malicious prosecution.
Because there are genuinely disputed material facts relevant to both count one and count three, those counts cannot be resolved as a matter of law.
SO ORDERED.