Daniel Stith v. Commonwealth of Virginia
v.
Commonwealth of Virginia
Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Bray
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
DANIEL STITH
MEMORANDUM OPINION [*] BY v. Record No. 1210-00-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER MAY 8, 2001 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HOPEWELL
James F. D'Alton, Jr., Judge
Robert L. Lichtenstein for appellant.
Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Daniel Stith (appellant) appeals from his bench trial conviction for assault on a police officer pursuant to Code § 18.2-57. 1 On appeal, he contends the evidence failed to prove he knew or had reason to know that the individuals were police parts as believable and reject other parts as implausible. See Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 82, 92, 428 S.E.2d 16, 24 (1993).
Intent or knowledge, like any element of a crime, may be proved by circumstantial evidence, see Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 524, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988), such as a person's conduct and statements, see Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 198, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). "Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983). "[T]he Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant." Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993).
Code § 18.2-57(C) provides that "if any person commits an assault . . . against another knowing or having reason to know that such other person is a law-enforcement officer . . . engaged in the performance of his public duties as such, such person shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony . . . ." What constitutes an assault is defined by common law:
An assault is an attempt or offer, with force and violence, to do some bodily hurt to another . . . by means calculated to produce the end if carried into execution; as . . . by levelling a gun at another within a distance from which, supposing it to be loaded, the contents might injure, or any similar act accompanied with circumstances denoting an intention coupled with a present ability, of using actual violence against the person of another. Harper v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 723, 733, 85 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1955) (emphasis added; citation and emphasis omitted). One may commit an assault even though the victim is not aware of or frightened by any acts directed at him, provided the perpetrator has the specific intent to commit a battery and commits an overt act in furtherance of that intent. Adams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 463, 469, 534 S.E.2d 347, 350 (2000); Park Oil Co. v. Parham, 1 Va. App. 166, 170, 336 S.E.2d 531, 534 (1985).
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, supports the trial court's finding that appellant intentionally shot at a group of people whom he knew or had reason to know were police officers engaged in the performance of their duties. When appellant testified at trial, he admitted firing the gun. Although appellant claimed to have fired it into the air to scare two would-be robbers, witness Linda Pace saw appellant pointing the gun "straight out" toward Winston Churchill Drive in the direction of 1204 Liberty Avenue immediately after she heard the gunshot. At that same instant, a bullet passed so close to Officer Bayes' position at the edge of the yard at 1204 Liberty that he heard the bullet as it traveled through the trees overhead. Bayes was an experienced hunter and said that the sound and motion of the leaves indicated to him the path of a bullet.
Shortly before appellant fired the shot, the police officers had walked up Liberty Street to the residence at 1204, and at least six of the seven were in uniforms indicating in various ways that they were police officers. All the uniforms were dark blue or black. Some of the uniforms bore the word, "Police," in large white letters, while others contained large patches denoting the men were police officers. All wore gun belts. The location on Liberty Street where the officers parked their unmarked vehicles was visible from the intersection of Liberty and Granby Avenue, where appellant stood when he fired the shot, and the driveway of 1204 Liberty Street, where the officers were gathered, was only 144 feet from that same intersection. Finally, when appellant was apprehended immediately after the shooting, he admitted at various times to Detectives McQuage and Hartman and Officer Dean that "[he] knew [they] were there" and knew they were police officers.
Detective McQuage's testimony about appellant's admission stood unimpeached. That Hartman and Dean gave conflicting testimony at the preliminary hearing about whether appellant made such statements was not dispositive; the trial court was free to assess the officers' credibility and to conclude they were testifying truthfully at appellant's trial. In addition, the trial court specifically concluded, as it was entitled to do, that appellant's testimony about an attempted robbery was incredible. Appellant did not report the attempted robbery when he was arrested, and the police officers did not see anyone pass them as they proceeded to the intersection, despite appellant's claim at trial that the would-be robbers fled in the same direction from which the officers had come.
Once the trial court resolved these credibility questions against appellant, the only reasonable hypothesis flowing from the circumstantial and direct evidence was that appellant knew the men were police officers engaged in the performance of their duties and that he intentionally shot at them on the afternoon of April 10, 1999.
For these reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction for assaulting a police officer in the performance of his duties in violation of Code § 18.2-57. However, due to the clerical error in the sentencing order regarding the statute under which appellant was convicted, see supra note 1, we remand this matter to the trial court for the sole purpose of correcting the sentencing order to reflect that appellant was convicted under Code § 18.2-57 rather than Code § 18.2-57.1.
Affirmed on the merits and remanded with instructions.