D.Z.G. ^[1] (“Appellant”) appeals the trial court’s judgment dismissing his petition for expungement of arrest, plea, and conviction (“petition for expungement”). 2 We reverse the trial court’s judgment dismissing Appellant’s petition for expungement and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion and the provisions of section 610.140. 3

I. BACKGROUND

In June 2017, Appellant pleaded guilty to, inter alia, resisting arrest under section[*~151–153] 462 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015). The “primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue.” Ivie, 439 S.W.3d at 202 (citation omitted). Additionally, statutory interpretation should not be hyper- technical, but reasonable and logical. Ivie, 439 S.W.3d at 203. B. General Law, Analysis, and Conclusion as to Appellant’s Sole Point on Appeal

Appellant’s sole point on appeal argues the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for expungement because the plain language of sections 610.140 and 575.150 do not make his conviction for resisting arrest by fleeing ineligible for expungement. For the reasons discussed below, we agree.

Section 610.140.2(4) states, in relevant part, that “[a]ny felony offense where death is an element of the offense” “shall not be eligible for expungement.” Id. Appellant seeks to expunge his conviction under section 575.150, which enhances the offense of resisting arrest by fleeing to a class E felony when “the person fleeing creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death to any person.” Id. The question before this court is whether “death is an element of” the class E felony of resisting arrest by fleeing. See id.; section 610.140.2(4).

MSHP argues on appeal that the statutory definition of “serious physical injury” as used in section 575.150 already accounts for a “substantial risk of death.” See section 556.061(44) 6 (defining “[s]erious physical injury,” in relevant part, as “physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death”) (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, MSHP urges this Court to interpret the relevant portion of section 575.150 “as having two [alternative] elements . . . for the section’s class E felony:” (1) “creating” “a substantial risk of serious physical injury”; or (2) “creating” “a death.”

However, the Southern District of this Court previously rejected a similar argument in D.D. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 704 S.W.3d 208 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024). The D.D. Court, interpreting the plain language of section 575.150, found that a person fleeing police can violate the statute in one of two ways: (1) by creating a substantial risk of serious injury to any person; or (2) by creating a substantial risk of death to any person. D.D., 704 S.W.3d at 210; see also Ivie, 439 S.W.3d at 202. The D.D. Court held that neither of these potential violations contains “death [as] an element” and therefore section 610.140.2(4) does not render them ineligible for expungement. See id.; D.D., 704 S.W.3d at 210.

We agree with the Southern District’s analysis in D.D. and similarly hold that “death” is not an element of the class E felony of resisting arrest under section 575.150. See id.; D.D., 704 S.W.3d at 209-10; section 610.140.2(4). Additionally, because statutory interpretation should be reasonable and logical as opposed to hyper-technical, we reject MSHP’s proposed interpretation of section 575.150 which illogically includes “creating” “a death” as an element of the class E felony of resisting arrest by fleeing. See Ivie, 439 S.W.3d at 203.

Appellant’s sole point on appeal is granted.

III. CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment dismissing Appellant’s petition for expungement is reversed, and we remand to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion and the provisions of section 610.140.

ROBERT M. CLAYTON III, Judge

John P. Torbitzky, P.J., and Michael S. Wright, J., concur.