Switzerland Cheese Assn., Inc. v. E. Horne's Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23 (1966). · Go Syfert
Search
Switzerland Cheese Assn., Inc. v. E. Horne's Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23 (1966). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
Quick Summary

Interlocutory appeals are generally prohibited for pretrial orders that do not address the merits of a claim to prevent piecemeal litigation and preserve trial court discretion.

After a district court denied a motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remained, the petitioners appealed, arguing the denial was an interlocutory order subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The court considers whether an order denying summary judgment constitutes an interlocutory order regarding an injunction. The court holds that an order denying summary judgment due to unresolved factual issues is strictly a pretrial order that does not decide the merits of the claim. Because such orders relate only to pretrial procedures and do not touch upon the merits, they are not interlocutory orders under the statute.

1,114 citation events (270 in the last 25 years) across 56 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: June Med. Svcs v. Phillips, No. 22-30425 (5th Cir. Sept. 21, 2022)
Treatment trajectory · 1966 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1966 1996 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
At page 25 Determining if pretrial orders are interlocutory under 28 Usc § 129260 citing cases“does not settle or even tentatively decide anything about the merits of the claim.”19 citing courts quote it · also cited as 87 S. Ct. at 195; 17 L. Ed. 2d at 25; 17 L. Ed. 2d at 23
Show 50 more citing cases
At page 24 Analyzing jurisdiction for interlocutory appeals under 28 u.s.c. § 1292(a)(1)31 citing cases“approach this statute somewhat gingerly lest a floodgate be opened that brings into the exception many pretrial orders.”17 citing courts quote it · 29 listed here
Show 19 more citing cases
Orders that in no way touch on the merits of the claim but only relate to pretrial procedures are not in our view ‘interlocutory’ within the meaning of [§] 1292(a)(1). We see no other way to protect the integrity of the congressional policy against piecemeal appeals.no pin page on record · 3 citing cases listed
87 S. Ct. at 194 Protecting congressional policy against piecemeal appeals3 citing cases2 listed here
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
SWITZERLAND CHEESE ASSOCIATION, INC., Et Al.
v.
E. HORNE’S MARKET, INC.
42.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 7, 1966.
Published opinion
385 U.S. 23
1966 U.S. LEXIS 2941
David Toren argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were John J. McGlew and Aljred E. Page., Harold E. Cole argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Douglas, Harlan, Chappell, Inc, Frankel, Stewart.
Cited by 354 opinions  |  Published
9 passages pin-cited by 10 cases
Pinpoint authority: #8,738 of 633,719
Citer courts: Eleventh Circuit (17) · Court of Appeals of Utah (6) · Fifth Circuit (3) · District of Columbia (2) · Supreme Court of The Virgin Is… (1)
Mr. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners brought this suit for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the trademark laws. 60 Stat. 427, 15 U. S. C. 1051 et seq. They sought a preliminary injunction during the pendency of the action, a permanent injunction, and damages. After issue was joined, petitioners moved for a summary judgment granting a permanent injunction and awarding damages against respondent. The District Court could not say that there was “no genuine issue as to any material fact”[*24] within the meaning of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which governs summary judgments and accordingly denied the motion. Petitioners appealed, claiming that order to be an “interlocutory” one “refusing” an injunction within the meaning of § 1292 (a)(1) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (a)(1). [1]

The Court of Appeals held that the order denying the motion for a summary judgment was not an “interlocutory” one within the meaning of § 1292 (a)(1) and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 351 F. 2d 552. We granted certiorari because of a conflict between that decision and those from the Second Circuit. See, e. g., Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 217 F. 2d 936. [2]

Unlike some state procedures, federal law expresses the policy against piecemeal appeals. See Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U. S. 176. Hence we approach this statute somewhat gingerly lest a floodgate be opened that brings into the exception many pretrial orders. It is earnestly argued, however, that, although this order denied a permanent injunction, it was nonetheless “interlocutory” within the meaning of § 1292 (a)(1) because the motion for summary judgment did service for a motion for a preliminary injunction (see Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, supra, at 938) and that therefore “interlocutory” must also include a denial of a permanent injunction.

[*25] We take the other view not because “interlocutory” or preliminary may not at times embrace denials of permanent injunctions, but for the reason that the denial of a motion for a summary judgment because of unresolved issues of fact does not settle or even tentatively decide anything about the merits of the claim. It is strictly a pretrial order that decides only one thing — that the case should go to trial. Orders that in no way touch on the merits of the claim but only relate to pretrial procedures are not in our view “interlocutory” within the meaning of § 1292 (a)(1). We see no other way to protect the integrity of the congressional policy against piecemeal appeals. [3]

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Harlan would affirm the judgment below on the basis of the reasoning set forth in Judge Waterman’s opinion for the Second Circuit in Chappell & Co., Inc. v. Frankel, 367 F. 2d 197. Mr. Justice Stewart concurs in the result.
1

That section provides:

“(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
“(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States ... or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”
2

Subsequent to the grant of certiorari in this case, the Second Circuit, en banc, reversed its position and held that such an order is not appealable. Chappell & Co., Inc. v. Frankel, 367 F. 2d 197.

3

As Judge Charles E. Clark said, in dissent, in Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dixon Textile Corp., 280 F. 2d 800, at 805-806:

“A district judge’s orders advancing a case to trial ought not to be critically examined and re-examined by the cumbersome method of appeal before he has approached the stage of adjudication. . . . I believe this an intolerable burden for us, an improper and uncertain interference with trial court discretion, and a confusing invitation to indiscriminate appeals in the future — all contrary to settled federal law against piecemeal appeals.”