Johnson v. Bd. of Ed. of Chicago, 457 U.S. 52 (1982). · Go Syfert
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Johnson v. Bd. of Ed. of Chicago, 457 U.S. 52 (1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 16× by 8 distinct cases, 1994–2025 · 6 courts→ Stable · …because we have vacated the court of appeals' judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the district court or, should an appeal subsequently be taken, the court of appeals. at p. 53 ✓ Topic ↗
cited 3× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1994 · …because we have vacated the court of appeals judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the district court or, should an appeal subsequently be taken, the court of appeals. ✓
cited 3× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2001 · …because we have vacated the court of appeals' judgments ... the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the district court or ... the court of appeals. ✓
122 citation events (53 in the last 25 years) across 26 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jill Brown v. Bryan County, Ok (ca5, 2000-07-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Jill Brown v. Bryan County, Ok
5th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
because we have vacated the court of appeals' judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the district court or, should an appeal subsequently be taken, the court of appeals.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Rubicon Global Ventures, Inc. v. Chongqing Zongshen Group Import/Export Corp. (3×)
D. Or. · 2016 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
because we have vacated the court of appeals' judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the district court or, should an appeal subsequently be taken, the court of appeals.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Spencer v. Earley (3×)
4th Cir. · 2008 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
because we have vacated the court of appeals' judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the district court or, should an appeal subsequently be taken, the court of appeals.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Schwartz v. Chan (3×)
E.D.N.Y · 2001 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
because we have vacated the court of appeals' judgments ... the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the district court or ... the court of appeals.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Brown v. Bryan County, OK
5th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
because we have vacated the court of appeals' judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the district court or, should an appeal subsequently be taken, the court of appeals.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Brown v. Bryan County (3×)
5th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
because we have vacated the court of appeals' judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the district court or, should an appeal subsequently be taken, the court of appeals.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Franklin Savings Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision (3×)
10th Cir. · 1994 · signal: cf. · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
because we have vacated the court of appeals judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the district court or, should an appeal subsequently be taken, the court of appeals.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Franklin Savings Association v. Office Of Thrift Supervision (3×)
10th Cir. · 1994 · signal: cf. · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
because we have vacated the court of appeals' judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the district court or, should an appeal subsequently be taken, the court of appeals.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) GASKINS v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
D.N.J. · 2025 · confidence medium
Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 457 U.S. 52, 53-54 (“Because we have vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the District Court or, should an appeal subsequently be taken, the Court of Appeals.”); De Nafo v. Finch, 436 F.2d 737, 740 (3d Cir. 1971) (finding that the argument that the law of the case doctrine applied “ha[d] no merit since the court below vacated its original judgment”); Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., 108 F.2d 71, 81 (3d Cir. 1939) (stating a vacated order “is no longer . . . law of the case”)…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Castagna v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
E.D. Pa. · 2022 · confidence medium
Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 457 U.S. 52, 53-54 (“Because we have vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the District Court or, should an appeal subsequently be taken, the Court of Appeals.”); De Nafo v. Finch, 436 F.3d 737, 740 (3d Cir. 1971) (finding that the argument that the law of the case doctrine applied “ha[d] no merit since the court below vacated its original judgment”); Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., 108 F.2d 71, 81 (3d Cir. 1939) (a vacated order “is no longer . . . law of the case”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Micro-Link, LLC v. Town of Amherst
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Indeed, ‘a vacated judgment has no preclusive force either as a matter of collateral or direct estoppel or as a matter of the law of the case’ ” (Schwartz v Chan, 142 F Supp 2d 325, 330 [ED NY 2001], citing, inter alia, Johnson v Board of Ed. of Chicago, 457 US 52, 53-54 [1982]; see Universal City Studios, Inc. v Nintendo Co., Ltd., 578 F Supp 911, 919 [SD NY 1983], affd 746 F2d 112 [2d Cir 1984]; see also City of New York v State of New York, 284 AD2d 255, 255-256 [1st Dept 2001]).
discussed Cited "see" Lorenzana v. United States
S.D.N.Y. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 457 U.S. 52 , 53–54 (1982) (“Because we have vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgments . . . the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the District Court or . . . the Court of Appeals.”); Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 556 F. Supp. 2d 284, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that where a “judgment has been vacated” the “law of the case doctrine does not apply”).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Dico, Inc. (3×)
S.D. Iowa · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
Creighton v. Anderson, 922 F.2d 443, 449 (8th Cir. 1990); see Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 457 U.S. 52, 53-54 , 102 S.Ct. 2223 , 72 L.Ed.2d 668 (1982).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Science Applications International Corporation (3×)
D.D.C. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 457 U.S. 52, 53 , 102 S.Ct. 2223 , 72 L.Ed.2d 668 (1982); see also Jackson v. Coalter, 337 F.3d 74, 85 (1st Cir.2003).
examined Cited "see" Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp. (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 457 U.S. 52, 53-54 , 102 S.Ct. 2223 , 72 L.Ed.2d 668 (1982).
examined Cited "see" Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan (3×)
2d Cir. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Bd. of Educ., 457 U.S. 52, 53-54 , 102 S.Ct. 2223 , 72 L.Ed.2d 668 (1982) (per curiam) (“Because we have vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the District Court or ... the Court of Appeals.”).
cited Cited "see" In re Abdur'Rahman v.
6th Cir. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Bd. of Educ., 457 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1982).
examined Cited "see" Abdur'Rahman v. Bell (6×)
6th Cir. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Bd. of Educ., 457 U.S. 52, 53-54 , 102 S.Ct. 2223 , 72 L.Ed.2d 668 (1982).
examined Cited "see" Hampton v. Jefferson County Board of Education (3×)
W.D. Ky. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 604 F.2d 504, 516 (7th Cir.1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 449 U.S. 915 , 101 S.Ct. 339 , 66 L.Ed.2d 162 (1980) and 457 U.S. 52 , 102 S.Ct. 2223 , 72 L.Ed.2d 668 (1982) ("The Board's articulated purpose for the [voluntary] adoption of the Plans was the alleviation of de facto segregation at Gage Park and Morgan Park High Schools.
examined Cited "see" Sylvester Lewis Adams v. James Aiken, Warden, Central Correctional Institution (3×)
4th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Board of Education, 457 U.S. 52, 53-54 , 102 S.Ct. 2223, 2224-25 , 72 L.Ed.2d 668 (1982); Smith v. Bounds, 813 F.2d 1299, 1304 (4th Cir.1987).
examined Cited "see" Willan v. Menomonee Falls School Board (3×)
E.D. Wis. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Board of Education, 604 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.1979), vacated, 457 U.S. 52 , 102 S.Ct. 2223 , 72 L.Ed.2d 668 (1982), reinstated by, United States, supra, 567 F.Supp. 290 .
discussed Cited "see" Burney v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CTY. OF BEAVER (2×)
W.D. Pa. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 2223 , 72 L.Ed.2d 668 (1982). [6] In its post-trial brief, the Housing Authority presented further facts and figures regarding the 3 Linmar Projects in District I, which the Authority claims further reflects the difficulty it is encountering there with "white flight." We believe that a post-trial brief is an inappropriate place in which to prove one's case.
discussed Cited "see" Burney v. Housing Authority of County of Beaver (2×)
W.D. Pa. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson,U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2223 , 72 L.Ed.2d 668 (1982). .
examined Cited "see" Robert W. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (4×)
6th Cir. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Board of Education of Chicago, 604 F.2d 504, 517 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated for consolidation - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2223 , 72 L.Ed.2d 668 (1982) (a school board may “consider the probability of white flight in formulating a remedial plan to prevent de facto segregation in public schools”); Parent Ass’n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 , 719 (2nd Cir. 1979); Higgins v. Board of Education of the City of Grand Rapids, 508 F.2d 779, 794 (6th Cir. 1974). .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., Inc. (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Carroll v. Lessee of Carroll, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 275, 286-87 , 14 L.Ed. 936 (1853) (finding that, if a point of law “might have been decided either way without affecting any right brought into question, then, according to the principles of the Common Law, an opinion on such a question is not a decision ....”) (cited with approval in Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 142, 143 (2d Cir.2006)); see also Schwabenbauer v. Bd. of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of Olean, 777 F.2d 837, 842 (2d Cir.1985) (finding that conclusions voiced in dicta does not bind the court’s subsequent rulings) …
examined Cited "see, e.g." Scherer v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States (3×)
2d Cir. · 2008 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Edu. of Chicago, 457 U.S. 52, 53-54 , 102 S.Ct. 2223 , 72 L.Ed.2d 668 (1982).
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Cisneros (3×)
S.D. Tex. · 2006 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 457 U.S. 52, 53-54 , 102 S.Ct. 2223 , 72 L.Ed.2d 668 (1982); Brown v. Bryan County, OK, 219 F.3d 450 , 453 n. 1 (5th Cir.2000); Creighton v. Anderson, 922 F.2d 443, 449 (8th Cir.1990); Dorsey v. Cont’l Cas., Co., 730 F.2d 675 (11th Cir.1984); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 177-78 (2d Cir.1967).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
JOHNSON Et Al.
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO Et Al.
81-1097.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jun 7, 1982.
457 U.S. 52
1982 U.S. LEXIS 117
Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Marshall.
Cited by 47 opinions  |  Published
3 passages pin-cited by 7 cases
Pinpoint authority: #11,550 of 633,719
Citer courts: Tenth Circuit (6) · Fifth Circuit (4) · Fourth Circuit (3) · E.D. New York (3) · D. Oregon (3)

Lead Opinion

Per Curiam.

This case was commenced by petitioners challenging the voluntary adoption by the Board of Education of the city of Chicago of racial quotas on enrollment at two high schools. Petitioners alleged that the quotas, purportedly designed to arrest “white flight,” were unlawful because they resulted in the denial of admission to those schools of some black applicants but no white applicants. The District Court upheld the plan, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 604 F. 2d 504 (CA7 1979). We granted certiorari, 448 U. S. 910 (1980), but then vacated the judgment and remanded the case “for further consideration in light of the subsequent development described in the suggestion of mootness filed by respondents.” 449 U. S. 915 (1980). That development was the entry of a consent decree in a related case, United States v.[*53] Board of Education of Chicago, No. 80-C-5124 (ND Ill.), in which the Board of Education agreed to develop a systemwide integration plan, and the Board’s announcement that it had abandoned use of the racial quotas at the two high schools. The Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court to consider the suggestion of mootness. 645 F. 2d 75 (1981). That court, finding that the Board had readopted the quotas, concluded without taking further evidence that the challenge was not moot. The Court of Appeals, agreeing that the case was not moot and relying upon the doctrine of the law of the case, affirmed without reconsidering the constitutional challenge to the racial quotas in light of the subsequent development that the Board argued eliminated or reduced any discriminatory effects of the quotas. 664 F. 2d 1069 (1981). Petitioners have now renewed their request for review.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the case is not moot and that the subsequent development does not undermine that court’s original decision upholding the racial quotas. However, since if we were to grant certiorari we would consider the constitutional challenge as an original matter, the subsequent development might well be relevant to that consideration. It was for that reason that we vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment for further consideration in light of the subsequent development. No additional evidence was taken and therefore neither the record nor the District Court or Court of Appeals opinions reflect the subsequent development. We therefore grant certiorari, vacate the judgment, and remand the case with the direction that the matter be consolidated with the ongoing proceeding in the District Court in United States v. Board of Education of Chicago, No. 80-C-5124, so that court may decide petitioners’ challenge on the basis of a complete factual record. Because we have vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either[*54] the District Court or, should an appeal subsequently be taken, the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.

Justice Brennan would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and set the case for oral argument. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this ease.

Dissent

Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Marshall joins, dissenting.

Title 28 U. S. C. §2106 provides that “[t]he Supreme Court. . . may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review . . . .” Our practice over many years indicates that implicit in this grant of authority is a requirement that we specify our reasons for acting as we do. Here the Court departs from that implicit requirement. The ultimate disposition of the case is the vacation of the judgment of the Court of Appeals and a remand so that this case may be consolidated with another proceeding in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. A reading of the Court’s per curiam suggests that the Court is vaguely dissatisfied with the opinion of the Court of Appeals which it purportedly reviews, but no substantive judgment is made as to whether that opinion was correct or incorrect in whole or in part. Nothing in the record before us suggests to me any reason why we should assume a function more properly exercised by the Court of Appeals or by the District Court, and order consolidation of this case with another pending action in the District Court. But even if I were disposed to agree as to the propriety of the disposition now made by the Court, I would hope that something in the nature of an opinion explaining the reasons for the action would accompany the disposition. Since the Court’s per curiam makes, no effort at such an explanation, I dissent.