Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985). · Go Syfert
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Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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The rental of real estate is an activity that affects interstate commerce, allowing federal regulation of individual activities within the broader rental market.

A petitioner was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) for attempting to set fire to an apartment building he owned and rented. The petitioner argued the building was not commercial property and thus fell outside the statute's scope. The Court held that the statute applies to property used in any activity affecting interstate commerce. Because the local rental of apartment units is an element of the broader commercial rental market, the rental of real estate constitutes an activity affecting commerce. Therefore, the congressional power to regulate the rental market includes the power to regulate individual activities within that class.

1,364 citation events (590 in the last 25 years) across 57 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Daniel Garcia, No. 12-10189 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2014)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
At page 862 Determining if real estate rental constitutes commerce56 citing cases“the legislative history suggests that congress at least intended to protect all business property, as well as some additional property that might not fit that description, but perhaps not every private home.”19 citing courts quote it
  • United States v. Daniel Garcia, 768 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2014).published
  • United States v. Williams, No. 01-3351 (3d Cir. July 30, 2002).published
    (By its terms . . . the statute only applies to property that is ‘used’ in an‘activity’ that affects commerce. The rental of real estate is unquestionably such an activity.)
  • United States v. Disanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir. 1996).published 4 cites
    Third, while the federal arson statute is similar to that struck down in López in that it does not regulate commercial or economic activity, see United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 526-27 (9th Cir.1995), it does regulate the damag…
  • United States v. Aljabari, 626 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2010).published 5 cites
    “the statute only applies to property that is 'used' in an 'activity' that affects commerce. the rental of real estate is unquestionably such an activity.”
  • United States v. Armstrong, 106 F. App'x 601 (9th Cir. 2004).unpublished 3 cites
    “by its terms, ... 844(i) only applies to property that is 'used' in an 'activity' that affects commerce. the rent al of real estate is unquestionably such an activity.”
  • GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 169 F. Supp. 2d 648 (S.D. Tex. 2001).published 3 cites
    “the rental of real estate is unquestionably such an activity that affects commerce.”
  • United States v. Kheir Al-Marimi, No. 2022-0392 (D.D.C. May 26, 2026).published 2 cites
    The government also contends that § 844(i)’s legislative history indicates that Congress “‘intended to protect all business property,’ a category to which a U.S. commercial airliner clearly belongs, wherever it happens to be at the time it…
  • Carribean Off the Grid Plaza, Inc. v. Hoolink, LLC, 2025 VI Super 28U (2025).unpublished
    Though it does not involve a trading agreement, the contract undoubtedly encompasses a transaction “involving” interstate commerce, as it involves “business property.”[7] Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Russ…
  • Brooks v. Greystar Real Est. Partners, LLC, No. 3:23-cv-01729 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2025). 4 cites
    Cal. Sept. 5 7, 2022) (citing Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862 (1985)) (finding that the rental of both commercial and residential real estate is an economic 6 activity that affects interstate commerce and that the FAA governs r…
  • Boyle v. Bessent, No. 2:24-cv-00081 (D. Me. Feb. 14, 2025).
    (recognizing “that the local rental of an apartment unit is merely an element of a much broader commercial market in rental properties)
Show 46 more citing cases
105 S. Ct. at 2457 [T]he local rental of an apartment unit is merely an element of a much broader commercial market in rental properties.33 citing cases3 citing courts put it this way
Show 23 more citing cases
At page 859 Defining building use for commerce clause jurisdiction20 citing casesThe reference to any building used in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce expresses an intent by Congress to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause.3 citing courts put it this way
  • United States v. Daniel Garcia, No. 12-10189 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2014).published 2 cites
    (The reference to any building used in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce expresses an intent by Congress to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause.)
  • United States v. Coward, 151 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D. Pa. 2001).published 3 cites
    “affecting interstate or foreign commerce" in 18 u.s.c. 844 (i) "expresses an intent by congress to exercise its full power under the commerce clause.”
  • United States v. Michael Hoover, 95 F.4th 763 (4th Cir. 2024).published
    That language “expresses an intent by Congress to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause.” Miltier, 882 F.3d at 91 (quoting Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 (1985)).
  • United States v. Tia Deyon Pugh, 90 F.4th 1318 (11th Cir. 2024).published
    In Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute that criminalizes the arson of “any building . . . used . . . in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” Id. at 859 (alte…
  • Terkel v. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 521 F. Supp. 3d 662 (E.D. Tex. 2021).published
    Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 (1985); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 850-51 (2000).
  • Bell v. United States, No. 2:18-cv-01572 (D. Nev. Jan. 21, 2020).
    “The reference to ‘any building . . . used . . . in any activity affecting interstate or foreign 28 commerce’ expresses an intent by Congress to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause”
  • Robert Bautista v. Atty Gen USA, No. 11-3942 (3d Cir. Feb. 28, 2014).published 2 cites
    Id. at 853 (citing Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859, 862 (1985)).
  • Bautista v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 744 F.3d 54 (3d Cir. 2014).published 3 cites
    Id. at 853, 120 S.Ct. 1904 (citing Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859, 862 , 105 S.Ct. 2455 , 85 L.Ed.2d 829 (1985)).
  • Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2008).published 3 cites
    After reviewing the legislative history of this provision, the Court acknowledged that Congress intended “to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause” to protect business property “as well as some additional property that might no…
  • Harrison v. Ollison, No. 06-55470 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2008).published 2 cites
    After reviewing the legislative history of this provision, the Court acknowledged that Congress intended “to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause” to protect business property “as well as some additional property that might no…
Show 10 more citing cases
At page 860 Legislative intent to protect business property8 citing casescitation omitted4 citing courts put it this way · 6 listed here
  • United States v. Emily Hari, 67 F.4th 903 (8th Cir. 2023).published
    As we noted in United States v. Rea, Congress intended the arson statute at issue in Jones “to encompass all commercial property, including, among other things, schools, police stations, and places of worship.” 300 F.3d 952, 960 (8th Cir.…
  • United States v. Schlesinger, 372 F. Supp. 2d 711 (E.D.N.Y 2005).published
    “because of the need to curb the use, transportation, *722 and possession of explosives”
  • United States v. Odom, 252 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2001).published
    Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 860 (1985).
  • United States v. Garcia, 143 F. Supp. 2d 791 (E.D. Mich. 2000).published
    Congress enacted this statute as part of Title XI of the Organized Crime *801 Control Act (“OCCA”) of 1970, Pub.L. 91-452, § 1102 , 84 Stat. 952 . 3 Congress criminalized the behavior “because of the need ‘to curb the use, transportation,…
  • Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).published 6 cites
    “because of the need ‘to curb the use, transportation, and possession of explosives”
  • United States v. Rodney Berens, Douglas Ray Nyenhuis, & Jody Lee Rus, 922 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1991).unpublished
105 S. Ct. at 2456 footnote omitted5 citing cases4 citing courts put it this way · 4 listed here
At page 858 Applying statute to rental property under commerce clause4 citing cases“whether 18 u.s.c. 844 (i) applies to a two-unit apartment building that is used as rental property.”the opinion's own words at *858, quoted by 2 later opinions
  • United States v. Willie Johnson, 42 F.4th 743 (7th Cir. 2022).published 2 cites
    The Supreme Court evaluated this legislative history in Russell v. United States, where “[t]he question presented [wa]s whether 18 U.S.C. § 844 (i) applies to a two-unit apartment building that is used as rental property”—the type of build…
  • United States v. James Hill, III, 927 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2019).published 7 cites
    Id. at 858-62.
  • United States v. Curtis Lee Terry, United States of Am. v. Ronnie Williams, 257 F.3d 366 (4th Cir. 2001).published 2 cites
    Such a limitation could impair Congress' ability to address national economic problems and stretch the judicial power beyond its proper constitutional role. 17 In Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985), a unanimous Supreme Court hel…
  • United States v. Terry, No. 00-4856 (4th Cir. July 12, 2001).published
    In Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985), a unanimous Supreme Court held that § 844(i) "unquestionably" applies to a "two- unit apartment building that is used as rental property." Russell, 471 U.S. at 858, 862 .
At page 861 Limiting statute scope regarding private home bombings3 citing casesacknowledging Representative Celler's statements that the statute would not cover the bombing of private homes1 citing court put it this way
[T]he statute only applies to property that is ‘used’ in an ‘activity’ that affects commerce. The rental of real estate is unquestionably such an activity.no pin page on record · 2 citing cases listed
  • United States v. Aljabari, 626 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2010).published 5 cites
    ([T]he statute only applies to property that is ‘used’ in an ‘activity’ that affects commerce. The rental of real estate is unquestionably such an activity.)
  • United States v. Armstrong, 106 F. App'x 601 (9th Cir. 2004).unpublished 3 cites
    (By its terms, ... [§ 844(i) ] only applies to property that is ‘used’ in an ‘activity’ that affects commerce. The rent al of real estate is unquestionably such an activity.)
85 L. Ed. 2d at 833 cited at this page1 citing case
  • United Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Borough of Belmar, 777 A.2d 950 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).published 2 cites
    More relevant is Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862 , 105 S.Ct. 2455, 2457 , 85 L.Ed. 2d 829, 833 (1985), holding that an apartment building that earned rental income fell within the proscription of 18 U.S.C.A. ง 844(i), where the…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Russell
v.
United States
84-435.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jun 3, 1985.
Published opinion
471 U.S. 858
1985 U.S. LEXIS 28
Julius Lucius Echeles argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Frederick F. Cohn., Christopher J. Wright argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Trott, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, and Thomas E. Booth.
Stevens.
Cited by 305 opinions  |  Published
4 passages pin-cited by 4 cases
Pinpoint authority: #19,034 of 633,719
Citer courts: Seventh Circuit (3) · Ninth Circuit (3) · E.D. Pennsylvania (3) · S.D. Texas (3)
Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether 18 U. S. C. § 844(i) applies to a two-unit apartment building that is used as rental property.

[*859] Petitioner owns an apartment building located at 4530 South Union, Chicago, Illinois. He earned rental income from it and treated it as business property for tax purposes. In early 1983, he made an unsuccessful attempt to set fire to the building [1] and was consequently indicted for violating §844(i). Following a bench trial, petitioner was convicted and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. The District Court [2] and the Court of Appeals [3] both rejected his contention that the building was not commercial or business property, and therefore was not capable of being the subject of an offense under § 844(i).

Section 844(i) uses broad language to define the offense. It provides:

“Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years or fined not more than $10,000, or both. . . .”

The reference to “any building . . . used ... in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce” expresses an intent by Congress to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause. [4]

[*860] The legislative history indicates that Congress intended to exercise its full power to protect “business property.” [5] Moreover, after considering whether the bill as originally introduced would cover bombings of police stations or churches, [6] the bill was revised to eliminate the words “for[*861] business purposes” from the description of covered property. [7] Even after that change, however, the final Report on the bill emphasized the “very broad” coverage of “substantially all business property.” [8] In the floor debates on the final bill, although it was recognized that the coverage of the bill was extremely broad, the Committee Chairman, Representative Celler, expressed the opinion that “the mere bombing of a private home even under this bill would not be[*862] covered because of the question whether the Congress would have the authority under the Constitution.” [9] In sum, the legislative history suggests that Congress at least intended to protect all business property, as well as some additional property that might not fit that description, but perhaps not every private home.

By its terms, however, the statute only applies to property that is “used” in an “activity” that affects commerce. The rental of real estate is unquestionably such an activity. We need not rely on the connection between the market for residential units and “the interstate movement of people,” [10] to recognize that the local rental of an apartment unit is merely an element of a much broader commercial market in rental properties. The congressional power to regulate the class of activities that constitute the rental market for real estate includes the power to regulate individual activity within that class. [11]

Petitioner was renting his apartment building to tenants at the time he attempted to destroy it by fire. The property was therefore being used in an activity affecting commerce within the meaning of §844(i).

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

1

Petitioner hired Ralph Branch, a convicted felon, to start a fire in the building by using a natural gas line in the basement. Branch attempted to start a fire by lighting a potato-chip bag and a piece of wood, but was unsuccessful in torching the building. 1 Tr. 35-39. Petitioner asked Branch to make a second attempt; however, Branch reported the events to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and consented to tape-record a conversation with petitioner. After the conversation, petitioner was arrested. The fire was never set. Id., at 41-50.

2

563 F. Supp. 1085 (ND Ill., ED 1983).

3

738 F. 2d 825 (CA7 1984).

4

See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S. 563, 571 (1977), in which the Court stated:

“As we have previously observed, Congress is aware of the ‘distinction between legislation limited to activities “in commerce” and an assertion of its[*860] full Commerce Clause power so as to cover all activity substantially affecting interstate commerce.’ United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Industries, 422 U. S. 271, 280 (1975); see also NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Corp., 371 U. S. 224, 226 (1963).”
5

Section 844(i) was passed as part of Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. 84 Stat. 922, 952. The section originated because of the need “to curb the use, transportation, and possession of explosives.” Hearings on H. R. 17154, H. R. 16699, H. R. 18573 and Related Proposals before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1970) (hereinafter Hearings). After hearings before a House Subcommittee, Title XI emerged from two bills, H. R. 18573 and H. R. 16699, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., that Representative McCullough introduced in the House of Representatives and that were referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. 116 Cong. Rec. 35198 (1970) (statement of Rep. McCullough). H. R. 16699 stated, in pertinent part:

“(f) Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used for business purposes by a person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years or fined not more than $10,000, or both. . . .” Hearings, at 30 (emphasis added).

During the hearings there were several discussions and statements on the reach of subsection (f) of H. R. 16699. Will R. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, stated early in the hearings:

“[W]e have added a new provision (subsection (f)) covering malicious damage or destruction by means of an explosive of any property used for business purposes by a person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce. . . . Since the term ‘affecting commerce’ embraces ‘the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the commerce clause,’ NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Corp., 371 U. S. 224, 226 (1963), subsection (f) would cover damage by explosives to substantially any business property.” Id., at 37.
6

Shortly after Assistant Attorney General Wilson made the comment quoted in n. 5, supra, Representative Rodino of New Jersey engaged in the following colloquy with Wilson:

[*861] “Mr. Rodino. That is the problem.
“Mr. Wilson, subsection (f) of section 837, as proposed by H. R. 16699, applies to structures used ‘for business purposes.’ I am a little bit in the dark. Would this section and these words cover the bombings of police stations? . . . Just what would new section 837(f) cover?
“Mr. Wilson. I don’t believe it would cover either public buildings or private homes under normal use, but what this is designed for is the business office, where the business is interstate commerce, giving the Federal Government a basis for jurisdiction. It is to broaden the thing, to get at such things as the bombing of business offices in New York City, where the business is in interstate commerce..
“Mr. Rodino. Would it apply to the bombings of churches, synagogues, or religious edifices?
“Mr. Wilson. I don’t think so.” Hearings, at 56.
7

See id., at 300:

“The CHAIRMAN. The question is whether you want to broaden it to cover a private dwelling or a church or other property not used in business.
“Mr. Wylie. As far as I am concerned we could leave out the words ‘for business purposes,’ and it would help the situation. . . .”

The phrase “for business purposes” was not included when the House Committee on the Judiciary amended S. 30 and those words were omitted from the statute as finally enacted.

8

The Report stated in pertinent part:

“Section 844(i) proscribes the malicious damaging or destroying, by means of an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal.property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce. Attempts would also be covered. Since the term affecting [interstate or foreign] ‘commerce’ represents ‘the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause,’ NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Corp., 371 U. S. 224, 226 (1963), this is a very broad provision covering substantially all business property.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-1549, pp. 69-70 (1970).
9

See 116 Cong. Rec. 35359 (1970); see also id., at 35198 (“[T]he committee extended the provision protecting interstate and foreign commerce from the malicious use of explosives to the full extent of our constitutional powers”) (statement of Rep. McCullough); id., at 37187 (“The reach of the law ... is greatly extended by making it unlawful to damage or destroy property which is used in or affects interstate commerce. Nearly all types of property will now be protected by the Federal law”) (statement of Rep. MacGregor).

10

See McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, 444 U. S. 232, 245 (1980).

11

See Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 153-154 (1971).