In Re Hatch, 73 P.2d 885 (Cal. 1937). · Go Syfert
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In Re Hatch, 73 P.2d 885 (Cal. 1937). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
111 citation events across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Parrish (calctapp, 1985-07-11) · Strongest negative: Morrison v. State Board of Education (cal, 1969-11-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1903 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1903 1964 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited "but see" Morrison v. State Board of Education (8×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Cal. · 1969 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see New York Times (April 4, 1969) p. 30, col. 6.) See In re Hatch (1937) 10 Cal.2d 147, 151 [ 73 P.2d 885 ]; Hewitt v. State Board of Medical Examiners (1906) 148 Cal. 590, 594 [ 84 P. 39 , 113 Am.St.Rep. 315 , 7 Ann.Cas. 750, 3 L.R.A.
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Parrish
Cal. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
(In re Hatch (1937) 10 Cal.2d 147, 151 [ 73 P.2d 885 ],) 8 Clearly, forgery involves elements that go to honesty and truthfulness.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Castro (2×)
Cal. · 1985 · confidence medium
“One dramatic exposition of the term was rendered by this court in 1938, and has since been consistently followed: ‘an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.’ (In re Craig (1938) 12 Cal.2d 93, 97 [ 82 P.2d 442 ]; see also Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 73 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 435 P.2d 553 ]; In re Boyd (1957) 48 Cal.2d 69, 70 [ 307 P.2d 625 ].)” (In re Higbie, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 569.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Golde v. Fox
Cal. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
Moral turpitude has also been described as any crime or misconduct committed without excuse (In re Hallinan (1954) 43 Cal.2d 243, 251 [ 272 P.2d 768 ]; In re Rothrock (1940) 16 Cal.2d 449, 453 [ 106 P.2d 907 , 131 A.L.R. 226 ]), or as any ‘dishonest or immoral’ act, not necessarily a crime. (1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Attorneys, § 195, at p. 202.) ‘“The concept of moral turpitude depends upon the state of public morals, and may vary according to the community or the times,”’ (see In re Hatch (1937) 10 Cal.2d 147, 151 [ 73 P.2d 885 ]), as well as on the degree of public…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Etc. Appeals Bd.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
Unlike the myriad factual situations requiring a rational nexus between the immoral conduct and the licensee's fitness to perform his licensed vocation (see, e.g., Morrison v. State Board of Education, supra, 1 Cal.3d 214, at pp. 225, 229 ; Board of Education v. Jack M. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 691 , 696-697 and cases cited at p. 702, fn. 6 [ 139 Cal. Rptr. 700 , 566 P.2d 602 ]; In re Fahey, supra, 8 Cal.3d 842, at pp. 851-852 ; In re Higbie, supra, 6 Cal.3d 562, at p. 573 ; Von Durjais v. Board of Trustees (1978) 83 Cal. App.3d 681, 688 [ 148 Cal. Rptr. 192 ]; Board of Trustees v. Judge, supra, 50 Ca…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board
Cal. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
Unlike the myriad factual situations requiring a rational nexus between the immoral conduct and the licensee’s fitness to perform his licensed vocation (see, e.g., Morrison v. State Board of Education, supra, 1 Cal.3d 214, at pp. 225, 229 ; Board of Education v. Jack M. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 691 , 696-697 and cases cited at p. 702, fn. 6 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 700 , 566 P.2d 602 ]; In re Fahey, supra, 8 Cal.3d 842, at pp. 851-852 ; In re Higbie, supra, 6 Cal.3d 562, at p. 573; Von Durjais v. Board of Trustees (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 681, 688 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 192 ]; Board of Trustees v. Judge, supra, 50 Cal.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Fahey
Cal. · 1973 · confidence medium
Moral turpitude has been defined as “an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.” (In re Craig (1938) 12 Cal.2d 93, 97 [ 82 P.2d 442 ]; see also Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 73 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 435 P.2d 553 ]; In re Boyd (1957) 48 Cal.2d 69, 70 [ 307 P.2d 625 ].) “ ‘ “The concept of moral turpitude depends upon the state of public morals, and may vary according to the community or…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Higbie
Cal. · 1972 · confidence medium
One dramatic exposition of the term was rendered by this court in 1938, and has since been consistently followed: “an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.” (In re Craig (1938) 12 Cal.2d 93, 97 [ 82 P.2d 442 ]; see also Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 73 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 435 P.2d 553 ]; In re Boyd (1957) 48 Cal.2d 69, 70 [ 307 P.2d 625 ].) Moral turpitude has also been described as any …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Smith
Cal. · 1967 · confidence medium
Sponsored by the State Bar, the amendments give greater flexibility and in substance (a) affirm this court’s established policy of referring cases where the question of moral turpitude was doubtful upon the “record of conviction” to the State Bar for hearing, report and recommendation (see, e.g., In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147, 150-151 [4] [ 73 P.2d 885 ] ; In re Richardson, 15 Cal.2d 536, 540-541 [2] [ 102 P.2d 1076 ]) ; (b) provide a means of obtaining a better record than provided under the former law by the bare “record of conviction” (which consists of indictment, information or com…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Cal. · 1966 · confidence medium
In any event, opinions of the United States Supreme Court and of our court which characterize a claim for admission to the bar as a claim of a right entitled to the protections of procedural due process (Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96, 102 [10 L.Ed2d 224, 83 S.Ct. 1175 ] ; In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 568 [89 L.Ed 1795, 65 S.Ct. 1307 ]; see also Woodard v. State Bar, 16 Cal.2d 755, 757 [ 108 P.2d 407 ]) make it impossible for us to regard admission to the profession as a mere privilege. " Moral turpitude,” in turn, has been broadly defined as " ‘everything done contrary to …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Alkow
Cal. · 1966 · confidence medium
Moral turpitude has been defined as ‘ ‘ everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals” (In re McAllister, 14 Cal.2d 602 , *841 603 [ 95 P.2d 932 ]; In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147, 150 [ 73 P.2d 885 ]) and as “ [a]n act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man” (In re Boyd, 48 Cal.2d 69, 70 [ 307 P.2d 625 ]; In re Craig, 12 Cal.2d 93, 97 [ 82 P.2d 442 ]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Clark
Cal. · 1965 · confidence medium
(In re Clark, 52 Cal.2d 322, 324 [ 340 P.2d 613 ]; In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147, 152 [ 73 P.2d 885 ].) In In re Clark we suspended petitioner herein for violations of the same provision of the Corporations Code as that involved here.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Weinstock v. L. A. Carpet, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1965 · confidence medium
(In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147, 151-152 [ 73 P.2d 885 ].)” (People v. Syde, 37 Cal.2d 765, 768 [ 235 P.2d 601 ].) Accordingly, an exemption from the operation of the Corporate Securities Law is “ (m) Any bona fide joint adventure interest, except such interests when offered to the public.” (Corp. Code, § 25100.) This has been interpreted to mean corporate securities as between joint venturers, partners, or copromoters of a corporation, where the parties are equal owners and stand on equal footing as entrepreneurs, where no stock is offered to or sold to the general public, where the corpor…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Best v. State Bar
Cal. · 1962 · confidence medium
Code, § 6106.) (Cf. In re Phillips, 17 Cal.2d 55, 61 [6] [ 109 P.2d 344 , 132 A.L.R. 644 ] ; In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147, 151 [5] [ 73 P.2d 885 ].) Third: That it was error for the trial committee to permit an investigator for the State Bar to be present during certain of their hearings relative to the charges against petitioner.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Clark (2×)
Cal. · 1959 · confidence medium
(In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147, 152 [ 73 P.2d 885 ]; see also In re Hallinan, 43 Cal.2d 243, 246-248 [ 272 P.2d 768 ].) Hearings were held before a Special Administrative Committee of the State Bar.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Sears
Cal. Ct. App. · 1956 · confidence medium
The name that is given to the law indicates the evil at which it is aimed, that is, to use the language of a cited ease, ‘ speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of “blue sky” or, as stated by counsel in another ease, ‘to stop the sale of stock of fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines and other like fraudulent exploitations. ’ Even if the descriptions be regarded as rhetorical, the existence of evil is indicated, and a belief of its detriment; and we shall not pause to do more than state that the prevention of deception is within the c…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Call v. State Bar (2×)
Cal. · 1955 · confidence medium
(In re Hallinan, 43 Cal.2d 243, 247-248 [ 272 P.2d 768 ]; Fall v. State Bar, 25 Cal.2d 149, 160 [ 153 P.2d 1 ]; Herron v. State Bar, 24 Cal.2d 53, 59-60 [ 147 P.2d 543 ]; In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147, 151 [ 73 P.2d 885 ]; Lantz v. State Bar, 212 Cal. 213, 218-219 [ 298 P. 497 ]; Marsh v. State Bar, 210 Cal. 303, 307 [ 291 P. 583 ].) [3] Some cases have said that gross negligence involves moral turpitude in that such conduct is a breach of his fiduciary duty, but in each instance there was misrepresentation or other improper action, and the statements must be read in the light of the additional f…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Hallinan
Cal. · 1954 · confidence medium
Co., 59 Cal.App.2d 476, 490-492 [ 139 P.2d 681 ], holding that a plea of nolo contendere is not the equivalent of a plea of guilty and cannot be used in another proceeding as an admission against the person so pleading, the State Bar was justified in concluding that such a plea was not the equivalent of a “plea or verdict of guilty” within the meaning of section 6101 of the Business and Professions Code. * Although the problem of defining moral turpitude is not without difficulty (see In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147, 151 [ 73 P.2d 885 ] ; dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Jordan v. D…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Syde
Cal. · 1951 · confidence medium
(In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147, 151-152 [ 73 P.2d 885 ] and cases cited.) But likewise the courts have followed the differentiation implicit in the statutory language between an interest in a profit-sharing agreement, or in profits and earnings, and the agreement itself of active participation in an enterprise although some monetary return be expected therefrom.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wyatt v. Cerf
Cal. Ct. App. · 1944 · confidence medium
(In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147, 151 [ 73 P.2d 885 ].) But in the case before us such evidence was produced by the petitioner.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bryant v. State Bar (2×)
Cal. · 1942 · confidence medium
(In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147, 150 [ 73 P.2d 885 ].) “It is agreed that an attorney may be disbarred, not only for professional misconduct, but also for such misconduct outside of his profession as shows him to be so wanting in integrity and trustworthiness that the legal business of others cannot safely be intrusted to him.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Strick (2×)
Cal. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence medium
(In re Rothrock, supra, 16 Cal.2d 449 ; see also, In re Hatch (1937) 10 Cal.2d 147, 150 [ 73 P.2d 885 ].) On the other hand, an attorney who drove for years without a valid license and knowing he had defective vision committed an act of moral turpitude when his car struck and killed a pedestrian.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Board of Trustees of the Santa Maria Joint Union High School District v. Judge (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1975 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare In re Hatch (1937) 10 Cal.2d 147 [ 73 P.2d 885 ]—under Business and Professions Code section 6101, providing that causes for disciplinary action arise from “conviction of a felony or misdemeanor, involving moral turpitude” the offense or crime, whether a felony or misdemeanor must be one involving moral turpitude—and Jennings v. Karpe (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 709 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 776 ]—Busi-ness and Professions Code section 10177, subdivision (b) authorizes revocation of a real estate salesman’s license when the licensee has been convicted of “a felony or a crime involving mor…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of IRA S. HATCH, an Attorney at Law
Bar Misc. 1481.
California Supreme Court.
Nov 22, 1937.
73 P.2d 885
1937 Cal. LEXIS 466
Houser, Houser & Houser for Attorney Hatch., Philbrick McCoy for The State Bar.
Cited by 51 opinions  |  Published
THE COURT.

On February 10, 1937, Ira S. Hatch, an attorney at law, was found guilty by the court sitting without a jury on 52 counts in two informations charging violations of the Corporate Securities Act in that he knowingly participated in the issuance and sale of securities without first having obtained a permit from the commissioner of corporations ; also that he engaged in the purchase of securities for the purpose of reselling them without first having obtained a broker’s license from the commissioner of corporations. The record of his convictions was filed with this court pursuant to the provisions of sections 287, 288, 289 and 299 of[*149] the Code of Civil Procedure. Under those sections an attorney who has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude must be suspended upon the receipt by the court of the record of conviction, and when the judgment of conviction has become final he must be permanently disbarred.

The question was raised whether the offenses of which Hatch was convicted were crimes involving moral turpitude. The matter is submitted on the record of conviction and the briefs filed on behalf of the attorney and The State Bar.

Upon his own application to the trial court, Hatch, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, was granted probation. The order of the court was that the “proceedings herein be suspended and defendants placed on probation as follows: Defendant Hatch is placed on probation for a period of ton years under the following conditions: Defendant shall not engage in any investment business or handle the money of others. Defendant is ordered released forthwith”.

The record in each of the two criminal proceedings against the defendant presents the numerous counts based upon the complaint of the persons therein named, the finding by the court of the guilt of the defendant on specified counts, and the orders of the court on the motions to dismiss certain other counts and on the application for probation. Under the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure above cited the offense or crime, whether a felony or a misdemeanor, must be one involving moral turpitude, otherwise the court is not called upon to carry out the requirements of the statute.

The defendant contends that the violations of the Corporate Securities Act, of which he was convicted, constitute merely technical violations and do not indicate that they were committed with moral turpitude; that the act of issuing and selling securities without a permit is not inherently bad, but is merely malum prohibitum, inasmuch as prior to the adoption of the act the issuance and sale of securities without a permit did not involve any question of right or wrong in human conduct. The defendant therefore stresses the view that wherever suspension or disbarment pursuant to section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure is concerned, moral turpitude must connote baseness, vileness or depravity, such as is inherently a part of murder and other crimes malum in se, . However, the courts of this state have[*150] rejected such a test as exclusive in determining whether an attorney has been guilty of conduct requiring disciplinary action or disbarment. Conduct involving moral turpitude has been defined as “everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals”. {Matter of Coffey, 123 Cal. 522, 524 [56 Pac. 448]; Lantz v. State Bar, 212 Cal. 213, 218 [298 Pac. 497]; Jacobs v. State Bar, 219 Cal. 59, 64 [25 Pac. (2d) 401].) Therefore, if the offenses of which the defendant was convicted meet the test and involve moral turpitude, this court under the code sections must suspend him from the practice of the law in this state at least during the term of his probation. {In re Jacobsen, 202 Cal. 289 [260 Pac. 294].)

This court is not called upon to consider the question of the defendant’s guilt. Section 287, subdivision 1, Code of Civil Procedure, makes the record of conviction conclusive on that point.

Conceivably not in every case of the conviction of violations of the Corporate Securities Act will the face of the record of conviction indicate conclusively whether the offense involved moral turpitude. No doubt attaches to the conviction of such crimes as murder, embezzlement, extortion and many others. But convictions of violations of police regulations, or of simple assault or battery, may indicate without further inquiry that moral turpitude was not involved.

There is necessarily a field of doubtful eases where the determination as to whether moral turpitude was involved may fall on one or the other side of the line, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. That certain violations of the Corporate Securities Act may fall into this class of doubtful cases is evident from the fact that in the criminal prosecution of a person so charged the question of good or bad faith is not necessarily an element for consideration. {El Claro Oil etc. Co. v. Daugherty, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 274, 281 [53 Pac. (2d) 1128, 55 Pac. (2d) 488]; People v. McCalla, 63 Cal. App. 783, 793-795 [220 Pac. 436].) The fact that the legislature has made the basis of conviction the bare act of knowingly authorizing or assisting in the issue or sale of securities without a permit, leaves for the determination of the court the question whether such act involved moral turpitude. This court would not be justified in holding that, because the circumstances of any one such case might indicate[*151] a. mere technical omission without the stigma of moral guilt, the entire class of offenses is one not involving moral turpitude. In some doubtful cases the record of conviction may not be sufficient upon which to base a determination one way or the other on the question of moral turpitude, and appropriate action by the court may require a reference to the Board of Governors of The State Bar for an inquiry and recommendation. The State Bar is not deprived of jurisdiction in disciplinary proceedings to inquire into the fitness of an attorney to practice when a record of his conviction is on file with the court under sections 287 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Shafer v. State Bar, 215 Cal. 706 [12 Pac. (2d) 957].)

“The concept of moral turpitude depends upon the state of public morals, and may vary according to the community or the times.” (hi re Bartos, 13 Fed. (2d) 138.) In Beck v. Stitzel, 21 Pa. 522, 524, citing among other cases, In re Coffey, supra, it was said: “This element of moral turpitude is necessarily adaptive; for it is defined by the state of public morals, and thus far fits the action to be at all times accommodated to the common sense of the community.” In the case of Rudolph v. United States, 6 Fed. (2d) 487 [55 App. D. C. 362, 40 A. L. R. 1042], it was said: “We are not much concerned with the distinction sought to be made between crimes malum in se and those which are merely malum prohibitum. Many things which were not considered criminal in the past have, with the advancement of civilization, been declared such by statute, and the commission of the offense, if it involves the violation of a rule of public policy and morals is such an act as may involve moral turpitude”; and, “There is no hard and fast rule as to what constitutes moral turpitude. It cannot be measured by the nature or character of the offense unless, of course, it be an offense inherently criminal, the very commission of which implies a base and depraved nature. The circumstances attendant upon the commission of the offense usually furnish the best guide. ’ ’

In sustaining legislation of the character of the Corporate Securities Act, it has been held that the general purpose and tenor of the act is to “protect the public against the imposition of unsubstantial schemes and the securities based upon them” and against “fraudulent or unlawful stock[*152] a,nd investment schemes and enterprises”. [Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539 [37 Sup. Ct. 217, 61 L. Ed. 480, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 643, L. R A. 1917F, 514]; In re Leach, 215 Cal. 536, 543 [12 Pac. (2d) 3]; Daugherty v. Riley, 1 Cal. (2d) 298, 305 [34 Pac. (2d) 1005] ; Cecil B. De Mille Productions v. Woolery, 61 Fed. (2d) 45.) It must necessarily follow that violations of the act are contrary to the concept of honesty and good morals where the intent is to evade its provisions with the object of gain or profit. Therefore the stigma of moral turpitude may attend the violation of the statutory requirement that a permit must be obtained from a body constituted to supervise the details and guard the interests of the public against impositions and frauds before the issuance or sale of securities. This stigma would seem to attach to the conviction of an attorney who, as charged and found guilty, “knowingly authorizes, directs or aids in the issue and sale of” securities contrary to the provisions of the act (Stats. 1931, p. 950, sec. 18), where the circumstances indicate that the omission was not merely technical but was done with the object and design of evading compliance with the act. (See, also, In re Diesen, 173 Minn. 297 [215 N. W. 427, 217 N. W. 356].)

The defendant claims that the failure to obtain the permit was in this ease merely a technical omission, for which he should not be disbarred or suspended from the practice of the law relying on In re Kling, 44 Cal. App. 267 [186 Pac. 152], The fact of the record itself refutes the contention. Numerous persons to whom we may assume the securities were sold complained against the defendant. The defendant does not offer to show that his alleged “technical” omission was cured by a dilatory application for a permit, or that a permit was subsequently granted. On the contrary the plain indication from the two classes of charges is that the defendant’s purpose was to evade the necessity of a permit by purchasing the securities and reselling them as his personally-owned property. The trial court apparently concluded that the acts of the defendant were of such a serious and dishonest character that protection to society demanded that he should not, during the period of probation, engage in the investment business or handle the money of other persons. It would be anomalous to conclude that he should nevertheless be permitted to continue in the practice of the law during that[*153] period. The same reason for requiring that he be restrained from further engaging in the business of making investments for others or in handling the property of others is persuasive that the motive and intent with which he acted was such as to indicate turpitude in the commission of the offenses of which he was convicted. The record of conviction therefore is sufficient upon which to dispose of the proceedings herein finally without a reference to and investigation and recommendation by the Board of Governors of The State Bar as to whether the defendant’s acts involved moral turpitude.

It is therefore ordered that the defendant be suspended from the practice of the law in this state for the period of his probation in the action herein referred to and until the further order of this court.