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20 California opinions name it 3 courts 1969–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Castrogreen2 sentences2014(People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 317 [A witness’ prior conviction is only admissible for impeachment purposes “if the least adjudicated elements of the conviction necessarily involve moral turpitude”].) The California Supreme Court defines moral turpitude as a “readiness to do evil” or a “moral depravity of any kind.” (People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1009 .) Without delving into the specific circumstances and motivations of Allen’s past misconduct, we assume that her vandalism conviction meets the moral turpitude requirement. 1992The moral turpitude requirement was imposed by our Supreme Court in People v. Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 301 . | 4 | 8 |
People v. Mansfieldgreen2 sentences1992This court has summarized the Castro rule many times, beginning with People v. Mansfield (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 82, 87 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 800 ]: “Pursuant to People v. Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 301 , and subject to the trial court’s discretion under Evidence Code section 352, only prior felony convictions that necessarily involve moral turpitude may be used to impeach a witness in a criminal proceeding. [Citation.] ‘Moral turpitude’ means a general ‘ “readiness to do evil” ’ [citation], i.e., ‘an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowm 1992The moral turpitude requirement was imposed by our Supreme Court in People v. Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 301 . (2) This court has summarized the Castro rule many times, beginning with People v. Mansfield (1988) 200 Cal. App.3d 82, 87 [ 245 Cal. Rptr. 800 ]: "Pursuant to People v. Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 301 , and subject to the trial court's discretion under Evidence Code section 352, only prior felony convictions that necessarily involve moral turpitude may be used to impeach a witness in a criminal proceeding. [Citation.] `Moral turpitude' means a general `"readiness to do evil"' [citation], | 2 | 2 |
In Re Faheygreen2 sentences1985L.Rev. at page 542 (The moral turpitude standard is "uninformative and vague."); see also Shapiro, Morals and the Courts: The Reluctant Crusaders (1961) 45 Minn. L.Rev. 897, 936-938. [2a] It is well established that "`"[t]he concept of moral turpitude depends upon the state of public morals, and may vary according to the community or the times...."'" ( In re Higbie, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 570; In re Fahey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 842, 849 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 313 , 505 P.2d 1369 , 63 A.L.R.3d 465 ].) [3a] The term moral turpitude "constitute[s] only [a] lingual abstraction[] until applied to a specific occu 1985L.Rev. at page 542 (The moral turpitude standard is "uninformative and vague."); see also Shapiro, Morals and the Courts: The Reluctant Crusaders (1961) 45 Minn. L.Rev. 897, 936-938. [2a] It is well established that "`"[t]he concept of moral turpitude depends upon the state of public morals, and may vary according to the community or the times...."'" ( In re Higbie, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 570; In re Fahey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 842, 849 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 313 , 505 P.2d 1369 , 63 A.L.R.3d 465 ].) [3a] The term moral turpitude "constitute[s] only [a] lingual abstraction[] until applied to a specific occu | 2 | 2 |
Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Boardgreen2 sentences1969Respondents also refer to dicta describing the department’s supposed power to “supervise” liquor licensees and their “good moral character.” (See, Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, 52 Cal.2d 287, 293 [ 341 P.2d 296 ]; Jack P. Meyers, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, supra, 238 Cal.App.2d at pp. 874-875; Jacques, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, supra, 155 Cal.App.2d at pp. 462-463.) The very existence of the moral turpitude standard marks a differentiation between offenses involving moral turpitude and those which do not. 1969Respondents also refer to dicta describing the department’s supposed power to “supervise” liquor licensees and their “good moral character.” (See, Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, 52 Cal.2d 287, 293 [ 341 P.2d 296 ]; Jack P. Meyers, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, supra, 238 Cal.App.2d at pp. 874-875; Jacques, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, supra, 155 Cal.App.2d at pp. 462-463.) The very existence of the moral turpitude standard marks a differentiation between offenses involving moral turpitude and those which do not. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Campbellgreen1 sentence2014(See People v. Campbell (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1496 [holding that felony vandalism involves moral turpitude].) Beyond “the relevance requirement of moral turpitude . . . the latitude [Evidence Code] section 352 allows for exclusion of impeachment evidence in individual cases is broad.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal. 4th 856, 931 .) Because the court’s discretion to admit or exclude impeachment evidence “is as broad as necessary to deal with the great variety of factual situations in which the issue arises” (People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 389 ), a reviewing court ordinarily will | 1 | 1 |
PG&E Corp. v. Public Utilities Commissiongreen2 sentences2006(See PG & E Corp. v. Public Utilities Com. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1204, fn. 25 , 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 630 .) [9] Contrary to the 1974 analysis of Senate Bill No. 1767, the 1972 predecessor legislation did not, in fact, purport to adopt a standard definition of "moral turpitude." Also, the sentence in the analysis stating that section 490 (as proposed to be amended by Sen. 2006(See PG & E Corp. v. Public Utilities Com. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1204, fn. 25 , 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 630 .) [9] Contrary to the 1974 analysis of Senate Bill No. 1767, the 1972 predecessor legislation did not, in fact, purport to adopt a standard definition of "moral turpitude." Also, the sentence in the analysis stating that section 490 (as proposed to be amended by Sen. | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Bock Laundry MacHine Co.green2 sentences1994However, Jefferson recognizes that “the same degree of danger of prejudice to a party from evidence of a felony conviction is not as great to a party in a civil action as to the defendant in a criminal case.” (1 Jefferson, supra, at p. 257; see, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. (1989) 490 U.S. 504, 522 [ 104 L.Ed.2d 557, 572 , 109 S.Ct. 1981 ] [federal rule authorizing impeachment by criminal convictions regards prejudice to anyone other than a criminal defendant “ ‘so minimal as scarcely to be a subject of comment.’ . . .”) Given the significant distinctions between the rights enjoyed 1994However, Jefferson recognizes that “the same degree of danger of prejudice to a party from evidence of a felony conviction is not as great to a party in a civil action as to the defendant in a criminal case.” (1 Jefferson, supra, at p. 257; see, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. (1989) 490 U.S. 504, 522 [ 104 L.Ed.2d 557, 572 , 109 S.Ct. 1981 ] [federal rule authorizing impeachment by criminal convictions regards prejudice to anyone other than a criminal defendant “ ‘so minimal as scarcely to be a subject of comment.’ . . .”) Given the significant distinctions between the rights enjoyed | 1 | 1 |
In Re Higbiegreen2 sentences1985The following list of cases is a small sample 4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [ 13 1985L.Rev. at page 542 (The moral turpitude standard is "uninformative and vague."); see also Shapiro, Morals and the Courts: The Reluctant Crusaders (1961) 45 Minn. L.Rev. 897, 936-938. [2a] It is well established that "`"[t]he concept of moral turpitude depends upon the state of public morals, and may vary according to the community or the times...."'" ( In re Higbie, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 570; In re Fahey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 842, 849 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 313 , 505 P.2d 1369 , 63 A.L.R.3d 465 ].) [3a] The term moral turpitude "constitute[s] only [a] lingual abstraction[] until applied to a specific occu | 1 | 1 |
| Bradpiece v. State Bargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hamilton v. State Bargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clancy v. State Bargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Aguilar
green
2 sentences2018Bedolla's effort to distinguish the offense at issue from one involving concealment does not answer whether a violation of section 25850, subdivision *356 (a) " 'reveal[s] dishonesty, a " 'general readiness to do evil,' " ' ... or 'moral laxity of some kind.' " ( Aguilar , supra , 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017 , 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 202 , citations omitted.) *552 Under section 25850, subdivision (a), it is a crime for a person to "carry[ ] a loaded firearm ... on the person or in a vehicle while in any public place ...." The facts of Bedolla's prior violation of this section are not relevant to the mo 2018Bedolla's effort to distinguish the offense at issue from one involving concealment does not answer whether a violation of section 25850, subdivision *356 (a) " 'reveal[s] dishonesty, a " 'general readiness to do evil,' " ' ... or 'moral laxity of some kind.' " ( Aguilar , supra , 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017 , 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 202 , citations omitted.) *552 Under section 25850, subdivision (a), it is a crime for a person to "carry[ ] a loaded firearm ... on the person or in a vehicle while in any public place ...." The facts of Bedolla's prior violation of this section are not relevant to the mo | 3 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Charles G. (In re Charles G.)
green
2 sentences2018To emphasize the distinction between concealment and possession, Bedolla cites In re Charles G . (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 945 , 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 350 ( Charles G . ). 2018To emphasize the distinction between concealment and possession, Bedolla cites In re Charles G . (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 945 , 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 350 ( Charles G . ). | 3 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Beagle
green
2 sentences1985First, we note that even under the more narrow standard of People v. Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 441 , and its progeny which require that a prior conviction involve dishonesty, auto theft was admissible for impeachment purposes. 4 We logically infer that under the broader moral turpitude standard, the prior auto theft conviction is necessarily admissible. 1985First, we note that even under the more narrow standard of People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 492 P.2d 1 ] and its progeny requiring that a prior conviction involve dishonesty, robbery was admissible for impeachment purposes. 3 We logically infer that under the broader moral turpitude standard, robbery is necessarily admissible. | 2 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Lang
green
1 sentence2014(People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 317 [A witness’ prior conviction is only admissible for impeachment purposes “if the least adjudicated elements of the conviction necessarily involve moral turpitude”].) The California Supreme Court defines moral turpitude as a “readiness to do evil” or a “moral depravity of any kind.” (People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1009 .) Without delving into the specific circumstances and motivations of Allen’s past misconduct, we assume that her vandalism conviction meets the moral turpitude requirement. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Collins
green
1 sentence2014(See People v. Campbell (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1496 [holding that felony vandalism involves moral turpitude].) Beyond “the relevance requirement of moral turpitude . . . the latitude [Evidence Code] section 352 allows for exclusion of impeachment evidence in individual cases is broad.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal. 4th 856, 931 .) Because the court’s discretion to admit or exclude impeachment evidence “is as broad as necessary to deal with the great variety of factual situations in which the issue arises” (People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 389 ), a reviewing court ordinarily will | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Clark
green
1 sentence2014(See People v. Campbell (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1496 [holding that felony vandalism involves moral turpitude].) Beyond “the relevance requirement of moral turpitude . . . the latitude [Evidence Code] section 352 allows for exclusion of impeachment evidence in individual cases is broad.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal. 4th 856, 931 .) Because the court’s discretion to admit or exclude impeachment evidence “is as broad as necessary to deal with the great variety of factual situations in which the issue arises” (People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 389 ), a reviewing court ordinarily will | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Clerici v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2001(Id. at pp. 1024-1027.) The applicant in Clerici, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d 1016 , had contended DMV lacked authority to deny his application because language providing authority to deny, suspend or revoke a license on the basis of a crime of moral turpitude does not appear in the vehicle salesperson licensing statute. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Brandt v. Fox
green
2 sentences1990The court noted the purpose of the moral turpitude standard in license regulatory statutes was not to punish but “to protect members of the public when they deal with respondent in his occupation of selling automobiles.” ( 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 366 .) The court agreed with respondent that there must be a nexus between the criminal conduct and the occupation in order to revoke such a license: “In our view before a criminal offender may be denied a license to engage in gainful work because of a standard requiring good moral character there must be a substantial or rational connection between the c 1990The court noted the purpose of the moral turpitude standard in license regulatory statutes was not to punish but “to protect members of the public when they deal with respondent in his occupation of selling automobiles.” ( 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 366 .) The court agreed with respondent that there must be a nexus between the criminal conduct and the occupation in order to revoke such a license: “In our view before a criminal offender may be denied a license to engage in gainful work because of a standard requiring good moral character there must be a substantial or rational connection between the c | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Brewer v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences1990The court noted the purpose of the moral turpitude standard in license regulatory statutes was not to punish but “to protect members of the public when they deal with respondent in his occupation of selling automobiles.” ( 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 366 .) The court agreed with respondent that there must be a nexus between the criminal conduct and the occupation in order to revoke such a license: “In our view before a criminal offender may be denied a license to engage in gainful work because of a standard requiring good moral character there must be a substantial or rational connection between the c 1990The court noted the purpose of the moral turpitude standard in license regulatory statutes was not to punish but “to protect members of the public when they deal with respondent in his occupation of selling automobiles.” ( 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 366 .) The court agreed with respondent that there must be a nexus between the criminal conduct and the occupation in order to revoke such a license: “In our view before a criminal offender may be denied a license to engage in gainful work because of a standard requiring good moral character there must be a substantial or rational connection between the c | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Ruzicka
green
2 sentences1986The lead opinion in Castro acknowledges that in State v. Ruzicka (1977) 89 Wn.2d 217 [ 570 P.2d 1208 ], the Supreme Court of Washington held that the Legislature could reasonably determine that there was a nexus between a person having committed crimes and that person’s propensity to lie. 1986The lead opinion in Castro acknowledges that in State v. Ruzicka (1977) 89 Wn.2d 217 [ 570 P.2d 1208 ], the Supreme Court of Washington held that the Legislature could reasonably determine that there was a nexus between a person having committed crimes and that person’s propensity to lie. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
In Re Strick
green
2 sentences1986In re Strick (1983) 34 Cal.3d 891 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 509 , 671 P.2d 1251 ], establishes that violent felonies which are lesser offenses than first degree murder do not constitute moral turpitude per se. 1986In re Strick (1983) 34 Cal.3d 891 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 509 , 671 P.2d 1251 ], establishes that violent felonies which are lesser offenses than first degree murder do not constitute moral turpitude per se. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| In Re Hallinan green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In Re Hatch green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In Re Jones green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Cadilla v. Board of Medical Examiners
green
2 sentences1985The following list of cases is a small sample 4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [ 13 1985The following list of cases is a small sample 4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [ 13 | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Etc. Appeals Bd. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In Re Rothrock green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Jennings v. Karpe green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In Re Langford green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In Re Cohen green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In Re Silverton green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In Re Kreamer green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Morrison v. State Board of Education
green
2 sentences1985The following list of cases is a small sample 4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [ 13 1985L.Rev. at page 542 (The moral turpitude standard is "uninformative and vague."); see also Shapiro, Morals and the Courts: The Reluctant Crusaders (1961) 45 Minn. L.Rev. 897, 936-938. [2a] It is well established that "`"[t]he concept of moral turpitude depends upon the state of public morals, and may vary according to the community or the times...."'" ( In re Higbie, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 570; In re Fahey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 842, 849 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 313 , 505 P.2d 1369 , 63 A.L.R.3d 465 ].) [3a] The term moral turpitude "constitute[s] only [a] lingual abstraction[] until applied to a specific occu | 1 | 1985–1985 |
In Re McAllister
green
2 sentences1985The following list of cases is a small sample 4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [ 13 1985The following list of cases is a small sample [4a] of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal. Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal. Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal. Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal. Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; *335 In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal. Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Ca | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Thorpe v. Board of Examiners
green
2 sentences1985The following list of cases is a small sample 4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [ 13 1985The following list of cases is a small sample 4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [ 13 | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Montag v. State Bar green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In Re Craig green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Matanky v. Board of Medical Examiners
green
2 sentences1985The following list of cases is a small sample 4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [ 13 1985The following list of cases is a small sample 4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [ 13 | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners
green
2 sentences1985The following list of cases is a small sample 4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [ 13 1985The following list of cases is a small sample 4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [ 13 | 1 | 1985–1985 |
In Re Rohan
green
2 sentences1985The following list of cases is a small sample 4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [ 13 1985The following list of cases is a small sample 4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [ 13 | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In Re Hurwitz green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In Re Kirschke green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
In Re Duggan
green
2 sentences1985The following list of cases is a small sample 4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [ 13 1985The following list of cases is a small sample 4 of the vast case law that this court unwittingly is incorporating into the criminal law: Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 894 , 652 P.2d 1370 ] (attorney discipline); In re Schwartz (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 640 , 644 P.2d 833 , 26 A.L.R.4th 1077 ]; Ambrose v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 184 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 903 , 643 P.2d 486 ]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 578 P.2d 102 ]; In re Calaway (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 570 P.2d 1223 ]; In re Kristovich (1976) 18 Cal.3d 468 [ 13 | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Golde v. Fox green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In Re Hallinan green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In Re Boyd green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In Re Bogart green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In Re Kristovich green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.