Rathburn v. Indus. Comm'n, 566 P.2d 372 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). · Go Syfert
Rathburn v. Indus. Comm'n, 566 P.2d 372 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
44 citation events (30 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Nakagaki v. ICAO (coloctapp, 2026-04-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nakagaki v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). ¶6 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) disqualifies a claimant from receiving benefits if their “failure to meet established job performance or other defined standards” caused their job 2 separation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Delgado v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). ¶7 Under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XXII), a claimant is disqualified from unemployment benefits if they resign “under conditions involving personal reasons, unless the personal reasons were compelling pursuant to other provisions of [section 8-73-108(4)].” ¶8 The disqualifying provision of section 8-73-108(5)(e) “must be read in light of the express legislative intent . . . to provide benefits to those who become unemployed through ‘no fault’ of their own.” Cole v. Indus.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cubbon v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). ¶7 An individual is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if the separation from employment occurred based on the “[r]udeness, insolence, or offensive behavior of the worker not reasonably to be countenanced by a customer, supervisor, or fellow worker.” § 8-73-108(5)(e)(XIV).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Crook v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nettles v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). ¶6 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) disqualifies a claimant from receiving benefits if his “failure to meet established job performance 2 or other defined standards” caused his job separation.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nicholson v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ford v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). ¶6 A claimant’s entitlement to employment benefits depends on the reason for the separation from employment, which is a question of fact for the hearing officer.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Garcia v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). ¶8 Section 8-73-108(5)(e) provides that a claimant shall be disqualified from receiving benefits if her employment separation occurred for “any” of several specifically enumerated reasons.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dorsaint v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). ¶5 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) disqualifies a claimant from receiving benefits if her “failure to meet established job performance or other defined standards” caused her job separation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas v. ICAO (2×) also: Cited "see"
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). ¶6 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) disqualifies a claimant from receiving benefits if his “failure to meet established job performance or other defined standards” caused his job separation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alexander v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). ¶9 Section 8-73-108(5)(e) provides claimants will be disqualified from receiving benefits if their employment separation occurred for “any” of several specifically enumerated reasons.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Stough v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mosley-Stichter v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lowery v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ahmadi v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Medrano v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). 2 III.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Farrar v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Krause v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Myers v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nichols v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). 4 Assessing the weight, credibility, and sufficiency of such evidence is the ALJ’s exclusive domain, and findings based on conflicting evidence are conclusive on review.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) LeRoy v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). ¶ 14 An individual is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if the separation from employment occurred as a result of “[r]udeness, insolence, or offensive behavior of the worker not reasonably to be countenanced by a customer, supervisor, or fellow worker.” § 8-73-108(5)(e)(XIV).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Schaupeter v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). 3 B.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Morrison v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Malczewski v. ICAO
Colo. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Comm’n , 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mesa County Public Library District v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office (2×)
Colo. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 39 Colo. App. 433, 435 , 566 P.2d 372, 373 (1977). ¶ 54 “It is the hearing officer’s responsibility, as trier of fact, to weigh the evidence, assess credibility, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and determine the inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Hoskins v. Indus.
discussed Cited "see" Rotenberg v. Industrial Commission (2×)
Colo. Ct. App. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rathburn v. Industrial Commission, 39 Colo.App. 433 , 566 P.2d 372 (1977).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Madril v. El Paso County Sch. Dist. 11 (2×)
Colo. Ct. App. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Weissman v. Board of Education, supra; see also Rathburn v. Industrial Commission, 39 Colo.App. 433 , 566 P.2d 372 (1977) (substantial evidence defined).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lynn G. RATHBURN (Cordova), Petitioner,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the State of Colorado (Ex-Officio Unemployment Compensation Commission of Colorado), and Hair Art International, Incorporated, Respondents.
76-799.
Colorado Court of Appeals.
Jun 16, 1977.
566 P.2d 372
Pierce.
Cited by 156 opinions  |  Published

William Redak, Jr., Boulder, for petitioner.

J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., John Kezer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondents.

[*373] PIERCE, Judge.

Petitioner seeks review of an Industrial Commission order disqualifying her from receipt of unemployment compensation under § 8-73-108(7)(a), C.R.S.1973. She urges the insufficiency of evidence supporting factual findings regarding non-entitlement. We uphold the order.

Petitioner was discharged from her employment as a receptionist. She claims that the termination was a result of her pregnancy and the need to take maternity leave in a few months, coupled with the immediate availability to the employer of a highly qualified replacement. The employer maintains that petitioner was replaced because during the pregnancy she had developed a decided lack of concentration and a poor attitude which was manifested in numerous small errors which adversely affected the business. The employer further claims that she had been admonished about these shortcomings on a number of occasions. Petitioner conceded that her work had deteriorated during this period, and testified as to two specific errors she made in the course of her employment, but blamed this decline in performance on her concern with the illness of her mother. See § 8-73-108(7)(b)(VI), C.R.S.1973.

The circumstances required the Commission to make factual determinations from conflicting evidence, to consider both the content and the credibility of the testimony. The factual conflicts were resolved in favor of the employer. See Standard Metals Corp. v. Ball, 172 Colo. 510, 474 P.2d 622 (1970); Levy v. Everson Plumbing Co., 171 Colo. 468, 468 P.2d 34 (1970). See also Regal Coal Co. v. Jackvich, 105 Colo. 479, 99 P.2d 196 (1940).

In support of her argument regarding the alleged inadequacy of the evidence and the insufficiency of the Commission's factual findings, petitioner emphasizes the absence of specificity in testimony proferred by the employer and the existence of a subsequent temporary re-hire offer when the replacement receptionist abruptly quit. She argues that by virtue of §§ 8-74-109 and 24-4-106(7), C.R.S.1973, which require support by substantial evidence for administrative findings to be conclusive on review, the mere existence of some evidence is insufficient.

Although we recognize the correctness of this statement in the abstract, see Lassner v. Civil Service Commission, 177 Colo. 257, 493 P.2d 1087 (1972), here the evidence, although conflicting, meets the test necessary to render the challenged findings conclusive. Substantial evidence is that which is probative, credible, and competent, of a character which would warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular finding, without regard to the existence of contradictory testimony or contrary inferences. See Coakley v. Hayes, 121 Colo. 303, 215 P.2d 901 (1950); A. Carbone & Co. v. MacGregor, 113 Colo. 241, 155 P.2d 994 (1945); Black Forest Fox Ranch, Inc. v. Garrett, 110 Colo. 323, 134 P.2d 332 (1943). See also Renner v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 187 Kan. 158, 354 P.2d 326 (1960); Brown v. Cobb, 53 N.M. 169, 204 P.2d 264 (1949). Cf. § 5-6-108(2), C.R.S.1973.

Here, although general in certain respects, the employer's unequivocal testimony as to why petitioner was fired completely and positively supports the Commission's findings that termination was the consequence of poor job performance caused by a poor attitude and lack of concentration. This testimony was corroborated in part by the petitioner herself. Petitioner concedes that the interim offer of re-employment is subject to several different interpretations, and that the inference she seeks to draw from it regarding the reason for termination is not compelled. Under these circumstances, the substantial evidence requirement is satisfied, and the Commission's determination may not be overturned on review. Industrial Commission v. Bennett, 166 Colo. 101, 441 P.2d 648 (1968).

A representative of the employer appeared as a witness, but also asked the petitioner one question during the hearing. Ross v. Industrial Commission, Colo.App., 566 P.2d 367 (announced April 7, 1977), is[*374] dispositive of petitioner's contention regarding the allegedly illegal practice of law by this representative.

Order affirmed.

SILVERSTEIN, C. J., and RULAND, J., concur.