Foster v. Foster, 400 S.E.2d 629 (Ga. 1991). · Go Syfert
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Foster v. Foster, 400 S.E.2d 629 (Ga. 1991). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
24 citation events (16 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Cawley v. Bennett (gactapp, 2008-07-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cawley v. Bennett
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Co., 204 Ga. App. 322, 323 ( 419 SE2d 99 ) (1992). 7 Foster v. Foster, 260 Ga. 813, 814 (2) ( 400 SE2d 629 ) (1991) (citation and punctuation omitted). 8 Pearson v. Pearson, 265 Ga. 100 ( 454 SE2d 124 ) (1995) (citations omitted; emphasis in original). 9 Hendrix v. Stone, 261 Ga. 874 (1) ( 412 SE2d 536 ) (1992); see Pearson, supra at 100-101 ; see generally Estes, supra; Smith, supra. 10 Aldworth Co. v. England, 281 Ga. 197, 200 ( 637 SE2d 198 ) (2006). 11 Id. at 197-198 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Drake v. Drake
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
See Jacobs v. Thomson Oak Flooring, 250 Ga. App. 56, 60 (3) ( 550 SE2d 465 ) (2001). 3 See Hackbart v. Hackbart, 272 Ga. 26, 27 ( 526 SE2d 840 ) (2000); Conley v. Conley, 259 Ga. 68, 69 (3) ( 377 SE2d 663 ) (1989). 4 (Emphasis in original.) Pearson v. Pearson, 265 Ga. 100 ( 454 SE2d 124 ) (1995), citing *578 Foster v. Foster, 260 Ga. 813, 814 (2) ( 400 SE2d 629 ) (1991). 5 Supra. 6 Id. at 69-70 (2), (3), (4). 7 “Any enumeration of error which is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.” Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2). 8 See Avery v. Avery, …
discussed Cited "see" Pearson v. Pearson (2×)
Ga. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Foster v. Foster, supra; Conley v. Conley, 259 Ga. 68 (5) ( 377 SE2d 663 ) (1989).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Butler v. Turner (4×)
Ga. · 2001 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Pearson v. Pearson, 265 Ga. 100 , 454 S.E.2d 124 (1995) and Foster v. Foster, 260 Ga. 813 , 400 S.E.2d 629 (1991), involving attempts by former spouses to augment support awards, in which this Court affirmed that a modification action under OCGA § 19-6-19 is the exclusive remedy available to a former spouse for obtaining a provision supplementing a child support award contained in a divorce decree.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Foster
v.
Foster
S91A0031.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Feb 21, 1991.
400 S.E.2d 629
Amanda F. Williams, Martha F. Dekle, Edward R. Zacker, for appellant., John T. McKnight, Jr., for appellee.
Weltner.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published
Weltner, Justice.

1. The trial court found that a settlement agreement was enforceable, and incorporated it into the final divorce decree. The former wife later filed a complaint against the former husband relative to this agreement, alleging fraud. [1] The trial court denied the father’s[*814] motion for summary judgment and we granted his discretionary application to consider:

Decided February 21, 1991. Amanda F. Williams, Martha F. Dekle, Edward R. Zacker, for appellant. John T. McKnight, Jr., for appellee.
Whether a former spouse may sue the other former spouse in tort for fraud on alleged misrepresentations made during settlement-agreement negotiations.

2. In Conley v. Conley, 259 Ga. 68 (377 SE2d 663) (1989), we held:

[I]t is clear that where, as here, the divorce decree does, at the very least, address a question concerning the liability of the non-custodial parent for child-support-obligation items, a § 19-6-19 modification action is the custodial parent’s exclusive remedy in regard to supplementing the decree with a provision obligating the non-custodial parent to pay additional child support. [Id. at 70.]

The trial court should have granted the former husband’s motion for summary judgment.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.
1

The agreement provided:

The parties hereto shall have joint legal custody of the minor children. . . . The custody arrangements herein are made with the belief that both parents should have continuing contact with the children and should have continuing responsibility for the children’s physical needs, medical and dental needs as well as their general mental health.
[T]he father agrees to continue to maintain the group hospitalization on the minor children through his employment, and to be responsible for reasonable and necessary medical, dental, and prescription drug expenses of the minor children, and shall reimburse [the mother] whenever she must advance such expenses for medical care for the children.

The former wife alleged that the former husband represented to her that if she signed the agreement allowing joint legal custody, he would allow the children to live with him and would support them. She alleged that this was a material misrepresentation, as he had no intention of allowing the children to live with him.