Butler claim in Georgia

2022That is because Dr. Stevens testified that it was “likely” that Mrs. Ewing’s preexisting medical conditions, “combined” with the blunt force trauma she suffered during the assault, caused her death, thus allowing the trial court, as the trier of fact, to conclude that the injuries from Mrs. Ewing’s beating “materially accelerated [her] death,” Jackson, 287 Ga. at 649, and thus proximately caused it.

2022That is because Dr. Stevens testified that it was “likely” that Mrs. Ewing’s preexisting medical conditions, “combined” with the blunt force trauma she suffered during the assault, caused her death, thus allowing the trial court, as the trier of fact, to conclude that the injuries from Mrs. Ewing’s beating “materially accelerated [her] death,” Jackson, 287 Ga. at 649, and thus proximately caused it.

2022“An attorney’s decision about which defense to present is a question of trial strategy,” and “unless the choice of strategy is objectively unreasonable, such that no competent trial counsel would have pursued such a course, we will not second-guess counsel’s decisions in this regard.” Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 298 (857 SE2d 682) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). 24 Moreover, “[a]n attorney’s decision about which defense to present is a question of trial strategy and will generally be considered reasonable if supported by evidence in the record.” Wilson v. State, Case No. S22A0005

2022“An attorney’s decision about which defense to present is a question of trial strategy,” and “unless the choice of strategy is objectively unreasonable, such that no competent trial counsel would have pursued such a course, we will not second-guess counsel’s decisions in this regard.” Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 298 (857 SE2d 682) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). 24 Moreover, “[a]n attorney’s decision about which defense to present is a question of trial strategy and will generally be considered reasonable if supported by evidence in the record.” Wilson v. State, Case No. S22A0005

2022We just note our exception.” 8 Contrary to Butler’s assertion in her appellate brief, this proposed instruction was included in her supplemental request no. 3, not in her request no. 14. 15 Butler’s claim that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on OCGA § 40-6-95 is premised primarily on State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6 ( 734 SE2d 50 ) (2012), and Miller, 236 Ga. App. 825 .

2022We just note our exception.” 8 Contrary to Butler’s assertion in her appellate brief, this proposed instruction was included in her supplemental request no. 3, not in her request no. 14. 15 Butler’s claim that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on OCGA § 40-6-95 is premised primarily on State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6 ( 734 SE2d 50 ) (2012), and Miller, 236 Ga. App. 825 .

2022See generally McKeever, 353 Ga. App. at 265 (4); Amica, 307 Ga. App. at 282 (2); Rogers, 298 Ga. App. at 903 (6); Jackson, 252 Ga. App. at 17 (2); see also generally OCGA §§ 5-5-20 through 5-5-25 (setting forth the grounds on which a new trial may be granted). 27 Regardless (and on a related note), Butler’s claim on this issue fails for the additional reason that she has neither identified any documents (including privileged communications) that were withheld from her12 or disclosed to others nor pointed to anything in the record indicating how the outcome of her trial would have been differen

2022See Mason v. State, 199 Ga. App. 691, 692-693 (1) ( 405 SE2d 747 ) (1991) (although a conviction based on circumstantial evidence is authorized only if the evidence excludes every other reasonable hypothesis save the defendant’s guilt, it need not exclude every inference or hypothesis, and whether this test has been satisfied is a question for the jury) (citing former OCGA § 24-4-6, now codified at OCGA § 24-14-6); accord Hill v. State, 297 Ga. 675, 678 (2) (b) ( 777 SE2d 460 ) (2015); see also generally State v. Loy, 251 Ga. App. 721, 722 ( 554 SE2d 800 ) (2001) (“[I]t is not necessary for a

2022See Mason v. State, 199 Ga. App. 691, 692-693 (1) ( 405 SE2d 747 ) (1991) (although a conviction based on circumstantial evidence is authorized only if the evidence excludes every other reasonable hypothesis save the defendant’s guilt, it need not exclude every inference or hypothesis, and whether this test has been satisfied is a question for the jury) (citing former OCGA § 24-4-6, now codified at OCGA § 24-14-6); accord Hill v. State, 297 Ga. 675, 678 (2) (b) ( 777 SE2d 460 ) (2015); see also generally State v. Loy, 251 Ga. App. 721, 722 ( 554 SE2d 800 ) (2001) (“[I]t is not necessary for a

2022See Mason v. State, 199 Ga. App. 691, 692-693 (1) ( 405 SE2d 747 ) (1991) (although a conviction based on circumstantial evidence is authorized only if the evidence excludes every other reasonable hypothesis save the defendant’s guilt, it need not exclude every inference or hypothesis, and whether this test has been satisfied is a question for the jury) (citing former OCGA § 24-4-6, now codified at OCGA § 24-14-6); accord Hill v. State, 297 Ga. 675, 678 (2) (b) ( 777 SE2d 460 ) (2015); see also generally State v. Loy, 251 Ga. App. 721, 722 ( 554 SE2d 800 ) (2001) (“[I]t is not necessary for a

2022See Mason v. State, 199 Ga. App. 691, 692-693 (1) ( 405 SE2d 747 ) (1991) (although a conviction based on circumstantial evidence is authorized only if the evidence excludes every other reasonable hypothesis save the defendant’s guilt, it need not exclude every inference or hypothesis, and whether this test has been satisfied is a question for the jury) (citing former OCGA § 24-4-6, now codified at OCGA § 24-14-6); accord Hill v. State, 297 Ga. 675, 678 (2) (b) ( 777 SE2d 460 ) (2015); see also generally State v. Loy, 251 Ga. App. 721, 722 ( 554 SE2d 800 ) (2001) (“[I]t is not necessary for a

2022See Mason v. State, 199 Ga. App. 691, 692-693 (1) ( 405 SE2d 747 ) (1991) (although a conviction based on circumstantial evidence is authorized only if the evidence excludes every other reasonable hypothesis save the defendant’s guilt, it need not exclude every inference or hypothesis, and whether this test has been satisfied is a question for the jury) (citing former OCGA § 24-4-6, now codified at OCGA § 24-14-6); accord Hill v. State, 297 Ga. 675, 678 (2) (b) ( 777 SE2d 460 ) (2015); see also generally State v. Loy, 251 Ga. App. 721, 722 ( 554 SE2d 800 ) (2001) (“[I]t is not necessary for a

2022See Mason v. State, 199 Ga. App. 691, 692-693 (1) ( 405 SE2d 747 ) (1991) (although a conviction based on circumstantial evidence is authorized only if the evidence excludes every other reasonable hypothesis save the defendant’s guilt, it need not exclude every inference or hypothesis, and whether this test has been satisfied is a question for the jury) (citing former OCGA § 24-4-6, now codified at OCGA § 24-14-6); accord Hill v. State, 297 Ga. 675, 678 (2) (b) ( 777 SE2d 460 ) (2015); see also generally State v. Loy, 251 Ga. App. 721, 722 ( 554 SE2d 800 ) (2001) (“[I]t is not necessary for a

2022See generally McKeever, 353 Ga. App. at 265 (4); Amica, 307 Ga. App. at 282 (2); Rogers, 298 Ga. App. at 903 (6); Jackson, 252 Ga. App. at 17 (2); see also generally OCGA §§ 5-5-20 through 5-5-25 (setting forth the grounds on which a new trial may be granted). 27 Regardless (and on a related note), Butler’s claim on this issue fails for the additional reason that she has neither identified any documents (including privileged communications) that were withheld from her12 or disclosed to others nor pointed to anything in the record indicating how the outcome of her trial would have been differen

2022“In determining the proper procedure to follow in pursuing an appeal, the underlying subject matter generally controls over the relief sought.” Self v. Bayneum, 265 Ga. 14, 14-15 ( 453 SE2d 27 ) (1995).

2022“In determining the proper procedure to follow in pursuing an appeal, the underlying subject matter generally controls over the relief sought.” Self v. Bayneum, 265 Ga. 14, 14-15 ( 453 SE2d 27 ) (1995).

2022See generally McKeever, 353 Ga. App. at 265 (4); Amica, 307 Ga. App. at 282 (2); Rogers, 298 Ga. App. at 903 (6); Jackson, 252 Ga. App. at 17 (2); see also generally OCGA §§ 5-5-20 through 5-5-25 (setting forth the grounds on which a new trial may be granted). 27 Regardless (and on a related note), Butler’s claim on this issue fails for the additional reason that she has neither identified any documents (including privileged communications) that were withheld from her12 or disclosed to others nor pointed to anything in the record indicating how the outcome of her trial would have been differen

2022“An appellant must show harm as well as error to prevail on appeal; error to be reversible must be harmful.” Holt, 248 Ga. App. at 337 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022We just note our exception.” 8 Contrary to Butler’s assertion in her appellate brief, this proposed instruction was included in her supplemental request no. 3, not in her request no. 14. 15 Butler’s claim that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on OCGA § 40-6-95 is premised primarily on State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6 ( 734 SE2d 50 ) (2012), and Miller, 236 Ga. App. 825 .

2022We held in Miller, in relevant part, that both “negligence by the defendant in operating his vehicle and the behavior of the victim remain relevant” in determining whether the State has met its burden of establishing that a defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of a victim’s death in a vehicular-homicide case. 236 Ga. App. at 828 (2).

2022See Alexander v. State, 313 Ga. 521, 532-533 (__ SE2d __) (2022) (“[W]e routinely conclude that such speculation is insufficient to establish prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”); Harris v. State, 304 22 Ga. 652 , 654-655 ( 821 SE2d 346 ) (2018) (defendant failed to prove he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to call trial witnesses or elicit certain testimony because defendant did not provide competent evidence of what their testimony would be).

2020Thus, trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the no-contact order and the subsequent related guilty pleas did not constitute deficient performance. “‘Failure to 16 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Esprit v. State, 305 Ga. 429, 434 (2) (b) ( 826 SE2d 7 ) (2019), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687, 694 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984) & Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 457 ( 807 SE2d 369 ) (2017). 9 make a meritless objection cannot be evidence of ineffective assistance.’”17 Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Butler’s motion for new trial on this ba

2020Thus, trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the no-contact order and the subsequent related guilty pleas did not constitute deficient performance. “‘Failure to 16 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Esprit v. State, 305 Ga. 429, 434 (2) (b) ( 826 SE2d 7 ) (2019), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687, 694 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984) & Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 457 ( 807 SE2d 369 ) (2017). 9 make a meritless objection cannot be evidence of ineffective assistance.’”17 Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Butler’s motion for new trial on this ba

2020Thus, trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the no-contact order and the subsequent related guilty pleas did not constitute deficient performance. “‘Failure to 16 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Esprit v. State, 305 Ga. 429, 434 (2) (b) ( 826 SE2d 7 ) (2019), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687, 694 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984) & Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 457 ( 807 SE2d 369 ) (2017). 9 make a meritless objection cannot be evidence of ineffective assistance.’”17 Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Butler’s motion for new trial on this ba

2020Thus, trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the no-contact order and the subsequent related guilty pleas did not constitute deficient performance. “‘Failure to 16 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Esprit v. State, 305 Ga. 429, 434 (2) (b) ( 826 SE2d 7 ) (2019), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687, 694 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984) & Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 457 ( 807 SE2d 369 ) (2017). 9 make a meritless objection cannot be evidence of ineffective assistance.’”17 Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Butler’s motion for new trial on this ba

2020Thus, trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the no-contact order and the subsequent related guilty pleas did not constitute deficient performance. “‘Failure to 16 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Esprit v. State, 305 Ga. 429, 434 (2) (b) ( 826 SE2d 7 ) (2019), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687, 694 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984) & Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 457 ( 807 SE2d 369 ) (2017). 9 make a meritless objection cannot be evidence of ineffective assistance.’”17 Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Butler’s motion for new trial on this ba

2020Thus, trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the no-contact order and the subsequent related guilty pleas did not constitute deficient performance. “‘Failure to 16 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Esprit v. State, 305 Ga. 429, 434 (2) (b) ( 826 SE2d 7 ) (2019), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687, 694 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984) & Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 457 ( 807 SE2d 369 ) (2017). 9 make a meritless objection cannot be evidence of ineffective assistance.’”17 Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Butler’s motion for new trial on this ba

2005See id. at 169 (1); Kates v. State, 271 Ga. App. 326 ( 609 SE2d 710 ) (2005) (defendant who initially refused consent to search car later gave valid consent when police threatened to bring drug dogs and where defendant consented in part to avoid upsetting children).

2001Compare Pearson v. Pearson, 265 Ga. 100 , 454 S.E.2d 124 (1995) and Foster v. Foster, 260 Ga. 813 , 400 S.E.2d 629 (1991), involving attempts by former spouses to augment support awards, in which this Court affirmed that a modification action under OCGA § 19-6-19 is the exclusive remedy available to a former spouse for obtaining a provision supplementing a child support award contained in a divorce decree.

2001Compare Pearson v. Pearson, 265 Ga. 100 , 454 S.E.2d 124 (1995) and Foster v. Foster, 260 Ga. 813 , 400 S.E.2d 629 (1991), involving attempts by former spouses to augment support awards, in which this Court affirmed that a modification action under OCGA § 19-6-19 is the exclusive remedy available to a former spouse for obtaining a provision supplementing a child support award contained in a divorce decree.

2001Compare Pearson v. Pearson, 265 Ga. 100 , 454 S.E.2d 124 (1995) and Foster v. Foster, 260 Ga. 813 , 400 S.E.2d 629 (1991), involving attempts by former spouses to augment support awards, in which this Court affirmed that a modification action under OCGA § 19-6-19 is the exclusive remedy available to a former spouse for obtaining a provision supplementing a child support award contained in a divorce decree.

2001Compare Pearson v. Pearson, 265 Ga. 100 , 454 S.E.2d 124 (1995) and Foster v. Foster, 260 Ga. 813 , 400 S.E.2d 629 (1991), involving attempts by former spouses to augment support awards, in which this Court affirmed that a modification action under OCGA § 19-6-19 is the exclusive remedy available to a former spouse for obtaining a provision supplementing a child support award contained in a divorce decree.

2001See Wyatt v. State, 267 Ga. 860, 864 , 485 S.E.2d 470 (1997).

2001See Wyatt v. State, 267 Ga. 860, 864 , 485 S.E.2d 470 (1997).