Long v. Long, 278 S.E.2d 370 (Ga. 1981). · Go Syfert
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Long v. Long, 278 S.E.2d 370 (Ga. 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 5× by 3 distinct cases, 2012–2013 · 2 courts · …an attempt to retain jurisdiction of a final order to the extent of allowing any party to file objections and thereby have the matter reconsidered by the court beyond the term in which the final order is entered is contrary to law and is a nullity. at p. 625 ✓
28 citation events (22 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Robert H. McNair, Co-Executor of the Estate of W. O. McNair v. Richard \Richie\" Harold McNair" (gactapp, 2017-03-15)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Robert H. McNair, Co-Executor of the Estate of W. O. McNair v. Richard \Richie\" Harold McNair" (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2017 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
the proper and timely filing of the notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Mandt v. Lovell (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
an attempt to retain jurisdiction of a final order to the extent of allowing any party to file objections and thereby have the matter reconsidered by the court beyond the term in which the final order is entered is contrary to law and is a nullity.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Lynda Mandt v. William Lovell (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
an attempt to retain jurisdiction of a final order to the extent of allowing any party to file objections and thereby have the matter reconsidered by the court beyond the term in which the final order is entered is contrary to law and is a nullity.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mandt v. Lovell
Ga. · 2013 · confidence medium
In Long v. Long, 247 Ga. 624, 625 ( 278 SE2d 370 ) (1981), we pointed out that “an attempt to retain jurisdiction of a final order to the extent of allowing any party to file objections and thereby have the matter reconsidered by the court beyond the term in which the final order is entered is contrary to law and is a nullity.” In the area of family violence protective orders, this rule should not be without exception.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission v. State Mutual Insurance Co.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
As we recently explained, the doctrine of judicial estoppel will preclude a party from contending that a trial court’s order is void when the remedies and such remedies were adequate.” 5 Miraglia v. Bryson, 152 Ga. 828, 828 ( 111 SE 655 ) (1922). 6 See Long v. Long, 247 Ga. 624, 625 ( 278 Ga. 370 ) (1981); Robinson v. Kemp Motor Sales, Inc., 185 Ga. App. 492, 492 ( 364 SE2d 623 ) (1988). 7 See, e.g., Bates v. Bates, 317 Ga. App. 339, 343 ( 730 SE2d 482 ) (2012). 3 application of that doctrine is necessary to “protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from delib…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ponse v. Atlanta Casualty Co.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
In this regard, Ponse’s motion for OCGA § 33-7-15 (b.l) attorney fees was filed one week outside the term of court in which the state court entered its judgment on the verdict. 6 Cobb County v. Buchanan, 261 Ga. 857 ( 413 SE2d 198 ) (1992); Long v. Long, 247 Ga. 624, 625 ( 278 SE2d 370 ) (1981). 3.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Columbus v. Barngrover
Ga. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
However, the court did not enter its order on such submission until December 1, 1999, during the October term of court. 20 Long v. Long, 247 Ga. 624, 625 ( 278 SE2d 370 ) (1981). 21 Brown v. Techdata Corp., 238 Ga. 622, 629 ( 234 SE2d 787 ) (1977). 22 City of Cordele v. Hobby, 240 Ga. 207 ( 240 SE2d 16 ) (1977). 23 Burton v. DeKalb County, 202 Ga. App. 676, 678 ( 415 SE2d 647 ) (1992). 24 City of Atlanta v. Frank, 120 Ga. App. 273 ( 170 SE2d 265 ) (1969). 25 City of Atlanta v. Black, 265 Ga. 425, 427 ( 457 SE2d 551 ) (1995). 26 Bowen v. Columbus, Ga., 256 Ga. 462, 463 (1) ( 349 SE2d 740 ) (198…
discussed Cited "see" Georgia Government Transparency & Campaign Finance Commission v. State Mutual Insurance (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Long v. Long, 247 Ga. 624, 625 ( 278 SE2d 370 ) (1981); Robinson v. Kemp Motor Sales, Inc., 185 Ga. App. 492, 492 ( 364 SE2d 623 ) (1988).
discussed Cited "see" Moore v. Thompson (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
Phillips v. Bowen, 206 Ga. 268, 269 (1) ( 56 SE2d 503 ) (1949); see Long v. Long, 247 Ga. 624, 625 ( 278 SE2d 370 ) (1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Kelly v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Long v. Long, 247 Ga. 624, 625 ( 278 SE2d 370 ) (1981) (where the trial court’s final order stated that “each party may file objections to this order during the next 30 days,” and appellant did so but the term of court had expired by that time, the trial court “no longer had jurisdiction of the matter,” and because no notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of that order, the appeal from a later order purporting to affirm the final order had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Long
v.
Long
37096.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
May 26, 1981.
278 S.E.2d 370
Smith, Longabaugh, Hendon, Boyce, Dickson, Bell & Clark, B. J. Smith, for appellant., Glen A. Garrett, Harrison, Kovacich & Naughton, Davies Owens, Jack L. Harrison, for appellee.
Jordan, Hill.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 3 cases
Pinpoint authority: #22,431 of 633,719
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Georgia (3)
Jordan, Chief Justice.

Appellee challenges this court’s jurisdiction for lack of a timely notice of appeal.

The Superior Court of DeKalb County entered its final order dissolving a receivership, discharging the receiver and providing for his compensation on April 18,1980. That order further provided that “each party may file objections to this order during the next 30 days.” Appellant filed his objections on May 13, 1980.

The trial court, after a hearing on the objection on October 10, 1980, ordered that “all terms and provisions of the Final Order of the Receivership of April 18, 1980, stand unchanged and affirmed.” Appellant filed his notice of appeal to the order of October 10 on November 7, 1980.

The terms of the Superior Court of DeKalb County begin on the first Mondays in January, March, May, July, September and November. Georgia Laws 1973, p. 317.

“The regular terms of the superior and state courts shall continue until the commencement of the next regular term, at which time they shall stand adjourned” Code Ann. § 24-3010 (Ga. L. 1972, p. 713). Thus, by statute, the March term of the DeKalb County[*625] Superior Court ended on the first Monday in May, May 5, 1980.

Decided May 26, 1981. Smith, Longabaugh, Hendon, Boyce, Dickson, Bell & Clark, B. J. Smith, for appellant. Glen A. Garrett, Harrison, Kovacich & Naughton, Davies Owens, Jack L. Harrison, for appellee.

We held in City of Cornelia v. Gunter, 227 Ga. 464 (181 SE2d 489) (1971) that after the expiration of the term at which a decree was entered it is out of the power of the court to modify and revise it in any manner of substance or in any manner affecting the merits. See also Carswell v. Shannon, 209 Ga. 596 (2) (74 SE2d 850) (1952).

We agree with the appellee that an attempt to retain jurisdiction of a final order to the extent of allowing any party to file objections and thereby have the matter reconsidered by the court beyond the term in which the final order is entered is contrary to law and is a nullity. See Kittel v. Comstock, 219 Ga. 161 (132 SE2d 77).

We find no provision in Georgia law for changing or modifying a final judgment after the term in which it is rendered by the filing of an objection to it. The DeKalb County Superior Court no longer had jurisdiction of the matter after the March term ended on May 5,1980, leaving the only appealable order the one of April 18. Since more than 30 days had elapsed from the date of that order and the notice of appeal on November 7,1980, and no extensions of time having been granted, this appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

“A notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained . . .” Code Ann. § 6-803 (a). “ ‘The proper and timely filing of the notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court.’ ” Hester v. State, 242 Ga. 173, 175 (249 SE2d 547) (1978); Jordan v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 343 (191 SE2d 530) (1972).

Appeal dismissed.

All the Justices concur, except Hill, P. J., who dissents.