Kearse v. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm'n, 456 S.E.2d 892 (S.C. 1995). · Go Syfert
Kearse v. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm'n, 456 S.E.2d 892 (S.C. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
51 citation events (45 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Cited for
456 S.E.2d at 893 Presumption of agency findings requiring substantial evidence16 citing casesholding the findings of an administrative agency are presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence3 citing courts put it this way
  • Moragne v. SC Dep't of Corr., No. 2010-UP-411 (S.C. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2010).unpublished 2 cites
    (The findings of the agency are presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence.)
  • Tippett v. South Carolina Dep't of Corr., No. 2008-UP-631 (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2008).unpublished 2 cites
    (The findings of the agency are presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence.)
  • Clemmons v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc.-Harbison, 803 S.E.2d 268 (S.C. 2017).published
    Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200 , 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995)). “ ‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, woul…
  • Clemmons v. Lowe's Home Centers, No. 27708 (S.C. Mar. 8, 2017).published
    Comm'n, 318 S.C. 198, 200 , 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995)). "'Substantial evidence' is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would…
  • Schnee v. SCDMV, No. 2013-UP-494 (S.C. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2013).unpublished
    (holding the findings of an administrative agency are presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence)
  • Est. of Nicholson Ex Rel. Nicholson v. South Carolina Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 660 S.E.2d 303 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008).published
    Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200 , 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995).
  • Morgan v. South Carolina Budget & Control Bd., 659 S.E.2d 263 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008).published
    Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200 , 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995). “‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would…
  • Peake v. South Carolina Dep't of Motor Vehs., 654 S.E.2d 284 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007).published
    Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200 , 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995); South Carolina Dep’t of Motor Vehicles v. Nelson, 364 S.C. 514, 519 , 613 S.E.2d 544, 547 (Ct.App.2005); Broughton v. South of the Border, 336 S.C. 488, 496 , 520 S.E.2d 634, 637 (Ct.…
  • Hull v. Spartanburg Cnty. Assessor, 641 S.E.2d 909 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007).published
    Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200 , 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995) (citation omitted). “ ‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the recor…
  • Smith v. Ncci, Inc., 631 S.E.2d 268 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006).published
    Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200 , 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995).
Show 6 more citing cases
  • Williams v. SCDMV, No. 2005-UP-596 (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2005).unpublished
    Comm’n , 318 S.C. 198, 200 , 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995).
  • Alexander v. Forklifts Unlimited, 618 S.E.2d 307 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).published
    Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200 , 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995).
  • S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehs. v. Nelson, 613 S.E.2d 544 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).published
    Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200 , 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995); Broughton v. South of the Border, 336 S.C. 488, 496 , 520 S.E.2d 634, 637 (Ct.App.1999).
  • Shuler v. SC Dep't of Pub. Saf., No. 2004-UP-411 (S.C. Ct. App. June 24, 2004).unpublished
    Comm'n , 318 S.C. 198, 199 , 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995).
  • McDaniel v. SC Dep't of Motor Vehs., No. 2004-UP-391 (S.C. Ct. App. June 21, 2004).unpublished
    Comm'n , 318 S.C. 198, 199 , 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995).
  • Brinson v. Lexington Med. Ctr., No. 2004-UP-337 (S.C. Ct. App. May 17, 2004).unpublished
    Comm’n , 318 S.C. 198, 200 , 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995).
318 S.C. at 200 “the findings of the agency are presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence.”1 citing case2 citing courts quote it
  • Moragne v. SC Dep't of Corr., No. 2010-UP-411 (S.C. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2010).unpublished 2 cites
    “The findings of the agency are presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence.”
456 S.E.2d at 894 holding worker's compensation claimant had no constitutional right to counsel and was not denied counsel when she was advised she could represent herself and was given "ample opportunity to present [her] side of the case1 citing case1 citing court put it this way
  • Vasile Florin Craus v. NUTRA Mfg., Inc., No. 2021-000778 (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2024).unpublished
    (holding worker's compensation claimant had no constitutional right to counsel and was not denied counsel when she was advised she could represent herself and was given "ample opportunity to present [her] side of the cas…)
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Margie KEARSE, Appellant
v.
the STATE HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES FINANCE COMMISSION, Respondent
24230.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Apr 3, 1995.
Published opinion
456 S.E.2d 892
1995 S.C. LEXIS 56
Susan Cross, Piedmont Legal Services, Inc., Rock Hill, for appellant., Charles M. Black, Jr., Asst. Gen. Counsel, State Health and Human Services Finance Com’n, Columbia, for respondent.
Waller, Finney, Toal, Moore, Chandler.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 63%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of South Caro… (1)
Waller, Justice:

On appeal is an Order of the circuit court upholding the denial of Medicaid benefits to Appellant Margie Kearse (Kearse). We affirm.

FACTS

Kearse applied for Medicaid benefits on the basis of disability due to high blood pressure, arthritis, sinusitis, and polio as a youth. Her application was denied. She requested a hearing before the State Health and Human Services Finance Commission (Commission), which administers the Medicaid program on the state level. After the hearing, the Commission denied benefits to Kearse, and the circuit court affirmed.

ISSUES
1. Is the Commission’s denial of benefits supported by substantial evidence?
2. Did Kearse receive a full and fair hearing before the Commission?

[*200] DISCUSSION

1. Denial of Benefits

It is well settled that in reviewing a decision by an administrative agency, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the agency concerning the weight of the evidence as to questions of fact. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 1993); Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E. (2d) 304 (1981). The findings of the agency are presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence. Parker v. S.C. Public Service Comm., 281 S.C. 22, 314 S.E. (2d) 148 (1984). Substantial evidence is defined as “such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 276 S.C. at 135, 276 S.E. (2d) at 307 (citing Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm., 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L.Ed. (2d) 131,140 (1966)).

In making a determination as to disability, the Commission follows the same definition of disability as the Social Security Administration: “The inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (1993).

Here, the Commission determined that Kearse’s medical problems did not rise to the level of disability. The Commission’s findings are substantiated by Kearse’s medical records, including an evaluation by her physician, Dr. Malcolm Marion, III. Dr. Marion’s report notes that Kearse suffers from obesity and controlled hypertension. She appeared depressed and had a “somewhat cushingnoid look.” However, he found no significant swelling, heat, or redness in her knees or ankles and noted that she was able to walk and get on and off the examining table without any problem. Nor did he find evidence of childhood polio.

We find substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that Kearse is not disabled pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (1993).

2. Hearing

Kearse contends that she was deprived of a full and fair hearing before the Commission because she was not represented by counsel. We disagree.

[*201] The right to counsel arises under the sixth amendment or the due process guarantee of the U.S. Constitution. Washington v. Washington, 308 S.C. 549, 419 S.E. (2d) 779 (1992). The sixth amendment is not implicated here as Kearse is not a criminal defendant. Moreover, due process must involve the deprivation of a liberty interest. Here, Kearse cites no liberty interest of which she is being deprived. Accordingly, Kearse had no constitutional right to counsel.

Moreover, the Commission advised Kearse that she could represent herself at the hearing or be represented by an attorney, and that if she could not afford an attorney, she could contact the Legal Services Association for legal aid. Further, the record of the hearing before the Commission shows that Kearse and her witnesses were given ample opportunity to present their side of the case.

Affirmed.

Finney, C.J., Toal and Moore, JJ., and A. Lee Chandler, Acting Associate Justice, concur.