requested charge error in Georgia

2012See also Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 406, 408 (2) ( 651 SE2d 12 ) (2007) (“The refusal to give a requested charge is error only where the request made is a correct statement of law that is pertinent and material to an issue in the case and contains information that is not substantially covered by the charge actually given.”) (citation omitted).

2012See also Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 406, 408 (2) ( 651 SE2d 12 ) (2007) (“The refusal to give a requested charge is error only where the request made is a correct statement of law that is pertinent and material to an issue in the case and contains information that is not substantially covered by the charge actually given.”) (citation omitted).

2009Carter v. State, 263 Ga. 401, 403 (4) ( 435 SE2d 42 ) (1993).

2009Carter v. State, 263 Ga. 401, 403 (4) ( 435 SE2d 42 ) (1993).

1995“It is well settled that the trial court is not obligated to instruct the jury in the exact language requested and that, where the same principle of law is covered in another instruction, failure to give the requested charge is not error.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pierce v. State, 209 Ga. App. 366, 368 (3) ( 433 SE2d 641 ) (1993).

1995“It is well settled that the trial court is not obligated to instruct the jury in the exact language requested and that, where the same principle of law is covered in another instruction, failure to give the requested charge is not error.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pierce v. State, 209 Ga. App. 366, 368 (3) ( 433 SE2d 641 ) (1993).

2012See also Milinavicius v. State, 290 Ga. 374, 378 (4) ( 721 SE2d 843 ) (2012) (where charge as a whole fairly represented the issue of justification failure to use certain words in charge presents no ground for reversal). (b) Willis also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to give his requested charge on the lesser offense of reckless conduct.

2012See also Milinavicius v. State, 290 Ga. 374, 378 (4) ( 721 SE2d 843 ) (2012) (where charge as a whole fairly represented the issue of justification failure to use certain words in charge presents no ground for reversal). (b) Willis also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to give his requested charge on the lesser offense of reckless conduct.

2012“It is well settled that the trial court is not obligated to instruct the jury in the exact language requested and that, where the same principle of law is covered in another instruction, failure to give the requested charge is not error.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Buruca v. State, 278 Ga. App. 650, 653 (2) ( 629 SE2d 438 ) (2006).

2012“It is well settled that the trial court is not obligated to instruct the jury in the exact language requested and that, where the same principle of law is covered in another instruction, failure to give the requested charge is not error.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Buruca v. State, 278 Ga. App. 650, 653 (2) ( 629 SE2d 438 ) (2006).

1992The jury was instructed that if they did not find appellant guilty of trafficking in cocaine, they could “consider the question of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, or of the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine.” “It is well *538 settled that the trial court is not obligated to instruct the jury in the exact language requested and that, where the same principle of law is covered in another instruction, failure to give the requested charge is not error.” Coleman v. State, 189 Ga. App. 366, 367 ( 375 SE2d 663 ).

1992The jury was instructed that if they did not find appellant guilty of trafficking in cocaine, they could “consider the question of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, or of the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine.” “It is well *538 settled that the trial court is not obligated to instruct the jury in the exact language requested and that, where the same principle of law is covered in another instruction, failure to give the requested charge is not error.” Coleman v. State, 189 Ga. App. 366, 367 ( 375 SE2d 663 ).

1989Assuming arguendo that the failure to give the requested charge was error, “we find that it is highly probable that any error in the charge did not contribute to the judgment in this case, and thus any such error was harmless. [Cit.]” Barton v. State, 188 Ga. App. 237, 238 ( 372 SE2d 647 ) (1988).

1989Assuming arguendo that the failure to give the requested charge was error, “we find that it is highly probable that any error in the charge did not contribute to the judgment in this case, and thus any such error was harmless. [Cit.]” Barton v. State, 188 Ga. App. 237, 238 ( 372 SE2d 647 ) (1988).

2012See also Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 406, 408 (2) ( 651 SE2d 12 ) (2007) (“The refusal to give a requested charge is error only where the request made is a correct statement of law that is pertinent and material to an issue in the case and contains information that is not substantially covered by the charge actually given.”) (citation omitted.) 7 Crusselle, supra. 5

2012Crusselle, supra.

1987Although the trial court did not give the specific charge requested by appellant, an instruction on the principle of equal access was given to the jury. “ ‘(I)t is no longer necessary to give the exact language of requests to charge when the same principles are fairly given to the jury in the general charge of the court. [Cit.]’ [Cit.]” Shirley v. State, 245 Ga. 616, 619 (3) ( 266 SE2d 218 ) (1980). *691 3.

1987Although the trial court did not give the specific charge requested by appellant, an instruction on the principle of equal access was given to the jury. “ ‘(I)t is no longer necessary to give the exact language of requests to charge when the same principles are fairly given to the jury in the general charge of the court. [Cit.]’ [Cit.]” Shirley v. State, 245 Ga. 616, 619 (3) ( 266 SE2d 218 ) (1980). *691 3.

2025Poppell, 319 Ga. at 685 (2); see also Rowe v. Tyson, 361 Ga. App. 885 , 889 (4) (a) ( 864 SE2d 170 ) (2021) (no error when defendant’s requested charge was generally covered by the other jury charges).

2016See also Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601 (3) (a) ( 555 SE2d 716 ) (2001) (appellant’s acts in disciplining the child victim were so severe that they plainly came within the definition of reckless conduct and did not qualify as a lawful act so as to require an instruction on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter); Moses v. State, 264 Ga. 313, 315 (2) ( 444 SE2d 767 ) (1994) (appellant’s admission to authorities that he placed his hand over an infant’s mouth to keep him from crying and waking the infant’s *525 mother did not require a charge on involuntary manslaughter where the evidenc

2016See also Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601 (3) (a) ( 555 SE2d 716 ) (2001) (appellant’s acts in disciplining the child victim were so severe that they plainly came within the definition of reckless conduct and did not qualify as a lawful act so as to require an instruction on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter); Moses v. State, 264 Ga. 313, 315 (2) ( 444 SE2d 767 ) (1994) (appellant’s admission to authorities that he placed his hand over an infant’s mouth to keep him from crying and waking the infant’s *525 mother did not require a charge on involuntary manslaughter where the evidenc

2016Here, the undisputed evidence was that the injuries were so severe that they could only have been inflicted by something akin to a blow from a fist or a kick with “tremendous force.” Even if the jury accepted appellant’s statement that he bounced the child on the bed, his conduct, if it were the cause of the child’s fatal injuries, could not have been lawfully playful but could only have been reckless and criminally negligent. “[Appellant’s] conduct, as related by him, comes so plainly within the definition of the crime of ‘reckless conduct’ that it cannot qualify as a ‘lawful act.’ The refusa

2016Here, the undisputed evidence was that the injuries were so severe that they could only have been inflicted by something akin to a blow from a fist or a kick with “tremendous force.” Even if the jury accepted appellant’s statement that he bounced the child on the bed, his conduct, if it were the cause of the child’s fatal injuries, could not have been lawfully playful but could only have been reckless and criminally negligent. “[Appellant’s] conduct, as related by him, comes so plainly within the definition of the crime of ‘reckless conduct’ that it cannot qualify as a ‘lawful act.’ The refusa

2016See also Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601 (3) (a) ( 555 SE2d 716 ) (2001) (appellant’s acts in disciplining the child victim were so severe that they plainly came within the definition of reckless conduct and did not qualify as a lawful act so as to require an instruction on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter); Moses v. State, 264 Ga. 313, 315 (2) ( 444 SE2d 767 ) (1994) (appellant’s admission to authorities that he placed his hand over an infant’s mouth to keep him from crying and waking the infant’s *525 mother did not require a charge on involuntary manslaughter where the evidenc

2016See also Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601 (3) (a) ( 555 SE2d 716 ) (2001) (appellant’s acts in disciplining the child victim were so severe that they plainly came within the definition of reckless conduct and did not qualify as a lawful act so as to require an instruction on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter); Moses v. State, 264 Ga. 313, 315 (2) ( 444 SE2d 767 ) (1994) (appellant’s admission to authorities that he placed his hand over an infant’s mouth to keep him from crying and waking the infant’s *525 mother did not require a charge on involuntary manslaughter where the evidenc

2012Ga. Dept. of Corrections v. Couch, 312 Ga. App. 544, 551-552 (4) ( 718 SE2d 875 ) (2011).

2012Ga. Dept. of Corrections v. Couch, 312 Ga. App. 544, 551-552 (4) ( 718 SE2d 875 ) (2011).

2011Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 406, 408 (2) ( 651 SE2d 12 ) (2007) (refusal to give a requested charge is error only where the request made is a correct statement of law that is pertinent and material to an issue in the case and contains information that is not substantially covered by the charge actually given); Mohamed v. State, 276 Ga. 706, 710-711 (4) ( 583 SE2d 9 ) (2003) (failure to give an instruction in the exact language requested by defendant was not harmful error, where principle asserted was adequately covered elsewhere in the jury charge as a whole).

2011Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 406, 408 (2) ( 651 SE2d 12 ) (2007) (refusal to give a requested charge is error only where the request made is a correct statement of law that is pertinent and material to an issue in the case and contains information that is not substantially covered by the charge actually given); Mohamed v. State, 276 Ga. 706, 710-711 (4) ( 583 SE2d 9 ) (2003) (failure to give an instruction in the exact language requested by defendant was not harmful error, where principle asserted was adequately covered elsewhere in the jury charge as a whole).

2004Parker v. State, 270 Ga. 256, 258 (3) ( 507 SE2d 744 ) (1998).

2004Parker v. State, 270 Ga. 256, 258 (3) ( 507 SE2d 744 ) (1998).

2002Williams v. Worsley, 235 Ga. App. 806, 807 (1) ( 510 SE2d 46 ) *677 (1998).

2002Williams v. Worsley, 235 Ga. App. 806, 807 (1) ( 510 SE2d 46 ) *677 (1998).

1998“For a refusal to give a requested charge to be error, the request must be entirely correct, accurate, adjusted to the pleadings, law and evidence, and not otherwise covered in the general charge. [Cit.]” Smith v. Curtis, 226 Ga. App. 470, 471 (2) ( 486 SE2d 699 ) (1997). 2.

1998“For a refusal to give a requested charge to be error, the request must be entirely correct, accurate, adjusted to the pleadings, law and evidence, and not otherwise covered in the general charge. [Cit.]” Smith v. Curtis, 226 Ga. App. 470, 471 (2) ( 486 SE2d 699 ) (1997). 2.

1998See, e.g., Maddox v. State, 136 Ga.App. 370 (4), 221 S.E.2d 231 (1975), where the defendant's own testimony and evidence that a car similar to the defendant's was seen in town before and after the crime, were sufficient to corroborate an accomplice's testimony, but the failure to give the requested charge on the requirement of corroboration required a new trial.

1998See, e.g., Maddox v. State, 136 Ga.App. 370 (4), 221 S.E.2d 231 (1975), where the defendant's own testimony and evidence that a car similar to the defendant's was seen in town before and after the crime, were sufficient to corroborate an accomplice's testimony, but the failure to give the requested charge on the requirement of corroboration required a new trial.

1997Salvador v. Coppinger, 198 Ga. App. 386, 388 (1) (b) ( 401 SE2d 590 ) (1991).

1997Salvador v. Coppinger, 198 Ga. App. 386, 388 (1) (b) ( 401 SE2d 590 ) (1991).

1995“It is well settled that the trial court is not obligated to instruct the jury in the exact language requested and that, where the same principle of law is covered in another instruction, failure to give the requested charge is not error.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pierce v. State, 209 Ga. *900 App. 366, 368 (3) ( 433 SE2d 641 ) (1993); Lawson v. State, 214 Ga. App. 464, 465 ( 448 SE2d 14 ) (1994).

1995“It is well settled that the trial court is not obligated to instruct the jury in the exact language requested and that, where the same principle of law is covered in another instruction, failure to give the requested charge is not error.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pierce v. State, 209 Ga. *900 App. 366, 368 (3) ( 433 SE2d 641 ) (1993); Lawson v. State, 214 Ga. App. 464, 465 ( 448 SE2d 14 ) (1994).

1994Webb v. State, 184 Ga. App. 89, 90 (2) ( 360 SE2d 643 ) (1987).

1994Webb v. State, 184 Ga. App. 89, 90 (2) ( 360 SE2d 643 ) (1987).

1993We disagree. “ ‘It is well settled that the trial court is not obligated to instruct the jury in the exact language requested and that, where the same principle of law is covered in another instruction, failure to give the requested charge is not error.’ [Cits.]” Montgomery v. State, 204 Ga. App. 534, 537-538 (6) ( 420 SE2d 67 ) (1992).

1993We disagree. “ ‘It is well settled that the trial court is not obligated to instruct the jury in the exact language requested and that, where the same principle of law is covered in another instruction, failure to give the requested charge is not error.’ [Cits.]” Montgomery v. State, 204 Ga. App. 534, 537-538 (6) ( 420 SE2d 67 ) (1992).

1993See also Johnson v. State, 204 Ga. App. 246, 247 (2) ( 419 SE2d 107 ) (1992).

1993See also Johnson v. State, 204 Ga. App. 246, 247 (2) ( 419 SE2d 107 ) (1992).

1992Ross v. State, 192 Ga. App. 850, 851 (4) ( 386 SE2d 721 ); accord Barton v. State, 188 Ga. App. 237, 238 ( 372 SE2d 647 ). 7.

1992Ross v. State, 192 Ga. App. 850, 851 (4) ( 386 SE2d 721 ); accord Barton v. State, 188 Ga. App. 237, 238 ( 372 SE2d 647 ). 7.

1992Smith v. State, 189 Ga. App. 244, 246 ( 375 SE2d 496 ).