Motley v. Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 232 (Va. Ct. App. 1993). · Go Syfert
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Motley v. Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 232 (Va. Ct. App. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
100 citation events (53 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Marquice Bynum v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 0273121 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2012)
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437 S.E.2d at 233 Burden of proof on appeal for motion to suppress43 citing cases“[However,] [i]t is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes rev…”10 citing courts quote it · passage not found verbatim in the opinion (90%)
  • Marquice Bynum v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 0273121 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2012).unpublished
    “[O]n appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes reversible error”
  • Derrick James Williams v. Commonwealth, No. 0471061 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2007).unpublished
    Williams bears the burden to show “that the denial of [the] motion to suppress constituted reversible error.” Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993). “‘Ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and pr…
  • Metkel Alana, a/k/a Kenneth Foster v. Commonwealth, No. 1602054 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2007).unpublished
    Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Cleveland Waynlee Southers, s/k/a Cleveland Waynelee Southers v. Commonwealth, No. 1434053 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2006).unpublished
    “[the] appellant carries the burden to show . . . that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes reversible error”
  • Eric Michael Jackson v. Commonwealth, No. 2734012 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2002).unpublished
    “It[, however,] is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes rev…”
  • Scott Allan Ingram, s/k/a v. Commonwealth, No. 2232011 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2002).unpublished
    “It[, however,] is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the - 3 - evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitut…”
  • Trevor Tyron Adderly v. Commonwealth, No. 0785011 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2002).unpublished
    Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993). - 5 - Adderly contends that the police acted unlawfully before obtaining his consent and deceived him as to their purpose.
  • Harris v. Commonwealth, 568 S.E.2d 385 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).published
    “It[, however,] is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes rev…”
  • Askew v. Commonwealth, 568 S.E.2d 403 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).published
    Moss v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 219, 223 , 516 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1999) (quoting Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993)). 4 .
  • Sheler v. Commonwealth, 566 S.E.2d 203 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).published 2 cites
    Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
Show 33 more citing cases
  • Calvin Austin Hargrove v. Commonwealth of VA, No. 2084001 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2002).unpublished
    See also White v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 662, 664 , 492 S.E.2d 451, 452 (1997); Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 - 4 - Va. App. 439, 440, 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993); Collins v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 177, 178 , 409 S.E.2d 175, 175 (1991).
  • Davis v. Commonwealth, 559 S.E.2d 374 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).published
    “It[, however,] is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes rev…”
  • Hargraves v. Commonwealth, 557 S.E.2d 737 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).published
    Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010 , 265 S.E.2d 729 , *307 731 (1980); Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Garrison v. Commonwealth, 549 S.E.2d 634 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).published
    “It[, however,] is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes rev…”
  • Purdie v. Commonwealth, 549 S.E.2d 33 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).published
    Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1980); Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Ramey v. Commonwealth, 547 S.E.2d 519 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).published
    “It[, however,] is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes rev…”
  • Keith Lamont Sanders v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 2149001 (Va. Ct. App. June 19, 2001).unpublished
    “It[, however] is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes reve…”
  • Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 543 S.E.2d 623 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).published
    Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Barry Scott Hill v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 0405003 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2001).unpublished 2 cites
    “[However,] [i]t is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. evidence in the light most favora…”
  • Jacob Coles Small v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 1630982 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 1999).unpublished
    WARRANTLESS ENTRY 3 On appeal, it is the defendant's burden to show "that the denial of [the] motion to suppress constitute[d] reversible error." Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Michael Simms, s/k/a Michael Kenneth Simms v. C.W., No. 1477982 (Va. Ct. App. July 13, 1999).unpublished
    To prevail on appeal, defendant “carries the burden to show . . . that the denial of [the] motion . . . constitute[d] reversible error.” Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Moss v. Commonwealth, 516 S.E.2d 246 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).published
    MOTION TO SUPPRESS On appeal, it is the defendant’s burden to show “that the denial of [the] motion to suppress constitute^] reversible error.” Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Williams v. Commonwealth, 496 S.E.2d 113 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).published
    To prevail on appeal, the defendant must “show ... that the denial of [his] motion ... constitute[d] reversible error.” Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Troy Eugene Braxton v. Commonwealth, No. 2006963 (Va. Ct. App. July 15, 1997).unpublished
    (where the police radio dispatch advised officer to be on the lookout for an individual fitting the defendant's description but gave no explanation as to why that individual was sought)
  • Grellan J. Harty v. Commonwealth, No. 0979963 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 1997).unpublished
    See Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010 , 265 S.E.2d 729, 731 , cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980); Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Frank E. Pennington, Jr. v. Commonwealth, No. 1346953 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 1997).unpublished
    To prevail on appeal, the defendant must "show . . . that the denial of [his] motion . . . constitute[d] reversible error." Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Spivey v. Commonwealth, 479 S.E.2d 543 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).published
    To prevail on appeal, the defendant must “show ... that the denial of [his] motion ... constitute^] reversible error.” Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Bynum v. Commonwealth, 477 S.E.2d 750 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).published
    To prevail on appeal, the defendant must “show ... that the denial of [his] motion ... constitute^] reversible error.” Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Commonwealth v. David Wayne Hall, No. 0282963 (Va. Ct. App. July 15, 1996).unpublished
    Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Jermaine Thomas v. Commonwealth, No. 0192952 (Va. Ct. App. July 9, 1996).unpublished
    Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Troy Johnson v. Commonwealth, No. 0613941 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 1995).unpublished
    To prevail on appeal, defendant "carries the burden to show . . . that the denial of [the] motion . . . constitute[d] reversible error." Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Peter Moore v. Commonwealth, No. 0619943 (Va. Ct. App. May 16, 1995).unpublished
    Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Hetmeyer v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 894 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).published 2 cites
    To prevail on appeal, the defendant must "show ... that the denial of [his] motion ... constitue[d] reversible error." Motley v. Commonwealth, ___ Va.App. ___, ___, 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Greene v. Commonwealth, 440 S.E.2d 138 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).published
    To prevail on appeal, the defendant must “show . . . that the denial of [his] motion . . . constitute^] reversible error.” Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Dewayne Thomas Garrison, Sr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 2056113 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2013).unpublished 2 cites
    See Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Darius T. Hicks v. Commonwealth, No. 0430064 (Va. Ct. App. May 1, 2007).unpublished 2 cites
    See Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Roger Keith Holcomb v. Commonwealth, No. 3018043 (Va. Ct. App. June 20, 2006).unpublished 2 cites
    See Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • King v. Commonwealth, 572 S.E.2d 518 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).published 2 cites
    See Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • McLellan v. Commonwealth, 554 S.E.2d 699 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).published 2 cites
    See Shears v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.App. 394, 398 , 477 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1996) (citation omitted). “[0]n appeal, appellant carries the burden to show ... that the denial of a motion to suppress constitute^] reversible error.” Motley v. Commo…
  • Lowe v. Commonwealth, 536 S.E.2d 454 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).published 2 cites
    See Shears v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.App. 394, 398 , 477 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1996) (citation omitted). “[0]n appeal, appellant carries the burden to show ... that the denial of a motion to suppress constitute^] reversible error.” Motley v. Commo…
  • Weathers v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 847 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).published 2 cites
    See Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 439, 440-41 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
  • Steven Lynn Kirby v. Commonwealth, No. 2467931 (Va. Ct. App. June 13, 1995).unpublished
  • Wechsler v. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 744 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).published
17 Va. App. at 439 “it, however, is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes reversible error.”5 citing cases5 citing courts quote it
  • Eric Michael Jackson v. Commonwealth, No. 2734012 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2002).unpublished
    "It[, however,] is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes reversible error." Mot…
  • Harris v. Commonwealth, 568 S.E.2d 385 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).published
    “It[, however,] is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes reversible error.” Mot…
  • Davis v. Commonwealth, 559 S.E.2d 374 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).published
    “It[, however,] is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes reversible error.” Mot…
  • Garrison v. Commonwealth, 549 S.E.2d 634 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).published
    “It[, however,] is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes reversible error.” Mot…
  • Ramey v. Commonwealth, 547 S.E.2d 519 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).published
    “It[, however,] is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes reversible error.” Mot…
437 S.E.2d at 235 cited at this page1 citing case
  • State v. McKeehan, 894 S.W.2d 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).published
    See State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158 , 642 A.2d 401, 409 (1994); Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 439 , 437 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1993); U.S. v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 127 (4th Cir.1991).
17 Va. App. at 440 cited at this page1 citing case
17 Va. App. at 443 holding that seizure occurred when an officer approached defendant, commanded the defendant to “stop” where he was, and the defendant complied with the command1 citing case1 citing court put it this way
  • Victor Andres Zelaya v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 1987194 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2020).unpublished
    (holding that seizure occurred when an officer approached defendant, commanded the defendant to “stop” where he was, and the defendant complied with the command)
Quoted next to this citation, but not language from this opinion
“[0]n appeal, appellant carries the burden to show ... that the denial of a motion to suppress constitute^] reversible error”quoted beside the cite; not in this opinion · 2 citing cases listed
  • McLellan v. Commonwealth, 554 S.E.2d 699 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).published 2 cites
    “[0]n appeal, appellant carries the burden to show ... that the denial of a motion to suppress constitute^] reversible error”
  • Lowe v. Commonwealth, 536 S.E.2d 454 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).published 2 cites
    “[0]n appeal, appellant carries the burden to show ... that the denial of a motion to suppress constitute^] reversible error”
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Raleigh Deon Motley
v.
Commonwealth of Virginia
Record No. 0966-92-3.
Court of Appeals of Virginia.
Nov 23, 1993.
Published opinion
437 S.E.2d 232
1993 Va. App. LEXIS 556
Counsel, Maureen L. White, Assistant Public Defender (Lynchburg Public Defender’s Office, on briefs), for appellant., Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General (Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Fitzpatrick.
Cited by 50 opinions  |  Published
Pinpoint authority: bottom 62%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Virginia (1)

Opinion

FITZPATRICK, J.

Raleigh Deon Motley (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial of possession of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the cocaine he discarded, because it was obtained as the result of an illegal seizure. We agree and reverse the conviction.

On January 21, 1992, Officer J.T. Lloyd of the City of Lynchburg Police Department was on duty and a passenger in a marked police cruiser. At approximately 9:00 p.m., the police radio dispatcher advised Lloyd to be on the lookout for “[a] black male with a yellow hat and black Kings coat.” There is no explanation in the record as to why this individual was sought by the police. Four or five minutes after Lloyd received this information, he saw appellant, who fit the description, walking along a street toward his police cruiser. The cruiser moved slowly toward appellant and stopped approximately ten feet from him. Lloyd then “bailfed] out of the car” and yelled at appellant to “stop.” Appellant halted and, “about the same time,” dropped an object on the ground, which was later determined to be cocaine.

Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress the cocaine seized by Lloyd, because the officer had no reasonable suspicion to make the initial stop. The Commonwealth failed to provide any explanation of the basis of the police broadcast or in what criminal activity the described individual was allegedly engaged. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial judge stated:

I think it’s an extremely close case. In this instance, I’m going to find that the officer had no probable cause to arrest and he had no reasonable and articulable suspicion as he stopped the car, but as he approached the individual and told him to stop, he got out of his car and told him to stop, and simultaneously he dropped the white object that appeared to be cocaine to the officer, he had at that point authority to seize him and that’s what happened. I’m going to overrule your motion.

It is well established that, on appeal, appellant carries the burden to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of a motion to suppress constitutes[*441] reversible error. Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980). The mere broadcast by the police to be on the lookout for an individual, without more, does not provide a patrol officer receiving such broadcast articulable and reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. See Waugh v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 620, 621-22, 405 S.E.2d 429, 429 (1991); Bulatko v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 135, 137, 428 S.E.2d 306, 307 (1993). Therefore, because there was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing explaining the reason for the police broadcast, the source or reliability of the information received, or any corroboration by the arresting officer, we conclude that the trial court properly found that the officer had no basis to conduct a Terry stop. [1]

The determinative issue presented by this case is whether the “bail out” from the police cruiser approximately ten feet from appellant and the simultaneous command by Officer Lloyd to “stop” constituted a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The evidence shows that the officer intended to curtail the possibility of appellant’s flight. In response to the question by the court: “Why did you say stop?” Officer Lloyd replied: “a lot of times people take off running; it was just in sting [sic].”

[A] person is “seized” only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but “to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.” As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification.
We conclude that a person has been “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would[*442] have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might he compelled.

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980) (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted).

Generally, where an individual has submitted to a police officer’s command, the test to determine whether a seizure has occurred is whether “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (citations omitted). The Commonwealth erroneously relies on California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) and Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 191, 413 S.E.2d 645 (1992), for the proposition that Officer Lloyd’s conduct and command to appellant to “stop” did not constitute a “seizure.” These cases, however, are distinguishable from the case at bar.

In Hodari D., a police officer attempted to stop and question the defendant without reasonable suspicion. The defendant reacted to the police encounter by fleeing and, during his flight, he discarded evidence. This evidence was admissible because the defendant abandoned the evidence prior to being seized by the police. The United States Supreme Court held that because the defendant did not submit to the officer’s “show of authority” he was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. “Thus, the issue in Hodari D. was not what a reasonable person would have assumed under the circumstances, but what the accused actually did in response to the police officer’s show of authority.” Woodson v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 401, 405, 429 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993). In the case at bar, the evidence shows that appellant complied with the officer’s command and made no attempt to flee. Accordingly, the Hodari D. analysis is inapplicable.

In Baldwin, a police officer responded to a radio call regarding a possible drunk in public. The officer pulled into a parking lot and stopped his police cruiser fifteen feet from the defendant. The officer then “ ‘got out of [the] car and went to them.’ He acknowledged that ‘maybe [he] did call towards - call for them’ as they were ‘walking[*443] back towards apartments.”’ Baldwin, 243 Va. at 193-94, 413 S.E.2d at 646. In concluding that the initial encounter did not constitute a seizure, the Supreme Court of Virginia, relying on the standard set forth in Mendenhall, found “no evidence of. . . ‘the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.’” Id. at 199, 413 S.E.2d at 649 (quoting Mendenhall, 466 U.S. at 554). In the case at bar, the officer’s conduct and command was intended to prevent appellant from leaving. Cf. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 576 n.7 (“goal of ‘chase’ was not to capture respondent”). Officer Lloyd described the purpose of his conduct as follows:

The whole idea is to act as normal as you can so don’t anybody think anything and at the last minute, you bail out of the car.
For the fact a lot of times people take off running; it was just in sting [sic].

From the evidence before us, we find that when the officer “bailfed] out” of his police cruiser approximately ten feet from appellant and yelled at him to “stop,” and appellant complied with the officer’s command, a seizure occurred. There is no dispute that, at the moment the officer left his vehicle, he had neither probable cause to arrest appellant nor reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. Accordingly, the seizure effected by the officer’s conduct and command violated appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights and the evidence discarded “around the same time” or “simultaneously” with the unlawful seizure is inadmissible.

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, if the Commonwealth be so advised.

Reversed and remanded.

Koontz, I, and Elder, X, concurred.

1

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).