Jackson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 768 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · Go Syfert
Jackson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 768 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
57 citation events (57 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Stewart v. State (ga, 2016-09-12)
Treatment trajectory · 2003 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2003 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stewart v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. · 2016 · confidence medium
A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he uses a deadly weapon to commit an act which places another [person] in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury Whether a victim has been placed in reasonable apprehension of injury is a question of fact, which may be established by indirect or circumstantial evidence. . . . [T]he presence of a deadly weapon “would normally place a victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently” Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 579 ( 554 SE2d 768 ) (2001) (footnotes omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Santiago v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
While the state may prove a victim’s reasonable apprehension by circumstantial evidence, Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 579 (1) ( 554 SE2d 768 ) (2001), speculation alone does not satisfy the sufficiency standard.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Furthermore, the mere “presence of a deadly weapon would normally place a victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 579 (1) ( 554 SE2d 768 ) (2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Atwell v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Kelley, District Attorney, Jan Kennedy, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 Dukes v. State, 285 Ga. App. 172, 173 (1) ( 645 SE2d 664 ) (2007), citing Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 579 (1) ( 554 SE2d 768 ) (2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carder v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
“A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he uses a deadly weapon to commit an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” (Footnote omitted.) Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 579 (1) ( 554 SE2d 768 ) (2001).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Defrancisco v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 579-580 (1) ( 554 SE2d 768 ) (2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
“A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he uses a deadly weapon to commit an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 579 (1) (554 SE2d *117 768) (2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moore v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
In addition, this Court has repeatedly found that the presence of a deadly weapon “would normally place a victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 579 (1) ( 554 SE2d 768 ) (2001) (evidence was sufficient to show the victims experienced a reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury when the defendant pointed a gun at them, even though only one of the three victims testified that he was afraid). 3 Moreover, a jury could find that a victim experienced a reasonable apprehension of receiving …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dukes v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Johnson, P. J., and Phipps, J., concur. 1 (Citations and footnotes omitted.) Anthony v. State, 276 Ga. App. 107 (1) ( 622 SE2d 450 ) (2005). 2 (Footnotes omitted.) Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 579 (1) ( 554 SE2d 768 ) (2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hicks v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Martin, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 Neal v. State, 271 Ga. App. 283, 285 (1) ( 609 SE2d 204 ) (2005) (citation omitted). 2 See Lovelace v. State, 269 Ga. App. 272, 273 (1) ( 603 SE2d 784 ) (2004). 3 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 4 505 U. S. 42 (112 SC 2348, 120 LE2d 33) (1992). 5 Id. at 59 . 6 Id. 7 See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S. 765, 767 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). 8 See id. at 768 . 9 White v. State, 257 Ga. App. 723, 725 (2) ( 572 SE2d 70 ) (2002). 10 See Lingo v. State, 263 Ga. 664, 665 (1) (a) ( 437 SE2d 463 ) (1993) (overwhe…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anthony v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Miller and Bernes, JJ., concur. 1 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 2 Escutia v. State, 277 Ga. 400, 402 (2) ( 589 SE2d 66 ) (2003). 3 Lawrence could not be located and was not therefore subpoenaed to testify at trial. 4 OCGA§ 16-5-21 (a) (2). 5 Smiley v. State, 263 Ga. 716, 717 (2) ( 438 SE2d 75 ) (1994). 6 OCGA § 16-5-20 (a). 7 Love v. State, 268 Ga. 484, 485 (1) ( 490 SE2d 88 ) (1997). 8 Lemming v. State, 272 Ga. App. 122, 125 (1) ( 612 SE2d 495 ) (2005). 9 Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 579 (1) ( 554 SE2d 768 ) (2001). 10 Hayes v. St…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cornelius v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
See also North Carolina v. Alford, supra at 38, n. 11; Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 580 (2) ( 554 SE2d 768 ) (2001).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Lemming v. State (6×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Although I concur fully with the majority opinion, I write separately to set forth an additional reason why I believe there was sufficient evidence authorizing the jury to conclude that Steve John Lemming placed Waffle House cook, Darryl Finley, in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. [31] "Whether a victim has been placed in reasonable apprehension of injury is a question of fact, which may be established by indirect or circumstantial evidence." (Footnote omitted.) Jackson v. State, 251 Ga.App. 578, 579 (1), 554 S.E.2d 768 (2001). "[P]roof that the victim has bee…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gordian v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Her “testimony that [she] was fear *77 ful, coupled with testimony that [Gordian] pointed the gun at each of the victims, was sufficient for a factfinder to find that [both] victims had a reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” (Footnote omitted.) Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 579 (1) ( 554 SE2d 768 ) (2001).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Jason Edwin Wilkerson (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 579 (1) ( 554 SE2d 768 ) (2001) (sufficient evidence where gun pointed at all three victims, but only one victim testified that he was afraid he would be shot).
discussed Cited "see" The State v. Wilkerson. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Jackson v. State , 251 Ga.App. 578 , 579 (1), 554 S.E.2d 768 (2001) (sufficient evidence *66 where gun pointed at all three victims, but only one victim testified that he was afraid he would be shot).
discussed Cited "see" Turley v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq. 10 See Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 580 (2) ( 554 SE2d 768 ) (2001); Alford, supra at 38, n. 11 (court’s holding that a trial court may, in appropriate circumstances, accept a guilty plea despite the defendant’s claim of innocence “does not mean that a trial judge must accept every constitutionally valid guilty plea merely because a defendant wishes so to plead”). 11 Indeed, we find this situation analogous to an attorney’s failure to inform his client of parole eligibility, which provides no basis for an ineffective assistance claim.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jackson
v.
the State
A01A2036.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Sep 17, 2001.
554 S.E.2d 768
2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 1082
Schoolcraft & Watkins, Stanley W. Schoolcraft III, for appellant., Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Jay M. Jackson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Ellington, Johnson, Ruffin.
Cited by 22 opinions  |  Published
Johnson, Presiding Judge.

Following a bench trial, Tyrus Trenton Jackson was convicted of three counts of aggravated assault, one count of giving a false name, and one count of giving a false date of birth. He appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated assault, the trial court erred in not accepting his guilty plea, and the trial court erred in allowing hearsay evidence. Because each of these enumerations of error lacks merit, we affirm Jackson’s convictions.

1. On appeal, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict, and Jackson no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence; moreover, the appellate court merely determines evidence sufficiency and does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility.* [1] As long as there is some competent[*579] evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the state’s case, the verdict will be upheld. [2]

Viewed in this light, the record shows that the victims, Marvin Sparks, Ledarian Craig, Kendrell Bryant, and Tristen Fairley, went to a bowling alley. Jackson and his girlfriend were at the same bowling alley. Jackson and the victims exchanged looks (referred to as “mugging”), but no words. It is undisputed that the victims never approached Jackson or made any type of gesture toward Jackson.

As the victims attempted to leave the bowling alley, Jackson ran toward them with a loaded gun. Jackson pointed his gun at Fairley as he ran past him. He trapped Sparks and Bryant in the entranceway, pointed the gun at them, and waved the gun around. Jackson called the victims “young punks” and told them, “y’all don’t want none of this.” He also said, “what /all need to mug me for?” Sparks testified that he was fearful that he would be shot because of Jackson’s actions.

As Jackson was leaving the bowling alley, he fired his gun into the air three times. He admitted he was angry and that he shot his gun out of anger. Jackson claims he only had the gun at his side during the confrontation with the victims and that he did not point the gun at any of the victims.

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he uses a deadly weapon to commit an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. [3] Whether a victim has been placed in reasonable apprehension of injury is a question of fact, which may be established by indirect or circumstantial evidence. [4] Intent to injure is not an element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. [5]

The evidence showed that Jackson pointed his gun at Sparks, Bryant, and Fairley. Although only Sparks testified that he was fearful he would be shot, the factfinder properly found evidence as to Bryant’s and Fairley’s state of mind. Sparks’ testimony that he was fearful, coupled with testimony that Jackson pointed the gun at each of the victims, was sufficient for a factfinder to find that all three victims had a reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. [6] Further, the presence of a deadly weapon “would normally place a victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently.” [7] Jackson’s remaining contentions go to the credibility of[*580] the witnesses, which was an issue for the factfinder and not for us to decide on appeal. The evidence was sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia 8 for a reasonable trier of fact to find Jackson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault on all three victims.

Decided September 17, 2001.

2. Jackson contends the trial court erred in refusing to accept his November 15,1999 guilty plea. However, it is within the discretion of the trial court to accept or reject a guilty plea. [9] A defendant is not entitled to have a guilty plea entered as a matter of right. [10]

Here, the trial court asked Jackson whether he believed a jury would find him guilty based on the state’s evidence, and Jackson responded, “no, sir.” Based on this response, the trial court refused to accept his guilty plea under North Carolina v. Alford.* 11 Because the record reveals Jackson’s ambivalence concerning his plea, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept his guilty plea. [12]

Moreover, the record further reveals that Jackson was given the opportunity two days later to enter an Alford plea and receive first offender status before his trial began. However, he declined the plef offer and elected to go forward with the bench trial. This enumeration of error lacks merit. ’

3. Jackson asserts the trial court committed reversible erro, when it allowed Craig to testify as to what Fairley said to him aboifJackson pointing his gun at Fairley. We disagree. -

The record shows that Fairley testified at trial that Jackso' pointed the gun at him. During his questioning of Craig, Jackson counsel elicited testimony that Craig was standing next to Fairle, and did not see Jackson point the gun at Fairley. This line of questioning put Fairley’s veracity into issue. Thus, the trial court did not err in permitting the state to question Craig about Fairley’s previous consistent statement to him that Jackson had pointed the gun at Fairley. [13] Moreover, we presume that a trial court in a bench trial considers only admissible evidence. [14] We find no error.

Judgment affirmed.

Ruffin and Ellington, JJ., concur. [*581] Schoolcraft & Watkins, Stanley W. Schoolcraft III, for appellant. Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Jay M. Jackson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
1

Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185 (2) (549 SE2d 406) (2001).

4

See In the Interest of K. D. J., 246 Ga. App. 500, 503 (4) (540 SE2d 682) (2000); Williams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 12, 13 (430 SE2d 157) (1993).

6

Cockrell v. State, 248 Ga. App. 359, 361 (1) (b) (545 SE2d 600) (2001).

7

State v. Bolman, 222 Ga. App. 534, 535 (474 SE2d 721) (1996).

8

443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

9

Mims v. State, 201 Ga. App. 277, 278 (1) (410 SE2d 824) (1991), overruled on other grounds, Hooten v. State, 212 Ga. App. 770, 775 (1) (442 SE2d 836) (1994).

10

Harris v. State, 175 Ga. App. 134, 135 (332 SE2d 685) (1985).

11

400 U. S. 25 (91 SC 160, 27 LE2d 162) (1970).

12

See Bowen v. State, 191 Ga. App. 760 (382 SE2d 694) (1989).

13

See Cuzzort v. State, 254 Ga. 745 (334 SE2d 661) (1985).

14

Corsini v. State, 238 Ga. App. 383, 385 (2) (519 SE2d 39) (1999).