green
Positive treatment
Issue: mens rea requirementCA ↗
Issue: personal-infliction requirementCA ↗
Issue: mental defenseCA ↗
Issue: criminal negligence standardCA ↗
Quoted verbatim 1×
12.1 score
G Cite
cited 2× by 1 distinct case ·
…numerous cases have held that whether the force used by the defendant was likely to produce great bodily injury is a question for the trier of fact to decide.
at p. 419
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996
2011
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
State v. Martinez
(3×)
also: Cited as authority (quoted), Cited as authority (rule)
numerous cases have held that whether the force used by the defendant was likely to produce great bodily injury is a question for the trier of fact to decide.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hector Ramirez v. Loretta E. Lynch
For example, the statute criminalizes conduct that “permits any child to suffer,” “permits the person or health of that child to be injured,” and “permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or health is endangered.” California case law confirms that section 273a(a) is an “omnibus statute,” meaning that a violation “can occur in a wide variety of situations: the definition broadly includes both active and passive conduct, i.e., child abuse by direct assault and child endangering by extreme neglect.” People v. Sargent, 19 Cal.4th 1206 , 81 Cal.Rptr…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Rubalcava
In any event, were I to attempt to determine section 12020's mental element, I would altogether avoid any invocation of "general intent" and "specific intent." [1] "For such notions do not assist in performing the task at hand, which is to explicate section 12020. ( People v. Sargent, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1228, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 , 970 P.2d 409 (cone. opn. of Mosk, J.).) "`General intent' and `specific intent' `evolved as labels to identify' particular offenses, with `specific intent' `admitting ... the defense of voluntary intoxication' and `general intent' not doing so. [Citations.] `Gene…
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Cody Sellers
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See, i.e., People v. Sargent, 970 P.2d 409, 419 (Cal. 1999).
examined
Cited "see"
State v. Cody Sellers
(4×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See, i.e., People v. Sargent, 19 Cal.4th 1206 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 , 970 P.2d 409, 419 (1999).
discussed
Cited "see"
Stringfield v. Superior Court
(2×)
See Sargent, 19 Cal.4th at 1222-23 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 , 970 P.2d 409 .
examined
Cited "see"
State of Arizona v. Christopher Mathew Payne
(3×)
See People v. Sargent, 19 Cal.4th 1206 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 , 970 P.2d 409, 418 (1999) (California’s circumstances clause “does not provide that a defendant must ‘know or reasonably should know that his or her actions occur under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death.’ ” (quoting Cal.Penal Code § 273a)); cf. Williams v. State, 100 Md.App. 468 , 641 A2d 990, 992-93 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1994) (whether circumstances in reckless endangerment are likely to result in serious physical injury or death is an objective inquiry). “[CJireumstances likely to produ…
discussed
Cited "see"
State of Arizona v. Christopher Mathew Payne
(2×)
See People v. Sargent, 19 Cal.4th 1206 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 , 970 P.2d 409, 418 (1999) (California’s circumstances clause “does not provide that a defendant must ‘know or reasonably should know that his or her actions occur under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death.’ ” (quoting Cal.Penal Code § 273a)); cf. Williams v. State, 100 Md.App. 468 , 641 A.2d 990, 992-93 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1994) (whether circumstances in reckless endangerment are likely to result in serious physical injury or death is an objective inquiry). “[Circumstances likely to produ…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Heath
(2×)
In this respect, the . . . statute resembles other . . . criminal laws, which provide enhanced penalties ... for obviously antisocial conduct upon proof of a fact of which the defendant need not be aware.’ ” (Meza, at p. 1748, *496 quoting United States v. Falu (2d Cir. 1985) 776 F.2d 46, 50 ; accord, People v. Price (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1183, 1192-1194 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 282 ], overruled on other grounds in Meza, at p. 1748; U.S. v. Klein (9th Cir. 1988) 860 F.2d 1489, 1494-1495 , overruled on other grounds in U.S. v. Nordby (9th Cir. 2000) 225 F.3d 1053, 1059 ; see People v. Sargent (1999)…
examined
Cited "see"
People v. Valdez
(10×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
"Criminal negligence is `"aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless, that is, ... such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful [person] under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life.( Sargent, supra, 19 Cal.4th at page 1215 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 , 970 P.2d 409 , quoting People v. Penny (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879 , 285 P.2d 926 .) [16] Peabody, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at page 46 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 780 . [17] Peabody, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at page 46 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 780 . [18] Peabody, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at page 46 , 119 Cal…
examined
Cited "see"
People v. Atkins
(6×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
"General intent" and "specific intent" have "evolved as labels to identify" particular crimes, with "specific intent" crimes allowing the admission of evidence of voluntary intoxication to disprove the required mental element and "general intent" crimes not doing so. ( People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1228 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 , 970 P.2d 409 (cone. opn. of Mosk, J.); accord, People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 83 , 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 (cone. opn. of Mosk, J.); People v. Hood supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 455-457, 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ; see People v. Whitfield (1994)…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Campbell
(2×)
(People v. Thurston, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054 ; see People v. Atkins (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 348, 358 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 855 ].) For example, the statute prohibiting the infliction of corporal injury on a child (§ 273d) uses almost identical language to section 273.5, and the courts have “consistently held that this offense is a general intent crime requiring only that the assailant have ‘purpose or willingness to commit the act,’ not the specific intent to inflict the traumatic injury.” (People v. Thurston, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054 , italics added; see People v. Sargent (19…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Campbell
(2×)
A California Court of Appeal recently rejected this identical contention. ( People v. Thurston (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1050 , 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 221 .) Thurston reasoned the Legislature's use of the term "willful" in section 273.5, subdivision (a) brings the crime under the general rule that "statutes proscribing willful behavior are general intent crimes." (Id. at p. 1055, 84 Cal. Rptr.2d 221 ; see also People v. Johnson (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 67, 72 , 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 795 .) The court explained that while this rule has exceptions, section 273.5 is not one of them because it "uses no other language o…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Atkins
(2×)
It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.” “[T]he terms ‘willful’ or ‘willfully,’ when applied in a penal statute, require only that the illegal act or omission occur ‘intentionally,’ without regard to motive or ignorance of the act’s prohibited character." (Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 396 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 375 , 584 P.2d 512 ] and cases cited therein.) “Willfully implies no evil intent; ‘ “it implies that the person knows what he is doing, intends to do what he is doing and is a free agent.” [Citation.]�…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
LOS CARNEROS COMMUNITY ASSOCIATES et al., Appellants,
v.
PENFIELD & SMITH ENGINEERS, INC. et al., Respondents
v.
PENFIELD & SMITH ENGINEERS, INC. et al., Respondents
S072581.
California Supreme Court.
Jan 13, 1999.
970 P.2d 409
99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 443
1999 Cal. LEXIS 22
Pursuant to the notice of settlement and request for dismissal submitted by all parties, review is DISMISSED and cause is remanded to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.4(c).)
GEORGE, C.J., MOSK, J., KENNARD, J., BAXTER, J., WERDEGAR, J., CHIN, J., BROWN, J., concur.