personal-infliction requirement (California) · Go Syfert
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personal-infliction requirement in California

6 California opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Modirigreen
cal · 2006 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2014
2 sentences

2014(People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 579 (Cole).) The enhancement does not apply to those who assist someone else in producing injury, and who do not personally and directly inflict it themselves, such as by blocking the victim’s escape or directing the attack. ( Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 570-571.) In People v. Modiri (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481 (Modiri), our Supreme Court addressed whether the group beating instruction in CALJIC No. 17.20, the predecessor to CALCRIM No. 3160, satisfied the personal infliction requirement in section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8).2 The relevant part of CALJIC No. 1

2007The issue presented in Modiri was whether the group beating instruction in CALJIC No. 17.20 satisfied the personal infliction requirement in section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). 2 The relevant part of CALJIC No. 17.20 given at that defendant’s trial is as follows: “ ‘When a person participates in a group beating and it is not possible to determine which assailant inflicted a particular injury, he or she may be found to have personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim if . . . the application of unlawful physical force upon the victim was of such a nature that, by itself, it could h

22
People v. Colegreen
cal · 1982 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2014
2 sentences

2014(People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 579 (Cole).) The enhancement does not apply to those who assist someone else in producing injury, and who do not personally and directly inflict it themselves, such as by blocking the victim’s escape or directing the attack. ( Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 570-571.) In People v. Modiri (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481 (Modiri), our Supreme Court addressed whether the group beating instruction in CALJIC No. 17.20, the predecessor to CALCRIM No. 3160, satisfied the personal infliction requirement in section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8).2 The relevant part of CALJIC No. 1

2014(People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 579 (Cole).) The enhancement does not apply to those who assist someone else in producing injury, and who do not personally and directly inflict it themselves, such as by blocking the victim’s escape or directing the attack. ( Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 570-571.) In People v. Modiri (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481 (Modiri), our Supreme Court addressed whether the group beating instruction in CALJIC No. 17.20, the predecessor to CALCRIM No. 3160, satisfied the personal infliction requirement in section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8).2 The relevant part of CALJIC No. 1

12
People v. Newmangreen
calctapp · 2016 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017The disqualifying factor speaks to the intent to inflict great bodily injury, not the personal infliction of great bodily injury as required by section 12022.7, subdivision (a). (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii); see Newman, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 725 .) Thus, the plain language of the Act does not contain a personal infliction requirement. “ ‘We presume the [electorate] intended everything in a statutory scheme, and we do not read statutes to omit expressed language or to include omitted language. [Citation.] When “ ‘ “ ‘a statute on a particular subject omits a

11
People v. Guilfordgreen
calctapp · 2014 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017The disqualifying factor speaks to the intent to inflict great bodily injury, not the personal infliction of great bodily injury as required by section 12022.7, subdivision (a). (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii); see Newman, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 725 .) Thus, the plain language of the Act does not contain a personal infliction requirement. “ ‘We presume the [electorate] intended everything in a statutory scheme, and we do not read statutes to omit expressed language or to include omitted language. [Citation.] When “ ‘ “ ‘a statute on a particular subject omits a

11
People v. DUNKERSONgreen
calctapp · 2007 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014(Dunkerson).) The court recognized that while Modiri involved personal infliction of great bodily injury under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8), the Supreme Court “applied its holding equally to the personal infliction requirement under section 12022.7.” (Dunkerson, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1417, fn. 2 .) The court observed that CALJIC No. 17.20 in Modiri and CALCRIM No. 31603 “each provide the jury with the same guidance, allowing the jury to find that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury during a group assault where it is impossible to determine which person caused wh

2014(Dunkerson).) The court recognized that while Modiri involved personal infliction of great bodily injury under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8), the Supreme Court “applied its holding equally to the personal infliction requirement under section 12022.7.” (Dunkerson, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1417, fn. 2 .) The court observed that CALJIC No. 17.20 in Modiri and CALCRIM No. 31603 “each provide the jury with the same guidance, allowing the jury to find that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury during a group assault where it is impossible to determine which person caused wh

11
People v. Sargentgreen
cal · 1999 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006Moreover, we have said that section 1192.7(c)(8) simply requires an intent to do the act the statute proscribes. ( People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1222 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 , 970 P.2d 409 [describing § 1192.7(c)(8) as "general intent" statute], citing People v. Gonzales, supra, 29 Cal. App.4th 1684, 1695-1698 , 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 450 .) [11] Instead of supplanting the personal-infliction requirement, the reference to what the defendant knew or should have known during the attack arguably imposes an additional evidentiary burden on the prosecution.

2006(People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1222 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 , 970 P.2d 409 ] [describing § 1192.7(c)(8) as “general intent” statute], citing People v. Gonzales, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1695-1698 .) 11 Instead of supplanting the personal-infliction requirement, the reference to what the defendant knew or should have known during the attack arguably imposes an additional evidentiary burden on the prosecution.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Slough green
calctapp · 2017
1 sentence

2021In determining whether the personal infliction requirement is satisfied, the key inquiry is whether “the furnishing was akin to administering.” (Slough, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 425 .) When a defendant administers the drugs without the victim’s consent, the defendant has participated in the injury-causing act and thus may be held liable for personal infliction of the overdose.

12021–2021
People v. Guiton green
cal · 1993
1 sentence

2015He also argues the exception is only applicable if, based on the evidence, the jury would be unable to (continued) 12 error to give an instruction which, while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case” (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129 ), “giving an irrelevant or inapplicable instruction is generally ‘ “only a technical error which does not constitute ground for reversal.” ’ ” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67 .) In this case, CALCRIM No. 3160 itself specifies that the jury can follow the instruction only if it is unable to determine

12015–2015
People v. Cross green
cal · 2008
1 sentence

2015He also argues the exception is only applicable if, based on the evidence, the jury would be unable to (continued) 12 error to give an instruction which, while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case” (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129 ), “giving an irrelevant or inapplicable instruction is generally ‘ “only a technical error which does not constitute ground for reversal.” ’ ” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67 .) In this case, CALCRIM No. 3160 itself specifies that the jury can follow the instruction only if it is unable to determine

12015–2015
Los Carneros Community Associates v. Penfield & Smith Engineers Inc. green
cal · 1999
2 sentences

2006Moreover, we have said that section 1192.7(c)(8) simply requires an intent to do the act the statute proscribes. ( People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1222 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 , 970 P.2d 409 [describing § 1192.7(c)(8) as "general intent" statute], citing People v. Gonzales, supra, 29 Cal. App.4th 1684, 1695-1698 , 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 450 .) [11] Instead of supplanting the personal-infliction requirement, the reference to what the defendant knew or should have known during the attack arguably imposes an additional evidentiary burden on the prosecution.

2006Moreover, we have said that section 1192.7(c)(8) simply requires an intent to do the act the statute proscribes. ( People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1222 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 , 970 P.2d 409 [describing § 1192.7(c)(8) as "general intent" statute], citing People v. Gonzales, supra, 29 Cal. App.4th 1684, 1695-1698 , 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 450 .) [11] Instead of supplanting the personal-infliction requirement, the reference to what the defendant knew or should have known during the attack arguably imposes an additional evidentiary burden on the prosecution.

12006–2006
People v. Gonzales green
calctapp · 1994
2 sentences

2006Moreover, we have said that section 1192.7(c)(8) simply requires an intent to do the act the statute proscribes. ( People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1222 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 , 970 P.2d 409 [describing § 1192.7(c)(8) as "general intent" statute], citing People v. Gonzales, supra, 29 Cal. App.4th 1684, 1695-1698 , 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 450 .) [11] Instead of supplanting the personal-infliction requirement, the reference to what the defendant knew or should have known during the attack arguably imposes an additional evidentiary burden on the prosecution.

2006Moreover, we have said that section 1192.7(c)(8) simply requires an intent to do the act the statute proscribes. ( People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1222 , 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 , 970 P.2d 409 [describing § 1192.7(c)(8) as "general intent" statute], citing People v. Gonzales, supra, 29 Cal. App.4th 1684, 1695-1698 , 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 450 .) [11] Instead of supplanting the personal-infliction requirement, the reference to what the defendant knew or should have known during the attack arguably imposes an additional evidentiary burden on the prosecution.

12006–2006
People v. Dominick green
calctapp · 1986
2 sentences

2006The issue presented is whether the group beating theories in CALJIC No. 17.20 satisfy the personal-infliction requirement of section 1192.7(c)(8), as construed in Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d 568 , 183 Cal.Rptr. 350 , 645 P.2d 1182 , and applied in Corona, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 589 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 765 , and Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d 1174 , 227 Cal.Rptr. 849 .

2006The issue presented is whether the group beating theories in CALJIC No. 17.20 satisfy the personal-infliction requirement of section 1192.7(c)(8), as construed in Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d 568 , 183 Cal.Rptr. 350 , 645 P.2d 1182 , and applied in Corona, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 589 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 765 , and Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d 1174 , 227 Cal.Rptr. 849 .

12006–2006
People v. Corona green
calctapp · 1989
2 sentences

2006The issue presented is whether the group beating theories in CALJIC No. 17.20 satisfy the personal-infliction requirement of section 1192.7(c)(8), as construed in Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d 568 , 183 Cal.Rptr. 350 , 645 P.2d 1182 , and applied in Corona, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 589 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 765 , and Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d 1174 , 227 Cal.Rptr. 849 .

2006The issue presented is whether the group beating theories in CALJIC No. 17.20 satisfy the personal-infliction requirement of section 1192.7(c)(8), as construed in Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d 568 , 183 Cal.Rptr. 350 , 645 P.2d 1182 , and applied in Corona, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 589 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 765 , and Dominick, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d 1174 , 227 Cal.Rptr. 849 .

12006–2006

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