Briscoe v. State, 431 S.E.2d 375 (Ga. 1993). · Go Syfert
Briscoe v. State, 431 S.E.2d 375 (Ga. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
24 citation events (18 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Coe v. State (ga, 2001-10-01)
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Coe v. State
Ga. · 2001 · confidence medium
Count one was felony murder with the armed robbery of Morris as the underlying felony, and count two was felony murder predicated on the aggravated assault of Morris. 5 See Ritter v. State, 272 Ga. 551, 554 ( 532 SE2d 692 ) (2000). 6 See, e.g., Pace v. State, 274 Ga. 69, 71 ( 548 SE2d 307 ) (2001); Briscoe v. State, 263 Ga. 310, 310-311 ( 431 SE2d 375 ) (1993); Thompson v. State, 263 Ga. 23, 25-26 ( 426 SE2d 895 ) (1993). 7 Enumeration two involves the trial court’s denying Coe’s motion for directed verdict, which the Court addressed in division one, and enumeration four raises the double-…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Woodall v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2014 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Briscoe v. State, 263 Ga. 310 (2) ( 431 SE2d 375 ) (1993) (where it was unclear which of two felonies — aggravated *634 assault or armed robbery — was the underlying felony for a felony murder conviction, the trial court was required to merge the armed robbery conviction and sentence appellant for aggravated assault which carried a lesser penalty).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Harris v. State (4×)
Ga. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Briscoe v. State, 263 Ga. 310 (2), 431 S.E.2d 375 (1993).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Linson v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Briscoe v. State, 263 Ga. 310, 311 (2) ( 431 SE2d 375 ) (1993); Thompson v. State, 263 Ga. 23, 26 (2) ( 426 SE2d 895 ) (1993).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Briscoe
v.
the State
S93A1097.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jul 15, 1993.
431 S.E.2d 375
1993 Ga. LEXIS 527
Steven J. Jackson, for appellant., Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, William W. Fincher III, Barry I. Mortge, Assistant District Attorneys, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew P. Stone, Staff Attorney, for appellee.
Hunstein.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
Hunstein, Justice.

Michael Clinton Briscoe was convicted of two counts of felony murder, two counts of armed robbery, and four counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Briscoe to two consecutive life imprisonments for the felony murder convictions and additional concurrent sentences on the remaining convictions which had not merged. [1]

1. Viewed to support the verdict, the evidence at trial established that appellant and a co-defendant, armed with assault rifles, approached four men at an apartment complex in Atlanta. The four men were forced to lie on the ground where they were robbed and then shot. Two victims were killed and two survived. Appellant was identified by the two surviving victims and by a witness who observed the incident from a nearby laundry room. The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Appellant contends that the armed robbery conviction in Count 3 should also merge with the felony murder conviction. The jury charge and the verdict form both failed to specify whether the armed robbery or the aggravated assault served as the underlying felony. See Dennis v. State, 263 Ga. 257 (430 SE2d 742) (1993). In an instance “where it is unclear which of two or more felonies is the underlying felony for a felony murder conviction, the trial court must merge the most severe (in terms of potential punishment).” Thompson v. State, 263 Ga. 23, 25 (426 SE2d 895) (1993). Inasmuch as the armed robbery is the more severe in terms of potential punishment, [2][*311] that offense rather than the aggravated assault must merge with the felony murder conviction. Accordingly, the trial court is hereby ordered to vacate the sentence for armed robbery and merge the conviction with the felony murder conviction; the conviction for aggravated assault which had been merged by the trial court is hereby reinstated with direction that the trial court impose sentence thereon.

Decided July 15, 1993. Steven J. Jackson, for appellant. Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, William W. Fincher III, Barry I. Mortge, Assistant District Attorneys, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew P. Stone, Staff Attorney, for appellee.

3. We have carefully reviewed appellant’s remaining enumerations of error and have found them to be without merit.

Judgment affirmed in part and remanded in part with direction.

All the Justices concur.
1

The crime occurred on January 28, 1992. Briscoe was indicted in Fulton County on May 29, 1992. A jury found him guilty on September 11, 1992, and he was sentenced the same day. His motion for new trial, filed September 21, 1992 and amended February 25, 1993, was denied March 11, 1993. His notice of appeal was filed on March 16, 1993, and the appeal was docketed in this court on April 19, 1993. Oral arguments were heard on June 21, 1993.

2

“A person convicted of the offense of armed robbery shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20 years ....” OCGA § 16-8-41 (b). “[A] person convicted of the offense of aggravated assault shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (b).