place hearing in Georgia

1914In Farmer v. Mayor and Council of Thomson, 133 Ga. 94 (4), 95 ( 65 S. E. 180 ), it was held that, under the provision of the act of 1897 (codified in the Civil Code (1910), § 446) which states that the presiding judge shall by order require the municipality, by its proper officers, to show cause “at such time and place . . as the judge . . may direct,” an order fixing the place of hearing in another county of the judicial circuit than that where the election was held “was not beyond the terms of the act.” This court was careful to indicate that no constitutional question was there raised or de

1914In Farmer v. Mayor and Council of Thomson, 133 Ga. 94 (4), 95 ( 65 S. E. 180 ), it was held that, under the provision of the act of 1897 (codified in the Civil Code (1910), § 446) which states that the presiding judge shall by order require the municipality, by its proper officers, to show cause “at such time and place . . as the judge . . may direct,” an order fixing the place of hearing in another county of the judicial circuit than that where the election was held “was not beyond the terms of the act.” This court was careful to indicate that no constitutional question was there raised or de

2002Applying that analysis to the same underlying felonies involved in the present case, armed robbery and aggravated assault, we decided in Briscoe v. State, 263 Ga. 310 (2) ( 431 SE2d 375 ) (1993), that the armed robbery conviction must be merged into the felony murder.

2002Applying that analysis to the same underlying felonies involved in the present case, armed robbery and aggravated assault, we decided in Briscoe v. State, 263 Ga. 310 (2) ( 431 SE2d 375 ) (1993), that the armed robbery conviction must be merged into the felony murder.

1971Under the above statute it would be sufficient to give the notice to the hearing officer at the place the hearing was held within four (4) days of the decision complained of (four days being the time within which appeals must be entered under court of ordinary practice — see in this connection Burson v. Foster, 123 Ga. App. 168 ( 179 SE2d 679 )) and then send a copy of same to the Director of the Department of Public Safety by registered mail.

1971Under the above statute it would be sufficient to give the notice to the hearing officer at the place the hearing was held within four (4) days of the decision complained of (four days being the time within which appeals must be entered under court of ordinary practice — see in this connection Burson v. Foster, 123 Ga. App. 168 ( 179 SE2d 679 )) and then send a copy of same to the Director of the Department of Public Safety by registered mail.

1958“An ordinance prescribing that notice of the time and place of hearing be published in a newspaper of general circulation ten days before the hearing is not complied with by publishing but one advertisement twenty days before the date set for the hearing, without notice as to the place of the hearing.” Jennings v. Suggs, 180 Ga. 141 (2) ( 178 S. E. 282 ).

1958“An ordinance prescribing that notice of the time and place of hearing be published in a newspaper of general circulation ten days before the hearing is not complied with by publishing but one advertisement twenty days before the date set for the hearing, without notice as to the place of the hearing.” Jennings v. Suggs, 180 Ga. 141 (2) ( 178 S. E. 282 ).

1946The evidence as to the operation of the place, after the previous raids, in the same general manner and with the buildings still containing secret panels, traps, with other like evidence, was sufficient to sustain the allegations of the petition that the operation was “continuous, in flagrant violation of law.” Because the proof shows continuity and intention to operate the place in violation of the law after the previous raids and confiscations, the present case is distinguished from Thornton v. Skelton, 149 Ga. 93 ( 99 S. E. 299 ).

1946The evidence as to the operation of the place, after the previous raids, in the same general manner and with the buildings still containing secret panels, traps, with other like evidence, was sufficient to sustain the allegations of the petition that the operation was “continuous, in flagrant violation of law.” Because the proof shows continuity and intention to operate the place in violation of the law after the previous raids and confiscations, the present case is distinguished from Thornton v. Skelton, 149 Ga. 93 ( 99 S. E. 299 ).

1929It is absolutely void.” In Ray v. City of Lavonia, 141 Ga. 626 ( 81 S. E. 884 ), the Supreme Court held that the provision of the act of 1897 (Ga. L. 1897, p. 82, Civil Code of 1910, § 446), having reference to the place of hearing in a proceeding to validate bonds, was unconstitutional in so far as it authorized a hearing outside of the county in which the municipality proposing to issue the bonds was located.

1929It is absolutely void.” In Ray v. City of Lavonia, 141 Ga. 626 ( 81 S. E. 884 ), the Supreme Court held that the provision of the act of 1897 (Ga. L. 1897, p. 82, Civil Code of 1910, § 446), having reference to the place of hearing in a proceeding to validate bonds, was unconstitutional in so far as it authorized a hearing outside of the county in which the municipality proposing to issue the bonds was located.

1913And in that case the Supreme Court cited with approval the case of Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Insurance Co., 7 Wall. 386 (19 L. ed. 257), where the exact point was ruled, and it was held that the policy stipulation as to limitation was not against the policy of the statute of limitations, but was valid, and that the action mentioned in the condition, which must be commenced within twelve months, is the one which is prosecuted to judgment.