B.Y.R.D. v. State, 523 S.E.2d 578 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · Go Syfert
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B.Y.R.D. v. State, 523 S.E.2d 578 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
17 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Streeter v. Department of Public Safety (gasd, 2023-08-28)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Streeter v. Department of Public Safety
S.D. Ga. · 2023 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Handley v. State, 668 S.E.2d 855, 856 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Ellison, 611 S.E.2d 129, 133-35 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (finding evidence that defendant had bloodshot eyes, smelled of alcohol, and refused to perform a field sobriety test was insufficient to constitute probable cause for a driving under the influence arrest)); see also id. at 856–57 (holding that evidence that the defendant smelled of alcohol, and alco-sensor test revealed the presence of alcohol, and that the defendant admitted to drinking “earlier in the day” was insufficient under Georgia law to show probable c…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hatcher v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Mikell and Adams, JJ., concur. 1 OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1). 2 OCGA § 40-6-72 (b). 3 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 4 Smith v. State, 269 Ga. App. 17 (1) ( 602 SE2d 921 ) (2004). 5 Monroe v. State, 273 Ga. App. 14, 15 (1) ( 614 SE2d 172 ) (2005). 6 Byrd v. State, 240 Ga. App. 354, 355 ( 523 SE2d 578 ) (1999). 7 Waits v. State, 232 Ga. App. 357, 358 (1) ( 501 SE2d 870 ) (1998). 8 Lane v. State, 268 Ga. 678, 680 (2) ( 492 SE2d 230 ) (1997). 9 Morrison v. State, 220 Ga. App. 151, 155 (3) (b) ( 469 SE2d 686 ) (1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kitchens v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Johnson v. State, 249 Ga. App. 29, 30 (1) ( 546 SE2d 922 ) (2001); Byrd v. State, 240 Ga. App. at 354.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Parrish v. Georgia State Patrol
S.D. Ga. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Ga. Dec. 22, 2009) (holding officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for driving under the influence under Georgia law where plaintiff had “three to four beers,” he was stopped for “erratic driving,” his breath smelled of alcohol, and he “refused to consent to the state-administered chemical test”); see also Byrd v. State, 523 S.E.2d 578, 579 (Ga. App. 1999) (evidence of odor of alcohol, driver admitting to drinking, and driver’s refusal to take chemical test can be sufficient evidence, among other things, to indicate that driver was driving under influence of alcohol).
Byrd
v.
the State
A99A1598.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Oct 14, 1999.
523 S.E.2d 578
1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1354
Coleman, Talley, Newbern, Kurrie, Preston & Holland, Robert C. Powell, for appellant., Richard W. Shelton, Solicitor, for appellee.
Miller, McMurray, Ruffin.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published
Miller, Judge.

A jury convicted James Byrd of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he was a less safe driver. [1] In his sole enumeration of error, Byrd argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because there was no evidence that his driving ability was impaired. We affirm.

On appeal the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict, and Byrd no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence; moreover, an appellate court determines evidence sufficiency and does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. The verdict must be upheld if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [2]

Viewed in this light, the evidence showed that as the arresting officer was driving to a patrol post, he passed Byrd driving a vehicle and observed that Byrd was not wearing his seatbelt. The officer also noticed that Byrd’s face “looked puffy” and that his “eyes were red [and] glossy.” While the officer was turning his vehicle around to stop Byrd, Byrd quickly turned behind a closed store, parked his car, and exited the vehicle. The officer stopped him, and they returned to Byrd’s vehicle. The officer smelled alcohol on Byrd, who admitted that he had drunk a beer. An alco-sensor test at the scene indicated the presence of alcohol on Byrd’s breath. The officer placed Byrd under arrest and transported him to the jail. While traveling to the jail, Byrd became violent and verbally abusive toward the officer. At the jail, Byrd twice refused to take a designated breath test.

OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1) provides that it is unlawful for a person to drive or be in actual physical control of any moving vehicle while under the influence of alcohol to the extent that the person is a less safe driver. Police officers may offer opinion testimony that the defendant was a less safe driver. [3]

Here, the arresting officer testified that Byrd smelled of alcohol, that he “looked like he was intoxicated,” that Byrd engaged in furtive conduct, [4] that he tested positive on the alco-sensor, that he behaved violently after his arrest, [5] [6] that he admitted to drinking alcohol, and[*355] that he refused the breath test. [6] The officer also testified, based on his experience in DUI cases, that Byrd was driving under the influence of alcohol and that his driving ability was impaired by alcohol to the extent that he was a less safe driver. A rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Byrd was guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he was a less safe driver.

Decided October 14, 1999. Coleman, Talley, Newbern, Kurrie, Preston & Holland, Robert C. Powell, for appellant. Richard W. Shelton, Solicitor, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

McMurray, P. J, and Ruffin, J, concur.
1

See OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1).

2

McGhee v. State, 223 Ga. App. 123, 124 (476 SE2d 853) (1996); see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

3

Waits v. State, 232 Ga. App. 357, 358 (1) (501 SE2d 870) (1998); Church v. State, 210 Ga. App. 670, 671 (2) (436 SE2d 809) (1993).

4

Castillo v. State, 232 Ga. App. 354, 357 (502 SE2d 261) (1998) (furtive conduct at approach of law officers reflects consciousness of guilt).

5

Heath v. State, 229 Ga. App. 69, 70 (493 SE2d 225) (1997) (belligerent behavior may be a sign of intoxication).

6

OCGA § 40-6-392 (d) (refusal to take breath test is admissible as evidence of guilt).