State v. Pickens, 466 S.E.2d 364 (S.C. 1996). · Go Syfert
State v. Pickens, 466 S.E.2d 364 (S.C. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
126 citation events (93 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Baccus (sc, 2006-01-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) State v. Baccus (2×)
S.C. · 2006 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
where a review of the entire record establishes the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction should not be reversed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Tony Avella Sanders
S.C. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) ("It is improper for the State to refer to or comment upon a defendant's exercise of a constitutional right."); State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528 , 530–31, 466 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1996) (explaining the admission of comments on a defendant's exercise of a constitutional right is a trial error subject to harmless error analysis); Gill v. State, 346 S.C. 209, 221 , 552 S.E.2d 26, 33 (2001) ("[I]mproper comments on a defendant's failure to testify do not…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sullivan v. State
S.C. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Douglas, 332 S.C. at 74-75 , 504 S.E.2d at 310-11 (holding involuntary manslaughter charge not warranted when defendant admitted he intentionally fired his gun in self-defense); State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 531-32 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 366-67 (1996) (holding defendant who admitted intentionally shooting the gun was not entitled to involuntary manslaughter charge); State v. Cooney, 320 S.C. 107, 112 , 463 S.E.2d 597, 600 (1995) (holding defendant not entitled to involuntary manslaughter charge when he intentionally shot towards the ground at the victim’s feet); Bozeman v. State, 307 S.C. 1…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Murray
S.C. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
See also Douglas, 332 S.C. at 74 , 504 S.E.2d at 310-11 (finding no involuntary manslaughter charge warranted where defendant admitted he intentionally fired a gun into a crowd); State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 531-32 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 366-67 (1996) (holding defendant not entitled to charge on involuntary manslaughter because defendant admitted intentionally shooting the gun recklessly in self-defense); Gibson, 390 S.C. at 358 , 701 S.E.2d at 772 (holding trial court properly refused to charge on involuntary manslaughter because defendant admitted he intentionally fired his weapon); State v. M…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Sams
S.C. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
State v. Pickens , in which the defendant argued he shot a gun at his victim in self-defense, is analogous to the present case. 320 S.C. 528, 531-32 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 366-67 (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lyles
S.C. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
“Where a review of the entire record establishes the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction should not be reversed.” Thompson, 352 S.C. at 562 , 575 S.E.2d at 83 (citing State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 530-531 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1996); State v. King, 349 S.C. 142, 161 , 561 S.E.2d 640, 650 (Ct.App.2002)); see Mizzell, 349 S.C. at 334 , 563 S.E.2d at 319 (“In determining whether an error is harmless, ‘the reviewing *345 court must review the entire record to determine what effect the error had on the verdict.’ ”) (quoting State v. Clark, 315 S.C. 478, 484 , …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bryant (2×)
S.C. · 2006 · confidence medium
State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 531 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Gibson
S.C. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
State v. Key , 256 S.C. 90, 93-94 , 180 S.E.2d 888, 889-90 (1971). “[W]here a review of the entire record establishes the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction should not be reversed.” State v. Pickens , 320 S.C. 528, 531 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Price
S.C. · 2006 · confidence medium
State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 531 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. McIntosh
S.C. · 2004 · confidence medium
“To be harmless, the record must establish the reference to the defendant’s right to silence was a single reference, which was not repeated or alluded to; the solicitor did not tie the defendant’s silence directly to his exculpatory story; the exculpatory story was totally implausible; and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.” State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 530-531 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Ward
S.C. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
State v. Mitchell , 286 S.C. 572, 573 , 336 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985). “[W]here a review of the entire record establishes the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction should not be reversed.” State v. Pickens , 320 S.C. 528, 531 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1996).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Edmond v. State (3×) also: Cited "see"
S.C. · 2000 · confidence medium
State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 530-31 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1996); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-10 , 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263-65 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 329-32 (1991) (a “trial error” occurs during the presentation of case to jury and is amenable to harmless-error analysis because it may be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine the effect it had on the trial; these are distinguished from structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy harmless error analysis).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Liberte
S.C. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See State v. Coleman, 301 S.C. 57, 61 , 389 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1990) (“The trial judge is vested with broad discretion in dealing with the propriety of the solicitor’s closing argument and once he has allowed the argument to stand, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating the argument had the effect of denying him a fair determination of the issues involved.”) (emphasis added); cf. State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 531 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1996) (Solicitor’s single reference during closing argument to the defendant’s failure to present evidence required reversal because the “e…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Burriss (2×)
S.C. · 1999 · confidence medium
Our recent opinion in State v. Pickens may be distinguished from this case because there we based our decision on the fact defendant admitted he shot intentionally. 320 S.C. 528, 532 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1996) (facts did not support a charge of involuntary manslaughter where the defendant claimed he "acted lawfully but recklessly in defending himself").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Holliday
S.C. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
In order to be harmless, “the record must establish the reference to the defendant’s right to silence was a single reference, which was not repeated or alluded to; the solicitor did not tie the defendant’s silence directly to his exculpatory story; the exculpatory story was totally implausible; and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.” State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 531 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1996).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Quayshaun X. Clark (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 531 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1996) (holding the defendant was not entitled to a charge of involuntary manslaughter when he "admitted he shot the gun" but "contend[ed] he acted lawfully but recklessly in defending himself"); Douglas v. State, 332 S.C. 67, 74 , 504 S.E.2d 307, 310-11 (1998) (reasoning that because "involuntary manslaughter is at its core an unintentional killing[,]" when "a defendant intentionally arms himself and shoots into a crowd . . . he is not entitled to an involuntary manslaughter charge"); Sullivan, 407 S.C. at 245 , 754 S.E.2d at 887 (…
discussed Cited "see" Clark v. State (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
Id.; see State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 531 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1996) (finding refusal to charge involuntary manslaughter is proper when a defendant admits he intentionally shot the gun at the victim); State v. Smith, 315 S.C. 547, 550 , 446 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1994) (finding defendant acted intentionally in wielding knife, and stabbing is an unlawful act; thus, defendant was not entitled to a charge on involuntary manslaughter); Sullivan v. State, 407 S.C. 241, 245 , 754 S.E.2d 885, 887 (Ct. App. 2014) ("When the victim was killed by a gunshot, and no evidence is presented showing the defend…
discussed Cited "see" State v. Simmons (2×)
S.C. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Price , 368 S.C. 494 , 499, 629 S.E.2d 363 , 366 (2006) (citing State v. Pickens , 320 S.C. 528 , 531, 466 S.E.2d 364 , 366 (1996) ).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Torrence (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 531-32 , 466 S.E.2d 364, 366-67 (1996) (holding defendant not entitled to involuntary manslaughter charge because defendant admitted intentionally shooting the gun); Gibson, 390 S.C. at 357-58 , 701 S.E.2d at 771-72 (holding defendant not entitled to charge of involuntary manslaughter because "the essence of involuntary manslaughter is the involuntary nature of the killing" and he intentionally fired the gun); State v. Morris, 307 S.C. 480, 484 , 415 S.E.2d 819 , 821-22 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding defendant not entitled to involuntary manslaughter charge becaus…
discussed Cited "see" State v. Primus (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528 , 466 S.E.2d 364 (1996); State v. Posey, 269 S.C. 500 , 238 S.E.2d 176 (1977).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Sweet (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 346 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (“[T]he admission of comments or evidence of the defendant’s exercise of a constitutional right is a ‘trial error’ subject to harmless error analysis.”); State v. Gaskins, 284 S.C. 105 , 326 S.E.2d 132 (1985) (the solicitor’s comment, during closing argument, that certain evidence was undisputed because of the defendant’s failure to testify was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt in context of entire record and in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt), cert. denied, Gaskins v. South Carolina, 471 U.S. 112…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Johnson v. State (2×)
S.C. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528 , 466 S.E.2d 364 (1996); State v. Arther, supm (improper comments on defendant’s failure to testify or present witnesses may be cured by giving of a “no adverse inference” charge); State v. Gaskins, 284 S.C. 105 , 326 S.E.2d 132 (1985) overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991); 3 Wharton’s Criminal Procedure, § 353 (13th Ed.1991) (improper comment on defendant’s failure to testify does not result in automatic reversal; question is whether comment was sufficiently prejudicial or was harmless).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The STATE, Respondent
v.
Maurice PICKENS, Appellant
24365.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Jan 22, 1996.
466 S.E.2d 364
1995 S.C. LEXIS 213
Chief Attorney Daniel T Stacey and Lesley M. Coggiola, SC Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant., Attorney General T. Travis Medlock, Chief Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Staff Attorney General G. Thomas Chase, Columbia; and Solicitor Dudley Saleeby, Jr., Florence, for respondent.
Moore, Finney, Toal, Waller, Burnett.
Cited by 46 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: #3,352 of 633,719
Citer courts: Supreme Court of South Carolina (2)
Moore, Justice:

Appellant appeals his convictions of two counts of voluntary-manslaughter and two counts of use of a pistol during the commission of a violent crime. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

Appellant and co-defendant, Willie Douglas, were involved in a shooting incident outside of the Waffle House in Florence. Many of the people at the Waffle House had been at a local bar called “Visions” earlier that evening. There was some testimony appellant and Douglas had been involved in a disagree[*530] ment with the victims at Visions. When appellant and Douglas arrived at the Waffle House, a crowd began to gather outside. There was some testimony a group of ten to twelve people rushed them, and in self-defense, appellant and Douglas began shooting. Two people were killed and two others were injured. Appellant did not testify nor present any witnesses. Douglas, however, put up several witnesses.

ISSUES

1) Did the trial judge err in refusing to give a curative instruction after the solicitor referred to appellant’s failure to call witnesses?

2) Did the trial judge err in refusing to charge involuntary manslaughter?

DISCUSSION

1) Solicitor’s comments

During his closing argument the solicitor stated:

“One think [sic] they short me up on is I didn’t put these officers up. Well, I tell you one thing, they can call witnesses just like I can. And [Douglas] did call witnesses.” Douglas objected, and appellant joined in the motion. The trial judge ruled appellant was entitled to protection under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed. (2d) 91 (1976). [1] We agree. However, the trial judge, not wanting to exacerbate the situation, refused to give a curative instruction. We hold this was error. Furthermore, the trial judge’s general charge, which was given shortly afterwards, did not cure the error.

We have applied a harmless error analysis when a Doyle violation has occurred. State v. Truesdale, 285 S.C. 13, 328 S.E. (2d) 53 (1984). [2] Further, in Truesdale, [*531] we stated where a review of the entire record establishes the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction should not be reversed. To be harmless, the record must establish the reference to the defendant’s right to silence was a single reference, which was not repeated or alluded to; the solicitor did not tie the defendant’s silence directly to his exculpatory story; the exculpatory story was totally implausible; and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. 285 S.C. at 18-19; 328 S.E. (2d) 53.

Here, the reference was a single reference. However, appellant’s exculpatory story of self-defense was not totally implausible and the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming. At best, only one witness, victim Corey Jeffery, unequivocally testified appellant fired any shots. A second witness, Deborah Dimson, testified appellant may have fired his gun. Further, several witnesses testified a group of people rushed appellant and Douglas. Only Jeffery testified the group had not rushed appellant or Douglas. We hold there was not overwhelming evidence of guilt based upon the record before us. Thus, the trial judge’s failure to give a curative instruction was not harmless error and we reverse on this issue.

2) Involuntary manslaughter

Although not necessary to the disposition of this case, we address this issue because of the likelihood it will be an issue during retrial. Appellant contends the trial judge erred in not charging involuntary manslaughter. We disagree. Involuntary manslaughter is 1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or 2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. Bozeman v. State, 307 S.C. 172, 414 S.E. (2d) 144 (1992). [3]

Appellant admitted he shot the gun. He, however, contends he acted lawfully but recklessly in defending himself. We disagree. There was no evidence to support a charge of involuntary manslaughter. State v. Smith, 315 S.C. 547, 446 S.E. (2d)[*532] 411 (1994) (defendant acted intentionally in wielding knife and stabbing is not a lawful act, thus, defendant was not entitled to a charge on involuntary manslaughter); State v. Morris, 307 S.C. 480, 415 S.E. (2d) 819 (Ct. App. 1991) (under involuntary manslaughter 'the act must be unintentional and defendant had intentionally shot his gun although he claimed self-defense).

This case is distinguishable from the cases involving self-defense and the failure to charge voluntary manslaughter. See e.g., State v. Lowry, 315 S.C. 396, 434 S.E. (2d) 272 (1993). Under these cases, we held the jury may fail to find self-defense, but could find sufficient legal provocation and heat of passion to conclude the defendant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Under the definition of involuntary manslaughter, however, the jury could not find appellant had acted lawfully without finding self-defense. Smith, supra. Therefore, the trial judge did not err in refusing to charge involuntary manslaughter as the facts did not warrant such a charge.

Reversed and remanded.

Finney, C.J., and Toal, Waller, and Burnett, JJ., concur.
1

Pursuant to Doyle, the State cannot comment on the accused’s right to remain silent. Further, under State v. Posey, 269 S.C. 500, 238 S.E. (2d) 176 (1977), this Court specifically held the State may not comment on the failure of the defendant to call a witness when he has not presented any evidence.

2

Truesdale was decided prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed. (2d) 302 (1991). In Fulminante, the Supreme Court discussed when a harmless error analysis should be applied. Pursuant to Fulminante, this error would qualify as a “trial error” making it subject to a harmless error analysis. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed. (2d) 96 (1983) (cited in Fulminante) (harmless error analysis applied to prosecutor’s comments which violated defendant’s fifth amendment rights).

3

Appellant relies upon State v. McLaughlin, 280 S.C. 462, 38 S.E. (2d) 492 (1946), where an involuntary manslaughter instruction was held proper when the defendant intentionally shot his pistol. To the extent McLaughlin is inconsistent with Bozeman and this opinion, it is hereby overruled.