Doyle violation (South Carolina) · Go Syfert
← South Carolina issues

Doyle violation in South Carolina

20 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2023 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (28)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Bellgreen
scctapp · 2001 · cited in 3 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2007–2021
2 sentences

2021See State v. Bell, 347 S.C. 267, 271 , 554 S.E.2d 435, 437 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding no due process violation when there was "no evidence in the record that Bell ever received Miranda warnings" and refusing to presume the warnings were given at the time of Bell's arrest); Brown v. State, 375 S.C. 464, 480-81 , 652 S.E.2d 765, 773-74 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding, in a post-conviction relief matter, that Brown failed to meet his burden of proving the solicitor committed a Doyle violation and that trial counsel erred in failing to object when there was "no evidence in the record that Brown ever receiv

2021See State v. Bell, 347 S.C. 267, 271 , 554 S.E.2d 435, 437 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding no due process violation when there was "no evidence in the record that Bell ever received Miranda warnings" and refusing to presume the warnings were given at the time of Bell's arrest); Brown v. State, 375 S.C. 464, 480-81 , 652 S.E.2d 765, 773-74 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding, in a post-conviction relief matter, that Brown failed to meet his burden of proving the solicitor committed a Doyle violation and that trial counsel erred in failing to object when there was "no evidence in the record that Brown ever receiv

23
Greer v. Millergreen
scotus · 1987 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2007–2023
2 sentences

2023See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 763 (1987) (stating where there is no question the defendant received Miranda warnings, "this prerequisite of a Doyle violation was met"); see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (explaining that Miranda warnings "are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation").

2007See also Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 763 , 107 S.Ct. 3102 , 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (the Miranda warnings' implicit assurance provides "the prerequisite of a Doyle violation"). *476 In a case setting the precedent for Brecht, the United States Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), guarded against the expansion of Doyle .

22
Lainhart v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2009 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021See also Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) ("[When] a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, he 'ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the state for impeachment purposes.'" (quoting 3 Wayne R.

2021See also Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) ("[When] a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, he 'ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the state for impeachment purposes.'" (quoting 3 Wayne R.

22
Brown v. Stategreen
scctapp · 2007 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021See State v. Bell, 347 S.C. 267, 271 , 554 S.E.2d 435, 437 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding no due process violation when there was "no evidence in the record that Bell ever received Miranda warnings" and refusing to presume the warnings were given at the time of Bell's arrest); Brown v. State, 375 S.C. 464, 480-81 , 652 S.E.2d 765, 773-74 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding, in a post-conviction relief matter, that Brown failed to meet his burden of proving the solicitor committed a Doyle violation and that trial counsel erred in failing to object when there was "no evidence in the record that Brown ever receiv

2021See State v. Bell, 347 S.C. 267, 271 , 554 S.E.2d 435, 437 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding no due process violation when there was "no evidence in the record that Bell ever received Miranda warnings" and refusing to presume the warnings were given at the time of Bell's arrest); Brown v. State, 375 S.C. 464, 480-81 , 652 S.E.2d 765, 773-74 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding, in a post-conviction relief matter, that Brown failed to meet his burden of proving the solicitor committed a Doyle violation and that trial counsel erred in failing to object when there was "no evidence in the record that Brown ever receiv

22
Mattox v. Stategreen
gactapp · 1990 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021In Mattox v. State, the trial court allowed the State to cross-examine the defendant with regard to her post-arrest silence over a defense objection. 395 S.E.2d 288, 289 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).

2021In Mattox v. State, the trial court allowed the State to cross-examine the defendant with regard to her post-arrest silence over a defense objection. 395 S.E.2d 288, 289 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).

22
State v. Hillgreen
scctapp · 2004 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2007–2012
2 sentences

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

22
Edmond v. Stategreen
sc · 2000 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2004–2007
2 sentences

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

22
State v. Hollidaygreen
scctapp · 1998 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2004–2007
2 sentences

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

22
State v. Myersgreen
sc · 1990 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2004–2007
2 sentences

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

22
State v. Reidgreen
sc · 1996 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2004–2007
2 sentences

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

22
State v. Pickensgreen
sc · 1996 · cited in 5 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2000–2005
2 sentences

2005When an alleged violation of this constitutional right has taken place, also referred to as a Doyle violation, the court must apply the harmless error analysis articulated in State v. Pickens , 320 S.C. 528 , 466 S.E.2d 364 (1996).

2005When an alleged violation of this constitutional right has taken place, also referred to as a Doyle violation, the court must apply the harmless error analysis articulated in State v. Pickens , 320 S.C. 528 , 466 S.E.2d 364 (1996).

15
State v. Truesdalegreen
sc · 1984 · cited in 4 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1996–2004
2 sentences

2004Issue 2: State v. Truesdale , 285 S.C. 13 , 328 S.E.2d 53 (1984) (where review of the entire record establishes error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction will not be overturned for a Doyle violation), rev’d in part on other grounds , Truesdale v. Aiken , 480 U.S. 527 , 107 S.Ct. 1394 , 94 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987).

2004Issue 2: State v. Truesdale , 285 S.C. 13 , 328 S.E.2d 53 (1984) (where review of the entire record establishes error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction will not be overturned for a Doyle violation), rev’d in part on other grounds , Truesdale v. Aiken , 480 U.S. 527 , 107 S.Ct. 1394 , 94 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987).

14
State v. McIntoshgreen
sc · 2004 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2005–2014
2 sentences

2014After a review of the direct appeal issue briefed, whether the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion for a mistrial, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (holding it is a violation of due process for a defendant's post-Miranda1 silence to be used against him at trial for impeachment purposes); State v. McIntosh, 358 S.C. 432, 447 , 595 S.E.2d 484, 492 (2004) ("When a Doyle violation occurs, the conviction still may be upheld when a review of the entire record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the error w

2014After a review of the direct appeal issue briefed, whether the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion for a mistrial, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (holding it is a violation of due process for a defendant's post-Miranda1 silence to be used against him at trial for impeachment purposes); State v. McIntosh, 358 S.C. 432, 447 , 595 S.E.2d 484, 492 (2004) ("When a Doyle violation occurs, the conviction still may be upheld when a review of the entire record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the error w

12
State v. Gatesgreen
sc · 1977 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
2 sentences

1984Shaw, supra, while approving the standards set out in Chapman, supra, for evaluating whether a Doyle violation is reversible error, holds that the determination must be made on a case-by-case analysis, citing Davis, supra. Our Court has held that testimony concerning a defendant’s refusal to give a statement to an officer, if error, would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where defendant’s “uncorroborated version of his part in the robbery was obviously incredible and the jury understandably did not believe him.” State v. Gates, supra 269 S. C. at 561, 238 S. E. (2d) 680 .

1984Shaw, supra, while approving the standards set out in Chapman, supra, for evaluating whether a Doyle violation is reversible error, holds that the determination must be made on a case-by-case analysis, citing Davis, supra. Our Court has held that testimony concerning a defendant’s refusal to give a statement to an officer, if error, would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where defendant’s “uncorroborated version of his part in the robbery was obviously incredible and the jury understandably did not believe him.” State v. Gates, supra 269 S. C. at 561, 238 S. E. (2d) 680 .

12
Rhode Island v. Innisgreen
scotus · 1980 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
2 sentences

2023See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 763 (1987) (stating where there is no question the defendant received Miranda warnings, "this prerequisite of a Doyle violation was met"); see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (explaining that Miranda warnings "are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation").

2023See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 763 (1987) (stating where there is no question the defendant received Miranda warnings, "this prerequisite of a Doyle violation was met"); see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (explaining that Miranda warnings "are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation").

11
Doyle v. Ohiogreen
scotus · 1976 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014After a review of the direct appeal issue briefed, whether the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion for a mistrial, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (holding it is a violation of due process for a defendant's post-Miranda1 silence to be used against him at trial for impeachment purposes); State v. McIntosh, 358 S.C. 432, 447 , 595 S.E.2d 484, 492 (2004) ("When a Doyle violation occurs, the conviction still may be upheld when a review of the entire record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the error w

2014After a review of the direct appeal issue briefed, whether the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion for a mistrial, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (holding it is a violation of due process for a defendant's post-Miranda1 silence to be used against him at trial for impeachment purposes); State v. McIntosh, 358 S.C. 432, 447 , 595 S.E.2d 484, 492 (2004) ("When a Doyle violation occurs, the conviction still may be upheld when a review of the entire record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the error w

11
State v. Mizzellgreen
sc · 2002 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014After a review of the direct appeal issue briefed, whether the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion for a mistrial, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (holding it is a violation of due process for a defendant's post-Miranda1 silence to be used against him at trial for impeachment purposes); State v. McIntosh, 358 S.C. 432, 447 , 595 S.E.2d 484, 492 (2004) ("When a Doyle violation occurs, the conviction still may be upheld when a review of the entire record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the error w

2014After a review of the direct appeal issue briefed, whether the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion for a mistrial, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (holding it is a violation of due process for a defendant's post-Miranda1 silence to be used against him at trial for impeachment purposes); State v. McIntosh, 358 S.C. 432, 447 , 595 S.E.2d 484, 492 (2004) ("When a Doyle violation occurs, the conviction still may be upheld when a review of the entire record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the error w

11
State v. Arthergreen
sc · 1986 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012Despite Williams’ failure to object to these subsequent instances, we review the entire record in determining whether the misconduct is sufficient to warrant reversal. 2 See State v. Arther, 290 S.C. 291 , 296, 350 S.E.2d 187, 190 (1986) (holding a Doyle violation “does not require reversal of a conviction if a review of the entire record establishes that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”) (emphasis added).

2012Despite Williams’ failure to object to these subsequent instances, we review the entire record in determining whether the misconduct is sufficient to warrant reversal. 2 See State v. Arther, 290 S.C. 291 , 296, 350 S.E.2d 187, 190 (1986) (holding a Doyle violation “does not require reversal of a conviction if a review of the entire record establishes that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”) (emphasis added).

11
Fletcher v. Weirgreen
scotus · 1982 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007See also Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 763 , 107 S.Ct. 3102 , 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (the Miranda warnings' implicit assurance provides "the prerequisite of a Doyle violation"). *476 In a case setting the precedent for Brecht, the United States Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), guarded against the expansion of Doyle .

2007See also Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 763 , 107 S.Ct. 3102 , 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (the Miranda warnings' implicit assurance provides "the prerequisite of a Doyle violation"). *476 In a case setting the precedent for Brecht, the United States Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), guarded against the expansion of Doyle .

11
State v. Johnsongreen
sc · 1987 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

11
State v. Mitchellgreen
sc · 1998 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 330 S.C. 189, 194 , 498 S.E.2d 642, 645 (1998) (appellant has burden to provide a sufficient record for review).

2007See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 330 S.C. 189, 194 , 498 S.E.2d 642, 645 (1998) (appellant has burden to provide a sufficient record for review).

11
State v. Woodsgreen
sc · 1984 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

11
United States v. Revelesgreen
ca5 · 1999 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
1 sentence

2004See e.g., Kibbe v. DuBois, 269 F.3d 26, 34-35 (1st Cir.2001) (explaining Doyle is not violated when defendant opens the door to cross-examination on post-arrest silence by testifying on direct he told police what had happened and lawyer stated the same in opening and closing); United States v. Reveles, 190 F.3d 678, 684-685 (5th Cir.1999) (finding no Doyle violation because “[w]hen a defendant attempts to convince a jury that he was of a cooperative spirit, Doyle does not tie the hands of prosecutors who attempt to rebut this presentation by pointing to a lack of cooperation”); Earnest v. Dors

11
State v. Smithgreen
sc · 1986 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
11
Ralph Rodney Earnest v. Donald Dorsey, Attorney General of the State of New Mexicogreen
ca10 · 1996 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
1 sentence

2004See e.g., Kibbe v. DuBois, 269 F.3d 26, 34-35 (1st Cir.2001) (explaining Doyle is not violated when defendant opens the door to cross-examination on post-arrest silence by testifying on direct he told police what had happened and lawyer stated the same in opening and closing); United States v. Reveles, 190 F.3d 678, 684-685 (5th Cir.1999) (finding no Doyle violation because “[w]hen a defendant attempts to convince a jury that he was of a cooperative spirit, Doyle does not tie the hands of prosecutors who attempt to rebut this presentation by pointing to a lack of cooperation”); Earnest v. Dors

11
Kibbe v. Duboisgreen
ca1 · 2001 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
1 sentence

2004See e.g., Kibbe v. DuBois, 269 F.3d 26, 34-35 (1st Cir.2001) (explaining Doyle is not violated when defendant opens the door to cross-examination on post-arrest silence by testifying on direct he told police what had happened and lawyer stated the same in opening and closing); United States v. Reveles, 190 F.3d 678, 684-685 (5th Cir.1999) (finding no Doyle violation because “[w]hen a defendant attempts to convince a jury that he was of a cooperative spirit, Doyle does not tie the hands of prosecutors who attempt to rebut this presentation by pointing to a lack of cooperation”); Earnest v. Dors

11
State v. Graygreen
scctapp · 1991 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004See Edmond, 341 S.C. 340 , 534 S.E.2d 682 (granting new trial to applicant in post-conviction relief action where testimony and prosecutor’s closing improperly referred to defendant’s exercise of right to remain silent and right to counsel); see also State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74 , 476 S.E.2d 695 (1996) (finding Doyle violation when officer, after arresting defendant and advising him of his Miranda rights, was asked whether defendant inquired about the condition of his passengers after an accident; granting new trial as it was not harmless error), overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 34

2004See Edmond, 341 S.C. 340 , 534 S.E.2d 682 (granting new trial to applicant in post-conviction relief action where testimony and prosecutor’s closing improperly referred to defendant’s exercise of right to remain silent and right to counsel); see also State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74 , 476 S.E.2d 695 (1996) (finding Doyle violation when officer, after arresting defendant and advising him of his Miranda rights, was asked whether defendant inquired about the condition of his passengers after an accident; granting new trial as it was not harmless error), overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 34

11
Wentz v. Stategreen
ind · 2002 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (12)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Watson green
sc · 2002
2 sentences

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

2007See also Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345 , 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000) (relying on Doyle, state may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 78 , 476 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1996) ("It is a violation of due process for a State to permit comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence since the giving of Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant his silence will not be used against him.") (overruled on other grounds by State v. Watson, 349 S.C. 372 , 563 S.E.2d 336 (2002)); Sta

22004–2007
Miranda v. Arizona green
scotus · 1966
1 sentence

2023We take the opportunity, however, to clarify the proper procedure when a potential Doyle violation arises and vacate the 1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). portion of the court of appeals' opinion dealing with this issue.

12023–2023
State v. White green
sc · 2004
2 sentences

2005State v. White, 361 S.C. 407 , 605 S.E.2d 540 (2004), involves a defendant convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping.

2005State v. White, 361 S.C. 407 , 605 S.E.2d 540 (2004), involves a defendant convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping.

12005–2005
United States of America, Ex Rel., Larry Saulsbury v. James Greer, Warden, Menard, Michael Lane, Director of the Department of Corrections green
ca7 · 1983
2 sentences

2004Saulsbury v. Greer, 702 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.1983) (finding no Doyle violation where defendant opened the door to cross-examination on post-arrest silence by testifying on direct he did not make a statement to *446 the sheriff because it could be used against him and, since he was on parole, he did not think the sheriff would believe him); Wentz v. State, 766 N.E.2d 351, 362 (Ind.2002) (finding no Doyle violation because defendant opened the door to cross-examination on post-arrest silence by testifying on redirect he had answered all the police’s questions).

2004Saulsbury v. Greer, 702 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.1983) (finding no Doyle violation where defendant opened the door to cross-examination on post-arrest silence by testifying on direct he did not make a statement to *446 the sheriff because it could be used against him and, since he was on parole, he did not think the sheriff would believe him); Wentz v. State, 766 N.E.2d 351, 362 (Ind.2002) (finding no Doyle violation because defendant opened the door to cross-examination on post-arrest silence by testifying on redirect he had answered all the police’s questions).

12004–2004
Truesdale v. Aiken green
scotus · 1987
12004–2004
McFadden v. State green
sc · 2000
12003–2003
State v. Caldwell green
sc · 1990
12003–2003
State v. Dawkins green
sc · 1989
12003–2003
Anderson v. Charles green
scotus · 1980
12003–2003
State v. Prince green
sc · 1983
12003–2003
Brecht v. Abrahamson green
scotus · 1993
11998–1998
Kotteakos v. United States green
scotus · 1946
11998–1998

Where else courts name it

IL 116 (1977–2025) CA 89 (1979–2026) IN 63 (1980–2026) KS 53 (1977–2024) CT 52 (1984–2025) OH 32 (1982–2020) SC 20 (1984–2023) LA 20 (1915–2018) MA 19 (1983–2026) MO 17 (1983–2025) MT 16 (1996–2025) MI 15 (1990–2022) AR 14 (1987–2019) AL 13 (1996–2015) TX 9 (1987–2024) UT 9 (1997–2020) NE 8 (1988–2016) ND 7 (1986–2024) WA 6 (1980–2008) VA 6 (1988–2023) PA 5 (2004–2025) MS 5 (1997–2018) TN 5 (2014–2025) GA 4 (1978–2008) IA 4 (1984–2024) NY 4 (1979–2014) FL 3 (1939–2018) AZ 3 (1994–2025) ME 3 (2012–2018) ID 3 (1983–2005) RI 2 (1994–1998) WV 2 (1988–1998) MN 2 (1992–2015) KY 2 (1994–2014) DC 2 (1985–2007) MD 2 (1998–2011) OK 2 (1988–1994) VT 2 (1988–2017) NJ 2 (1996–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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