Chandler v. Chandler, 409 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. 1991). · Go Syfert
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Chandler v. Chandler, 409 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. 1991). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases · …no rights of visitation with the child except that she may visit with the child at such times and places and on such conditions as are agreed to in writing by the parties. ✓
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1996 · …shall be suspended or modified during such time that either therapist determines appellant presents a risk to the child's emotional or physical safety or well-being or presents a risk of fleeing with the child, ⚠ not in text
26 citation events (18 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Andrew Paul Beall v. Megan Alisha Beall (gactapp, 2024-01-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) Andrew Paul Beall v. Megan Alisha Beall (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Thus, the trial court was authorized to expand the restriction into a permanent ban only if there was evidence that contact with B. would be harmful to A. B.7 Nothing in the record 6 Chandler, 261 Ga. at 599 (1) (where the trial court was concerned that the non- custodial parent would take the child outside the court’s jurisdiction, the court abused its discretion by denying the parent any right to visit her child because a less extreme arrangement would have satisfied the court’s concern). 7 See Arnold v. Arnold, 275 Ga. 354 ( 566 SE2d 679 ) (2002) (“In the absence of any evidence that …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mitchum v. Manning
Ga. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Under these circumstances, and in the absence of any medical or other direct testimony that visitation with Manning would have a negative impact on Wanda, we agree with the trial court that the current record is insufficient to justify denying Manning visitation with his daughter. 2 Cf. Woodruff, 272 Ga. at 485-488 (1); Chandler v. Chandler, 261 Ga. 598, 599 (1) ( 409 SE2d 203 ) (1991); Shook, 242 Ga. at 56 (2) Judgment affirmed.
discussed Cited "see" Woodruff v. Woodruff (2×)
Ga. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Chandler v. Chandler, 261 Ga. 598, 599 (1) ( 409 SE2d 203 ) (1991).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Selvage v. Franklin. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Chandler v. Chandler , 261 Ga. 598 , 599 (1), 409 S.E.2d 203 (1991) (trial court's effective denial of any visitation with child was abuse of trial court's discretion where "[l]ess extreme arrangements, including limited and supervised visitation, could be instituted to satisfy the trial court's concerns that appellant might abduct the child if granted visitation"); Taylor v. Taylor , 282 Ga. 113 , 116, 646 S.E.2d 238 (2007) (Sears, J., dissenting) (trial court's order denying all visitation and prohibiting any contact with child is "a de facto termination order" which sidesteps the…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Weiss v. Grant. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Chandler v. Chandler , 261 Ga. 598 , 599 (1), 409 S.E.2d 203 (1991).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bryant v. Bryant (2×)
Ala. Civ. App. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Chandler v. Chandler , 261 Ga. 598 , 409 S.E.2d 203 (1991) (order leaving visitation completely at the unfettered discretion of father is in effect an order denying any right of visitation); Willey v. Willey , 253 Iowa 1294 , 115 N.W.2d 833 (1962) (order allowing mother to visit her children at the father's discretion held improper); McCourtney v. McCourtney , 205 Ark. 111 , 168 S.W.2d 200 (1943) (order allowing father visitation with his children on the mother's written permission held improper).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Chandler
v.
Chandler
S91A0632.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Oct 18, 1991.
409 S.E.2d 203
Cheeley & Chandler, Joseph E. Cheeley, Joseph E. Cheeley III, for appellant., Chestnut & Livingston, Tom Pye, for appellee.
Benham.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published
Benham, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order changing child custody from appellant, the mother, to appellee, the father. The change of custody[*599] proceeding, and an associated contempt proceeding, stemmed from appellant’s conduct in taking the child out of Georgia without notice to appellee, a violation of the divorce decree, and in withholding visitation based on an assertion that she was protecting the child from sexual abuse by appellee. After the Court of Appeals denied appellant’s application for discretionary review, we granted the writ of certiorari in order to consider a provision in the trial court’s final order which gave appellant “no rights of visitation with the child except that she may visit with the child at such times and places and on such conditions as are agreed to in writing by the parties.”

1. The trial court’s order has the effect of denying appellant any right to visitation with her daughter, leaving the visitation completely at the unfettered discretion of appellee. In Shook v. Shook, 242 Ga. 55 (2) (247 SE2d 855) (1978), where the divorce decree awarded the noncustodial parent “reasonable” visitation privileges, but the custodial parent refused to permit any visitation, this court found an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s failure, upon the non-custodial parent’s motion therefor, to specify times, places, and circumstances of visitation.

“A divorced parent has a natural right of access to [her] child awarded to the other parent, and only under exceptional circumstances should the right or privilege be denied.” [Cit.] Appellant was not shown to be an unfit parent in either the original divorce proceeding or the present action. Therefore, we find that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to specify times, places and circumstances for visitation. . . . [Id. at 56.]

While it is true that appellant and her counsel contributed to the present problem by declining to make any suggestion to the court regarding appellant’s right to visitation, and that the trial court expressed concern that appellant would take the child out of the jurisdiction again, we do not believe that the trial court’s solution, effectively denying appellant any right to visit her daughter, was a sound exercise of the trial court’s discretion. Less extreme arrangements, including limited and supervised visitation, could be instituted to satisfy the trial court’s concerns that appellant might abduct the child if granted visitation. Accordingly, we reverse the visitation portion of the trial court’s order and remand for entry of an appropriate award of visitation rights to appellant.

2. Upon consideration of appellant’s other enumerations of error, we find no cause for reversal.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

All the Justices concur. [*600] Decided October 18, 1991. Cheeley & Chandler, Joseph E. Cheeley, Joseph E. Cheeley III, for appellant. Chestnut & Livingston, Tom Pye, for appellee.