clear and convincing evidence standard in Georgia

2021See Raulerson v. Warden, 928 F3d 987, 1013-1014 (I) (B) (11th Cir. 2019) (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the varying standards of proof applied).

2021See Raulerson v. Warden, 928 F3d 987, 1013-1014 (I) (B) (11th Cir. 2019) (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the varying standards of proof applied).

2021Stripling, 289 Ga. at 373 (1).

2021Stripling, 289 Ga. at 373 (1).

2019See Luke v. Luke , 280 Ga. App. 607 , 610-611 (2), 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006) ; cf. Rainey v. Lange , 261 Ga. App. 491 , 492 (1), 583 S.E.2d 163 (2003) (The trial court's grandparent visitation order failed to show that it applied the clear and convincing evidence standard and, instead, stated only as follows: "Given the allegations the parents have raised against each other (but without making a finding as to the truth or falsity of any of the allegations), the [c]ourt finds that enough issues have been raised that visitation with the maternal grandparents is in the child's best interests and will

2019See Luke v. Luke , 280 Ga. App. 607 , 610-611 (2), 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006) ; cf. Rainey v. Lange , 261 Ga. App. 491 , 492 (1), 583 S.E.2d 163 (2003) (The trial court's grandparent visitation order failed to show that it applied the clear and convincing evidence standard and, instead, stated only as follows: "Given the allegations the parents have raised against each other (but without making a finding as to the truth or falsity of any of the allegations), the [c]ourt finds that enough issues have been raised that visitation with the maternal grandparents is in the child's best interests and will

2019See Luke v. Luke , 280 Ga. App. 607 , 610-611 (2), 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006) ; cf. Rainey v. Lange , 261 Ga. App. 491 , 492 (1), 583 S.E.2d 163 (2003) (The trial court's grandparent visitation order failed to show that it applied the clear and convincing evidence standard and, instead, stated only as follows: "Given the allegations the parents have raised against each other (but without making a finding as to the truth or falsity of any of the allegations), the [c]ourt finds that enough issues have been raised that visitation with the maternal grandparents is in the child's best interests and will

2019See Luke v. Luke , 280 Ga. App. 607 , 610-611 (2), 634 S.E.2d 439 (2006) ; cf. Rainey v. Lange , 261 Ga. App. 491 , 492 (1), 583 S.E.2d 163 (2003) (The trial court's grandparent visitation order failed to show that it applied the clear and convincing evidence standard and, instead, stated only as follows: "Given the allegations the parents have raised against each other (but without making a finding as to the truth or falsity of any of the allegations), the [c]ourt finds that enough issues have been raised that visitation with the maternal grandparents is in the child's best interests and will

2017See Slakman, supra, 277 Ga. at 191 ; Johnson v. State, 267 Ga. 77, 78 ( 475 SE2d 595 ) (1996).

2017See Slakman, supra, 277 Ga. at 191 ; Johnson v. State, 267 Ga. 77, 78 ( 475 SE2d 595 ) (1996).

2017See Slakman, supra, 277 Ga. at 191 ; Johnson v. State, 267 Ga. 77, 78 ( 475 SE2d 595 ) (1996).

2017See Slakman, supra, 277 Ga. at 191 ; Johnson v. State, 267 Ga. 77, 78 ( 475 SE2d 595 ) (1996).

2012The Supreme Court of Georgia has ruled that “although OCGA § 51-1-29.5 (c) raises the burden of proof in certain cases, it does not deprive [plaintiffs] of the right to a jury trial or any other fundamental right.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gliemmo, supra, 287 Ga. at 11 (3).

2012The Supreme Court of Georgia has ruled that “although OCGA § 51-1-29.5 (c) raises the burden of proof in certain cases, it does not deprive [plaintiffs] of the right to a jury trial or any other fundamental right.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gliemmo, supra, 287 Ga. at 11 (3).

1988A., 172 Ga. App. 364, 365-366 ( 323 SE2d 208 ) (1984). ‘The factfinding and weighing of evidence is to be done in the trial court under the clear and convincing evidence test.

1988A., 172 Ga. App. 364, 365-366 ( 323 SE2d 208 ) (1984). ‘The factfinding and weighing of evidence is to be done in the trial court under the clear and convincing evidence test.

2019See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 756 (II) ( 102 SCt 1388 , 71 LE2d 599) (1982) (discussing the clear and convincing evidence standard).

2019See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 756 (II) ( 102 SCt 1388 , 71 LE2d 599) (1982) (discussing the clear and convincing evidence standard).

2019R. lived with Lindsey 13 See Luke v. Luke, 280 Ga. App. 607, 610-611 (2) ( 634 SE2d 439 ) (2006); cf. Rainey v. Lange, 261 Ga. App. 491, 492 (1) ( 583 SE2d 163 ) (2003) (The trial court’s grandparent visitation order failed to show that it applied the clear and convincing evidence standard and, instead, stated only as follows: “Given the allegations the parents have raised against each other (but without making a finding as to the truth or falsity of any of the allegations), the [c]ourt finds that enough issues have been raised that visitation with the maternal grandparents is in the child’s b

2019Sheppard , 317 Ga. App. at 92 -93 , 730 S.E.2d 721 (citations omitted).

2008The factfinding and weighing of evidence is to be done in the trial court under the clear and convincing evidence test." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of E.C., 225 Ga. App. 12, 19 , 482 S.E.2d 522 (1997).

2008The factfinding and weighing of evidence is to be done in the trial court under the clear and convincing evidence test." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of E.C., 225 Ga. App. 12, 19 , 482 S.E.2d 522 (1997).

2021See Hill, 269 Ga. at 303-304 (4). 40 standard of proof has been challenged several times in this Court on constitutional grounds, particularly in light of the fact that some other states impose only a clear and convincing evidence standard on defendants seeking to prove their intellectual disability and the majority of states that still have the death penalty impose only a preponderance of the evidence standard on defendants.

2019See, e.g., Chandler v. Chandler , 261 Ga. 598 , 599 (1), 409 S.E.2d 203 (1991) (trial court's effective denial of any visitation with child was abuse of trial court's discretion where "[l]ess extreme arrangements, including limited and supervised visitation, could be instituted to satisfy the trial court's concerns that appellant might abduct the child if granted visitation"); Taylor v. Taylor , 282 Ga. 113 , 116, 646 S.E.2d 238 (2007) (Sears, J., dissenting) (trial court's order denying all visitation and prohibiting any contact with child is "a de facto termination order" which sidesteps the

2019See, e.g., Chandler v. Chandler , 261 Ga. 598 , 599 (1), 409 S.E.2d 203 (1991) (trial court's effective denial of any visitation with child was abuse of trial court's discretion where "[l]ess extreme arrangements, including limited and supervised visitation, could be instituted to satisfy the trial court's concerns that appellant might abduct the child if granted visitation"); Taylor v. Taylor , 282 Ga. 113 , 116, 646 S.E.2d 238 (2007) (Sears, J., dissenting) (trial court's order denying all visitation and prohibiting any contact with child is "a de facto termination order" which sidesteps the

2019See Warren , 336 Ga. App. at 344 -345 , 785 S.E.2d 25 (vacating trial court's custody order and remanding case where father requested findings of fact and conclusions of law and order failed to provide such). 2.

2019See Warren , 336 Ga. App. at 344 -345 , 785 S.E.2d 25 (vacating trial court's custody order and remanding case where father requested findings of fact and conclusions of law and order failed to provide such). 2.

2015Cir. 2013) (collecting cases); United States v. Diaz, 630 F3d 1314, 1330-1331 (11th Cir. 2011) (same). 4 We also join the prevailing view and hold that the State should bear the burden of proof on the factual questions involved under the clear and convincing evidence standard.

2015See, e.g., Dillon, 738 F3d at 291-292 (collecting cases); Diaz, 630 F3d at 1331 (same). *813 See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 432-433 ( 99 SCt 1804 , 60 LE2d 323) (1979) (holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard is the lowest standard that due process permits for cases involving civil commitment).

2015See, e.g., Dillon, 738 F3d at 291-292 (collecting cases); Diaz, 630 F3d at 1331 (same). *813 See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 432-433 ( 99 SCt 1804 , 60 LE2d 323) (1979) (holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard is the lowest standard that due process permits for cases involving civil commitment).

2015See, e.g., Dillon, 738 F3d at 291-292 (collecting cases); Diaz, 630 F3d at 1331 (same). *813 See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 432-433 ( 99 SCt 1804 , 60 LE2d 323) (1979) (holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard is the lowest standard that due process permits for cases involving civil commitment).

2015See, e.g., Dillon, 738 F3d at 291-292 (collecting cases); Diaz, 630 F3d at 1331 (same). *813 See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 432-433 ( 99 SCt 1804 , 60 LE2d 323) (1979) (holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard is the lowest standard that due process permits for cases involving civil commitment).

2015See, e.g., Dillon, 738 F3d at 291-292 (collecting cases); Diaz, 630 F3d at 1331 (same). *813 See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 432-433 ( 99 SCt 1804 , 60 LE2d 323) (1979) (holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard is the lowest standard that due process permits for cases involving civil commitment).

2011See Stripling, 277 Ga. at 410 (3), 590 S.E.2d 122 . [2] Soon after Atkins , Delaware completed its adoption of the clear and convincing evidence standard for proving mental retardation.

2011See Stripling, 277 Ga. at 410 (3), 590 S.E.2d 122 . [2] Soon after Atkins , Delaware completed its adoption of the clear and convincing evidence standard for proving mental retardation.

2009See also Johnson v. Taylor, 292 Ga. App. at 354 (this Court applies the clear and convincing evidence standard when considering the sufficiency of evidence in adoption cases involving the termination of parental rights).

2009“It is the petitioner's] burden to prove that termination of the mother’s parental rights is warranted, including the lack of justifiable cause.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Smallwood v. Davis, 292 Ga. App. 173, 175 (1) ( 664 SE2d 254 ) (2008).

2009“It is the petitioner's] burden to prove that termination of the mother’s parental rights is warranted, including the lack of justifiable cause.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Smallwood v. Davis, 292 Ga. App. 173, 175 (1) ( 664 SE2d 254 ) (2008).

2004Further, in Mack Trucks v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 544-545 (4) ( 436 SE2d 635 ) (1993), our Supreme Court sustained an award of punitive damages under the clear and convincing evidence standard when the evidence showed that over a period of years a manufacturer ignored evidence that its trucks had cracks in their frames by finding that the evidence showed a conscious indifference to the consequences.

2004Further, in Mack Trucks v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 544-545 (4) ( 436 SE2d 635 ) (1993), our Supreme Court sustained an award of punitive damages under the clear and convincing evidence standard when the evidence showed that over a period of years a manufacturer ignored evidence that its trucks had cracks in their frames by finding that the evidence showed a conscious indifference to the consequences.

2002However, “any evidence” means any evidence “sufficient under the applicable standard”; here, the standard is clear and convincing evidence. [See Tronitec, Inc. v. Shealy, 249 Ga. App. 442, 448 ( 547 SE2d 749 ) (2001) (standard of proof under RICO statute clear and convincing evidence).] As such, under a clear and convincing evidence standard there must be substantial evidence to constitute “any evidence” to support a verdict under such intermediate standard of proof; a scintilla or slight amount of evidence would not satisfy such a higher standard of proof.

2002However, “any evidence” means any evidence “sufficient under the applicable standard”; here, the standard is clear and convincing evidence. [See Tronitec, Inc. v. Shealy, 249 Ga. App. 442, 448 ( 547 SE2d 749 ) (2001) (standard of proof under RICO statute clear and convincing evidence).] As such, under a clear and convincing evidence standard there must be substantial evidence to constitute “any evidence” to support a verdict under such intermediate standard of proof; a scintilla or slight amount of evidence would not satisfy such a higher standard of proof.

2001See Clarke v. Cotton, 263 Ga. 861, 862 , 440 S.E.2d 165 (1994). 5.

2001See Clarke v. Cotton, 263 Ga. 861, 862 , 440 S.E.2d 165 (1994). 5.

2001The trial court erred in failing to define the clear and convincing evidence standard at the end of the first phase of the trial before the jury applied that standard in determining whether punitive damages were appropriate.H & H Subs, Inc. v. Lim, 223 Ga. App. 656, 658-659 (2) ( 478 SE2d 632 ) (1996); Gen.

2001The trial court erred in failing to define the clear and convincing evidence standard at the end of the first phase of the trial before the jury applied that standard in determining whether punitive damages were appropriate.H & H Subs, Inc. v. Lim, 223 Ga. App. 656, 658-659 (2) ( 478 SE2d 632 ) (1996); Gen.