City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1994). · Go Syfert
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City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
208 citation events (149 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In the Interest of W.A.H., a Child v. the State of Texas, No. 05-23-00625-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 24, 2023)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
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At page 23 Determining applicability of general versus specific statutes42 citing casesWhen two statutes conflict, the specific controls over the general.2 citing courts put it this way · 37 listed here
Show 27 more citing cases
  • Peachtree Constr., Ltd. v. Marion Neal Head, No. 07-08-00020-CV (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 8, 2009).published
    City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. 1994) (citing Sam Bassett Lumber Co. v. City of Houston, 145 Tex. 492 , 198 S.W.2d 879, 881 (1947)).
  • Untitled Texas Attorney Gen. Opinion, No. GA-0650 (Tex. Att'y Gen. July 2, 2008).published
    Texas courts, including the Texas Supreme Court, have construed the term "special or local" to mean "specific." See City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. 1994); see also Tex. Att'y Gen.
  • William Eugene Springer, M.D., Lubbock Heart Hosp., Cardiologists of Lubbock, P.A., Joseph A. Rizzo, M.D., & Roberto E. Solis, M.D. v. Joyce Johnson, No. 07-07-00424-CV (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 4, 2008).published
    City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. 1994) (citing Sam Bassett Lumber Co. v. City of Houston, 145 Tex. 492 , 198 S.W.2d 879, 881 (1947)).
  • Springer v. Johnson, 280 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008).published
    City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex.1994) (citing Sam Bassett Lumber Co. v. City of Houston, 145 Tex. 492 , 198 S.W.2d 879, 881 (1947)).
  • Untitled Texas Attorney Gen. Opinion, No. GA-0441 (Tex. Att'y Gen. July 2, 2006).published
    (the specific controls over the general)
  • City of San Antonio v. Butler, 131 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004).published
    See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.025 (Vernon 1998); City of *177 Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. 1994). 8 Finally, for many of the same reasons discussed with respect to section 51.075, the language of the City Charter should not…
  • Howard v. East Texas Baptist Univ., 122 S.W.3d 407 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003).published
    No. 1 v. Crossland, 781 S.W.2d 427 , 437 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1989, writ denied) ("This statute serves the salutary purpose of encouraging landowners to allow the public to enjoy outdoor recreation on the landowner's property by limiting th…
  • City of Bellmead v. Torres, 89 S.W.3d 611 (Tex. 2002).published 5 cites
    See City of Lubbock v. Rule, 68 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (concluding that using playground equipment is “akin to ‘picnicking’ (albeit without the food)” and thus that it is an activity associated with enjoying natu…
  • State v. Est. of Horton, 4 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999).published
    See City of Fort Worth v. Adams, 888 S.W.2d 607, 613-14 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 992 , 116 S.Ct. 525 , 133 L.Ed.2d 432 (1995); Tarrant County Water Control and Improvement District No. 1 v. Crossland,…
  • Davis v. Covert, 983 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998).published
    City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex.1994); Graf v. Harris County, 877 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.026(b) (Vernon 1988).
  • Siders v. State, 970 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998).published 2 cites
    No. 1 v. Crossland, 781 S.W.2d 427 , 433 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied), overruled on other grounds by City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex.1994); see also Villarreal, 810 S.W.2d at 422 .
  • Hollingsworth v. City of Dallas, 931 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996).published
    See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.025 (Vernon 1988); City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex.1994).
  • Barker v. City of Galveston, 907 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995).published 2 cites
    On appeal, the City no longer relies on section 75.002 because, after summary judgment was rendered, the Supreme Court decided City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex.1994).
  • Lipton v. Wilhite, 902 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995).published 4 cites
    City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 22 (Tex.1994); Burton Constr. & Shipbuilding Co. v. Broussard, 154 Tex. 50 , 273 S.W.2d 598, 603 (1954).
  • Bennett v. Tarrant Cty Water Control, 894 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995).published 2 cites
    See Terrell, 588 S.W.2d at 787-88 ; Mitchell, 855 S.W.2d at 745 ; Christilles v. Southwest Texas State Univ., 639 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex.App.—Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.), overruled on other grounds by, City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2…
  • CIGNA Ins. Co. v. TPG Store, Inc., 894 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995).published 2 cites
    City of Dallas v. Mitchell , 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. 1994); Sam Bassett Lumber Co. v. City of Houston , 198 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex. 1947).
  • Maxwell v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 880 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994).published
    No. 1 v. Crossland, 781 S.W.2d 427 , 432 (Tex.App. —Fort Worth 1989, writ denied), overruled on other grounds, Mitchell v. City of Dallas, 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex.1994).
  • Rhonda Maxwell v. Texas Dep't of Transp., No. 03-93-00562-CV (Tex. App.—Austin June 22, 1994).published
    No. 1 v. Crossland , 781 S.W.2d 427 , 432 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1989, writ denied), overruled on other grounds, Mitchell v. City of Dallas , 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. 1994).
  • Russell v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 219 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007).published
  • Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 36 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001).published
  • Smith v. Adair, 96 S.W.3d 700 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003).published
  • Howell Aviation Servs. v. Aerial Ads, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000).published
  • McLendon v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Saf., 985 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998).published
  • Martin v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 2008-NMCA-151, 194 P.3d 766.published
  • Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n Todd Brown in His Off. Capacity as Exec. Dir. of the Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n & Michael L. MacIk, No. 03-00-00370-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 21, 2000).published
  • A. O. Smith v. John Adair, No. 06-02-00163-CV, 2003 WL 141148 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 24, 2003).published
  • Untitled Texas Attorney Gen. Opinion, No. GA-0476 (Tex. Att'y Gen. July 2, 2006).published
At page 22 Analyzing conflict between tort and property liability statutes21 citing cases“the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.”9 citing courts quote it · 18 listed here
  • City of Bay City v. Bobbie P. Gaspard, No. 13-14-00439-CV (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 13, 2015).published
    “This distinction is often stated in terms of actions taken at the planning or policy-making level, which are immune, and actions taken at the subordinate or operational level, which are not immune.” Mitchell v. City of Dallas, 855 S.W.2d…
  • Wichita Cnty. & Wichita Cnty. Commissioners Court v. Daryl Lee Bonnin, No. 02-07-00156-CV (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 2, 2008).published
    If the conflict between a general provision and a more specific provision is irreconcilable, “the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the man…
  • Wichita Cnty. v. Bonnin, 268 S.W.3d 811 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008).published
    If the conflict between a general provision and a more specific provision is irreconcilable, “the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the man…
  • Untitled Texas Attorney Gen. Opinion, No. GA-0650 (Tex. Att'y Gen. July 2, 2008).published
    Texas courts, including the Texas Supreme Court, have construed the term "special or local" to mean "specific." See City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. 1994); see also Tex. Att'y Gen.
  • in the Interest of C.A.P., Jr. & M.M.P., Child., 233 S.W.3d 896 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007).published
    If the conflict between a general provision and a more specific provision is irreconcilable, “the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the man…
  • In Re Cap, 233 S.W.3d 896 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007).published
    If the conflict between a general provision and a more specific provision is irreconcilable, "the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the man…
  • Pifer v. Muse, 984 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998).published
    City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 22 (Tex.1994); Lipton v. Wilhite, 902 S.W.2d 598 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
  • Johnson v. State, 926 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996).published 2 cites
    GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.026 (Vernon 1988); City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 22 (Tex.1994); State v. Kinkle, 902 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no pet.).
  • Harris v. State, 913 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995).published
    Wilson v. State, 899 S.W.2d at 39 (citing City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 22-23 (Tex.1994)).
  • Simmons v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 932 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1995).published
    See generally, Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.026 (Vernon 1988); City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 22 (Tex.1994).
Show 8 more citing cases
At page 37 cited at this page1 citing case
  • the Univ. of Texas v. Hermelinda Amezquita, No. 03-06-00606-CV (Tex. App.—Austin June 4, 2009).published
    Safety, 35 S.W.3d 723, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (parking lot); Mitchell v. City of Dallas, 855 S.W.2d 741, 745 (Tex. 4 App.—Dallas 1993) (public buildings and other municipal premises), aff’d, 870 S.W.2d 21, 37…
Other citing cases3 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
CITY OF DALLAS, Texas, Petitioner,
v.
Saundra Harris MITCHELL, Et Al., Respondents
D-4311.
Texas Supreme Court.
Mar 9, 1994.
Published opinion
870 S.W.2d 21
1994 WL 27173
Patricia Medrano and Sam A. Lindsay, Dallas, for petitioner., Kristina Bline, Burleson, for respondents.
Enoch.
Cited by 168 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: #39,021 of 633,719
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Texas (2)
Justice ENOCH

delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Justices join.

The only issue in this case is whether the recreational use statute in Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code AnN. § 76.002 applies to governmental entities. For the reasons stated below, we hold that it does not.

The Mitchells brought suit against the City of Dallas for injuries suffered by their minor son, Ashley Harris, when he fell from his bicycle into a creek bed in a public park owned and maintained by the City. The accident occurred at a location in the park where there is a 15 to 25 foot drop-off along the creek. The drop-off is created by a gabion wall constructed by the City for erosion control. The Mitchells allege the City was negligent and grossly negligent in the construction and maintenance of the gabion wall and that the City failed to warn park users of the drop-off or construct a fence around the area. The City moved for summary judgment asserting that it was not liable as a matter of law because the duty the City owed to Ashley Harris is the duty a landowner owes to a trespasser under section 75.002. The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment.

The court of appeals reversed the trial court holding that section 75.002 does not apply to governmental entities because the applicable standard of care owed to recreational users on government property is specified in section 101.022 of the Texas Tort Claims Act. Tex.Civ.PraC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.022(a) (Vernon 1986). 855 S.W.2d 741, 747. We granted the application for writ of error in this case to resolve a conflict among the courts of appeals. See Martinez v. Harris County, 808 S.W.2d 257 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) and Tarrant County Water Control & Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Crossland, 781 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied) (both cases holding that section 75.002 controls). We agree with the court of appeals below that section 75.002 does not control because the duty owed by governmental units to persons injured on government property is prescribed by section 101.022 of the Texas Tort[*22] Claims Act. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Under the Texas Tort Claims Act, a governmental unit is liable for personal injuries “so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.” Tex.Civ.PRAc. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1986). Section 101.022 specifically deals with the duty of care owed by a governmental entity in premises defect eases:

(a) If a claim arises from a premise defect, the governmental unit owes to the claimant only the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private property, unless the claimant pays for the use of the premises.
(b) The limitation of duty in this section does not apply to the duty to warn of special defects such as excavations or obstructions on highways, roads, or streets or to the duty to warn of the absence, condition, or malfunction of traffic signs, signals, or warning devices as is required by Section 101.060.

Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.022 (emphasis added).

Section 75.002 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code provides for limited liability to land owners who permit others to use their property for recreational purposes:

If an owner, lessee, or occupant of real property gives permission to another to enter the premises for recreation, the owner, lessee, or occupant, by giving the permission, does not: ...
(2) owe to the person to whom permission is granted a greater degree of care than is owed to a trespasser on the premises; ....

Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 75.002 (emphasis added). [1]

The City asserts that section 75.002 applies and that it owed to Ashley Harris only the same duties owed to a trespasser, i.e., not to injure him willfully or through gross negligence and to warn of, or make safe, dangerous conditions actually known. [2] Burton Construction and Shipbuilder Co. v. Broussard, 154 Tex. 50, 273 S.W.2d 598, 603 (1955); Mendoza v. City of Corpus Christi 700 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, writ refd n.r.e.). We disagree.

The two statutes give rise to an apparent conflict when the landowner is a governmental entity who gives implied permission to use its property for recreation purposes. When faced with a conflict in statutory provisions, the Code Construction Act gives us guidance:

(a) If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, the provisions shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both.
(b) If the conflict between the general provision and the special or local provision is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general rule, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.

Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.026 (Vernon 1988). The predecessor to section 75.002 was enacted in 1965 as Article lb in the General Provisions of Title 1 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. See Act of May 29,1965, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 677, 1965 Tex.Gen.Laws 1551, 1551-2; Tex.Rev.Civ.StatAnn. art. lb, § 1 (Vernon 1969). The predecessor to section 101.022(a), Article 6252-19, § 18(b) of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, was enacted four years later in 1969. See Texas Tort Claims Act, 61st Leg., R.S., ch. 292, 1969 Tex.Gen.Laws 874, 878-79; Tex.Rev.Civ.[*23] Stat.Ann. art. 6252-19, § 18(b) (Vernon 1970).

In light of this legislative history, the court of appeals correctly concluded that section 75.002 and its predecessor, Article lb, were intended to be laws of general application and that section 101.022(a) and its predecessor, Article 6252-19, § 18(b), were specific laws applicable to governmental landowners. When two statutes conflict, the specific controls over the general. Sam Bassett Lumber Co. v. City of Houston, 145 Tex. 492, 198 S.W.2d 879, 881 (1947); Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.026(b). In addition, the more recent statutory enactment prevails over an earlier statute. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 811.025(a).

We hold that section 75.002 does not apply to governmental entities because the standard of care owed to recreational users on government property is specified in section 101.022 of the Texas Tort Claims Act. We disapprove of Martinez v. Harris County, 808 S.W.2d 257 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) and Tarrant County Water Control & Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Crossland, 781 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied) to the extent these cases are contrary to our holding today. The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.

1

. Section 75.002 was amended effective September 1, 1989. See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 75.002(c) (Vernon Supp.1994). This cause of action accrued prior to the effective date, and therefore, the amendments are not applicable to this case. In any event, the amendments resulted in no substantive change in the statutory provision at issue in this case.

2

. In a cross-point, the Mitchells argue that the City owed Ashley Harris the same duty as is owed to invitees because the Mitchells paid for use of the park through the payment of taxes. The court of appeals rejected this argument. 855 S.W.2d at 747; see also, Garcia v. State, 817 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied). The Mitchells did not file a motion for rehearing on this point with the court of appeals and thus have waived this point of error. Tex.R.App.P. 131(e). See also City of Denton v. Van Page, 701 S.W.2d 831, 833, n. 2 (Tex.1986).