Rivers v. State, 328 A.2d 398 (Vt. 1974). · Go Syfert
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Rivers v. State, 328 A.2d 398 (Vt. 1974). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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The state is not liable for injuries caused by inmates released on probation or parole because such liability would undermine the rehabilitative goals of inmate release.

The plaintiffs sued the state after two individuals were killed in a collision caused by a prisoner on a weekend pass who drove a stolen vehicle while intoxicated. The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that the state’s act of granting the pass was not the proximate cause of the accident. The court examines whether the release of a prisoner under statutory authority constitutes negligence and whether that act is a proximate cause of subsequent independent negligent acts, such as drunk driving and vehicle theft. The court holds that the granting of a furlough is a lawful act and, absent specific allegations of negligent administration, it is not a proximate cause of the prisoner’s independent criminal and negligent conduct. Consequently, the state is not liable for the resulting injuries, and the dismissal is affirmed.

104 citation events (53 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Burke v. Deml, No. 23-cv-1303 (Vt. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2024)
Treatment trajectory · 1974 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1974 2000 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
328 A.2d at 400 Limiting state liability for inmate release negligence17 citing cases“The law of proximate cause calls for a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible and which is alleged to be negligent and the resulting flow of injurious consequences”2 citing courts quote it
  • Drake ex rel. J.D. v. Allergan, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 382 (D. Vt. 2014).published
    “The law of proximate cause ‘calls for a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible and which is alleged to be negligent and the resulting flow of injurious consequences.’ ” Lussier v. Bessette,…
  • Lussier v. Bessette, 2010 VT 104, 16 A.3d 580.published
    “calls for a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible and which is alleged to be negligent and the resulting flow of injurious consequences”
  • State v. Sandsness, 72 P.3d 299 (Alaska 2003).published 2 cites
    (refusing to impose liability on state "where there is release on probation or parole, or even for early release based on good time)
  • Repucci v. Lake Champagne Campground, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Vt. 2002).published 2 cites
    See Hobart v. P. J.’s Auto Village, Inc., 136 Vt. 287, 289 , 388 A.2d 419, 420 (1978) (“It is also the well established law that negligence to be actionable must be the proximate cause of the injury for which compensation is sought.”) (cit…
  • Kennedy v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, 921 F. Supp. 231 (D. Vt. 1996).published
    See Langle v. Kurkul, 510 A.2d at 1305 ; Rivers v. State, 133 Vt. 11, 14 , 328 A.2d 398, 400 (1974); see also Restatement (Second) Torts, § 317(b)(ii) (A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant if he “k…
  • Est. of Sumner v. Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 649 A.2d 1034 (Vt. 1994).published
    (as a matter of law, release of inmate through furlough program not proximate cause of deaths from automobile accident negligently caused by inmate)
  • Kathy L. Lavoie v. Pac. Press & Shear Co., 975 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1992).published
    Rivers v. State of Vermont, 133 Vt. 11 , 328 A.2d 398, 400 (1974).
  • Tufts v. Wyand, 536 A.2d 541 (Vt. 1987).published
    Rivers v. State, 133 Vt.11, 14, 328 A.2d 398, 400 (1974).
  • Roberts v. State, 514 A.2d 694 (Vt. 1986).published 6 cites
    “The law of proximate cause calls for a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible and which is alleged to be negligent and the resulting flow of injurious consequences”
  • Peck v. Counseling Serv. of Addison Cnty., Inc., 499 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1985).published 2 cites
    Rivers v. State, 133 Vt. 11, 14 , 328 A.2d 398, 400 (1974).
Show 7 more citing cases
  • Brown v. Kelly, 437 A.2d 1103 (Vt. 1981).published
    Finnegan v. State, 138 Vt. 603, 606 , 420 A.2d 104, 105 (1980); Rivers v. State, 133 Vt. 11, 14 , 328 A.2d 398, 400 (1974).
  • Tina Stocker v. State of Vermont, 2021 VT 71, 215 VT 432.published 2 cites
    See Rivers v. State, 133 Vt. 11, 14 , 328 A.2d 398, 400 (1974).
  • Cannata v. Wiener, 789 A.2d 936 (Vt. 2001).published 2 cites
    Powers v. Hayes, 172 Vt. 535, 536, 776 A.2d 374, 375 (2001); see Rivers v. State, 133 Vt. 11, 14 , 328 A.2d 398, 400 (1974).
  • Sorge v. State, 762 A.2d 816 (Vt. 2000).published 4 cites
    See Rivers v. State, 133 Vt. 11, 14 , 328 A.2d 398, 400 (1974) (rejecting argument for transferable liability to State “where there is release on probation or parole, or even for early release based on good time.
  • Carole Kuligoski v. Brattleboro Retreat & Ne. Kingdom Human Servs., 2016 VT 54A, 156 A.3d 436.published 4 cites
    Id. at 177-78 , 762 A.2d at 820-21 ; see also Rivers v. State, 133 Vt. 11, 14 , 328 A.2d 398, 400 (1974) (emphasizing rehabilitative goals of release of inmates on probation or parole, and stating that liability premised on duty of State t…
  • Carole Kuligoski v. Brattleboro Retreat & Ne. Kingdom Human Servs., 2016 VT 54.published 2 cites
    Id. at 177-78 , 762 A.2d at 820-21 ; see also Rivers v. State, 133 Vt. 11, 14 , 328 A.2d 398, 400 (1974) (emphasizing rehabilitative goals of release of inmates on probation or parole, and stating that liability premised on duty of State t…
  • Fritzeen v. Trudell Consulting Engineers, Inc., 751 A.2d 293 (Vt. 2000).published 2 cites
    “Proximate cause is ordinarily an issue to be resolved by the jury ‘unless the proof is so clear that reasonable minds cannot draw different conclusions or where all reasonable minds would construe the facts and circumstances one way.’” Ro…
133 Vt. at 14 Defining proximate cause in negligent automobile accidents10 citing cases“the law of proximate cause calls for a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible and which is alleged to be negligent and the resulting flow of injurious consequences.”7 citing courts quote it
  • Burke v. Deml, No. 23-cv-1303 (Vt. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2024).published
    (The law of proximate cause calls for a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible and which is alleged to be negligent and the resulting flow of injurious consequences.)
  • Burlington Sch. Dist. v. Monsanto Co., Solutia, Inc., & Pharmacia LLC, No. 2:22-cv-00215 (D. Vt. June 30, 2026).
    “The law of proximate cause calls for a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible . . . and the resulting flow of injurious consequences”
  • Baptie v. Bruno, No. 235 (Vt. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2012).published
    “a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible and which is alleged to be negligent and the resulting flow of injurious consequences”
  • Harrington v. Rheaume, No. 729 (Vt. Super. Ct. July 9, 2012).published
    “a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible and which is alleged to be negligent and the resulting flow of injurious consequences”
  • Okundaye v. Driscoll, No. 83 (Vt. Super. Ct. May 12, 2011).published
    “a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible and which is alleged to be negligent and the resulting flow of injurious consequences”
  • Lussier v. Bessette, 2010 VT 104, 16 A.3d 580.published
    The law of *103 proximate cause “calls for a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible and which is alleged to be negligent and the resulting flow of injurious consequences.” Rivers v. State, 13…
  • Collins v. Thomas, No. 336 (Vt. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2005).published 3 cites
    A>The law of proximate cause calls for a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible and which is alleged to be negligent and the resulting flow of injurious consequences.=@ State v. Roberts, 147…
  • Watson v. Dimke, No. S1497 (Vt. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 2004).published
    Rivers v. State, 133 Vt. 11, 14 (1974).
  • Tufts v. Wyand, 536 A.2d 541 (Vt. 1987).published
    Rivers v. State, 133 Vt.11, 14, 328 A.2d 398, 400 (1974).
  • Roberts v. State, 514 A.2d 694 (Vt. 1986).published 6 cites
    "The law of proximate cause calls for a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible and which is alleged to be negligent and the resulting flow of injurious consequences." Rivers v. State, 133 Vt.…
328 A.2d at 399 Analyzing proximate cause and negligence requirements5 citing cases
  • Roberts v. State, 514 A.2d 694 (Vt. 1986).published 6 cites
    "The law of proximate cause calls for a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible and which is alleged to be negligent and the resulting flow of injurious consequences." Rivers v. State, 133 Vt.…
  • Hughes v. Holt, 435 A.2d 687 (Vt. 1981).published
    Rivers v. State, 133 Vt. 11, 13 , 328 A.2d 398, 399 (1974).
  • Finnegan v. State, 420 A.2d 104 (Vt. 1980).published
    As Mr. Chief Justice Barney stated in Rivers v. State, 133 Vt. 11, 13 , 328 A.2d 398, 399 (1974): There are two interrelated legal concerns involved here.
  • Collins v. Thomas, 2007 VT 92, 938 A.2d 1208.published 2 cites
    See, e.g., Rivers v. State, 133 Vt. 11, 13 , 328 A.2d 398, 399 (1974).
  • Collins v. Thomas, 2007 VT 92, 938 A.2d 1208.published 2 cites
    See, e.g., Rivers v. State, 133 Vt. 11, 13 , 328 A.2d 398, 399 (1974).
emphasizing rehabilitative goals of release of inmates on probation or parole, and stating that liability premised on duty of State to third parties harmed during inmate’s release on weekend pass “runs dangerously parallel to the arguments for preventative detention that represent an overriding of…no pin page on record · 2 citing cases listed
  • Carole Kuligoski v. Brattleboro Retreat & Ne. Kingdom Human Servs., 2016 VT 54A, 156 A.3d 436.published 4 cites
    (emphasizing rehabilitative goals of release of inmates on probation or parole, and stating that liability premised on duty of State to third parties harmed during inmate’s release on weekend pass “runs dangerously paral…)
  • Carole Kuligoski v. Brattleboro Retreat & Ne. Kingdom Human Servs., 2016 VT 54.published 2 cites
    (emphasizing rehabilitative goals of release of inmates on probation or parole, and stating that liability premised on duty of State to third parties harmed during inmate’s release on weekend pass “runs dangerously paral…)
Other citing cases1 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Mary Rivers, Administratrix of the Estate of Loretta Patterson
v.
State of Vermont, Et Al. and Mary Rivers, Administratrix of the Estate of Oscar Raymond Patterson v. State of Vermont, Et Al.
150-73 and 151-73.
Supreme Court of Vermont.
Oct 2, 1974.
Published opinion
328 A.2d 398
1974 Vt. LEXIS 276
McNamara, Fitzpatrick, Sylvester, Farrell & Maley, Burlington, for Plaintiff., Karen Me Andrew, Esq., of Dinse, Allen & Erdmann, Burlington, for Defendant.
Barney, Smith, Keyser, Daley, Larrow.
Cited by 36 opinions  |  Published
Barney, C.J.

These two cases, consolidated ■ below, have á most unhappy state of facts. The two deceased, each represented by the same administratrix, were killed in an automobile collision. The pleadings allege that the vehicle in which they were traveling was struck by a truck being driven without lights at a high rate of speed by one Douglas Robtoy, who was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. It was about eight o’clock on a September evening, and the fact that the Pattersons were in a lighted vehicle did not help them. Robtoy, at the time, was an inmate of the Burlington Regional Correctional Center but on release on a weekend pass. It appears from matter in the record that the truck was stolen.

Although a jury was empaneled, no issues of fact were submitted to them, since the ruling which is here appealed came at the close of the plaintiffs’ opening statement. At the time, the defendant State of Vermont made a motion which the trial court treated as a motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion and discharged the jury. The plaintiffs appealed.

The issues presented relate, first, to the presence of proximate cause as it applies' to the defendants Department of Corrections and State of Vermont, and, second, to sovereign immunity as it may be available to these same parties in this case. As to this last issue, an additional concern is the plaintiffs’ indicated wish to amend the pleadings to insure the proper presentation of the sovereign immunity question. Fundamentally, the plaintiffs are asserting the existence of factual issues requiring submission of the case to the jury, and making a dismissal on an issue of law prior to any factual adjudication erroneous.

Since proximate cause is an issue involved in the granting of the motion, and a vital ingredient of the plaintiffs’ cause of action, we will examine that question first It must be pointed out that this litigation does not make Douglas Robtoy a party. His own liability, if any, is not in issue; and any negligent[*13] acts of his are relevant only as a part of the chain of consequences claimed to be set in motion by some alleged negligent act or acts on the part of the defendants, unless his negligence is properly an intervening cause. See Bennett v. Robertson, 107 Vt. 202, 209-10,177 A. 625 (1935).

There are two interrelated legal concerns involved here. The first is whether or not the acts of the defendants as set out in the pleadings constitute negligence. The second is the related question of whether, if negligence, those acts formed any part of the proximate' cause. Without that connection, negligence itself does not support recovery. Paquin v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., Inc., 116 Vt. 466, 470, 78 A.2d 683 (1951).

It is the granting of a weekend pass to Robtoy that is set out as the triggering negligent act of the defendants. Certainly the granting of furloughs in this manner is not, per se, a negligent act. Robtoy was released under the authority of State statutes as they then existed. 28 V.S.A. § 109 authorized regional correction centers and envisaged the furloughing of prisoners assigned to such centers.'28 V.S.A. § 207(1) placed authority in the Commissioner of Corrections to grant freedom from close confinement for up to ten days. •-

These statutes represent a part of the rehabilitative pattern for criminal offenders that the Legislature has seen fit to implement. That body deliberately elected to put upon the public the risks incident to such a program, in return for' the presumably greater rehabilitative returns. Whether this was wise policy is not a judicial concern, since it was clearly within the proper province of the Legislature to undertake it.

Thus, by itself, the granting of a weekend pass is a proper action, justified under law, and therefore not negligent. However, although no facts are now alleged to support a claim that that action was performed in a negligent manner, in the light of the plaintiffs’ request for a chance to amend, and since all issues have been presented in argument supported by full and competent briefing, we will consider the proximate cause issue on the assumption that some valid claim could be made of negligence in the granting of a furlough. -

What the plaintiffs would have the court do is translate an act under the authority of that rehabilitative legislation into[*14] a part of the proximate cause of an automobile accident. This is to be done in the presence of a number of independent acts by Robtoy; namely, intoxication, theft of a vehicle, driving without lights and without maintaining a proper lookout, and driving at an excessive rate of speed. Nothing is alleged claiming that Robtoy suffered from any mental shortcoming such as to make him not responsible for his acts or that his state of competency required constant supervision.

The law of proximate cause calls for a causal connection between the act for which the defendant is claimed to be responsible and which is alleged to be negligent and the resulting flow of injurious consequences. McDonnell v. Montgomery Ward, 121 Vt. 221, 229, 154 A.2d 463 (1959). Foreseeability, although an ingredient in the determination of negligence, is not a factor in the determination of proximate cause. Dodge v. McArthur, 126 Vt. 81, 83, 223 A.2d 453 (1966). As that case says, proximate cause is described as cause-in-fact, resulting from the negligent act.

To say that Robtoy’s negligent acts were transferable to the State as a matter of causation, because the rehabilitative release mechanism was involved, is to claim the State is liable for such acts where there is release on probation or parole, or even for early release based on good time. Such a theory might hold the Legislature itself to be responsible if an accident occurred based on a release from a sentence too short to rehabilitate, or because a driving while intoxicated license suspension failed to prevent a subsequent accident.

The argument that suggests that this ought to be so, even on the facts of this case, runs dangerously parallel to the arguments for preventive detention that represent an overriding of constitutional limitations.

To this Court, the act of giving a weekend furlough to a prisoner not under such mental disability as to require supervision is an act outside the causative factors of the kind of negligent accident alleged in these proceedings. The motion for dismissal had to be granted as a matter of law, and the directed verdict was proper. This being so, the issues relating to sovereign immunity are not reached.

Judgment of dismissal affirmed.