At page 468 Determining mineral interest upon lease termination40 citing cases“a possibility of reverter is the interest left in a grantor after the grant of a fee simple determinable.”
- Ruth McLean Bowers, Marrs McLean Bowman, Bonnie Bowman Korbell, Ruth Bowman Russell, Beth Bowman Harper & Margaret Bowman McMahon v. Betty Speer Taylor, Robert C. Barker, Jr., Charles H. Barker, David T. Speer, T.C. Craighead & Co., & Bank of Am., N.A., as Tr. for the Katherine C. Holt Trusts F/B/O Robert C. Barker, Jr., Charles H. Barker, Betty Speer Taylor, David T. Speer, No. 01-05-00667-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 3, 2007).published (forfeited or terminated without producing mineral of any kind)
- Bowers v. Taylor, 263 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007).published (forfeited or terminated without producing mineral of any kind)
- Deborah J. Greer, Diana MacY, Marvin Greer, Jr. & MAP2004, LLC D/B/A MAP2004-OK, Wolf Bone Ranch Partners LLC, Sapphire Royalties, Inc., Stephen Flanagan, Tr. of the Midland Trust, John G. Harper, John P. Wandel, Jr. v. Glenn David Shook, Sheila Lucile McCrea, Esq. on Behalf of the Marguerite A. McCrea Trust, as Co-Tr., Carl A. Crowley, as of the Est. of Annie Lee Crowley, Christopher Lance Trigg, Cecily Trigg Ortenberg, Lynn D. Hughes, 503 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016).published “texas courts have long recognized that the owner of a mineral estate can sell or assign the possibility of reverter.”
- Thomas R. Craddick, Sr & Sandra H. Staley/Cimarex Energy Co., Prize Energy Resources, Inc. & BPX Props. (N.A.) LP v. Cimarex Energy Co., Prize Energy Resources, Inc. & BPX Props. (N.A.) LP/Thomas R. Craddick, Sr & Sandra H. Staley, No. 08-24-00010-CV (May 28, 2026).publishedJupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991).
- Ridgefield Permian, LLC & Albert Jeffryes Griffiths, as Tr. of the Albert Jeffryes Griffiths Trust v. Diamondback E & P LLC & Magnolia, LLC, 626 S.W.3d 357 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021).published Co. v. Laddex, Ltd., 513 S.W.3d 476, 480 (Tex. 2017) (citing Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991)).
- Samson Expl., LLC v. T. W. Moak & Moak Mortg. & Inv. Co., No. 09-18-00463-CV (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 16, 2020).publishedJupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991).
- BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Laddex, Ltd., 513 S.W.3d 476 (Tex. 2017).published “A possibility of reverter is the interest left in a grantor after the grant of a fee simple determinable”
- BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Laddex, Ltd., 458 S.W.3d 683 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015).publishedLuckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Tex.1991); Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex.1991).
- Helen Butts Tipps, Sue Ethel McEachern, Est. of Flora L. Thompson, Perry Thompson, Jr., Indep. Perry Thompson, Jr. & Sandra Sue Sartain v. Chinn Expl. Co., & Cherokee Royalty Syndicate, Howard P. Coghlan, Receiver, No. 06-13-00033-CV (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 5, 2014).publishedHad this been presented to the trial court, this situation is controlled by the holding of Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991).
- Neil Edward Richmond, Mary Richmond Clark & James B. Richmond v. T.N. Wells & Vicki Wells, 395 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012).publishedId.; Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex.1991).
Show 25 more citing cases
- Petri v. Kestrel Oil & Gas Props., L.P., 878 F. Supp. 2d 744 (S.D. Tex. 2012).published(The common oil and gas lease is a fee simple determinable.)
- XTO Energy Inc. v. Nikolai, 357 S.W.3d 47 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011).publishedJupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex.1991).
- XTO Energy Inc. & Tommy J. Madewell, Patricia Madewell, Violet Joyce Renfro Kivimaki, Gary W. Yount, Shirley K. Stephens, Gregory Doyle Moseley, Sharlet Yvonne Holamon, & Viola D'Ann Madewell & NASA Energy Corp. & Edith McCurrin v. Leonard Nikolai & Sandy Nikolai, No. 02-09-00299-CV (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 30, 2011).publishedJupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991). 34 Alagood’s Request for Attorney’s Fees In July 2009, the trial court signed an agreed order that approved payment of $12,070.33 for ad litem fees to Alagood.
- Frontier Energy, LLC v. Aurora Energy, Ltd. (In Re Aurora Oil & Gas Corp.), 439 B.R. 674 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010).published“the grantors of the lease, their heirs or assigns”
- Pounds v. Jurgens, 296 S.W.3d 100 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009).published See, e.g., [Tipps v. Bodine, 101 S.W.2d 1076, 1078 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1937, writ ref'd)] (lessor of mineral interest "retained one-eighth of all the minerals in place, subject to the lease"); [Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466,…
- Longoria v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 255 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008).published Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex.1991).
- Pioneer Nat. Resources USA, Inc. v. W.L. Ranch, Inc., 127 S.W.3d 900 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004).published(grantor’s possibility of reverter in the .mineral estate becomes a present possessory interest only upon the termination of the lease)
- Alby v. Banc One Fin., 82 P.3d 675 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).publishedJupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991).
- Francis v. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 130 S.W.3d 76 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003).publishedE.g., Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex.1991).
- Francis, Algenard v. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., No. 01-01-00457-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 29, 2003).publishedE.g. , Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow , 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991).
- Bristol v. Placid Oil Co., 74 S.W.3d 156 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002).publishedJupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex.1991).
- Mason Bristol & JBW Land & Minerals, Inc. v. Placid Oil Co., No. 07-01-00256-CV (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 17, 2002).publishedJupiter Oil Co. v. Snow , 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991).
- Hamman v. Bright & Co., 924 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996).published Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d at 468-69.
- Mitchell Energy Corp v. Samson Resources Co, No. 95-40204 (5th Cir. Jan. 22, 1996).unpublishedIntervenors, insisting that Texas law permits an oil and gas lease to be repudiated in these circumstances, erroneously rely on cases discussing the doctrine of repudiation.10 That doctrine provides that a lessor may be estopped from asser…
- Mitchell Energy Corp., Maurice Sherman Bliss, Intervenors v. Samson Resources Co., 80 F.3d 976 (5th Cir. 1996).publishedJupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex.1991). 9 .
- Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Expl. & Prod. Co., 878 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994).publishedSee Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Tex.1991); Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex.1991). 7 .
- Energetics, Ltd v. Whitmill, 497 N.W.2d 497 (Mich. 1993).publishedAt termination of such a lease, the oil and gas rights revert to "the grantors of the lease, their heirs or assigns.” Jupiter Oil Co v Snow, 819 SW2d 466, 468 (Tex, 1991); Kaiser v Love, 163 Tex 558, 560; 358 SW2d 586 (1962). 16 *48 It is…
- MITCHELL ENERGY Corp., Plaintiff-Appellee, Maurice Sherman Bliss, et al v. SAMSON RESOURCES Co..publishedAbsent a specific lease clause to the contrary, nonpayment of royalty does not terminate an oil and gas lease; the lessor's sole remedy lies in an action for damages based on breach of covenant.9 The leases in the instant case contain no c…
- Linda Ann Parrish Richardson & Gary Bruce Richardson, Co-Trs. of the M.C. Parrish, Jr. Testamentary Trust v. Donald Roger Mills, 514 S.W.3d 406 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017).publishedSee Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991).
- Linda Ann Parrish Richardson & Gary Bruce Richardson, Co-Trs. of the M.C. Parrish, Jr. Testamentary Trust v. Donald Roger Mills, No. 12-15-00170-CV (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 30, 2016).publishedSee Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991).
- Phil Wilson, in His Off. Capacity as Gen. Manager of the Lower Colorado River Auth. & Timothy Timmerman Thomas Michael Martine J. Scott Arbuckle Steve K. Balas Lori A. Berger Joseph M. Crane Pamela Jo Ellison John M. Franklin v. New Braunfels Utils., 536 S.W.3d 5 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016).publishedPowell, Powell on Real Property § 20.01-.02 (2000)); see id. at 803-04 (observing that “possibility of reverter” was future interest in real property that was “vested compensable property interest”); see Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d…
- Linda Ann Parrish Richardson & Gary Bruce Richardson, Co-Trs. of the M.C. Parrish, Jr. Testamentary Trust v. Donald Roger Mills, No. 12-15-00170-CV (Tex. App.—Tyler July 12, 2016).publishedSee Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991).
- Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glenn W. Loggins, Inc., 115 S.W.3d 67 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003).published See Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex.1991).
- Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 60 S.W.3d 134 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001).published(holding this to be the rule in Texas)
- Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, Phillip, Individually & as Tr. of the Terry Thompson Child.'s Trust, Francis Diane Neal, Co-Tr. of the Terry Thompson, Jr. Trust for the Benefit of Margaret Thompson, Amarillo Nat'l Bank, Co-Tr., No. 07-99-00147-CV (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 20, 2000).published(holding this to be the rule in Texas)
At page 469 “the right upon expiration of the present term of the lease on said premises to make other additional leases”1 citing case
- Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Expl. & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1998).published See Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex.1991).
v.
Gene M. SNOW, Respondent
Lead Opinion
OPINION
CORNYN, Justice.This is a suit to construe a mineral deed. Jupiter Oil Company (Jupiter) seeks, in addition to damages, a declaratory judgment to establish its claimed ownership of one-half of the minerals underlying a tract upon which Gene M. Snow (Snow), a mineral lessee, has produced oil and gas. The trial court held that Jupiter owned a one-half interest in all minerals underlying the tract. The court of appeals reversed, 802 S.W.2d 354, based on the application of the “repugnant to the grant” rule of Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.1984). We hold that Alford v. Krum is inapplicable in the current case as the deed at issue unambiguously grants a one-sixteenth interest in the mineral estate as well as seven-sixteenths of the grantor’s possibility of re-verter. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.[1]
In 1918, J.W. and Malinda Henderson owned all of the minerals underlying a 80-acre tract in Eastland County. The land was at that time subject to an oil and gas lease to the States Oil Corporation (the “States lease”). The States lease reserved a l/8th royalty to the Hendersons.
On September 27, 1918, the Hendersons conveyed a portion of their mineral interest to Joseph M. Weaver. The proper construction of this 1918 mineral deed (the Henderson deed) is the issue here. Specifically, the issue is the interest conferred in the grantee, Joseph M. Weaver, after the termination of the States lease. Jupiter, the successor in interest to the grantee, claims that the deed gave the grantee an immediate Vieth mineral interest in the property which expanded to a full one-half mineral interest upon termination of States lease. Snow, the holder of the current oil and gas leases on the subject property, contends that the grantee received only a ½6⅛ mineral interest.
[*468] The first paragraph of the Henderson Deed conveys:
all that certain undivided Vie interest in and to all the oil, gas, and other minerals of whatsoever kind and character in and under the following described lot....
The second paragraph acknowledges that the tract in dispute was under lease at the time to the States Oil Corporation. The third paragraph provides that:
[i]n the event the lease now on said land is forfeited or terminated withou[t] producing mineral of any kind, then the grantee herein or his assigns are to have and hold under this conveyance an undivided ½ of all the oil. [sic] gas or other mineral of whatsoever kind character in and under the land herein described, and it is the intention of the grantors herein that in the event said lease is forfeited, then in that event the grantee is to have and hold an equal undivided one half of all such minerals.
The common oil and gas lease is a fee simple determinable estate in the realty. Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex.1982); Halbouty v. R.R. Comm’n, 163 Tex. 417, 432, 357 S.W.2d 364, 375 (1962); Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 174, 254 S.W. 290, 295 (1923). A possibility of reverter is the interest left in a grantor after the grant of a fee simple determinable.[2] Caruthers v. Leonard, 254 S.W. 779, 782 (Tex.Comm’n App.1923, holding approved); James v. Dalhart Consol. Indep. School Dist. 254 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1952, writ ref’d); See also Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (lessor of mineral estate retains non-possessory interest in the minerals which is a possibility of reverter). The grantor’s possibility of reverter in the mineral estate becomes a present possessory interest only upon the termination of the lease. Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d at 525 (Tex.1982); Murphy v. Dilworth, 137 Tex. 32, 37, 151 S.W.2d 1004, 1006 (1941). Thus, upon the termination of the lease, the mineral estate ordinarily reverts to the grantors of the lease, their heirs or assigns. Kaiser v. Love, 163 Tex. 558, 560, 358 S.W.2d 586, 587 (1962).
Texas courts have long recognized that the owner of a mineral estate can sell or assign the possibility of reverter. Murphy v. Dilworth, 151 S.W.2d at 1006; Gregg v. Caldwell-Guadalupe Pick-Up Stations, 286 S.W. 1083, 1084 (Tex.Comm’n App.1926, holding approved). For example, in Tipps v. Bodine, 101 S.W.2d 1076 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1936, writ ref’d), Mrs. Tipps conveyed a ½6⅛ mineral interest to Mrs. Bodine subject to an existing oil and gas lease to Shaw, Shipp & Spivey. In the third paragraph the deed provided that
in the event that the above described lease for any reason becomes canceled or forfeited, then and in that event an undivided one-half of the lease interest and all future rentals on said land for oil, gas, and other mineral privileges shall be owned by the said Grantee ...
Reading the deed as a whole and reconciling all paragraphs in order to ascertain the intent of the parties, the Tipps court held that the initial statement conveyed a present one-sixteenth interest in the mineral estate while the third paragraph granted a portion of the grantor’s possibility of reverter. Thus, the Tipps court held that the deed unambiguously granted one-sixteenth of the minerals to Mrs. Bodine as well as seven-sixteenths of the grantor’s total fourteen-sixteenths possibility of re-verter. Id. at 1078-79.
Such analysis is equally applicable here. The Henderson deed immediately[*469] gave the grantee a Vwth interest in the mineral estate. Upon the termination of the States lease, fee simple title would re-vest in the Hendersons. Read thus, the third paragraph conveys one half of the Hendersons’ possibility of reverter. The effect of this grant is that when the States lease ended, Jupiter’s interest in the mineral estate simultaneously expanded into a full one-half by operation of law.
Under this analysis, we hold the deed unambiguous as none of its clauses irreconcilably conflict. The court of appeals therefore erred in resorting to rules of construction which are inapplicable absent clear conflict. Harris v. Windsor, 156 Tex. 324, 328, 294 S.W.2d 798, 800 (1956); Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 552, 84 S.W.2d 442, 445-56 (1935). See also Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tex.1986).
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court affirmed.
HECHT, J., concurs.Although we hold Alford to be inapplicable, we note that it has been overruled this date in Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.1991).
A possibility of reverter is not the same thing as a reversion. Both terms denote reversionary interests. A reversion, however, is “the residue of an estate left in the grantor, to commence in possession after the determination of some particular estate granted out of him." C.J. MOYNI-HAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 94 (1962) (quoting Blackstone). A reversion exists in a grantor whenever something less than a full fee simple has been conveyed. Id. In contrast, a possibility of reverter follows a grant of the entire fee simple. Id. As a typical oil and gas lease creates a fee simple determinable, the interest left in the grantor by such grant is a possibility of reverter, not a reversion.
Concurrence
concurring.
I agree with the result the Court reaches; it comports with, and indeed is required by, our opinion today in Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.1991). I am puzzled, however, that the Court considers Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.1984), inapplicable to this case. I fail to see a meaningful distinction between this case and Alford.
The grantors in Alford owned all of the minerals in the property in issue, subject to a lease. So did the grantors in this case. The Alford grantors conveyed “one-half of the one-eighth interest in and to all the oil and gas and other minerals”. Id. at 871. The grantors in this case conveyed “all that certain undivided one-sixteenth (½6) interest in and to all the oil and gas and other minerals”. These two granting clauses are practically identical.
The deeds in both cases acknowledged the existence of a mineral lease. The Alford deed stated: “And said ... lands now being under an oil and gas lease ..., it is understood and agreed that this sale is made subject to said lease, but covers and includes ½6 of all the oil royalty and gas rental or royalty due and to be paid under the terms of said lease.” Id. at 872. The deed in this case states: “It is the intention of the parties ... that the grantee herein is to receive ½6 part of the oil, gas or other mineral ... produced by the holder of the lease on said land, that grantors now intend to convey one-half of the interest they now have in such production under said lease.” I see no material difference in these provisions.
Both deeds also contemplated the eventual termination of the existing lease. The Alford deed stated: “and in the event that the ... lease for any reason becomes can-celled or forfeited, then and in that event, the lease interests and all future rentals on said land, for oil, gas and mineral privileges shall be owned jointly by [grantee and grantors] each owning a one-half interest in all oil, gas and other minerals in and upon said land, together with one-half interest in all future rents.” Id. at 872. The deed before us states: “it is the intention of the grantors herein that in event said lease is forfeited, ... the grantee is to have and hold an equal undivided one-half of all such minerals.” Although the divergence in the language of the two deeds is greater here than in the two instances previously examined, the effect of each provision appears to be the same.
If Alford and this case are not twins, there is certainly a strong resemblance between them. In Luckel and this case both, we depart from the rule stated in Alford and adopt the rule proposed in its dissent. The confusion left by the Court’s failure to say so is unnecessary.