future lease clause in Texas

2018Consequently, before ascribing any particular meaning to double-fraction language in a conveying instrument, all the other language in the document must be considered to deduce intent." Id. at 14 . 6 We ultimately held that the Luckel deed conveyed a floating royalty interest, but we reached that conclusion because other language in the deed-specifically, the future-lease clause-provided that the grantee "shall be entitled to one-fourth of any and all royalties reserved under said leases." Luckel , 819 S.W.2d at 461 .

2016Similarly, in virtually every other case cited by the Greer Group, the courts determined the size and nature of a grantee’s interest in a future lease by looking not only to a deed’s future lease clause, but by considering and harmonizing every other provision in the deed in order to determine exactly what the grantor intended to convey to the grantee, both in terms of existing as well as future' leases. 4 See, e.g., Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 458 (in determining grantee’s interest in a future lease, the Court reviewed the parties’ deed as a whole to determine the nature of the interests t

2012Id. at 145 . - 10 - 04-11-00838-CV The court harmonized the provisions in a way that the interests set out in the granting clauses entitled the grantees to consistently receive an interest in whatever amount of royalty was paid under the future lease clause.

1987Points one through three are overruled. *887 Garrett v. Dils Company The deed in Garrett v. Dils Company, 157 Tex. 92 , 299 S.W.2d 904 (1957), contained a granting clause, a subject-to clause, and a future-lease clause.

1987In Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392 , 185 S.W.2d 563, 564-65 (1945), the Court held that a subject-to deed made two separate and distinct grants: (1) a grant of a permanent Vmth mineral interest which was determined by the granting clause and the future-lease clause; and (2) a Vioaith royalty which was determined by the subject-to clause.

1987In Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392 , 185 S.W.2d 563, 564-65 (1945), the Court held that a subject-to deed made two separate and distinct grants: (1) a grant of a permanent Vmth mineral interest which was determined by the granting clause and the future-lease clause; and (2) a Vioaith royalty which was determined by the subject-to clause.

2011In Luckel , the Court overruled its earlier opinion in Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.1984) on the grounds that the Alford majority “failed to harmonize the provisions under the four corners rule and then erred in applying the ‘repugnant to the grant’ rule in disregard of the future lease clause.” Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 464 . 1 The Luckel Court held that a court’s primary duty “when construing such a deed is to ascertain the intent of the parties from all of the language in the deed by a fundamental rule of construction known as the ‘four corners’ rule.” Id. at 461 .

2011In Luckel , the Court overruled its earlier opinion in Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.1984) on the grounds that the Alford majority "failed to harmonize the provisions under the four corners rule and then erred in applying the `repugnant to the grant' rule in disregard of the future lease clause." Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 464 . [1] The Luckel Court held that a court's primary duty "when construing such a deed is to ascertain the intent of the parties from all of the language in the deed by a fundamental rule of construction known as the `four corners' rule." Id. at 461 .

2016Similarly, in virtually every other case cited by the Greer Group, the courts determined the size and nature of a grantee’s interest in a future lease by looking not only to a deed’s future lease clause, but by considering and harmonizing every other provision in the deed in order to determine exactly what the grantor intended to convey to the grantee, both in terms of existing as well as future' leases. 4 See, e.g., Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 458 (in determining grantee’s interest in a future lease, the Court reviewed the parties’ deed as a whole to determine the nature of the interests t

1998See, e.g., Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991) (describing grantee's mineral interest "[i]n the event the lease now on said land is forfeited or terminated"); Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex.1991) (stating that grantor reserved "the right upon expiration of the present term of the lease on said premises to make other additional leases" and that grantee would receive 1/4 of any future lease royalties); Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92 , 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex.1957) (specifying that grantee would receive 1/8 of future lease benefits "in the event the then existin

2016Id. at 139-40 .

2012See generally Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied); Hamilton v. Morris Res., Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. denied); Garza v. Prolithic Energy Co., L.P., 195 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. denied). -2- 04-11-00838-CV The future lease clause provides: It is further agreed that Grantee shall have no interest in any bonus money received by the Grantor in any future lease or leases given on said land, and that it shall not be necessary for the Grantee to join in any such lease or leases so made; That Grantee shall receiv

2016Hausser , 345 S.W.3d at 467 .

2012See generally Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied); Hamilton v. Morris Res., Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. denied); Garza v. Prolithic Energy Co., L.P., 195 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. denied). -2- 04-11-00838-CV The future lease clause provides: It is further agreed that Grantee shall have no interest in any bonus money received by the Grantor in any future lease or leases given on said land, and that it shall not be necessary for the Grantee to join in any such lease or leases so made; That Grantee shall receiv

2016Similarly, in virtually every other case cited by the Greer Group, the courts determined the size and nature of a grantee’s interest in a future lease by looking not only to a deed’s future lease clause, but by considering and harmonizing every other provision in the deed in order to determine exactly what the grantor intended to convey to the grantee, both in terms of existing as well as future' leases. 4 See, e.g., Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 458 (in determining grantee’s interest in a future lease, the Court reviewed the parties’ deed as a whole to determine the nature of the interests t

2006Our holding is consistent with the Concord decision because neither the Contract nor the Mineral Deed contain any language that make it evident that two differing estates were to be conveyed. 966 S.W.2d at 457 .

2014Id. at 840 .

2014Id. at 840.

2023See Greer, 503 S.W.3d at 588–89 (recognizing that a grantor may convey two separate estates to a grantee in a mineral deed, which may or may not be of equal size or duration— a concept often referred to as the “two estates” doctrine) (citing Richardson v. Hart, 185 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex. 1945) (construing deed as conveying two separate and distinct estates in the land)).

1998See, e.g., Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991) (describing grantee's mineral interest "[i]n the event the lease now on said land is forfeited or terminated"); Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex.1991) (stating that grantor reserved "the right upon expiration of the present term of the lease on said premises to make other additional leases" and that grantee would receive 1/4 of any future lease royalties); Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92 , 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex.1957) (specifying that grantee would receive 1/8 of future lease benefits "in the event the then existin

1998See, e.g., Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991) (describing grantee’s mineral interest “[i]n the event the lease now on said land is forfeited or terminated”); Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex.1991) (stating that grantor reserved “the right upon expiration of the present term of the lease on said premises to make other additional leases” and that grantee would receive 1/4 of any future lease royalties); Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92 , 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex.1957) (specifying that grantee would receive 1/8 of future lease benefits “in the event the then existin

1984See Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 161 Tex. 122 , 338 S.W.2d 143, 145 (1960); Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59 , 273 S.W.2d at 619 ; Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216 , 205 S.W.2d at 355, 357-60 (1947); Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392 , 185 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1945); see also Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41 , 175 S.W.2d 401, 405 (1943); Kokernot v. Caldwell, 231 S.W.2d at 531-32 ; Cannon v. Wingard, 355 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.Civ.App. —Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

1984See Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 161 Tex. 122 , 338 S.W.2d 143, 145 (1960); Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59 , 273 S.W.2d at 619 ; Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216 , 205 S.W.2d at 355, 357-60 (1947); Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392 , 185 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1945); see also Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41 , 175 S.W.2d 401, 405 (1943); Kokernot v. Caldwell, 231 S.W.2d at 531-32 ; Cannon v. Wingard, 355 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.Civ.App. —Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

1984See Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 161 Tex. 122 , 338 S.W.2d 143, 145 (1960); Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59 , 273 S.W.2d at 619 ; Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216 , 205 S.W.2d at 355, 357-60 (1947); Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392 , 185 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1945); see also Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41 , 175 S.W.2d 401, 405 (1943); Kokernot v. Caldwell, 231 S.W.2d at 531-32 ; Cannon v. Wingard, 355 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.Civ.App. —Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

1984See Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 161 Tex. 122 , 338 S.W.2d 143, 145 (1960); Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59 , 273 S.W.2d at 619 ; Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216 , 205 S.W.2d at 355, 357-60 (1947); Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392 , 185 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1945); see also Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41 , 175 S.W.2d 401, 405 (1943); Kokernot v. Caldwell, 231 S.W.2d at 531-32 ; Cannon v. Wingard, 355 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.Civ.App. —Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

1984See Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 161 Tex. 122 , 338 S.W.2d 143, 145 (1960); Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59 , 273 S.W.2d at 619 ; Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216 , 205 S.W.2d at 355, 357-60 (1947); Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392 , 185 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1945); see also Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41 , 175 S.W.2d 401, 405 (1943); Kokernot v. Caldwell, 231 S.W.2d at 531-32 ; Cannon v. Wingard, 355 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.Civ.App. —Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

1984See Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 161 Tex. 122 , 338 S.W.2d 143, 145 (1960); Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59 , 273 S.W.2d at 619 ; Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216 , 205 S.W.2d at 355, 357-60 (1947); Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392 , 185 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1945); see also Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41 , 175 S.W.2d 401, 405 (1943); Kokernot v. Caldwell, 231 S.W.2d at 531-32 ; Cannon v. Wingard, 355 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.Civ.App. —Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).