State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1983). · Go Syfert
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State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2011 · 2 courts · …nce the court has determined that the sentence was indeed illegal and the prisoner is entitled to a modification of the original sentence or the imposition of a new sentence, the full panoply of due process considerations attach. at p. 220 ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2011–2014 · …nor has the plight of the trial court seeking to impose a new sentence been an easy one, fraught as it is with constitutional challenges and considerations of post-sentencing infractions which would allow a material increase in the sentence, pursuant to north carolina v. pearce,… at p. 221 ✓
74 citation events (56 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Collins (fla, 2008-06-05)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 48 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Collins
Fla. · 2008 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
once the court has determined that the sentence was indeed illegal and the prisoner is entitled to a modification of the original sentence or the imposition of a new sentence, the full panoply of due process considerations attach.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gazoombi v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1983); Trotter v. State, 825 So. 2d 362 , 367–68 (Fla. 2002); see generally Jackson v. State, 767 So. 2d 1156 , 1159–60 (Fla. 2000) (discussing how “all proceedings affecting life, liberty, or property must be conducted according to due process”—proceedings that include sentencings— meaning there is a constitutional mandate that a sentencing hearing comport with the principle of “fairness” (internal quotation and citation omitted)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David Puzio v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2021 · confidence medium
Therefore, resentencing under Williams must transpire “de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence,” Teffeteller v. State, 495 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 1986), pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2. in order to provide “the full panoply of due process considerations” to which the defendant is entitled, State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) GERALD SPIRES v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
“This means that when a defendant is resentenced, ‘the fully panoply of due process considerations attach.’” Id. (quoting State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kelvin Terrill Dortch v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Its actions were perfectly appropriate because “where a sentence has been reversed or vacated, the resentencings in all criminal proceedings . . . are de novo in nature.” Id. at 406 . “[T]he full panoply of due process considerations attach . . . [and] both parties may present new evidence bearing on the sentence.” Id. (citing State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1983)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) RICHARD CARL GOUDREAU v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
P. 3.720(b); State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219, 221 (Fla. 1983); Hodierne v. State, 141 So. 3d 1254, 1255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Hill v. State, 246 So. 3d 392, 396-97 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smallwood v. State
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
In State v. Scott, for example, the Florida Supreme Court held that a prisoner whose sentence was found illegal, and who was therefore “entitled to a modification of the original sentence or the imposition of a new sentence,” was then also entitled to “the full panoply of due process considerations,” including the right to counsel. 439 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) RICARLO A. BETTY v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
See Jackson, 767 So. 2d at 1160 (finding that defendant’s presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure and thus extending the right to be present to the hearing where the sentence will be reconsidered); Griffin v. State, 517 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla. 1987) (finding presence of defendant necessary at resentencing so that defendant has the opportunity to submit evidence relevant to the sentence, if warranted); State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219, 221 (Fla. 1983) (finding defendant entitled to be present at a sentencing correction in the same manner and to the same degree as when the defen…
examined Cited as authority (rule) KERN R. DAVIS v. STATE OF FLORIDA (4×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
State v. Fleming, 61 So. 3d 399, 406 (Fla. 2011) (quoting State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matthew Marana v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
The Florida Supreme Court “has long held that where a sentence has been reversed or vacated, the resentencings in all criminal proceedings ... are de novo in nature.” See State v. Fleming, 61 So.3d 399, 406 (Fla. 2011). “[T]he full panoply of due process considerations attach .,. [and] both parties may present new evidence bearing on the sentence.” Id. (citing State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1983)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Veal v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 221 (Fla.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jordan v. State
Fla. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Jackson, 767 So.2d at 1160 (finding that defendant’s presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure and thus extending the right to be present to the hearing where the sentence will be reconsidered); Griffin v. State, 517 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla.1987) (finding presence of defendant necessary at resentencing so that defendant has the opportunity to submit evidence relevant to the sentence, if warranted); State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 221 (Fla.1983) (finding defendant entitled to be present at a sentencing correction in the same manner and to the same degree as when the defendant …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tyrone Jordan v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Jackson, 767 So. 2d at 1160 (finding that defendant’s presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure and thus extending the right to be present to the hearing where the sentence will be reconsidered); Griffin v. State, 517 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla. 1987) (finding presence of defendant necessary at resentencing so that defendant has the opportunity to submit evidence relevant to the sentence, if warranted); State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219, 221 (Fla. 1983) (finding defendant entitled to be present at a sentencing correction in the same manner and to the same degree as when the defen…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Fleming (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2011 · confidence medium
This means that when a defendant is resentenced, “the full panoply of due process considerations attach.” State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1983) (“[0]nce the court has determined that the sentence was indeed illegal and the prisoner is entitled to a modification of the original sentence or the imposition of a new sentence, the full panoply of due process considerations attach.”); see Trotter v. State, 825 So.2d 362, 368 (Fla.2002) (“We agree with the district courts of appeal that a resentencing pursuant to Heggs is a de novo sentencing proceeding that must comport with consti…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bennett v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
P. 3.720(b); State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 221 (Fla.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Galindez v. State
Fla. · 2007 · confidence medium
This means that the trial court must extend to the defendant the "full panoply" of existing procedural protections, State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1983), including any new constitutional protections that have been recognized since the defendant's original sentencing.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nickerson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
"Once a trial court determines that a defendant's sentence is illegal and the defendant is entitled to re-sentencing, the full panoply of due process considerations attaches." Gonzalez v. State, 838 So.2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moline v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
As explained in Isaac v. State, 911 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), "a departure sentence imposed pursuant to the trial court determining a fact by merely a preponderance of the evidence violates the holding of Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)], as explained by Blakely [v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)]." "[O]nce the court has determined that the sentence was indeed illegal and the prisoner is entitled to a modification of the original sentence or the imposition of a new sentence, the full panoply of due pr…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tubwell v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
As this resentencing proceeding was de novo, see State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1983); see also Mills v. State, 724 So.2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997);, the state was not relieved of its burden to prove the prior offenses.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Leslie v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 221 (Fla.1983); see also Jackson v. State, 767 So.2d 1156, 1160 (Fla.2000); Brice v. State, 770 So.2d 740 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Duhart v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
"Re-sentencing is a critical stage in which a defendant has the right to be present and has the right to have the assistance of counsel." Waldo v. State, 781 So.2d 1198, 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1983)(defendant has right to be present at re-sentencing and to be represented by counsel).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pelham v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Lawrence v. State, 785 So.2d 728, 729-30 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (citing State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1983), and Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harris v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
P. 3.180(a)(9); Griffin, 517 So.2d at 670 ("The pronouncement of sentence upon a criminal defendant is a critical stage of the proceedings to which all due process guarantees attach whether the sentence is the immediate result of adjudication of guilt or, as here, the sentence is the result of an order directing the trial court to resentence the defendant."); State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 221 (Fla.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) June v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Since the robbery with a mask was resolved prior to the time of his Heggs resentencing, it was correctly included as part of his prior record at resentencing. *1259 Once the trial court determined that resentencing was appropriate, June was entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights. [1] State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1983); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that on resentencing, a defendant is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing and may challenge his prior record even though the priors had not been previously c…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) St. Lawrence v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1983); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that on resentencing, a defendant is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing and may challenge his prior record even though the priors had not been previously challenged). "[W]hen a discrepancy concerning the scoresheet is brought to the sentencing court's attention, the court should resolve the discrepancy and correct the scoresheet to reflect the accurate numbers." Erickson v. State, 565 So.2d 328, 336 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barcelo v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 221 (Fla.1983); see also Jackson v. State, 767 So.2d 1156, 1160 (Fla.2000); Brice v. State, 770 So.2d 740 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stavely v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
In State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1983), the Florida Supreme Court held that, once it is determined that the sentence is illegal and the prisoner is entitled to a modification of the original sentence or the imposition of a new sentence, the full panoply of due process considerations attaches.
cited Cited "see" RASHAD MILANES v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219, 221 (Fla. 1983).
discussed Cited "see" Reginald L. Bryant v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See [State v. Scott, 439 So. 2d 219, 221 (1983)] (“Nor has the plight of the trial court seeking to impose a - 18 - new sentence been an easy one, fraught as it is with constitutional challenges and considerations of post-sentencing infractions which would allow a material increase in the sentence, pursuant to North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S. Ct. 2072 , 23 L.
discussed Cited "see" Morris v. Buss (2×)
N.D. Fla. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1983).
discussed Cited "see" Dixon v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1983) (“[0]nce the court has determined that the sentence was indeed illegal and the prisoner is entitled to a modification of the original sentence or the imposition of a new sentence, the full panoply of due process considerations attach.”).
cited Cited "see" Payne v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1988); Gonzalez v. State, 838 So.2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
cited Cited "see" Christian v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219 (Fla.1983); McGough v. State, 876 So.2d 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
cited Cited "see" Granatino v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1983).
cited Cited "see" Hawley v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219 (Fla.1983); Behrman v. State, 696 So.2d 811 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1997); Chestnut v. State, 578 So.2d 27 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) REVERSED and REMANDED.
discussed Cited "see" Gonzalez v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1983).
discussed Cited "see" Trotter v. State
Fla. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1983) (concluding that "once the court has determined that the sentence was indeed illegal and the prisoner is entitled to a modification of the original sentence or the imposition of a new sentence, the full panoply of due process considerations attach"); see also Jackson v. State, 767 So.2d 1156, 1159-60 (Fla.2000) (holding that resentencing after vacating a sentence of death must comply with the requirements of due process and the Sixth Amendment).
cited Cited "see" Ingram v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 221 (Fla. 1983); Taylor v. State, 745 So.2d 341, 342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)(citing Griffin v. State, 517 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla.1987)).
discussed Cited "see" Davenport v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219 (Fla.1983) (holding that appellee should have been allowed to submit evidence relevant to his sentence); Tuthill v. State, 478 So.2d 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (ruling that sentence must be reversed where appellant was not given the opportunity to be heard on the question of the severity of the sentence); State v. Hohl, 431 So.2d 707 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
cited Cited "see" Brice v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219 (Fla.1983).
cited Cited "see" Petkus v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219 (Fla.1983); Behrman v. State, 696 So.2d 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
cited Cited "see" Behrman v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219 (Fla.1983).
cited Cited "see" Dolinger v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Griffin v. State, 517 So.2d 669 (Fla.1987) and State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219 (Fla.1983).
cited Cited "see" Davis v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1983); Tuthill v. State, 478 So.2d 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review denied, 484 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1986); Hargis, 451 So.2d 551 .
cited Cited "see" Griffin v. State
Fla. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1983).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Pringle v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Bennett v. State, 974 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (reversing for a hearing because the circuit court sentenced the defendant without first conducting a hearing as defendant requested); see also Davenport v. State, 787 So.2d 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (reversing for a new sentencing hearing because defendant was not allowed to present evidence or speak at the prior sentencing hearing, citing State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219 (Fla.1983)).
cited Cited "see, e.g." McDonald v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
Chestnut v. State, 578 So.2d 27 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); see also State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219 (Fla.1983).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Wagner v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1983); Thacker v. State, 185 So.2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
James Richard SCOTT, Respondent.
63146.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct 6, 1983.
439 So. 2d 219
Ehrlich.
Cited by 63 opinions  |  Published

[*220] Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and James P. McLane, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender and Ellen Morris, Asst. Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for respondent.

EHRLICH, Justice.

We once again find ourselves caught in the backwash of our decision in Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1981), this time asked to determine the procedural due process requirements which attach to the correction of a Villery-invalidated split sentence.

In 1980, Scott was sentenced to six years' imprisonment with the last three years suspended so that he could serve them on probation. At that time, such a sentence was legal and commonly imposed. In 1982, after Villery was handed down, he filed a pro se motion to have the sentence vacated pursuant to that holding. Without granting a hearing, the trial court issued an order vacating the original sentence and imposing six years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Fourth District found that Scott's due process rights had been violated because he had not had the opportunity to be present or to be represented by counsel at the new sentencing and certified as a question of great public importance the following:

When a defendant has been given a split sentence probation contrary to the case of Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1981) and when same is corrected upon the defendant's application, is it required that such defendant be present at the time the order is corrected?

Scott v. State, 439 So.2d 222, 223 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). We answer in the affirmative and so approve the holding of the district court.

The state contends that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 waives the prisoner's right to be present and represented by counsel at the time the corrected sentence is imposed. That rule provides that a prisoner in custody under sentence of a Florida court may file a motion in that court to correct an illegal sentence and that the court, upon finding the motion meritorious,

shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant him a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The state's reading of the rule overlooks the plain meaning of its language. The court is authorized to entertain the motion and decide whether or not relief is warranted on the issues raised in the motion. The prisoner is not entitled to be present or represented during the consideration of the merits of the motion. However, once the court has determined that the sentence was indeed illegal and the prisoner is entitled to a modification of the original sentence or the imposition of a new sentence, the full panoply of due process considerations attach. Walker v. State, 284 So.2d 415 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).

This must especially be true in the post-Villery correction of sentences. Unlike most illegal sentences being corrected, the pre-Villery split sentence was legal when imposed, and the court imposing the split sentence had chosen that particular combination of incarceration and probation as offering the best means of punishing and rehabilitating the prisoner. When that sentence was invalidated by the decision of this Court, the trial court was forced to review all the considerations which led to the selection[*221] of the split sentence, and to fashion a new sentence which would achieve the same goals. Nor has the plight of the trial court seeking to impose a new sentence been an easy one, fraught as it is with constitutional challenges and considerations of post-sentencing infractions which would allow a material increase in the sentence, pursuant to North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). See, e.g., Beech v. State, 436 So.2d 82 61,925 (Fla. 1983). It would be wasteful of the court's time and of the limited resources of the appellate system to deny the sentencing judge the benefit of contemporaneous objections to a sentence and the concomitant opportunity to correct errors at the sentencing hearing.

Unarguably, the prisoner to be sentenced is facing a critical stage of the criminal proceedings, whether the sentence to be imposed is the immediate result of adjudication of guilt or the result of a successful Rule 3.850 challenge. Thus, a sentencing hearing is mandatory, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720, and the prisoner is entitled to show legal cause why sentence should not be pronounced and to submit evidence relevant to the sentence. The indigent prisoner is entitled to appointment of counsel at sentencing. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967).

We therefore agree with the Fourth District Court of Appeal that the prisoner being resentenced under a post-Villery sentence correction is "entitled to be present at the time of such correction in the same manner and to the same degree as ... when initially sentenced." Scott, at 223 (footnote omitted.) Accordingly, the opinion of the district court is approved.

It is so ordered.

ALDERMAN, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, McDONALD and SHAW, JJ., concur.