PER CURIAM: Joseph Turner, Lonnie Edmonds, Michael Levatino, Don Thames, and Michael Logan (“the defendants”), appeal the denial of their motion for summary judgment asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity. We affirm.

John Poullard, a Louisiana inmate, filed suit against the defendants, all of whom are Louisiana

correctional officers, in their “[i]ndividual and [p]ersonal” capacities. He alleged that Turner, Edwards, and Levatino beat him in retaliation for lawsuits that he was prosecuting, and that Thames

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH Cir. R. 47.5.4. and Logan failed to stop the beating. Based on his allegations, Poullard asserted that the defendants had transgressed the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and had committed the intentional tort of battery, in violation of state law.^[1] The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the battery claim.2 The Magistrate Judge, to whom the district court had referred all pretrial matters, recommended denial of the motion. The defendants objected. The district court overruled the objection, and denied the motion for summary judgment. The defendants timely appealed.3 We review the district court’s refusal to grant the defendants Eleventh Amendment immunity de novo.4 See Ussery v. Louisiana ex rel. La. Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 150 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. dismissed, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 1161, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___ (1999). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against state officials where the state is the real, substantial party in interest. See Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 1990). The state is the real party in interest if the decision rendered in a case will operate against the sovereign, expending itself on the public treasury, interfering with public administration, or compelling the state to act or refrain from acting. See id. at 378. Under this reasoning, a claim that a state official violated state law in carrying out his official responsibilities is a claim against the state. See id. Therefore, when a plaintiff accuses

a state official of violating state common law when acting in the acting in the course and scope of their employment, the Elevent h Amendment prevents him from raising the claim in federal court

regardless of whether he seeks damages or injunctive relief, and regardless of whether he invokes the court’s original or supplemental jurisdiction. See id. We look to state law to determine if a state official’s conduct is within the course and scope of his employment. See id. at 379; Goss v. San

Jacinto Junior College, 588 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1979).

The defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars Poullard’s battery claim because

Poullard alleges that they violated state common law when acting in the course and scope of their employment. In support of their contention, they point to Louisiana’s rule of vicarious liability, which provides that “an employer is liable for a tort committed by his employee if, at the time, the employee

was acting within the course and scope of his employment.” Baumeister v. Plunkett, 673 So.2d 994, 996 (La. 1996); see LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320 (West 1997) (“Masters and employers are answerable for damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.”).5 Certain conditions must prevail for this rule to apply:

[I]n order for an employer to be vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employee the “tortious conduct of the [employee must be] so closely connected in time, place, and causation to his employment duties as to be regarded as a risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer’s business, as compared with conduct instituted by purely personal considerations entirely extraneous to the employer’s interest.”

Baumeister, 673 So.2d at 996. Therefore, vicarious liability attaches only if the employee commits an intentional tort (1) on business premises (2) during work hours (3) while acting within the ambit of his assigned duties and (4) in furtherance of his employer’s objective. See id.; see also LeBrane v. Lewis, 292 So.2d 216, 218 (La. 1974) (identifying factors relevant to determining if an employer is vicariously liable for his employee’s violent act).

We find that Poullard does not plead facts that show the defendants’ conduct to have

occurred while the defendants were acting in the course and scope of their employment. The defendants’ alleged conduct does not implicate Louisiana’s rule of vicarious liability. Neither beating an inmate in retaliation for litigiousness nor allowing such an attack to occur comes within the scope of a correctional officer’s assigned duties or furthers the state’s penological objectives.^[6] See

Baumeister, 673 So.2d at 997-98 (reviewing cases deciding whether or not an employer was vicariously liable for its employee’s violent conduct). We therefore reject the defendants’ contention that the Eleventh Amendment bars Poullard’s battery claim because they were acting in the course and scope of their employment.7

The district court correctly held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Poullard’s battery

claim. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and remand this case for further proceedings.