A trial judge sitting without a jury has the duty to reconcile conflicting testimony, and findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.
An appellant seeks to recover money by alleging that the appellee charged usurious interest rates in violation of state statute. The trial court, sitting without a jury, finds that the appellant failed to prove usury by a preponderance of the evidence and that the appellee proved the existence of an unpaid debt. The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the parties' intentions. Because the trial judge is responsible for reconciling conflicting testimony and an appellate court will not disturb findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, the trial court's judgment is upheld.
Other citing cases
- DuPont Plaza, Inc. v. Samuel Kipnis Fam. Found., 132 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961).published
- Hively v. Dunn, 169 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964).published
v.
CASNER MOTORS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.
[*588] Henry R. Carr and Marshall G. Curran, Jr., Miami, for appellant.
Maynard Abrams and Paul Koenig, Hollywood, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
This was a law action by the appellant to recover sums of money on which it was alleged that usurious rates were charged in violation of § 687.07, Fla. Stat., F.S.A. The appellee generally denied the material allegations of the complaint and counterclaimed for a money judgment for sums advanced to the appellant but not repaid.
Upon agreement of counsel for the parties, the cause was tried before the court without a jury. The trial judge rendered final judgment against the appellant on his complaint, and in favor of the appellee on its counterclaim, finding that the appellant had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the transactions were tainted with usury, and further, that appellee had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellant was indebted to the appellee for sums of money advanced by the appellee. It is from this final judgment that the appeal was taken.
The appellant presents two questions for review, both of which challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial judge's finding. The trial of the cause resulted in a sharp conflict in testimony as to the intentions of the parties regarding the multiple business transactions between them. It was the duty of the trial judge, sitting in the place and stead of the jury, to reconcile these conflicts. The fact that he reconciled the conflicts adverse to appellant presents little basis for review by this court.
The sum and substance of the record presented reflects the court's findings of fact based upon conflicting evidence. The parties stipulated to a hearing before the trial judge without the assistance of a jury. An appellate court would not be warranted in disturbing the findings of the trial judge unless they were clearly erroneous. See Marek v. Patterson, Fla. 1954, 75 So.2d 808; First Atlantic National Bank of Daytona Beach v. Cobbett, Fla. 1955, 82 So.2d 870; In re Thompson's Estate, Fla. 1955, 84 So.2d 911; Holland v. Gross, Fla. 1956, 89 So.2d 255, 63 A.L.R.2d 920.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
CARROLL, CHAS., C.J., and HORTON and PEARSON, JJ., concur.