Hewitt Contracting Co., Inc. v. MELBOURNE REG. AIRPORT AUTH., 528 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). · Go Syfert
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Hewitt Contracting Co., Inc. v. MELBOURNE REG. AIRPORT AUTH., 528 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
3 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Holly's, Inc. v. Cnty. of Greensville, 458 S.E.2d 454 (Va. 1995)
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At page 122 cited at this page1 citing case
  • Holly's, Inc. v. Cnty. of Greensville, 458 S.E.2d 454 (Va. 1995).published 2 cites
    Our research has disclosed two other decisions holding to the same effect: Hewitt Contracting Co. v. Melbourne Regional Airport Auth., 528 So. 2d 122, 122 (Fla. Dist.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
HEWITT CONTRACTING COMPANY, INC., Appellant,
v.
MELBOURNE REGIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, et al., Appellees.
87-1891.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jul 14, 1988.
Published opinion
528 So. 2d 122
1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 2988
1988 WL 71549
Cowart.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published

Maxwell G. Battle, Jr., of Maxwell G. Battle, Jr., P.A., Dunedin, for appellant.

Douglas D. Marks of Potter, McClelland & Marks, P.A., Melbourne, for appellees.

COWART, Judge.

This is a "late bid" case.

The advertisement of Melbourne Regional Airport Authority for competitive bids for certain construction work stated that the bids would be received until 11:00 A.M. on a certain date. The appellant, Hewitt Contracting Company, Inc., submitted a bid prior to 11:00 A.M. Between 11:01 and 11:10 A.M., Hubbard Construction Company placed its sealed bid package on a table along with the other unopened bids. At 11:10 A.M., the Airport Authority's director entered the room, announced the bids were closed, and opened all bids. Hewitt objected to Hubbard's bid as untimely, but Hubbard's was the lowest bid and was ultimately accepted by the Airport Authority.

We affirm the trial court which upheld the Airport Authority's legal authority to accept Hubbard's late bid. We believe the governmental agency soliciting bids here had, and should have, the discretion to waive the irregularity of Hubbard's bid being late and to accept the late bid under the facts in this case.[1]

AFFIRMED.

SHARP, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur.

1 We write this opinion because we find no Florida "late bid" cases. See generally Liberty County v. Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc., 421 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1982). See also Townsend v. McCall, 262 Ala. 554, 80 So.2d 262 (1955); William M. Young Co., Inc. v. West Orange Redevelopment Agency, 125 N.J. Super. 440, 311 A.2d 390 (1973). The cases cited by appellant, being George A. Nole & Son, Inc. v. Board of Education, 129 A.D.2d 873, 514 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1987) and Wiltom Coach Co., Inc. v. Central Highschool District No. 3, 36 Misc.2d 637, 232 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1962), merely hold that it was not a violation of the law of New York for the governmental agencies soliciting bids in those cases to reject a late bid.