A defendant is entitled to a voluntary intoxication jury instruction for specific intent crimes, such as battery on a law enforcement officer, when evidence supports the defense.
The defendant appeals convictions for battery, battery on a law enforcement officer, and resisting arrest with violence, arguing the trial court erred by refusing a voluntary intoxication instruction. The court determines that battery on a law enforcement officer is a specific intent crime where intoxication is a valid defense, and evidence of the defendant's potential intoxication entitled him to the instruction. Conversely, battery is not a specific intent crime, and the defendant did not request the instruction for the resisting arrest charge. The court affirms the convictions for battery and resisting arrest with violence but reverses and remands for a new trial on the battery on a law enforcement officer charge.
Other citing cases
- Bush v. State, 543 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).published
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and William H. Pasch, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Ann Garrison Paschall, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals from his convictions and sentences for battery, battery on law enforcement officers and resisting arrest with violence.
Defendant's first contention is that the trial court erred in refusing his request for a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication as a defense. Battery on a law enforcement officer is a specific intent crime to which intoxication would be a defense. There was evidence indicating that defendant might have been intoxicated. Therefore, defendant was entitled to the jury instruction. Evans v. State, 452 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (decided after the trial court's disposition of this case). Since defendant did not request the intoxication instruction for the charge of resisting arrest with violence, we need not address whether that charge alleged a specific intent crime. Battery is not a specific intent crime. See Evans; Linehan v. State, 442 So.2d 244, 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
We affirm as to defendant's second contention. McCuiston v. State, 462 So.2d 830 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
Therefore, we affirm the convictions and sentences on the battery and resisting arrest with violence charges and reverse and remand for a new trial on the charges of battery on a law enforcement officer.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and LEHAN, JJ., concur.