Rose v. Schantz, 201 N.W.2d 593 (Wis. 1972). · Go Syfert
Rose v. Schantz, 201 N.W.2d 593 (Wis. 1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
279 citation events (223 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Notz v. Everett Smith Group, Ltd. (wisctapp, 2008-05-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1974 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1974 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 25 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Notz v. Everett Smith Group, Ltd. (10×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
Wis. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
where some individual right of a stockholder is being impaired by the improper acts of a director, the stockholder can bring a direct suit on his own behalf because it is his individual right that is being violated.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) VIRNICH v. Vorwald
W.D. Wis. · 2009 · confidence medium
In determining whether a claim should be brought by an individual or on behalf of the corporation, the Wisconsin supreme court has explained that the underlying question is whether “the primary injury is to the corporation or the shareholder.” Notz, 2009 WI 30, ¶ 23 . ‘Where the injury to the corporation is the primary injury, and any injury to stockholders secondary, it is the derivative action alone that can be brought and maintained.” Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis.2d 222, 229-30 , 201 N.W.2d 593, 598 (1972).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Notz v. Everett Smith Group, Ltd. (5×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Wis. · 2009 · confidence medium
Id. at 224, 230 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jorgensen v. Water Works, Inc.
Wis. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis. 2d 222, 228 , 201 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1972); Grognet v. Fox Valley Trucking Serv., 45 Wis. 2d 235, 242 , 172 N.W.2d 812, 816 (1969).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Simmons v. Miller
Va. · 2001 · confidence medium
App. Div. 1977); Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 12 (S.D. 1997); Rose v. Schantz, 201 N.W.2d 593, 598 (Wis. 1972). *574 The reasons underlying the general rule are that 1) it prevents a multiplicity of lawsuits by shareholders; 2) it protects corporate creditors by putting the proceeds of the recovery back in the corporation; 3) it protects the interests of all shareholders by increasing the value of their shares, instead of allowing a recovery by one shareholder to prejudice the rights of others not a party to the suit; and 4) it adequately compensates the injured shareholder by increasing…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Reget v. Paige
Wis. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis. 2d 222, 228 , 201 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1972). ¶ 13.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Einhorn v. Culea
Wis. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
In Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis. 2d 222, 228-29 , 201 N.W.2d 593, 597-98 (1972), our supreme court stated: [W]here some individual right of a stockholder is being impaired by the improper acts of a director, the stockholder can bring a direct suit on his own behalf because it is his individual right that is being violated.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schaefer v. Ballantyne (In Re Ballantyne)
Bankr. E.D. Wis. · 1994 · confidence medium
“A stockholder cannot, as an individual as distinguished from a representative of the corporation, sue directors or other corporate officers for mismanagement, negligence or the like, on a cause of action which belongs to the corporation.” Rose at 229, n. 9, 201 N.W.2d 593 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Flynn v. Merrick
7th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis.2d 222 , 201 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Flynn v. Merrick
7th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis.2d 222 , 201 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Van v. Town of Manitowoc Rapids
Wis. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis. 2d 222, 227 , 201 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hurd
Wis. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis.2d 222, 227 , 201 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1972); see also sec. 939.10, Stats. *277 “Wilfully” must be defined within the context of the statute in which it is used.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Neimark v. Mel Kramer Sales, Inc.
Wis. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
Shelstad v. Cook, 77 Wis. 2d 547, 553 , 253 N.W.2d 517, 521 (1977) ; Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis.2d 222, 229 , 201 N.W.2d 593, 598 (1972).
examined Cited "see" Arrowhead Systems, Inc. v. Grant Thornton LLP (3×)
Wis. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis. 2d 222, 228-29 , 201 N.W.2d 593 (1972).
examined Cited "see" Daniel Marx v. Richard L. Morris (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Wis. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. ; Notz v. Everett Smith Grp., Ltd. , 2009 WI 30 , ¶ 20, 316 Wis. 2d 640 , 764 N.W.2d 904 . ¶38 Morris encourages us to read corporate principles of derivative standing into ch. 183 and hold that Marx and Murray's claims belong exclusively to North Star.
examined Cited "see" Krier v. Vilione (8×)
Wis. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis. 2d 222, 229 , 201 N.W.2d 593 (1972) (stating that " '[rlights of action accruing to a corporation belong to the corporation, and an action at law or in equity, cannot be maintained by the members as individuals'" (citation omitted)).
examined Cited "see" Borne v. Gonstead Advanced Techniques, Inc. (6×)
Wis. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis. 2d 222, 228-29 , 201 N.W.2d 593, 597-98 (1972).
cited Cited "see" Dan T. Slaughter & Associates, Incorporated, Clay T. Slaughter, and Florence Slaughter v. Federal Bureau of Investigation
7th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rose v. Schantz, 201 N.W.2d 593, 597 (Wis.1972).
examined Cited "see" Benjamin Plumbing, Inc. v. Barnes (4×)
Wis. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis. 2d 222, 228 , 201 N.W.2d 593 (1972); The North Hudson Building and Loan Ass'n v. Childs, 82 Wis. 460, 475 , 52 N.W. 600 (1892).
discussed Cited "see" Manbourne, Inc., a California Corporation v. Bruce Conrad, and Third-Party v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, a Mutual Insurance Company, James T. Lundberg, Melbourne B. Weddle and Norman A. Harris, Third-Party (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis.2d 222, 228 , 201 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1972) (The "fiduciary duty of a director is owed to the individual stockholders as well as to the corporation."); see also Borak v. J.I.
discussed Cited "see" Manbourne, Inc. v. Conrad (2×)
7th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis.2d 222, 228 , 201 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1972) (The “fiduciary duty of a director is owed to the individual stockholders as well as to the corporation.”); see also Borak v. J.I.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Nancy A. Scobie v. Patrick S. Scobie
Wis. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence low
In particular, Nancy and Tim allege that Pat and Lori “schem[ed] to deprive Nancy and Tim of the voting rights on their Class A shares for their own personal benefit,” and, further, [t]heir misappropriation of Nancy’s marital property, misrepresentations made to Bill and Tim (and Nancy), wrongful termination of Tim and his subsequent removal from the Mason board, and other actions designed to secure control of Mason for themselves, were done in their own self-interest and are certainly not in the interest of Tim and Nancy. ¶51 To the extent that any of Nancy and Tim’s claims are not d…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Daniel Marx v. Richard L. Morris (2×)
Wis. · 2019 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis. 2d 222, 229-30 , 201 N.W.2d 593 (1972).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Industrial Electron v. iPower Dist Group
7th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Wis. Stat. sec. 183.0305; see also Rose v. Schantz, 201 N.W.2d 593, 597 (Wis. 1972) (holding that action accruing to corporation cannot be brought by the members as individuals); Flynn v. Merrick, 881 F.2d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); Carney v. General Motors Corp., 23 F.3d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that sole shareholder may not bring action in his own name to enforce a right that belonged to the corporation); Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185, 1194 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that under United States law, a stockholder of a corporation has no individual righ…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Industrial Electronics Corp. Of Wisconsin v. Ipower Distribution Group, Inc. (2×)
7th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Wis. Stat. § 183.0305 ; see also Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis.2d 222 , 201 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1972) (holding that action accruing to corporation cannot be brought by the members as individuals); Flynn v. Merrick, 881 F.2d 446, 449 (7th Cir.1989) (same); Carney v. General Motors Corp., 23 F.3d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that sole shareholder may not bring action in his own name to enforce a right that belonged to the corporation); Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185, 1194 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that under United States law, a stockholder of a corporation has no individu…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Rose, Respondent,
v.
Schantz and Another, Appellants
215.
Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Oct 31, 1972.
201 N.W.2d 593
For the appellants there was a brief and oral argument by Erwin E. Nemmers of Chicago, Illinois., For the respondent there was a brief by Walther & Hailing and Herbert Morse, attorneys, and David L. Walther and F. M. Van Hecke of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by David L. Walther.
Robert W. Hansen.
Cited by 55 opinions  |  Published
[*225] Robert W. Hansen, J.

The demurrer here challenged: (1) The derivative cause of action; (2) the direct stockholder action; and (3) the joinder of causes of actions and parties. Each involves a separate area of inquiry, and will be so approached.

Derivative action.

We deal here with the statutory restrictions surrounding the bringing of stockholders’ derivative actions. [1] Particularly, we deal with sec. 180.405 (1) (b), Stats., requiring in any such action that:

“(1) No action may be instituted or maintained in the right of any domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or holders of shares or of voting trust certificates representing shares of such corporation unless:
“(b) The plaintiff alleges in the complaint with particularity his efforts to secure from the board of directors such action as he desires and alleges further that he has either informed the corporation or such board of directors in writing of the ultimate facts of each cause of action against each such defendant director or delivered to the corporation or such board of directors a true copy of the complaint which he proposes to file, and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the reasons for not making such effort.” (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case before us, the plaintiff gave no notice, electing rather to state “the reasons for not making such[*226] effort.” [2] Appellants contend that this is not enough, finding in the statute a requirement that the complaint allege: (1) Efforts made by the plaintiff to obtain the required action; and (2) written notice or delivery of a copy of the proposed complaint to the corporation or its board.

Respondent argues that there is no absolute requirement of notice in the statute, but it requires only that either there be an allegation of efforts and notice or an allegation of the reason for not giving notice or making such effort. Respondent’s contention is that the use of the word “or” in the last portion of the last sentence of the statute clearly indicates that such alternatives exist. Thus interpreted, the statute requires efforts to be made and notice given, with the alternative being that, if no such effort has been made, plaintiff must state in his complaint “the reasons for not making such effort.”

Both appellants and respondent strongly urge that this court consider questions of basic public policy and probable legislative intent as to requiring notice in all derivative stockholder suits. We decline the invitation feeling that the dispute can and should be resolved by an interpretation of what the legislature enacted, rather than by seeking to determine what it may have had in mind at the time of the enactment. The words and phrases around which the dispute centers come from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At the time of the enactment of sec. 180.405 (2), Stats., Federal Rule 23 (b) provided:

[*227] “. . . The complaint shall also set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure from the managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the shareholders such action as he desires, and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the reasons for not making such effort.” (Emphasis supplied.)

As it appears in the federal rules, we read the requirement as being a requirement of alleging “efforts” or, in the alternative, “the reasons for not making such effort.” It is true that, with only minor modifications, the legislature elected to place this pleading requirement in the middle of a sentence. However, we see the result as not changing the creation of an alternative to both efforts and notice, to wit: alleging “the reasons for not making such effort.” That “effort” is singular in the latter part of the sentence and pluralized earlier, supports the conclusion that the latter use is a reference to the several earlier requirements. We agree with respondent that the word “or” creates an alternative to the earlier stated requirements.

If this were a choice between two equally palatable alternatives, we would nonetheless hold to the construction we give the statute. At common law there was no notice requirement in Wisconsin as to suits of this kind. Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be narrowly construed, meaning that “. . . the rules of the common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication. To give such effect to the statute, the language must be clear, unambiguous and peremptory. ...” [3]

We affirm the trial court’s ruling that stating the reasons in the complaint for not making the effort to secure action or give notice is sufficient, on test by demurrer, as to compliance with the requirements of sec. 180.405 (1) (b), Stats. The order overruling the demurrer to the derivative cause of action is affirmed.

[*228] Direct came of action.

This brings us to the challenge by demurrer to plaintiff’s pleaded “alternative cause of action.” This is a direct action brought on his own behalf as a stockholder. [4] Appellants contend that this type of direct action is barred in Wisconsin. Respondents contend that, for a breach of fiduciary duty owed to shareholders, a direct action can be brought by a stockholder in this state. The answer is that in the present case the allegations made by this plaintiff and contained in this complaint do not support a direct action by a stockholder.

It is true the fiduciary duty of a director is owed to the individual stockholders as well as to the corporation. [3] Directors in this state may not use their position of trust to further their private interests. [6] Thus, where some individual right of a stockholder is being impaired by the improper acts of a director, the stockholder can bring a[*229] direct suit on his own behalf because it is his individual right that is being violated.

However, it is also true in this state that: “Rights of action accruing to a corporation belong to the corporation, and an action at law or in equity, cannot be maintained by the members as individuals. ...” [7]

So the question to be asked is, “Whose right is sought to be enforced by the alternative cause of action?” It appears to us that the only direct injury alleged is to the corporation. It is the corporation’s funds that allegedly are to be used to pay off debts before due and to redeem stock. It is the corporation that allegedly will have its working capital impaired. It is the corporation that allegedly will no longer be able to stay in business. At least, the primary injury set forth is to the corporation, not the individual stockholder bringing the suit.

That such primary and direct injury to a corporation may have a subsequent impact on the value of the stockholders’ shares is clear, but that is not enough to create a right to bring a direct, rather than derivative, action. [8] Where the injury to the corporation is the primary injury, and any injury to stockholders secondary, it is the derivative action alone that can be brought and maintained. [9] That is the general rule, [10] and, if it were to be[*230] abandoned, there would be no reason left for the concept of derivative actions for the redress of wrongs to a corporation. Given an option to proceed by either direct or derivative action, stockholders could be expected to prefer the direct action. Statutes, like sec. 180.405, providing controls over derivative suits would wither on an unused vine. In the case before us, the plaintiff does not have either option or opportunity to pursue the direct action road to recovery. The demurrer to the alternative cause of action, the direct stockholders’ action, should have been sustained. The order overruling this portion of defendant’s demurrer must be reversed.

Improper joinder.

As to the trial court’s order overruling defendant’s demurrer on the basis of misjoinder of causes of action, it is enough to say that the sustaining of the demurrer to the alternative cause of action leaves no issue of improper joinder of causes of action to discuss. Only the derivative cause of action can be pursued. As to the overruling of the demurrer on the basis of its claim of a misjoinder of parties, little need be said except that, in a derivative suit, the corporation is not only a proper, but also a necessary party. [11] The trial court’s order overruling the demurrer on this ground is affirmed.

[*231] By the Court. — Order affirmed insofar as it overrules the demurrer to the derivative cause of action and overrules the demurrer on the basis of misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Order reversed and cause remanded on the portion of order overruling the demurrer to the alternative cause of action. No costs to either party.

Beilfuss, J., took no part.
1

As to purpose of legislative action setting new requirements for stockholder’s derivative suits, see:

"Revision Committee Note, 19SS: This section is a substitute for 180.40 (7) (Stats. 1951). The problem in the shareholder’s derivative action is the possibility of its abuse for personal profit. This possibility bears no relation to the number of shares held by the plaintiff or his ability to furnish security for expenses. This section is designed to handle the problem directly. The elimination of the chance for personal profit should discourage the strike suit without imposing any obstacles to the good faith action. (Bill 524-S)”
2

Amended complaint alleges: “That plaintiff has made no demand on the board of directors or the officers of the defendant U. S. Controls Corporation to bring this action for the benefit of said defendant U. S. Controls Corporation for the reason that together with the plaintiff the defendants Spencer C. Sehantz and Erwin Nemmers constitute the officers and the entire board of directors of the defendant U. S. Controls Corporation, the actions complained of were committed by said defendants, and to demand that said defendants act to bring said suit against themselves would be futile and useless.”

3

Meek v. Pierce (1865), 19 Wis. 318 (*300), 322 (*303).

4

Plaintiff’s amended complaint, as “Alternate cause of action,” alleges:

“Thirteen: Plaintiff re-alleges herein all those allegations contained in paragraphs 5 through 11 of the within complaint as though specifically set forth herein.
“Fourteen: That as directors of the defendants, U. S. Controls Corporation the defendants Spencer C. Schantz and Erwin Nem-mers occupy a position of trust and confidence and stand in a fiduciary relationship toward the plaintiff who is a stockholder of the defendant, U. S. Controls Corporation.
“Fifteen: That if allowed to act as has been previously alleged said defendants Spencer Schantz and Erwin Nemmers would thereby use their positions of trust and confidence to further their private interests, in conflict with a free and impartial discharge of their duties toward the plaintiff, and would thereby cause irreparable harm to the plaintiff, for which there would be no adequate remedy at law.”
3

Grognet v. Fox Valley Trucking Service (1969), 45 Wis. 2d 235, 241, 172 N. W. 2d 812.

6

Timme v. Kopmeier (1916), 162 Wis. 571, 575, 156 N. W. 961; McDermott v. O’Neil Oil Co. (1930), 200 Wis. 423, 426, 228 N. W. 481; Stoiber v. Miller Brewing Co. (1950), 257 Wis. 13, 18, 42 N. W. 2d 144.

7

Marshfield Clinic v. Doege (1955), 269 Wis. 519, 526, 69 N. W. 2d 558.

8

Id. at pages 526, 527, holding: “Any injury to a corporation gives no individual right of action, although the injury to the corporation may incidentally result in the depression of the value of the stocks and bonds. . . .”

9

See; 13 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (1970 rev.), ch. 58, sec. 5924, Mismanagement by corporate officers or majority stockholders, page 309: “While an injury to the corporation resulting from wrongdoing, fraud or negligence of corporate officers operates, indirectly, as an injury to stockholders, the injury to stockholders is secondary and the injury to the corporation primary. A stockholder cannot, as an individual as distinguished from a representative of the corporation, sue directors or other corporate officers for mismanagement, negligence or the like, on a cause of[*230] action which belongs to the corporation. In other words, the remedial rights of minority stockholders with respect to wrongs committed against the corporation by the officers and directors in the management of corporate affairs are derivative rights and any action taken by the stockholders to redress such wrongs must be for the benefit of the corporation. . . .”

10

See: 19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, p. 62, sec. 526, stating: “. . . It is generally held that a stockholder has no personal or individual right of action against third persons, including officers and directors of the corporation, for a wrong or injury to the corporation, even though the particular wrong or injury may have resulted in the destruction or depreciation of the value of his stock; . . .”

11

See: Whitcomb v. Albany Hardware Specialty Mfg. Co. (1944), 245 Wis. 86, 13 N. W. 2d 516; Donnelly v. Sampson (1908), 135 Wis. 368, 115 N. W. 1089.