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37 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1876–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Notz v. Everett Smith Group, Ltd.green2 sentences2023Cf. Notz v. Everett Smith Grp., Ltd., 2009 WI 30, ¶20 , 316 Wis. 2d 640 , 764 N.W.2d 904 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) ("[A] right of action that belongs to the corporation cannot be pursued as a direct claim by an individual stockholder. . . . [E]ven where the injury to the corporation results in harm to a shareholder, it won't transform an action from a derivative to a direct one . . . ."); 54 C.J.S. 2023Cf. Notz v. Everett Smith Grp., Ltd., 2009 WI 30, ¶20 , 316 Wis. 2d 640 , 764 N.W.2d 904 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) ("[A] right of action that belongs to the corporation cannot be pursued as a direct claim by an individual stockholder. . . . [E]ven where the injury to the corporation results in harm to a shareholder, it won't transform an action from a derivative to a direct one . . . ."); 54 C.J.S. | 2 | 4 |
C. Severin Buschmann, Jr. v. Professional Men's Associationgreen2 sentences2013Buschmann v. Professional Men's Ass'n, 405 F.2d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1969) (concluding that a direct claim existed where the plaintiff sought damages "which he sustained individually" that were not sustained by the corporation and could not have been asserted by the corporation in its own right). ¶45 However, examining the differences between direct claims, derivative claims, or claims that are both direct and derivative does not fully resolve our inquiry into whether the Westburgs as guarantors have standing to raise derivative counterclaims. 2013Buschmann v. Professional Men's Ass'n, 405 F.2d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1969) (concluding that a direct claim existed where the plaintiff sought damages "which he sustained individually" that were not sustained by the corporation and could not have been asserted by the corporation in its own right). ¶ 45. | 2 | 2 |
Rose v. Schantzgreen2 sentences2019In those circumstances, an individual shareholder may bring only a derivative action—that is, an action in which “the claims belong to the 26 No. 2018AP1715 corporation, not to the complaining shareholder,” and the shareholder proceeds “on behalf of the corporation that has been unwilling to bring the suit.” Einhorn v. Culea, 2000 WI 65, ¶16 , 235 Wis. 2d 646 , 612 N.W.2d 78 . ¶60 When determining whether a shareholder may assert a direct claim, as opposed to a derivative claim, the salient inquiry is “[w]hose right is sought to be enforced.” Rose, 56 Wis. 2d at 229 . “[W]here the injury to th 2009Since a shareholder lacks standing to make a direct claim for such damages, id., it follows that a distinct entity would not have greater standing than the shareholder. ¶ 34. | 1 | 6 |
A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Insurancegreen2 sentences2025Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 491 , 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[A]n issue raised in the trial court, but not raised on appeal, is deemed abandoned.”); see also State v. Mercado, 2021 WI 2, ¶¶35, 37 , 395 Wis. 2d 296 , 953 N.W.2d 337 (explaining that a direct challenge to unobjected-to errors are generally forfeited and can be reviewed through ineffective assistance of counsel). ¶11 As a result, the only viable argument remaining is his argument claiming ineffective assistance of counsel related to whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a lesser-included jury instruction. 2025Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 491 , 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[A]n issue raised in the trial court, but not raised on appeal, is deemed abandoned.”); see also State v. Mercado, 2021 WI 2, ¶¶35, 37 , 395 Wis. 2d 296 , 953 N.W.2d 337 (explaining that a direct challenge to unobjected-to errors are generally forfeited and can be reviewed through ineffective assistance of counsel). ¶11 As a result, the only viable argument remaining is his argument claiming ineffective assistance of counsel related to whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a lesser-included jury instruction. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Angel Mercadogreen2 sentences2025Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 491 , 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[A]n issue raised in the trial court, but not raised on appeal, is deemed abandoned.”); see also State v. Mercado, 2021 WI 2, ¶¶35, 37 , 395 Wis. 2d 296 , 953 N.W.2d 337 (explaining that a direct challenge to unobjected-to errors are generally forfeited and can be reviewed through ineffective assistance of counsel). ¶11 As a result, the only viable argument remaining is his argument claiming ineffective assistance of counsel related to whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a lesser-included jury instruction. 2025Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 491 , 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[A]n issue raised in the trial court, but not raised on appeal, is deemed abandoned.”); see also State v. Mercado, 2021 WI 2, ¶¶35, 37 , 395 Wis. 2d 296 , 953 N.W.2d 337 (explaining that a direct challenge to unobjected-to errors are generally forfeited and can be reviewed through ineffective assistance of counsel). ¶11 As a result, the only viable argument remaining is his argument claiming ineffective assistance of counsel related to whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a lesser-included jury instruction. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Countygreen1 sentence2023See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (we interpret statutes “reasonably, to avoid 12 No. 2021AP2001-CR absurd or unreasonable results”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Churchgreen2 sentences2022As the Church court explained, the concern in those circumstances is that a defendant’s appeal “pose[s] a direct challenge to a decision of the circuit court,” and, on remand, the court is then required to “do[] over what it thought it had already done correctly.” Church, 262 Wis. 2d 678, ¶54 (citation omitted). 2022The Church court concluded that “these circumstances” inherently gave rise to a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.” Id. (citation omitted). ¶31 Unlike Church and Pearce, this case does not involve a single decision-maker being forced to “do[] over what it thought it had already done correctly” after its original decision was reversed by an appellate tribunal. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garfootgreen1 sentence2022Nonetheless, we include the deferential standard to sustaining the circuit court’s competency ruling because it is relevant to our analysis. (continued) 11 No. 2020AP275-CR ¶25 Thus, for example, in Garfoot our supreme court held that the circuit court’s “decision that the State failed to meet its burden of proof” by the greater weight of the credible evidence “was not clearly erroneous.” See Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 227-28 (The circuit “court was faced with testimony from one expert that Garfoot was not competent and testimony from another expert that Garfoot was only marginally competent” and | 1 | 1 |
State v. Galliongreen1 sentence2021See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶61 (“The [sentencing] court also observed that society has an interest in punishing Gallion so that his sentence might serve as a general deterrence against drunk driving.”); see also United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522, 527 (1st Cir. 1974) (“the view that punishment should fit the offender has never yet been held to eliminate general deterrence as a factor to be considered along with others[,] … even though general deterrence concerns itself not with the individual offender but with the sentence’s impact on others.”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Stewart Fossgreen1 sentence2021See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶61 (“The [sentencing] court also observed that society has an interest in punishing Gallion so that his sentence might serve as a general deterrence against drunk driving.”); see also United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522, 527 (1st Cir. 1974) (“the view that punishment should fit the offender has never yet been held to eliminate general deterrence as a factor to be considered along with others[,] … even though general deterrence concerns itself not with the individual offender but with the sentence’s impact on others.”). | 1 | 1 |
Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrutgreen2 sentences2018See Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut , 2004 WI 79 , ¶ 3, 273 Wis. 2d 76 , 681 N.W.2d 190 (because forfeiture is a rule of judicial administration, a reviewing court has inherent authority to disregard forfeiture and address the merits of an unpreserved argument). 2018See Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut , 2004 WI 79 , ¶ 3, 273 Wis. 2d 76 , 681 N.W.2d 190 (because forfeiture is a rule of judicial administration, a reviewing court has inherent authority to disregard forfeiture and address the merits of an unpreserved argument). | 1 | 1 |
Trujillo v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Due process requires that sentencing be individualized, avoiding reliance on stereotypes or other 7 See, e.g., People v. Hernandez-Clavel, 186 P.3d 96, 100 (Colo. App. 2008) (concluding that the sentencing court did not err in considering the circumstances surrounding the defendant's status as an undocumented immigrant when deciding whether to grant or deny probation); Trujillo v. State, 698 S.E.2d 350, 354 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (determining that the trial court did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights by considering his undocumented immigration status as a relevant factor in formul | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hernandez-Clavelgreen1 sentence2016Due process requires that sentencing be individualized, avoiding reliance on stereotypes or other 7 See, e.g., People v. Hernandez-Clavel, 186 P.3d 96, 100 (Colo. App. 2008) (concluding that the sentencing court did not err in considering the circumstances surrounding the defendant's status as an undocumented immigrant when deciding whether to grant or deny probation); Trujillo v. State, 698 S.E.2d 350, 354 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (determining that the trial court did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights by considering his undocumented immigration status as a relevant factor in formul | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Juan Ramirez-Fuentesgreen1 sentence2016Due process requires that sentencing be individualized, avoiding reliance on stereotypes or other 7 See, e.g., People v. Hernandez-Clavel, 186 P.3d 96, 100 (Colo. App. 2008) (concluding that the sentencing court did not err in considering the circumstances surrounding the defendant's status as an undocumented immigrant when deciding whether to grant or deny probation); Trujillo v. State, 698 S.E.2d 350, 354 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (determining that the trial court did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights by considering his undocumented immigration status as a relevant factor in formul | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cesargreen1 sentence2016Due process requires that sentencing be individualized, avoiding reliance on stereotypes or other 7 See, e.g., People v. Hernandez-Clavel, 186 P.3d 96, 100 (Colo. App. 2008) (concluding that the sentencing court did not err in considering the circumstances surrounding the defendant's status as an undocumented immigrant when deciding whether to grant or deny probation); Trujillo v. State, 698 S.E.2d 350, 354 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (determining that the trial court did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights by considering his undocumented immigration status as a relevant factor in formul | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Juan Flores-Olaguegreen1 sentence2016Due process requires that sentencing be individualized, avoiding reliance on stereotypes or other 7 See, e.g., People v. Hernandez-Clavel, 186 P.3d 96, 100 (Colo. App. 2008) (concluding that the sentencing court did not err in considering the circumstances surrounding the defendant's status as an undocumented immigrant when deciding whether to grant or deny probation); Trujillo v. State, 698 S.E.2d 350, 354 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (determining that the trial court did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights by considering his undocumented immigration status as a relevant factor in formul | 1 | 1 |
Balwin County Electric v. Catrettgreen2 sentences2012The court in Baldwin held that a claim that the board of trustees failed to follow the procedures set out in the bylaws for the election of trustees was properly brought as a direct claim "because [the plaintiffs] are enforcing an individual right — the right to vote — rather than a right of the corporation." Id. (citations omitted). 2012After describing the specific bylaw provisions at issue, id. at 340-41, the court's analysis began with the proposition that under Alabama law the bylaws and certain other writings of a voluntary association constitute a contract between the association's members. | 1 | 1 |
Whirlpool Corp. v. Ziebertgreen2 sentences2011Such a conclusion defies both logic and common sense." Id. at 155 (emphasis added). ¶ 47. 2011See Whirlpool, 197 Wis. 2d at 153 ("A 'direct' benefit [] would accrue to Jaclyn Ziebert by way of a direct claim against Sharon Ziebert and Allstate.... | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Knightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nelson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Meyer v. Fronimadesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Casamasino v. City of Jersey Citygreen | 1 | 1 |
| The People v. O'Neillgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walker v. Trumpgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Levesque v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Giese v. Schultzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ndina
green
2 sentences2021Clark forfeited his ability to bring a direct claim for a violation of his right to confrontation ¶12 Clark first argues that we can directly address the alleged violation of his right to confrontation; however, as Clark concedes in his brief, trial counsel failed to object to the admission of the forensic interviews or M.H.’s live testimony. “[U]nobjected-to errors are generally considered waived; and the rule applies to both evidentiary and constitutional errors.” State v. Boshcka, 178 Wis. 2d 628, 642 , 496 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1992).4 “[W]e may, in our discretion 4 In State v. Ndina, our s 2021Clark forfeited his ability to bring a direct claim for a violation of his right to confrontation ¶12 Clark first argues that we can directly address the alleged violation of his right to confrontation; however, as Clark concedes in his brief, trial counsel failed to object to the admission of the forensic interviews or M.H.’s live testimony. “[U]nobjected-to errors are generally considered waived; and the rule applies to both evidentiary and constitutional errors.” State v. Boshcka, 178 Wis. 2d 628, 642 , 496 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1992).4 “[W]e may, in our discretion 4 In State v. Ndina, our s | 2 | 2021–2023 |
Jorgensen v. Water Works, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012One example of a proper direct claim by a shareholder is found in Jorgensen v. Water Works, Inc., 2001 WI App 135 , 246 Wis. 2d 614 , 630 N.W.2d 230 (Jorgensen II). 2012One example of a proper direct claim by a shareholder is found in Jorgensen v. Water Works, Inc., 2001 WI App 135 , 246 Wis. 2d 614 , 630 N.W.2d 230 (Jorgensen II). | 2 | 2008–2012 |
S.Y. v. Eau Claire County
green
2 sentences2023STAT. ch. 51 committee forfeited her sufficiency of the evidence claim because she did not raise an objection on that basis before the circuit court); State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30 , 315 Wis. 2d 653 , 761 N.W.2d 612 (“[F]ailure to object [at trial] constitutes a forfeiture of the right on appellate 6 Edward relies upon S.Y. v. Eau Claire County, 156 Wis. 2d 317 , 457 N.W.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1990), aff’d, 162 Wis. 2d 320 , 469 N.W.2d 836 (1991), in contending that the circuit court here could not rely upon the alleged “hearsay” evidence in determining dangerousness. 2023STAT. ch. 51 committee forfeited her sufficiency of the evidence claim because she did not raise an objection on that basis before the circuit court); State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30 , 315 Wis. 2d 653 , 761 N.W.2d 612 (“[F]ailure to object [at trial] constitutes a forfeiture of the right on appellate 6 Edward relies upon S.Y. v. Eau Claire County, 156 Wis. 2d 317 , 457 N.W.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1990), aff’d, 162 Wis. 2d 320 , 469 N.W.2d 836 (1991), in contending that the circuit court here could not rely upon the alleged “hearsay” evidence in determining dangerousness. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In Matter of Condition of SY
green
2 sentences2023STAT. ch. 51 committee forfeited her sufficiency of the evidence claim because she did not raise an objection on that basis before the circuit court); State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30 , 315 Wis. 2d 653 , 761 N.W.2d 612 (“[F]ailure to object [at trial] constitutes a forfeiture of the right on appellate 6 Edward relies upon S.Y. v. Eau Claire County, 156 Wis. 2d 317 , 457 N.W.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1990), aff’d, 162 Wis. 2d 320 , 469 N.W.2d 836 (1991), in contending that the circuit court here could not rely upon the alleged “hearsay” evidence in determining dangerousness. 2023STAT. ch. 51 committee forfeited her sufficiency of the evidence claim because she did not raise an objection on that basis before the circuit court); State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30 , 315 Wis. 2d 653 , 761 N.W.2d 612 (“[F]ailure to object [at trial] constitutes a forfeiture of the right on appellate 6 Edward relies upon S.Y. v. Eau Claire County, 156 Wis. 2d 317 , 457 N.W.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1990), aff’d, 162 Wis. 2d 320 , 469 N.W.2d 836 (1991), in contending that the circuit court here could not rely upon the alleged “hearsay” evidence in determining dangerousness. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Waukesha Cnty. v. S.L.L. (In Re Mental Commitment of S.L.L.)
green
2 sentences2023Due to his failure to (or decision not to) object, he has forfeited a direct challenge to the admission of the alleged hearsay evidence.6 See Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, ¶42 , 387 Wis. 2d 333 , 929 N.W.2d 140 (concluding that a WIS. 2023Due to his failure to (or decision not to) object, he has forfeited a direct challenge to the admission of the alleged hearsay evidence.6 See Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, ¶42 , 387 Wis. 2d 333 , 929 N.W.2d 140 (concluding that a WIS. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Boshcka
green
2 sentences2021Clark forfeited his ability to bring a direct claim for a violation of his right to confrontation ¶12 Clark first argues that we can directly address the alleged violation of his right to confrontation; however, as Clark concedes in his brief, trial counsel failed to object to the admission of the forensic interviews or M.H.’s live testimony. “[U]nobjected-to errors are generally considered waived; and the rule applies to both evidentiary and constitutional errors.” State v. Boshcka, 178 Wis. 2d 628, 642 , 496 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1992).4 “[W]e may, in our discretion 4 In State v. Ndina, our s 2021Clark forfeited his ability to bring a direct claim for a violation of his right to confrontation ¶12 Clark first argues that we can directly address the alleged violation of his right to confrontation; however, as Clark concedes in his brief, trial counsel failed to object to the admission of the forensic interviews or M.H.’s live testimony. “[U]nobjected-to errors are generally considered waived; and the rule applies to both evidentiary and constitutional errors.” State v. Boshcka, 178 Wis. 2d 628, 642 , 496 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1992).4 “[W]e may, in our discretion 4 In State v. Ndina, our s | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Terry v. Journal Broadcast Corp.
green
2 sentences2019Peterson v. Anderson, 2006 WI App 170, ¶18 , 295 Wis. 2d 714 , 721 N.W.2d 146 , nor did he introduce evidence of “an extreme disabling response” required for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Terry v. Journal Broadcast Corp., 2013 WI App 130, ¶42 , 351 Wis. 2d 479 , 840 N.W.2d 255 . ¶8 Finally, some portions of Lecheler’s brief may be read to suggest that the circuit court judge was unfairly biased against him, though Lecheler does not cite any controlling law on this point. 2019Peterson v. Anderson, 2006 WI App 170, ¶18 , 295 Wis. 2d 714 , 721 N.W.2d 146 , nor did he introduce evidence of “an extreme disabling response” required for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Terry v. Journal Broadcast Corp., 2013 WI App 130, ¶42 , 351 Wis. 2d 479 , 840 N.W.2d 255 . ¶8 Finally, some portions of Lecheler’s brief may be read to suggest that the circuit court judge was unfairly biased against him, though Lecheler does not cite any controlling law on this point. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Einhorn v. Culea
green
2 sentences2019In those circumstances, an individual shareholder may bring only a derivative action—that is, an action in which “the claims belong to the 26 No. 2018AP1715 corporation, not to the complaining shareholder,” and the shareholder proceeds “on behalf of the corporation that has been unwilling to bring the suit.” Einhorn v. Culea, 2000 WI 65, ¶16 , 235 Wis. 2d 646 , 612 N.W.2d 78 . ¶60 When determining whether a shareholder may assert a direct claim, as opposed to a derivative claim, the salient inquiry is “[w]hose right is sought to be enforced.” Rose, 56 Wis. 2d at 229 . “[W]here the injury to th 2019In those circumstances, an individual shareholder may bring only a derivative action—that is, an action in which “the claims belong to the 26 No. 2018AP1715 corporation, not to the complaining shareholder,” and the shareholder proceeds “on behalf of the corporation that has been unwilling to bring the suit.” Einhorn v. Culea, 2000 WI 65, ¶16 , 235 Wis. 2d 646 , 612 N.W.2d 78 . ¶60 When determining whether a shareholder may assert a direct claim, as opposed to a derivative claim, the salient inquiry is “[w]hose right is sought to be enforced.” Rose, 56 Wis. 2d at 229 . “[W]here the injury to th | 1 | 2019–2019 |
CAMP EX REL. PETERSON v. Anderson
neutral
2 sentences2019Peterson v. Anderson, 2006 WI App 170, ¶18 , 295 Wis. 2d 714 , 721 N.W.2d 146 , nor did he introduce evidence of “an extreme disabling response” required for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Terry v. Journal Broadcast Corp., 2013 WI App 130, ¶42 , 351 Wis. 2d 479 , 840 N.W.2d 255 . ¶8 Finally, some portions of Lecheler’s brief may be read to suggest that the circuit court judge was unfairly biased against him, though Lecheler does not cite any controlling law on this point. 2019Peterson v. Anderson, 2006 WI App 170, ¶18 , 295 Wis. 2d 714 , 721 N.W.2d 146 , nor did he introduce evidence of “an extreme disabling response” required for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Terry v. Journal Broadcast Corp., 2013 WI App 130, ¶42 , 351 Wis. 2d 479 , 840 N.W.2d 255 . ¶8 Finally, some portions of Lecheler’s brief may be read to suggest that the circuit court judge was unfairly biased against him, though Lecheler does not cite any controlling law on this point. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Krier v. Vilione
green
1 sentence2019Krier, 317 Wis. 2d 288, ¶14 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Park Bank v. Roger E. Westburg
green
2 sentences2019In those circumstances, an individual shareholder may bring only a derivative action—that is, an action in which “the claims belong to the 26 No. 2018AP1715 corporation, not to the complaining shareholder,” and the shareholder proceeds “on behalf of the corporation that has been unwilling to bring the suit.” Einhorn v. Culea, 2000 WI 65, ¶16 , 235 Wis. 2d 646 , 612 N.W.2d 78 . ¶60 When determining whether a shareholder may assert a direct claim, as opposed to a derivative claim, the salient inquiry is “[w]hose right is sought to be enforced.” Rose, 56 Wis. 2d at 229 . “[W]here the injury to th 2019In those circumstances, an individual shareholder may bring only a derivative action—that is, an action in which “the claims belong to the 26 No. 2018AP1715 corporation, not to the complaining shareholder,” and the shareholder proceeds “on behalf of the corporation that has been unwilling to bring the suit.” Einhorn v. Culea, 2000 WI 65, ¶16 , 235 Wis. 2d 646 , 612 N.W.2d 78 . ¶60 When determining whether a shareholder may assert a direct claim, as opposed to a derivative claim, the salient inquiry is “[w]hose right is sought to be enforced.” Rose, 56 Wis. 2d at 229 . “[W]here the injury to th | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Briand green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Davis
green
1 sentence2010Id., ¶ 36 (quoting Briand, 547 A.2d at 239 ). ¶ 113 The court held that Davis did not waive his right simply by presenting Richard A.P . evidence, because such evidence was not a direct challenge to an element of the crime. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Notz v. Everett Smith Group, Ltd. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Peterson v. State green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Einhorn v. Culea green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Bentley green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Peterson green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Rabideau v. City of Racine green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Burton green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. David J.K. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Bjerkaas green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Pierce v. Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, Inc. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hospital of Vermont, Inc. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Fix v. Fix Material Co., Inc. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Swan v. Porter neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Galloway v. State green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Gagnon v. Scarpelli red | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Perkins v. Peacock green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Kaye v. Crawford neutral | 1 | 1876–1876 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.