Carmichael v. Shelley Tractor & Equip, 300 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). · Go Syfert
Carmichael v. Shelley Tractor & Equip, 300 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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A trial court denies due process when it grants a directed verdict before the opposing party has completed its case-in-chief.

In a breach of contract action, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his complaint after a non-jury trial began, leaving only the defendant's counterclaim. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion to amend his answer to deny the defendant's performance and granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the defendant's case-in-chief, before the plaintiff presented evidence. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the amendment, which merely restated the dismissed complaint's allegations without causing surprise or prejudice. Furthermore, the court ruled that granting a directed verdict before the opposing party completed its case-in-chief was premature and denied the plaintiff due process. The judgment is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

14 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Cited for
At page 299 Prohibiting premature directed verdict before opposing case-in-chief3 citing casesAt trial upon the issues made by the pleadings, a party may not move for and obtain a directed verdict prior to the time that the party moved against has completed his case-inchief. Otherwise, such party would be denied due process of law.3 citing courts put it this way
  • Williams v. Salem Free Will Baptist Church, 784 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).published
    (At trial upon the issues made by the pleadings, a party may not move for and obtain a directed verdict prior to the time that the party moved against has completed his case-inchief. Otherwise, such party would be denie…)
  • Claridge H, LLC v. Claridge Hotel, Lc, 66 So. 3d 1049 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).published
    (At trial upon the issues made by the pleadings, a party may not move for and obtain a directed verdict prior to the time that the party moved against has completed his case-in-chief. Otherwise, such party would be deni…)
  • Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Acanda, 23 So. 3d 1200 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).published
    (At trial upon the issues made by the pleadings, a party may not move for and obtain a directed verdict prior to the time that the party moved against has completed his case-in-chief. Otherwise, such party would be deni…)
Other citing cases1 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Waldo S. CARMICHAEL, Appellant,
v.
SHELLEY TRACTOR & EQUIPMENT COMPANY, Appellee.
74-27.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Sep 20, 1974.
Published opinion
300 So. 2d 298
Owen.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published

B.F. Paty, Jr., of Paty, Downey, Lewis & Reiter, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Joseph J. Reiter of Levy, Plisco, Perry & Retier, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

OWEN, Chief Judge.

Appellant, the original plaintiff in a suit for breach of contract, suffered a judgment for damages on appellee's counterclaim following a non-jury trial.

Appellant's amended complaint alleged that he had entered into a written contract with appellee to purchase from the latter a certain dragline, pursuant to which contract appellee agreed to provide plaintiff-appellant with certain services, maintenance and materials for contemplated repair of the dragline; that the dragline as delivered by appellee was not delivered timely, was not in the condition as warranted, and that appellee had breached its agreement to make repairs thereon, all to the plaintiff's damage. By counterclaim appellee alleged in Count I the execution of the contract, the delivery of the dragline, and appellant's breach of the contract by failure to pay the installments due on the purchase price and by subsequently selling the dragline to a third party. In an amendment to the counterclaim, appellee alleged that it had furnished at appellant's request certain labor and materials for repair of the dragline for which appellant had not paid.

When the cause came on for trial before the court without a jury, appellant announced[*299] a voluntary dismissal of his complaint, and orally moved to amend his answer to the counterclaim to deny that appellee had performed its obligations under the contract. Initially, the court reserved ruling on this motion. The case proceeded to trial on appellee's counterclaim, and at the conclusion of appellee's case-in-chief on this counterclaim the court denied appellant's motion to amend his answer as aforesaid, and at that time and before appellant had put on any evidence, granted appellee's motion for directed verdict on Count I. These two orders are assigned as error.

The amendment which appellant sought to make to its answer to the counterclaim, whereby he sought to deny that appellee had performed its obligations under the contract, was in essence nothing more than the substance of appellant's voluntarily dismissed complaint, i.e., that appellee had breached its contract. There could have been no surprise or prejudice to appellee by permitting such amendment as the issue of whether appellee breached its contract was included in the pretrial order. It would appear that the court's denial of appellant's motion to amend his answer in this respect was an abuse of discretion.

The granting of appellee's motion for a directed verdict on Count I at the close of its case-in-chief and before appellant had rested was error, as the motion was premature. At trial upon the issues made by the pleadings, a party may not move for and obtain a directed verdict prior to the time that the party moved against has completed his case-in-chief. Otherwise, such party would be denied due process of law. Cf., Pelle v. Diners Club, Fla.App. 1974, 287 So.2d 737.

The judgment is reversed and this cause remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

CROSS and MAGER, JJ., concur.