Kessell v. State, 713 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). · Go Syfert
Kessell v. State, 713 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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An unlimited plea agreement provision for credit for time served includes incarceration in another jurisdiction solely because of the Florida offense.

The defendant fled to New York, was arrested, and served time awaiting extradition before returning to Florida to plead guilty to concurrent sentences with credit for time served. The defendant argues the awarded credit excludes his New York incarceration. The State contends no right exists for out-of-state credit but acknowledges the omission. The court applies the rule that while out-of-state credit is discretionary, an unlimited plea agreement provision for credit for time served logically includes all custody resulting from the Florida offense. Because the agreement lacked specific exclusions and reasonably led the defendant to expect full credit, the court holds the agreement includes the New York time. The court reverses the order denying additional credit and remands for recalculation.

4 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Cited for
At page 1123 Interpreting plea agreements for credit for time served2 citing casesBefore COPE, GERSTEN and SHEVIN, JJ. PER CURIAM. Juan C. Kessell appeals an order denying his postconviction motion for additional credit for time served prior…opening of page *1123 (no citing court says what it cites this page for)
  • Picariello v. State, 728 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).published
    In Kessell v. State, 713 So.2d 1122, 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) we concluded as follows: The State opposes the award of any additional credit, arguing that a defendant is not entitled, as a matter of right, to credit for time served in other…
  • Pino-Roque v. State, 718 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).published
    Moreover under the instant facts, as we recently observed in Kessell v. State, 713 So.2d 1122, 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), “May-ing led the defendant reasonably to conclude that he would be given credit for all, not just some, of the time he…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Juan C. KESSELL, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
98-1200.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Jul 29, 1998.
Published opinion
713 So. 2d 1122
1998 WL 422563
Cope, Gersten and Shevin.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published

Juan C. Kessell, in proper person.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Douglas Gurnic, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

[*1123] Before COPE, GERSTEN and SHEVIN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Juan C. Kessell appeals an order denying his postconviction motion for additional credit for time served prior to trial. We reverse.

With multiple criminal charges pending, defendant-appellant fled to New York where he was ultimately arrested. He was incarcerated for several months pending extradition. Upon his return to Florida, he entered into a plea agreement for twenty-four-month concurrent sentences with credit for time served. He contends that the credit he was awarded does not include credit for some of the time he was incarcerated in New York awaiting extradition, and the State concedes that is so.

The State opposes the award of any additional credit, arguing that a defendant is not entitled, as a matter of right, to credit for time served in other jurisdictions while awaiting transfer to Florida. See Kronz v. State, 462 So.2d 450, 451 (Fla.1985); Hopping v. State, 650 So.2d 1087, 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). It is also true, however, that the trial court has discretion to make an award of such credit for time served "when the defendant was incarcerated in another state solely because of the Florida offense for which he or she is being sentenced." Kronz, 462 So.2d at 451.

In this case the plea colloquy simply indicates that the plea agreement includes credit for time served. The "credit for time served" phrase was repeated numerous times in the colloquy. There was no discussion, one way or the other, about credit for the time defendant was incarcerated in New York.

It is our view that in this circumstance, where the plea agreement provided for credit for time served without limitation, the plea agreement is most logically construed as including credit for all time served, including time served in New York solely because of the Florida offense on which defendant was awaiting extradition. Having led the defendant reasonably to conclude that he would be given credit for all, not just some, of the time he spent in custody, it is too late now to suggest otherwise. That being so, the order under review is reversed and the cause remanded for recalculation of credit for time served.

Reversed and remanded.