At page 23 Determining right to counsel in probation revocation hearings11 citing cases“unless there has been an informed waiver thereof such a person is entitled to counsel, and it must be afforded him before he is required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges.”
- Carliovis Bandera-Valier v. State of Florida, 433 So. 3d 503 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026).published“In Florida, the right to counsel has been extended to all probation violation hearings.” White v. State, 336 So. 3d 427 , 428 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (citing State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1985)).
- Leon Bernard Camel v. State of Florida, 386 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).published(holding that a defendant has a right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings)
- Maxwell v. State of Florida, 383 So. 3d 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).publishedThe probationer, for instance, is entitled to the provision of effective assistance of counsel “before he is required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges.” State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1985).
- Bowden v. State, 150 So. 3d 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).publishedState v. Hicks, 478 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla.1985).
- Brady v. State, 910 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).publishedHowever, Florida has adopted the rule that "unless there has been an informed waiver [of the right to counsel, a probationer] is entitled to counsel, and it must be afforded him before he is required to respond in any manner to the revocat…
- Pearl v. State, 996 P.2d 688 (Wyo. 2000).published State v. Hicks, 478 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla.1985).
- Gibson v. State, 747 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).publishedAs our supreme court noted in State v. Hicks, 478 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla.1985), there is no constitutional requirement that counsel be appointed in all probation revocation proceedings.
- Tyler v. State, 710 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).published“Unless there has been an informed waiver thereof such a person is entitled to counsel, and it must be afforded him before he is required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges”
- Register v. State, 514 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).publishedThe Court held that, “unless there has been an informed waiver thereof such a person is entitled to counsel, and it must be afforded him before he is required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges.” Id. at 23.
- Floyd v. Parole & Prob. Com'n, 509 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1987).publishedWe doubt that we could improve upon his opinion and therefore adopt it as the opinion of this Court. 478 So.2d at 23-24 (emphasis supplied).
Show 1 more citing case
- Speckhardt v. State, 110 So. 3d 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).publishedSee State v. Hicks, 478 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla.1985); Brady v. State, 910 So.2d 388, 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
Other citing cases
- Edwards v. State, 721 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).published
- White v. Dept. of Health & Rehab. Servs., 483 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).published
v.
Carl Lee HICKS, Respondent.
[*23] Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Carolyn V. McCann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender and Margaret Good, Asst. Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for respondent.
Enoch J. Whitney, Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, amicus curiae for Florida Parole and Probation Com'n.
McDONALD, Justice.
We accepted jurisdiction of Hicks v. State, 452 So.2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), because of conflict with Sanderson v. State, 447 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and we approve Hicks.
The issue in this case is whether a person subject to probation revocation has an absolute right to counsel in such a proceeding, and, if so, whether the right must be afforded him before he is required to admit or deny the revocation charges. We hold that unless there has been an informed waiver thereof such a person is entitled to counsel, and it must be afforded him before he is required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges.
We note at the outset that there is no constitutional requirement for the appointment of counsel in all probation revocation hearings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). We predicate our decision here on the ground that a uniform rule in all probation revocation hearings is more easily understood and easier to administer than requiring attorneys in some cases but not in others. We do not believe that a uniform requirement will unduly tax the resources of the public defender system; we believe it will result in a more orderly and uniform administration of the criminal justice system.[*] Judge Downey, writing for the district court, has cogently stated reasons to adopt the ruling we make. We doubt that we could improve upon his opinion and[*24] therefore adopt it as the opinion of this Court.
The opinion of the district court of appeal is approved.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
ADKINS and ALDERMAN, JJ., dissent.
ON REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
On rehearing we are asked to decide whether this decision, which related to a probation violation, is also applicable to a parole violation hearing. We should not address on rehearing an issue that was not presented, essential, or directly germane to the case under review and therefore decline to decide the applicability of our holding to parole violations.
We do feel that it is appropriate to determine whether our holding relative to probation violations is retroactive or prospective in its application to other probation violation hearings. We hold that it has prospective application only.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
[*] Further, a probation revocation usually leads to sentencing; an attorney is required at a sentencing proceeding. It seems illogical not to mandate an attorney when revocation is likely to lead to incarceration and to require an attorney only when the length of that incarceration is being decided.