A confession by a juvenile is inadmissible if police fail to deliver the child to the court without delay as mandated by statute.
A sixteen-year-old minor is interrogated by police regarding a rape, gives a confession after receiving Miranda warnings, and later repudiates the statement before a juvenile court judge. The trial court suppresses the confession based on statutory requirements, while the appellate court reverses without addressing the specific juvenile custody statute. The Supreme Court of Florida addresses whether the mandatory language of the juvenile code requiring immediate delivery of a child to the court and notification of parents controls the admissibility of the confession. The court applies the explicit statutory mandate that officers must deliver the child to the court without delay for investigation. The court holds that the statutory violation renders the confession inadmissible, quashes the appellate decision, and remands the case for a new trial consistent with this ruling.
At page 386 Adopting prior holding based on mandatory statute1 citing caseThis was the result reached in In Re A.J.A., supra, on facts which are similar to those presently under review. In view of the explicit mandatory language of…
- Interest of Rlj, 336 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).publishedRoberts v. State, 285 So.2d 385, 386 (Fla. 1973), quashing this Court's decision in State v. Roberts, 274 So.2d 262 (Fla.App.1st, 1973).
Other citing cases
- Theriault v. State, 223 N.W.2d 850 (Wis. 1974).published
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Brian T. Hayes, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and A.S. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported at 274 So.2d 262 (1973). Our jurisdiction is based upon conflict between this case and In Re A.J.A., 248 So.2d 290 (Fla.App. 1971). Fla. Const., Art. V, Section 3(b)(3) (1973) F.S.A.
Petitioner, a 16-year-old minor, was interrogated by police officials concerning a rape. After being given Miranda warnings the petitioner gave the police a statement that amounted to a confession of the crime. Following the recording of that statement, the defendant was taken before a juvenile court judge at which time he repudiated the statement and proclaimed his innocence.
Petitioner filed a motion to suppress the confession and that motion was ultimately granted based, in part, on the provisions of F.S. Section 39.03(3), F.S.A.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, reversed that determination after an extensive interpretation of the McNabb-Mallory rule, failing, however, to discuss the applicability of F.S. Section 39.03(3), F.S.A.
After a thorough review of the record in this cause, we have determined that the following language in F.S. Section 39.03 (3), F.S.A., is controlling:
"The person taking and retaining a child in custody shall notify the parents or legal custodians of the child and the principal of the school in which said child is enrolled at the earliest practicable time, and shall, without delay for the purpose of investigation or any other purpose, deliver the child, by the most direct practicable route, to the court of the county or district where the child is taken into custody... ." (Emphasis supplied.)
[*386] This was the result reached in In Re A.J.A., supra, on facts which are similar to those presently under review. In view of the explicit mandatory language of F.S. Section 39.03(3), F.S.A., we feel we must adopt the rationale of the In Re A.J.A. holding as expressed at 248 So.2d 690, at 692. Cf. Oliver v. State, 250 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1971); see generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).
Accordingly, the decision of the District Court is quashed and the cause remanded to the First District Court of Appeal with instructions to remand the same to the trial court for a new trial not inconsistent herewith.
CARLTON, C.J., and ERVIN, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
ROBERTS, ADKINS and DEKLE, JJ., dissent.