Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 514 N.E.2d 1095 (Mass. 1987). · Go Syfert
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Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 514 N.E.2d 1095 (Mass. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1988 · …as a matter of policy, it must be recognized that tort liability cannot be extended without limit. at p. 142 ✓
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1988 · …tort liability cannot be extended without limit. at p. 142 ✓
62 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jessica Vance And Justice Vance, Apps. v. Mehmet Solak, Res. (washctapp, 2017-10-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 21 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Jessica Vance And Justice Vance, Apps. v. Mehmet Solak, Res.
Wash. Ct. App. · 2017 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
that value of marriage would be subverted by our recognition of a right to recover for loss of consortium by a person who has not accepted the correlative responsibilities'of marriage.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Charron v. Amaral
Mass. · 2008 · confidence medium
Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142 (1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hayes v. Pediatric Health Care Associates, Inc.
Mass. Super. Ct. · 2008 · confidence medium
Elecs., 403 Mass. 437, 438 (1988), or a “de facto” spouse, Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142 (1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (2×)
Mass. · 2003 · confidence medium
See Collins v. Guggenheim, 417 Mass. 615, 618 (1994) (rejecting claim for equitable distribution of property where plaintiff cohabited with but did not marry defendant); Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142 (1987) (government interest in promoting marriage would be “subverted” by recognition of “a right to recover for loss of consortium by a person who has not accepted the correlative responsibilities of marriage”); Davis v. Misiono, 373 Mass. 261, 263 (1977) (unmarried partners not entitled to rights of separate support or alimony).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bobick v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
Mass. · 2003 · confidence medium
Elecs., 403 Mass. 437, 438 (1988) (stepson); Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142 (1987) (de facto spouse). 18 The loss of filial consortium statute, G.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martin v. C.R. Bard, Inc.
D.N.H. · 1999 · confidence medium
Husband and Wife § 117, at 412 (West 1991); Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 588 N.E.2d 66, 67 , 79 N.Y.2d 797, 798 (1991); Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 514 N.E.2d 1095, 1096 (Mass. 1987) ;2 Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165, 166-69 (Me. 1980); Schroeder v. Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., 712 F. Supp. 39, 40-43 (D.N.J. 1989) (collecting cases).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Henry Heywood Memorial Hospital
Mass. Super. Ct. · 1997 · confidence medium
Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142 (1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Armstrong v. Lamy
D. Mass. · 1996 · confidence medium
This argument is based upon Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141 , 514 N.E.2d 1095, 1096 (1987), which held that there can be no recovery from loss of consortium where, although the couple had lived together for twenty years, they were not married “at the time of the injury.” Feliciano established that a plaintiff must have been married in order to bring a loss of consortium claim; it did not establish the rules for determining when a loss of consortium accrues.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sullivan v. McCann
Mass. Super. Ct. · 1995 · confidence medium
However, the courts of our Commonwealth do not recognize the legal rights of those involved in a “common law marriage.” 6 See Collins v. Guggenheim, 417 Mass. 615, 617 (1994) (incidents of the marriage relationship do not attach to an arrangement of cohabitation without marriage); Fliciano v. Roseman Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142-43 (1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Richmond v. Shatford
Mass. Super. Ct. · 1995 · confidence medium
In Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142 (1987), the Supreme Judicial Court denied a long-term cohabitant’s loss of consortium claim.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reep v. Commissioner of the Department of Employment & Training (2×)
Mass. · 1992 · confidence medium
Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142 (1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reep v. COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPT. OF EMP. & TRAINING (2×)
Mass. · 1992 · confidence medium
Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142 (1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pinheiro v. MED. MALPRACTICE JOINT UNDERWRITING ASS'N
Mass. · 1989 · confidence medium
Electronics, 403 Mass. 437, 438 (1988); Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142 (1987); Olsen v. Bell Tel.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pinheiro v. Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n
Mass. · 1989 · confidence medium
Electronics, 403 Mass. 437, 438 (1988); Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142 (1987); Olsen v. Bell Tel.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Mendoza v. B.L.H. Electronics (4×)
Mass. · 1988 · confidence medium
This cautious approach flows from our recognition that “tort liability cannot be extended without limit.” Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142 (1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Norman v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (2×)
Mass. · 1988 · confidence medium
Our repeated commitment to use discerning caution was prompted by an awareness that, as a matter *305 of sound public policy, the law cannot and should not attempt to right all wrongs. "[A]s a matter of policy, it must be recognized that tort liability cannot be extended without limit." Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142 (1987).
cited Cited "see" Fitzsimmons v. Mini Coach of Boston, Inc.
Mass. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141 (1987) (no recovery for loss of consortium of cohabitee).
cited Cited "see" Fredette v. Simpson
Mass. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141 (1987).
cited Cited "see" Collins v. Guggenheim
Mass. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142-143 (1987).
discussed Cited "see" Burke v. Rivo (2×)
Mass. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142 (1987); Schofield v. Merrill, 386 Mass. 244, 246-251 (1982); W.L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ukau v. Wang
D. Guam · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Sprague v. Kaplan, 572 A.2d 789 , 11 789–91 (Pa. 1990); Doe v. Cherwitz, 518 N.W. 2d 362 , 364–65 (Iowa 1994); see also Feliciano v. 12 Rosemar Silver Co., 514 N.E.2d 1095, 1096 (Mass. 1987); Leonard v. John Crane, Inc., 206 Cal. App. 13 4th 1274, 1283 (Cal. App. 2012). 14 Because Sinuk and Ukau were married at the time of injury, Sinuk has a derivative claim for 15 loss of consortium.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Dolores Feliciano vs. Rosemar Silver Company
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Nov 12, 1987.
514 N.E.2d 1095
1987 Mass. LEXIS 1508
Orlando F. deAbreu for the plaintiff., D. Michael Arter for the defendant.
Hennessey, Wilkins, Abrams, Nolan, O'Connor.
Cited by 37 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 65%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Washington (1)
O’Connor, J.

Marcial Feliciano and the plaintiff Dolores Feliciano commenced an action in the Superior Court against Miguel Costa and Rosemar Silver Company (Rosemar) claiming that Marcial sustained personal injuries and the plaintiff sustained loss of consortium due to Costa’s wrongful conduct in the course of his employment by Rosemar. Rosemar moved for summary judgment on the loss of consortium claim. That motion was allowed, and the plaintiff appealed. We took the case on our own initiative. We now affirm the judgment.

According to the plaintiff’s deposition and affidavit submitted in connection with Rosemar’s summary judgment motion, Marcial and the plaintiff had lived together as husband and wife for approximately twenty years before Marcial’s injuries[*142] in 1981 “as a de facto married couple,” although they were not legally married until 1983. During those years, the plaintiff used Marcial’s surname, and the plaintiff and Marcial held themselves out as husband and wife, had joint savings accounts, filed joint tax returns, jointly owned their home, depended on each other for companionship, comfort, love and guidance, and maintained a sexual relationship to the exclusion of all others. The question on appeal is whether, in those circumstances, the plaintiff may recover for loss of consortium. We answer that question in the negative.

“Marriage is not merely a contract between the parties. It is the foundation of the family. It is a social institution of the highest importance. The Commonwealth has a deep interest that its integrity is not jeopardized.” French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 546 (1935). Our recognition of a right of recovery for the loss of a spouse’s consortium, see Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153 (1973), promotes that value. Conversely, that value would be subverted by our recognition of a right to recover for loss of consortium by a person who has not accepted the correlative responsibilities of marriage. This we are unwilling to do.

Furthermore, as a matter of policy, it must be recognized that tort liability cannot be extended without limit. Distinguishing between the marriage relationship and the myriad relationships that may exist between mere cohabitants serves the purpose of limiting protection to interests and values that are reasonably ascertainable. See Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra at 165. That cohabitants must have a “stable and significant” relationship to qualify for loss of consortium recovery, a standard relied on in the case of Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 70 (1983), is an unsatisfactorily vague and indefinite standard.

We are not aware that any State court of last resort has recognized a right of recovery for loss of consortium outside of marriage. The two Federal decisions cited by the plaintiff interpreting State law as allowing such recovery, Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1973)., and Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078[*143] (D.N.J. 1980), were subsequently repudiated in the relevant States. See Leonardis v. Morton Chem. Co., 184 N.J. Super. 10 (1982); Childers v. Shannon, 183 N.J. Super. 591 (1982); Rockwell v. Liston, 71 Pa. D. & C.2d 756 (1975).

Judgment affirmed.