loss of consortium claim in Massachusetts

1992The plaintiffs also contend that their construction of the statute is supported by the common law, and that their cause of action is the logical extension of the Supreme Judicial Court’s decisions in Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629-630 (1976) (abolishing the common law rule of interspousal immunity), and Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 606-610 (1981) (holding that a spouse’s loss of consortium claim is an independent claim and therefore should not be reduced by the degree of the injured spouse’s negligence).

1985A loss of consortium claim is said to be independent of the damage claim of the physically injured spouse or parent (Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 606 [1981]), but at the same time there is a “pervasive interrelationship.” Filder v. E.M.

2012Remaining Claims DeMoulas Super Markets, Inc. has also moved for summary judgment on the loss of consortium claim. “[A] claim for loss of consortium requires proof of a tortious act that caused the claimant’s spouse personal injury.” Sena v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 250, 264 (1994) (citations omitted).

1997LOSS OF CONSORTIUM A loss of consortium claim must be based on “proof of a tortious act that caused the claimant’s spouse [or parent or child] personal injury.” Sena v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 250, 264-65 (1994).

2003The decision of Morgan v. Lalumiere, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 270 (1986), in which the Appeals Court allowed a loss of consortium claim brought by a handicapped adult who was “physically, emotionally and financially” dependent on an injured parent, is inapposite.

2002See Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 607-08 (1986); Morgan v. Lalumiere, 22 Mass.App.Ct. 262, 271 (1986).

1990This court has ruled that a spouse's loss of consortium claim is an independent cause of action, Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, 381 Mass. 507, 543 (1980) (Wilkins, J., dissenting).

1990This court has ruled that a spouse’s loss of consortium claim is an independent cause of action, Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, 381 Mass. 507, 543 (1980) (Wilkins, J., dissenting).

1980In support of this analysis, the employer points to our "recognition" in Diaz of the derivative character of a wife's loss of consortium claim: "The consortium claim ... has been treated as so far derivative ... that contributory negligence of the spouse who suffered the physical injuries is held to bar the plaintiff's claim...." Diaz, supra at 157 n. 14.

1980In support of this analysis, the employer points to our “recognition” in Diaz of the derivative character of a wife’s loss of consortium claim: “ The consortium claim . . . has been treated as so far derivative . . . that contributory negligence of the spouse who suffered the physical injuries is held to bar the plaintiff’s claim . . . .” Diaz, supra at 157 n.14.

1990As the court pointed out in Fidler, supra at 547 , and points out again now, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided in Roy v. Jasper Corp., 666 F.2d 714, 716 (1st Cir.1981), that the New Hampshire Supreme Court would apply the bar of collateral estoppel to a woman's loss of consortium claim following an adverse determination of her husband's workers' compensation claim.

1990As the court pointed out in Fidler, supra at 547 , and points out again now, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided in Roy v. Jasper Corp., 666 F.2d 714, 716 (1st Cir. 1981), that the New Hampshire Supreme Court would apply the bar of collateral estoppel to a woman’s loss of consortium claim following an adverse determination of her husband’s workers’ compensation claim.

2002Tauriac v. Polaroid Corp., 716 F.Sup. 672, 673 (D.Mass. 1989); see Mouradian v. General Electric Co., 23 Mass.App.Ct. 538, 543-44 (1987) (consortium claim dismissed in employment discrimination case where spouse’s contract and tort claims did not survive); see also Forti v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995 WL 809498 , at 6 (Mass. Super. 1995) (consortium claim fails because spouse’s emotional distress claim did not survive summary judgment).

2002Tauriac v. Polaroid Corp., 716 F.Sup. 672, 673 (D.Mass. 1989); see Mouradian v. General Electric Co., 23 Mass.App.Ct. 538, 543-44 (1987) (consortium claim dismissed in employment discrimination case where spouse’s contract and tort claims did not survive); see also Forti v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995 WL 809498 , at 6 (Mass. Super. 1995) (consortium claim fails because spouse’s emotional distress claim did not survive summary judgment).

2020See, e.g., Robart, 19 Mass. L.

2003See Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141 (1987).

1998The Supreme Judicial Court held that the husband’s loss of consortium claim against the distributor of the chemical was barred by collateral estoppel, even though his claims were nominally “independent.” Id. at 541-42 . 3 “The policy of repose is especially significant when the spouse of a nonprevailing litigant seeks to litigate a claim relating to the spouse’s alleged injuries.” Id. at 547 .

1998The Supreme Judicial Court held that the husband’s loss of consortium claim against the distributor of the chemical was barred by collateral estoppel, even though his claims were nominally “independent.” Id. at 541-42 . 3 “The policy of repose is especially significant when the spouse of a nonprevailing litigant seeks to litigate a claim relating to the spouse’s alleged injuries.” Id. at 547 .

1993See also, Gill v. North Shore Radiological Assoc., Inc., 385 Mass. 180, 183 (1982) (original complaint properly amended three years after filing to include new party-plaintiff asserting a loss of consortium claim for the first time).

1992L. c. 152, § 24, in Russell v. Boston Wyman, Inc., 410 Mass. 1005, 1006 (1991). 14 In that case, a financially independent husband whose wife was injured at work sought to bring a loss of consortium claim, arguing, as the St.

1992The plaintiffs also contend that their construction of the statute is supported by the common law, and that their cause of action is the logical extension of the Supreme Judicial Court’s decisions in Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629-630 (1976) (abolishing the common law rule of interspousal immunity), and Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 606-610 (1981) (holding that a spouse’s loss of consortium claim is an independent claim and therefore should not be reduced by the degree of the injured spouse’s negligence).

1990As the court pointed out in Fidler, supra at 547 , and points out again now, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided in Roy v. Jasper Corp., 666 F.2d 714, 716 (1st Cir.1981), that the New Hampshire Supreme Court would apply the bar of collateral estoppel to a woman's loss of consortium claim following an adverse determination of her husband's workers' compensation claim.

1990As the court pointed out in Fidler, supra at 547 , and points out again now, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided in Roy v. Jasper Corp., 666 F.2d 714, 716 (1st Cir. 1981), that the New Hampshire Supreme Court would apply the bar of collateral estoppel to a woman’s loss of consortium claim following an adverse determination of her husband’s workers’ compensation claim.

1988Cf. Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 385 Mass. 323 Mass. 323, 334 (1982) (“A claim for damages based on emotional distress does not include an administrator’s claim for loss of consortium . . .”).

1981Although this view has been accepted by a number of courts (see Nelson v. Busby, 246 Ark. 247, 255 [1969]; White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 575 [1975]; see also Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389 [Alaska 1979]), we conclude that the plaintiff Anne Feltch’s requested instruction correctly states the law of Massachusetts and should have been granted.

1981Although this view has been accepted by a number of courts (see Nelson v. Busby, 246 Ark. 247, 255 [1969]; White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 575 [1975]; see also Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389 [Alaska 1979]), we conclude that the plaintiff Anne Feltch’s requested instruction correctly states the law of Massachusetts and should have been granted.

1981Although this view has been accepted by a number of courts (see Nelson v. Busby, 246 Ark. 247, 255 [1969]; White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 575 [1975]; see also Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389 [Alaska 1979]), we conclude that the plaintiff Anne Feltch’s requested instruction correctly states the law of Massachusetts and should have been granted.

1980The employer also cites Thibeault v. Poole, 283 Mass. 480, 486 (1933).

1980The employer also cites Thibeault v. Poole, 283 Mass. 480, 486 (1933).